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"Strategic Environmental Assessment and the Danish Energy 
Sector" is a doctoral thesis based on a Ph.D. project with the 
same title. The overall aim of the project has been to assist 
actors in the energy sector in developing a meaningful way of 
applying SEA at strategic level. Understanding of how strategic 
decisions are made is a prerequisite for achieving this target, and 
the thesis therefore explores the strategic decision-making 
processes of contemporary energy infrastructure developments. 
 
The highlights of this thesis are: 
‐ A combination of disciplines in a continuum of perspectives 
on strategic decision-making provides a strong framework for 
enhancing insight into how decisions are made. 
‐ Sense-making theory is a pertinent frame for increasing 
insight into how we create meaning of information, which is 
crucial for how we perceive strategic choices and determine 
relevant alternatives. 
‐ Empirical cases reveal how strategic decision-making in the 
sector is characterised by an extensive interaction between 
policy-making and planning in a highly dynamic context. 
‐ The outlined characteristics challenge the application of SEA 
especially in terms of timing and flexibility. SEA practice is 
still in its infancy in the Danish energy sector, but SEA is 
achieving increased attention in the sector. 
‐ The change agent research approach used in the project is 
relevant medium for a critical interdependence between 
theory and practice that at the same time promotes more 
sustainable decision-making. 
 
The research is based on interaction with a range of actors in the 
Danish energy sector, hereunder Energinet.dk and the Danish 
Energy Agency. It draws on contemporary cases of policy and 
planning decisions like the development of offshore wind power 
and natural gas infrastructures. Application of SEA on these cases 
is crucial for reducing the risk of unintended environmental 
impacts and for enhancing attention to relevant alternatives 
prior to decision-making. 
 
SEA and the D
anish energy sector: Exploring non-program
m
ed strategic decisions               Ivar Lyhne 
STRATEGIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT  
&  
THE DANISH 
ENERGY SECTOR 
EXPLORING  
NON-PROGRAMMED  
STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
 
 
Ivar Lyhne 
Doctoral thesis, 2011 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT 
AND PLANNING 
AALBORG UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT  
&  
THE DANISH ENERGY SECTOR 
 
EXPLORING NON-PROGRAMMED STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
 
 
 
Ivar Lyhne 
Doctoral thesis, 2011 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING 
AALBORG UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2011 by Ivar Lyhne 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise without the prior written permission by the author 
Printed by Uniprint, Aalborg University 
 
The publication: 
Title: SEA and the Danish Energy sector: Exploring non-programmed strategic decisions 
ISBN: 978-87-91404-14-6 
Number of pages: 292 (329 with appendixes) 
Front cover: Photo copyrights by Energinet.dk and Svend Lyhne 
 
The author: 
Ivar Lyhne, M.Sc. in Engineering (Planning and Environment with specialisation in Environmental 
Management)  
Member of the Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment  
Ph.D. fellow at the Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University 
 
The Ph.D. project: 
Project title: Strategisk miljøvurdering i energisektoren [Strategic environmental assessment in the 
energy sector] 
Project period: August 2008 - November 2011 
Ph.D. supervisor: Professor Lone Kørnøv 
Partner: Energinet.dk 
 iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The need for a meaningful way of applying SEA 3 
1.1 State of the art and contributions  10 
2. Research questions and structure 15 
FRAMEWORKS 
3. Research framework as change agent research 21 
3.1 Change agent in the field of SEA 22 
3.2 Approaches to practice and theory in this Ph.D. project 51 
4. Conceptual framework on strategic decision-making processes 63 
4.1 Combining theories of decision-making and sense-making 65 
4.2 Proposing a conceptual framework 86 
5. Methodological framework for the investigations 97 
5.1 Generic methodological considerations 99 
5.2 Methodology for the specific parts of the thesis 105 
UNRAVELLING 
6. Strategic decision-making as a series of choices 117 
6.1 SEA between policy-making and planning 118 
6.2 Strategic decision-making processes in Energinet.dk 141 
7. Strategic decision-making as contextual interaction 151 
7.1 Strategic developments and framing of alternatives in SEA 152 
8. Strategic decision-making as human choice  173 
8.1 Making sense of significance 175 
8.2. Choices and sense-making in an EA of a gas storage  206 
SPIN-OFFS 
9.   Scope of the legislation  227 
10. Discourses on the role of SEA  241 
SYNTHESIS 
11. Elements of a meaningful way of applying SEA 255 
12. Looking outwards and forward  264 
APPENDIXES 271 
REFERENCES 299 
 
 iv 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
AESOP: Association of European Schools of Planning 
ANSEA: Analytical Strategic Environmental Assessment 
CCS:  Carbon capture and storage 
DASEP:  Danish Agency of Spatial and Environmental Planning 
DEA:  Danish Energy Agency 
EA: Environmental assessment  
EIA:  Environmental impact assessment  
IAIA:  International Association for Impact Assessment 
NGSSP:  Natural Gas Security of Supply Plan 
SEA:  Strategic environmental assessment 
TSO:  Transmission system operator (on energy) 
 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Some of the terms used in this thesis are overlapping each other in the literature used. 
Therefore, they are defined as follows: 
 
Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
- SEA is "a systematic, decision aiding procedure for evaluating the likely significant 
environmental effects of options throughout the policy plan or programme development 
process, beginning at the earliest opportunity, including a written report and the 
involvement of the public throughout the process" (Sheate et al. 2001, p. 7). The concept of 
SEA used in this thesis is presented in details in appendix B. 
- EIA is also a systematic, decision aiding procedure for evaluating the likely significant 
environmental effects, however, in contrast to SEA, EIA is oriented towards individual 
projects and towards alternatives rather than options. 
 
Decision and choice 
- Decision has its origin in the Latin 'decidere' = to cut off (Merriam-Webster online). A 
decision is thus given importance and it is cutting off other options (see chapter 4) 
- Choice has its origin in the Old English 'cēosan' = to choose. A choice is here understood as 
less prominent and decisive. A decision can be constituted by a range of choices. 
 
Equivocality, ambiguity and uncertainty 
- Uncertainty is about lack of knowledge, e.g. "an individual's perceived inability to predict 
something accurately" (Milliken 1990, p. 136). Uncertainty is categorised in several types 
by Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) and Rotmans and van Asselt (2001). 
- Ambiguity is about unclear meaning: "Ambiguous situations are situations that cannot be 
coded precisely into mutually exhaustive and exclusive categories" (March 1994, p. 178). In 
contrast to uncertainty, ambiguity is a lack of a clear-cut meaning of the information. 
- Equivocality is the "richness and multiplicity of meaning that can be superimposed on a 
situation" (Weick 1989, p. 174) and compared to ambiguous situations, equivocality "is 
more about the confusion created by two or more meanings" (p. 174) 
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PREFACE 
 
A professor once told me that a Ph.D. project is a rare chance for going in depth into aspects 
of research; three years of immersion into aspects of interest is not easy to achieve in other 
ways. I have treasured this chance and indeed enjoyed being immersed in theories of human 
behaviour and being a change agent that investigates the mysterious strategic decision-
making in the energy sector in order to facilitate change.  
This thesis is an outcome of a three-year Ph.D. project on strategic environmental assessment 
and the energy sector. The research has been carried out at Aalborg University in 
collaboration with and co-financed by Energinet.dk. The project period has been convergent 
with a period of considerable strategic developments in the energy sector, which has made 
the project even more interesting: With immense investments in energy infrastructure, the 
need for consideration of environmental issues in strategic decision-making has never been 
greater.  
The thesis is a writing-up of thoughts and inputs gained throughout the three years of study. 
In its final appearance, it hides a myriad of compromises between ambitions and 
pragmatism, between simplicity and complexity, between interests and expectations, and 
between ideals and reality. It is primarily addressed to researchers and practitioners with 
interest in the relation between strategic environmental assessment and strategic decision-
making processes, especially within energy sectors. The content may, however, be relevant 
for people working with other tools as the issues of timing, perceiving, and changing touched 
upon in the thesis are relevant in any decision-aid context.  
The insight into strategic decision-making processes has been facilitated by openness and 
interest in the research from a range of persons in Energinet.dk and in the Danish Energy 
Agency. Especially Kim Behnke, Energinet.dk, has been a great inspiration and an 
inexhaustible source of insight.  
With a remarkable engagement and inspiration, Lone Kørnøv has supervised the project by 
competent contesting and suggesting on ideas, approach, and arguments. The project has 
indeed benefitted from her disputes of the 'religions' that I have constructed during the 
process. 
Thanks to all the persons that have been involved in this project. I am grateful for your input 
and I hope that the process has been as fruitful for you as it has for me. Thanks for helping 
me widen my horizon, for letting me into your worlds, and for teaching me to play jazz as a 
critical friend. 
A special thanks to my family for reminding me about the world outside the Ph.D. project 
and for your whole-hearted support during the process. 
 
Ivar Lyhne 
Hjedsbæk,  
November 2011 
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SUMMARY 
(A Danish summary is found in appendix A) 
 
This thesis explores non-programmed strategic decision-making processes in the Danish 
energy sector in order to discuss how to apply strategic environmental assessment (SEA) in a 
meaningful way. Contemporary decision-making processes on major energy infrastructures 
are scrutinised to identify when and how environmentally decisive choices are made in the 
interaction between multiple actors. These decisions often involve situations, which the 
involved actors have not experienced before. This non-programmed character constitutes a 
particular challenge for SEA application that is not described in existing SEA literature. 
In the current years, the Danish energy sector is undergoing comprehensive changes in 
politics, infrastructure, technologies, actor composition, and regulatory setup. In order to 
avoid unintended environmental effects or lost opportunities for environmental 
improvements in these comprehensive changes, environmental issues must be considered in 
the strategic decision-making process. 
The purpose of SEA is to integrate environmental considerations into the preparation and 
adoption of plans and programmes with a view to promoting sustainable development. The 
literature on SEA draws on theories about decision-making, however, so far there is limited 
knowledge about strategic, non-programmed decisions, and how this type of decision-
making, is challenging the application of SEA.  
Knowledge about how strategic decisions are made is fragmented in disciplines and models. 
The thesis approaches this fragmentation by exploring synergies in combining models of 
different levels of detail in a continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making. To 
enhance a limited insight into detailed socio-psychological processes within SEA, sense-
making theory is introduced and insights from sense-making and decision-making theory are 
combined to enhance the understanding of how we create meanings of information and how 
these meanings interact with our choices. In this respect, the thesis draws on writings by 
James G. March, Herbert A. Simon and Karl E. Weick. 
The continuum of perspectives is used as a framework for unravelling strategic decision-
making in the Danish energy sector. Recent cases of energy planning and projects are 
analysed and the thesis reveals how policy-making and planning interact and obscure 
questions of responsibility and timing of SEA; how strategic dynamics complicate the 
framing of alternatives in an SEA process of gas infrastructure planning; how practitioners' 
determination of significance of environmental impacts in a strategic choice on energy issues 
is characterised by ambiguities and diversity. These empirical findings are adding to the 
theoretical understanding of strategic, non-programmed decision-making. 
As spin-offs to the investigations into strategic decision-making processes, the thesis 
articulates the scope of the SEA legislation in terms of what plans and programmes in the 
energy sector SEA are - and may be - mandatory. Discussions of the scope and the role of 
SEA have been key issues in the process of making a stance on SEA in the two most 
important state organisations in the strategic development of the Danish energy sector, 
Energinet.dk and in the Danish Energy Agency. 
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The thesis is based on a change agent research approach and this way of doing research is 
investigated and discussed in terms of its relevance and potentials in an SEA context. Based 
on three empirical cases, the change agent approach is considered a rewarding but 
demanding approach. In line with the change agent approach, the thesis reflects a threefold 
ambition of the Ph.D. project: 
- To facilitate development of SEA practice through interaction and involvement of actors in 
investigations 
- To communicate experiences to other Danish and international actors 
- To contest assumptions in the SEA literature and propose developments to how strategic 
decision-making processes are understood. 
In conclusion, the thesis outlines elements of how SEA can be applied in a meaningful way in 
the strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector. It furthermore presents 
an outline of the meaningfulness of the combination of the change agent research approach 
and the conceptual combination of theories of decision-making and sense-making in 
achieving insight in strategic decision-making processes. The main conclusions are: 
- A combination of disciplines in a continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making 
provides a strong framework for enhancing insight into how decisions are made 
- Sense-making theory is a pertinent frame for increasing insight into how we create 
meaning of information, which is crucial for how we perceive strategic choices and 
determine relevant alternatives. 
- The change agent research approach used in the project is relevant medium for a critical 
interdependence between theory and practice that at the same time promotes more 
sustainable decision-making. 
- Empirical cases reveal how strategic decision-making in the sector is characterised by an 
extensive interaction between policy-making and planning in a highly dynamic context. 
- The outlined characteristics challenge the application of SEA especially in terms of timing 
and flexibility. Orienting SEA towards formal plans is not adequate. Instead, an approach 
of targeting pivotal decisions on specific infrastructures may be relevant, although this 
approach is not without drawbacks 
- Compromises with public involvement at strategic level may be meaningful in 
competitive environments between TSOs. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL WAY 
 OF APPLYING SEA 
 
"The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, to 
the decider himself […] There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the 
decisionmaking process mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved" 
(John F Kennedy 1963) 
 
There is indisputably a great physical and contextual difference between the White House 
decision-making and the strategic decision-making in the Danish energy sector. Nonetheless, 
Kennedy's portrayal of decision-making catches - in an excellent way - the mystique around 
the strategic development in the energy sector. This mystique has been portrayed as decades 
of fierce power struggles and dramas (Trong and Limann 2009) and it has given rise to a 
range of conspiracies (e.g. Springborg 2011). An EU directive on environmental assessment of 
plans and programmes from 2001 has put pressure on this mystery, since a prerequisite for 
fulfilling the directive's target of integrating environmental considerations into strategic 
decision-making is to understand and make at least some of these dark and tangled stretches 
transparent. And this quest is the point of departure for this thesis. 
In order to improve the influence of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) on decision-
making, theories of decision-making have been considered for decades within SEA literature. 
The development in the use of these theories in SEA literature has similarities with the 
development in the decision-making discipline itself: In the early years, rational models were 
dominating and from experienced inadequacies with this model, a range of alternative 
theories have been suggested, so that the field now can be characterised as a patchwork of 
theories of decision-making. Every theory of decision-making has it advantages and 
disadvantages and one of the main arguments of this thesis is that to increase an 
understanding of decision-making processes, synergies in the width of the patchwork must 
be utilised. Decision-making theories should thus not be seen as separate and incompatible 
theories, but as complementary and potentially synergistic. The thesis explores synergies of a 
combination of perspectives with different level of detail. It proposes a continuum that 
ranges from process models providing an overview of decision-making in one end, to models 
providing insight into the details of social-psychological processes in human choices in the 
other end. The continuum seeks to combine two theoretical branches, which have had a 
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crucial role in our understanding of decision-making processes: James G March and Herbert 
A Simon's writings on decision-making in organisations (e.g. March and Simon's 
"Organizations" from 1958) and Karl E Weick's writings on sense-making (especially Weick's 
"Sense-making in Organizations" from 1995). Each of these theoretical branches provides 
genuine insight into important aspects of decision-making, and both of them, it is argued, are 
needed to understand strategic decision-making processes and the relations between SEA 
and strategic decision-making. 
The Danish energy sector has during the previous decade undergone comprehensive changes 
in regulation, technologies, actor composition, and in politics. The current developments do 
not seem to be minor to the previous development, since foci on climate change, renewable 
energy, 'prosumers', intelligent control, economic recovery, and security of supply create a 
dynamic in the entire sector. Due to the magnitude of the developments, integration of 
environmental considerations into the strategic development of the sector is crucial. As this 
thesis will reveal, environmental aspects are unsystematically considered at the strategic 
level, and the practice of applying SEA to strategic decision-making is only slowly evolving; 
the present developments are to a large extent made without an integrated and systematic 
consideration of environmental impacts and in the worst case, the environmental 
consequences of the strategic decisions may be far more comprehensive than what the actors 
suppose.  
When SEA was introduced, the energy sector was regarded an important sector (Jay 2010), 
and the energy sector is explicitly mentioned in the European Directive on SEA as one of the 
sectors within which environmental assessments is required for certain plans and 
programmes. However, the investigations in this thesis indicate that the Directive is not 
designed in a way that meets the characteristics of the Danish energy sector, and the energy 
sector seems reluctant to adapt its strategic decision-making processes to the Directive. To 
find ways forward in this 'conflict', this Ph.D. project has played a role in creating the 
dynamics needed to foster a practice of SEA. 
This thesis unravels the scarcely described ways in which a range of stakeholders, interests 
and actions form strategic developments in the Danish energy sector. Central in this 
exploration is when and how environmental issues are considered and what role SEA may 
and do play. This unravelling of the strategic decision-making processes constitutes an 
important input in the discussions of how SEA can be meaningfully applied. It reveals 
interesting insights into how policy-making and planning interact and obscure questions of 
responsibility, tiering of assessments, and timing of SEA; into how strategic dynamics 
complicates SEA application, especially in the framing of alternatives in an SEA process; and 
into the ambiguities and diversity in how practitioners determine significance of 
environmental impacts of a strategic choice on energy issues.  
Introduction 
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The thesis reflects a threefold ambition in the Ph.D. project:  
- To empower the energy sector to develop a practice on SEA through participation and 
involvement of actors in investigations 
- To communicate experiences on SEA practice to other Danish and international actors 
- To contest assumptions in the SEA literature and propose developments to how the 
relation between SEA and strategic decision-making processes can be understood. 
These ambitions are reflected in empirical investigations of practice in the energy sector and 
in theoretical studies of decision-making theory. As spin-offs to the investigations on strategic 
decision-making processes, the thesis investigates the scope of the SEA legislation in terms of 
decisions in the energy sector and discourses on the role of SEA among key actors in the 
sector. These two topics have been key issues in the considerations on how to apply SEA in 
Energinet.dk and in the Danish Energy Agency. Furthermore, the thesis discusses ways of 
doing research by exploring the change agent approach. 
 
THE DANISH ENERGY SECTOR  
The strategic decisions studied in this Ph.D. project concerns major infrastructure such as a 
gas connection between Norway and Denmark with an estimated cost of NOK 10 billion 
(Gassco 2010) and a decision of cabling the Danish high voltage grid with an estimated cost of 
at least DKK 17 billion (Energinet.dk 2009h). The European Commission (2010a) suggests 
expanding the energy infrastructure using a vast amount of money: "Over the next ten years, 
energy investments in the order of € 1 trillion are needed" (p. 2). Such investment decisions 
are complex as regulation and sectors are interrelated; an example is described by Wittrup 
(2011, translated): "[E]ach wind power plant that we build help energy companies in Europe 
to live up to their CO2 reduction targets, which causes even lower prices on CO2-quotas - and 
thus better possibilities for using cheap coal […] Apparently simple energy policy initiatives 
may result in complete different consequence than what was intended - maybe even the 
opposite". 
The Danish energy sector is of global interest due to the high percentage of wind power and 
the experiences of handling fluctuating energy. Utilisation of batteries in electrical vehicles 
and Smart Grid are a few of the current initiatives to facilitate an increase in renewable 
energy and the Danish system is considered a test laboratory for a range of international 
actors (Wittrup 2010). Besides the domestic initiatives to facilitate renewable energy is 
development of international energy infrastructure. International infrastructure is a priority 
at a European level, and Denmark plays a special role due to its geography as a spatial link 
between Scandinavia and mid-Europe. 
Despite a high percentage of renewable energy, the energy sector is responsible for a 
considerable amount of environmental impacts. As an example, the production of energy 
accounts for almost 40 % of the total Danish SO2 emissions and around 26 % of NOx 
emissions in 2007 (NERI 2011). Added to these emissions are a range of debated 
environmental issues like visual impacts of infrastructure, uptake of land for biomass, and 
resource consumption. 
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So how are strategic decisions made in the Danish energy sector? At a first glance, strategic 
decisions seem to be made in a straightforward hierarchical system of EU programmes, 
governmental energy strategies, political agreements on energy policies, ministerial 
regulations, and formal infrastructure plans in Energinet.dk. A second glance, however, 
reveals a complex picture of opaque decision-making processes, where decisions seem to be 
made in windows of opportunity that are motivated by many other things than the formal 
objectives of increasing security of supply or lowering customer prices. Strategic decisions 
often seem to deal with novel situations, new technology, or a new actor composition. 
Therefore, they seem to involve elements of non-programmed decisions, as characterised by 
Simon (1960, p. 6): "Decisions are non-programmed to the extent that they are novel, 
unstructured, and consequential" and "[t]here is no cut-and-dried method of handling the 
problem because it hasn't arisen before, or because its precise nature and structure are elusive 
or complex, or because it is so important that it deserves a custom-tailored treatment". In a 
similar vein, Shrivastava (1985) describes decision-making at strategic level as "ambiguous 
and uncertain situations" (p. 97). Furthermore, the strategic decisions in the Danish energy 
sector often seem to take place outside formal decision systems, which are important in terms 
of integration of SEA. Strategic decisions with these characteristics include 'something else' 
than the formal, predictable and programmed decisions, which much SEA literature and 
guidance has been based upon. This 'something else' is a central interest in this thesis. 
These non-programmed and non-prescribed strategic decisions must be related to the Danish 
legislation on environmental assessment. At policy-level, national laws and government 
proposals are subject to Circular no. 159 of September 16, 1998 (first circular in 1993) 
requiring an assessment of environmental consequences. At planning level, certain types of 
plans and programmes are subject to act no. 936 of September 24, 2009 (first act in 2004), 
requiring SEA. Practice is, however, disappointing seen from an SEA perspective: At national 
policy-making level, only the Government’s energy action plan "Energi 21" from 1996 has 
been subject to a thorough environmental assessment, although a range of consequential 
decisions have been made at this level since the commencement of the circular. At the 
national planning level, the only two SEAs made concerned the Offshore Wind Action Plan in 
2008 and the "Gas in Denmark" 2010 security of supply plan. Presently, we witness a growing 
SEA practice with a current SEA of test sites for windmills, an SEA of locations for inshore 
windmill parks as well as an SEA of oil and gas exploration in an unexploited area in the 
Nord Sea being undertaken. Still, a range of strategic decisions on this level is avoiding SEA 
attention as outlined in chapter 9. The limited application of the formal SEA process may 
among other things be due to the opaqueness of strategic decision-making in the sector and 
due to decisions being made outside the formal decision-making arenas. As this thesis will 
argue, bilateral cooperation and the dynamics of the sector challenge the flexibility of SEA 
and the orientation towards formal plans. In describing these challenges, a manager in 
Energinet.dk points at the mismatch between the expectation of a hierarchical decision-
making process in which to apply SEA and the decision-making practice centred on specific 
connections: 
 
"The world is just not put together in the way, that we have the entire range of options 
and then narrow it, when we are about to plan a connection - like we would prefer. It 
happens in a totally different way." (Vinther 2011, translated) 
Introduction 
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Another manager in Energinet.dk emphasises the inertia of strategic decision-making 
processes in the context of bilateral cooperation: 
 
"It is like we are seated in a high-speed train and through the window we see a sign 
saying 'SEA process', but it is too late to press the stop button" (A manager in 
Energinet.dk 2009, translated) 
 
The problems of applying SEA and the slow start of SEA application in the energy sector 
seems, however, not unique for Denmark. Besides a considerable amount of SEAs of offshore 
energy in Great Britain, all the researchers and practitioners from energy sectors around the 
world that I have approached are in a depressing tone reporting a deficient or only slowly 
evolving practice on SEA. In a review of practice in a wide range of countries throughout the 
world, Jay (2010) reports that "the experience of officially sanctioned energy-related SEAs 
remains relatively scant, suggesting that authorised practice remains slow to develop" (p. 
3494). He further argues that SEA "has received relatively little attention" (p. 3489) in the 
energy sector compared to other tools developed to improve environmental protection. This, 
he argues, seems to be changing, since "a number of operators of large-scale electricity grid 
systems have started to carry out SEA for their development plans" (p. 3491) accompanied by 
a "… steadily growing interest in SEA as a tool for incorporating environmental 
considerations more effectively into the development of energy systems." (p. 3494) 
With limited international experiences on SEA in energy sector strategic decision-making and 
other international experiences on SEA tied to widely different organisational and legislative 
setups, the Danish energy sector needs to a large extent to look inwards to find a meaningful 
way of applying SEA at a strategic level. If strategic decision-making processes are not 
understood, actors risk applying SEA on plans that formalise rather than constitute strategic 
decisions and the actual decisions will in this way not be based on the systematic and 
participatory environmental considerations provided by the SEA process. 
 
THE STORY OF THE PH.D. PROJECT AND MAIN RESEARCH AREAS OF THIS THESIS 
This Ph.D. project is motivated by a common interest between Energinet.dk and Aalborg 
University in finding a meaningful way of applying SEA in the strategic decision-making 
processes in the Danish energy sector. Meaningful is used in this respect to emphasise that 
the intension is to go beyond legislative requirements to a societal cost-effective level: From 
the beginning, the project was oriented towards clarifying how to time SEA application so 
that decision-makers have the opportunity to use the input from the SEA process as basis for 
their decisions and to use SEA in a way that the society benefits from. Meaningful is thus 
defined by the project partners, but has similarities with the intensions of SEA application in 
other research and practices. The societal cost-effective orientation has its point of departure 
in the direct linkage between Energinet.dk's administrative costs and the levies on energy. 
The use of 'meaningful' also reflects a normative stance among the partners of the Ph.D. 
project in line with the sustainable development notions (The World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987) and an acknowledgement of a need to change practice 
towards better consideration of environmental aspects. The basic idea of the EU Directive on 
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SEA is to change practice "with a view to promoting sustainable development" (article 1) and 
a normative stance is therefore inherent in all SEA initiatives, see also appendix B. 
Faced with a need to unravel strategic decision-making processes in order to develop a 
meaningful way of applying SEA, the Ph.D. project has from its beginning been oriented 
towards participation in practice. The expectation was that a participative approach would 
give insight into how strategic decision-making processes unfold, as well as insights into the 
meaning central actors make of SEA and its legislation. This understanding is in line with a 
generally accepted notion that SEA practitioners need to learn how decision-making 
processes evolve. In the field of evaluation, Weiss (1988, p. 6) state that: "A number of writers 
have been urging evaluators to understand the decision-making systems in organizations and 
the policymaking system in government if we want our evaluations to have any influence" 
(Weiss 1988, p. 6). Nitz and Brown make a similar point in the field of SEA by arguing that "a 
precondition to SEA exploiting any of its potential to provide policy makers with information 
regarding the environmental consequences of their decisions, and consequently influencing 
those decisions towards more sustainable outcomes, requires SEA to learn how the policy 
making process works" (Nits and Brown 2001, p. 331).  
With the comprehensive changes in the Danish energy sector, this thesis focuses on 
developing an understanding of how the decision-making process works in terms of 
decisions with non-programmed elements. The strategic decisions studied in this thesis are 
defined as: 
 
Non-programmed, formal as well as informal decisions at a strategic level that are 
potentially decisive for subsequent decisions on environmental aspects 
 
In order to ease the communication, this definition is referred to by the notion of 'strategic 
decisions'. As an example of such a novel situation is the contemporary decision-making on 
intelligent control of the energy system, in which new actors, new technology and new 
regulation are involved. The design of the intelligent control is - at least indirectly - 
environmentally decisive, however, there are limited experiences upon which an SEA can be 
conducted.  
The ways of doing participative research in order to achieve insight in decision-making 
processes and facilitate a change in practice are another main focus area in this thesis. 
Combining a change orientation with research is, however, not unproblematic and a range of 
issues about pragmatism, validity, and ethics - just to mention a few - have to be considered 
by the change agent researcher. The thesis shows that if such issues are coped with, this 
participative and change oriented way of doing research is indeed rewarding for the involved 
actors. 
For me as an upcoming Ph.D. fellow, the prospect of engaging with actors within the energy 
sector as an open-minded and autonomous researcher seemed an ideal situation for critically 
investigating the potential of the SEA tool in practice, and for exploring environmental 
considerations in the black box of strategic decision-making in the energy sector. 
Energinet.dk's interest in SEA seemed to be a window of opportunity for improving practice 
that simply was too appealing and promising to decline. Furthermore, the chance to work 
with non-programmed and unstructured decision-making processes seemed to be an 
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interesting opportunity to investigate the implications of these processes for SEA in theory 
and practice.  
The focus on theories of decision-making in this project has evolved from a growing personal 
frustration with a widely unconstructive critique of the rational behaviour theory, which the 
environmental assessment tools were developed upon; a range of articles criticise this point 
of departure without empirically testing practical solutions for how to bring the SEA tool 
further. The frustration has led my focus to Karl E Weick's theory of how we make sense of 
events as a theory that may help shed light on some of the aspects of strategic decision-
making, which are not deeply understood in the SEA literature. Weick's writings seemed for 
example an obvious heuristic for investigating how actors create meaning of impacts and of 
questions like whether developments are SEA obligatory and what alternatives to work with. 
Sense-making theory should, however, not be yet another isolated perspective on decision-
making in the literature, but integrated with the dominating discourses of decision-making in 
the field. The thesis therefore involves a theoretical focus on these two disciplines concerned 
with human choices and a conceptual framework that makes use of insights from both 
disciplines. With a unified conceptual framework, the hope is to avoid inconsistencies and 
enhance synergies between the disciplines. Sense-making has previously been related to 
energy planning by Greitzer et al. (2008) who argue that with "increasing complexity and 
interconnectivity of the electric power grid, the scope and complexity of grid operations 
continues to grow" and that sensemaking "deserves further consideration by designers of 
decision support systems for power grid operations" (p. 1). Sense-making theory is here used 
due to its insight into how we make sense of complex issues and equivocal stimuli. The 
relevance of sense-making for energy planning argued by Greitzer et al. only increases the 
relevance of sense-making theory in this thesis. 
The focus on how we create meaning was also motivated by an interest in how SEA 
influences decision-makers. Using Shrivastava's (1985) distinction on the role of strategic 
knowledge as either instrumental or enlightening (p. 97), SEA literature seemed widely to 
focus on the instrumental role of providing a basis for decision-making. The use of sense-
making theory may help putting focus on the enlightening role in which "strategic 
knowledge is often subjective, soft, diffused, vague, nonspecific, and unquantified" (p. 97). In 
this respect, information is used to develop "a context of knowledge and meaning for 
unknown possible actions and for talking about experience" (March 1987, p. 163). Sense-
making theory may help focusing on how strategic knowledge are conceptualising 
vocabulary and influencing problem formulation by "predisposing decision makers toward 
certain selective views of the problem" (p. 97). Furthermore, the focus on equivocality and 
how humans organize reality seemed a promising counterbalance to widespread portrays of 
simple and predictable decision-making processes in the SEA literature. Sense-making 
provided not only an opportunity for exploring SEA in practice, but also an opportunity for 
discussing how our understandings of SEA are constructed through interactive sense-making 
processes. 
The state of the art of these research areas are outlined in the following as a point of 
departure for presenting the research questions and the structure of the thesis. 
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1.1 STATE OF THE ART AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chapter presents a brief review of the state of the art of the research on the three overall 
research areas of this thesis: The relation between SEA and strategic decision-making 
processes in energy sectors; the relations between theories of decision-making and sense-
making; change agent research as a way of doing research within the field of SEA. The 
specific chapters in the thesis are expanding the review when relevant. The review of the 
state of the art is a point of departure for showing how the investigations in this thesis 
contribute to the existing research and for formulating research questions. The state of the art 
reviews are based on a search in journals that publicise environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and SEA research and searches within journals within the decision-making and action 
research disciplines. The journals within these disciplines are supplemented by a snow-
balling method of searching journals which interesting articles refer to. 
Only contributions to research are outlined in the following although the practical and 
'academic' contributions of this thesis are highly interlinked and mutually supportive. The 
practical contributions to practice in the energy sector have mainly been clarification of 
process elements of strategic decision-making and input to the interpretation of SEA 
regulation in terms of energy sector characteristics. Other practical contributions are 
awareness raising and advice on when and how to consider environmental aspects in 
concrete strategic decision-making processes.  
 
SEA AND STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
The energy sector oriented research on SEA of strategic decision-making processes is limited, 
which may partly be due to a limited practice on SEA in the energy sectors as pointed at by 
Jay above. Elements of research can be found within review reports on specific countries (Jay 
2010; Sheate et al. 2004) and within a few rather academic exercises on the potentials of SEA 
in the sector (e.g., Noble and Storey 2001; Nilsson 2005) of which two have been oriented to 
the potential of SEA in the private sector (Jay and Marshall 2005; Jay 2007). This group of 
research points at status and boundary conditions for SEA in the energy sector, but research 
into the possibilities of applying SEA in a meaningful way given the characteristics of 
strategic decision-making in energy sectors are negligible.  
Looking beyond the energy sector, theories of decision-making has gained increased 
importance and attention within environmental assessment literature. The relation between 
the concept of SEA and decision theory is explored by among others Kørnøv and Thissen 
(2000), by Nitz and Brown (2001) in terms of policy-making, by Cherp et al. (2007) in terms of 
strategy formation, and by Elling (2008) in terms of rationalities. Specific approaches have 
been developed based on theories of decision-making with the analytical SEA (ANSEA) 
approach (Caratti et al. 2004) and the strategy-based SEA guidance in Portugal (Partidário 
2007) as prominent examples. The ANSEA project uses theories of decision-making to 
introduce the concept of "decisive moments" into the SEA literature. Decisive moments are in 
an SEA perspective defined as moments "that have a significant influence on the 
environmental impacts of the policy, programme or plan that is under decision" (Dalkmann 
et al. 2004, p. 387). The focus on decisive moments is a reaction to the insufficiency of solely 
focusing on the formal planning systems and therefore interesting in terms of the strategic 
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decisions studied in this thesis. Despite being mentioned in a range of publications, the 
concept of decisive moments or "decision-windows" is rarely empirically investigated in an 
SEA context - with Pischke and Cashmore (2006) as a notable exemption. 
When it comes to the field of SEA, there is a stunningly low amount of research into sense-
making and socio-psychological processes of strategic decision-making. The few and 
fragmented studies related to such processes deal with issues of frames, discourses, 
interpretation and communication. Runhaar (2009) focuses on frames and meaning as 
explanation of how SEA contributes to decision-making. Vicente and Partidário (2006) 
discuss perception and interpretation in SEA processes in a communication perspective. 
Wibeck (2009) explores communication of uncertainty between policy-makers and civil 
servants in assessing environmental progress and concludes that "the present and earlier 
studies have highlighted a need for further research into the recontextualization processes 
taking place when uncertainties are taken out of their original (scientific) contexts and put 
into new contexts, for example, policy making or public debate. […] The sense-making 
processes occurring as actors in the policy and practitioner arenas interpret expert messages 
thus need further study." (p. 99). Without referring to Weick, Stoeglehner et al. (2009) stage 
the planner as a "sense-maker" (p. 114) in SEA implementation. In a broader look on journals 
that publish environmental assessment studies, Weick has been mentioned in a few 
publications: Within planning and management of the environment, Aarts et al. (2007) use 
sense-making to explain inter-human processes in innovation networks. Hertin et al. (2008) 
include sense-making among the cognitive approaches that form the "intellectual basis of soft 
[regulation] instruments" (p. 261).  
In terms of insight into details in the socio-psychological processes of human choices in SEA 
processes, much can be learned from research and findings within a range of related fields. 
Organisation and management studies have, as an example, a long tradition of research into 
these processes, e.g. into how managers generate sense (Rouleau 2005; Starbuck and Milliken 
1988). Within the sense-making literature itself, the amount of empirical research into how we 
make sense is modest and empirical research is regarded an important way of developing the 
field (Weick et al. 2005). Helms Mills et al. (2010) state that "there is still a lack of empirical 
studies that draw specifically upon Weick's framework as a method of analysis." (p. 192). 
In the light of the outlined state of the art, the contributions of this thesis are: 
- Increasing knowledge about how to apply SEA in a meaningful way in strategic decision-
making processes in the energy sector by exploring the Danish case. 
- Supplement to the limited empirical exploration of 'decisive moments' in SEA literature. 
- Increasing insight into socio-psychological processes of how we in practice make sense 
and make choices in SEA process and strategic decision-making. 
 
COMBINATIONS OF DECISION-MAKING AND SENSE-MAKING THEORY 
The effort of embracing theories of decision-making and sense-making in a single conceptual 
framework is treated in a handful of studies. Most remarkably, Choo (2006) proposes a bridge 
between the two disciplines in his book "The Knowing Organisation" in which he 
conceptualises sense-making as processes that precede decision-making. Ericson (2010) 
proposes a sensed decision-making approach focusing on emotion-related interpretative 
 
 12 
processes. Seligman (2006) studies sense-making within an innovation-decision process. 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) combine sense-making with other models of naturalistic decision-
making in a heuristic for coping with uncertainty. The existing efforts of combining decision-
making and sense-making widely leave the impression that sense-making is about making 
sense of signals prior to decision-making. None of the efforts describes sense-making and 
decision-making as complementary and concurrent processes in spite of the common 
elements of the disciplines; Choo (2002) regards the disciplines "complementary ways of 
understanding information seeking and use in organizations" (p. 8) and concludes: "Any 
attempt to study the use of information in organizations would benefit from applying the two 
points of view" (p. 8). 
The similarities between the two disciplines are obvious although only cursory explored. 
March and Weick were both pioneers in "a new style of theorizing that provided 
amendments to the rational model by focusing on social actors in open systems" (Colville et 
al. 1999, p. 136). March (1994) often refers to interpretation: "Each vision [of decision making] 
assumes that decision makers interpret their situations and their experiences, that they make 
sense of them in order to make decisions" (p. 207) and "Interpretation is treated as central, 
sense making as a basic need" (pp. 207-208). Likewise, Weick draws on March and other 
decision-making researchers in his description of the processes of sense-making, for example 
Simon on management behaviour (Weick 1995, p. 70). 
In terms of the research on how to relate the theories of decision-making and sense-making, 
the contributions of this thesis are: 
- An increased understanding of the similarities and complementarities of the two 
disciplines 
- A conceptual framework that portrays the human choice as concurrent processes of 
decision-making and sense-making 
 
CHANGE AGENT RESEARCH WITHIN SEA 
Research in which the researcher collaborates with communities or people under study is 
described in many streams of collaborative research: Participatory action research (Whyte 
1991), action Science (Argyris and Schön 1974), Co-operative Inquiry (Bradbury and Reason 
2006), and others. One of the streams that emphasises on an active role of the researcher in 
contributing to change is the action research as described by Aagaard Nielsen and Svensson 
(2006). They define action research as "Action research is […] a perspective on how to 
conduct research. However, there must, of course, be an action component, that is, the 
research should support a normative change in one way or another (in problem solving, 
developmental work, restructuring, etc.) while, at the same time, producing new knowledge" 
(p. 13, original emphasis). Despite different nuances and backgrounds among the traditions, 
the term 'change agent research' is this thesis used as a common concept for participatory, 
critical research aimed at creating change. 
Collaborative research is undoubtedly widespread within the field of SEA as many 
researchers also are practitioners and use the practice as part of their research, e.g. Valve 
(1999). Furthermore, a normative stance is inherent in much research on SEA, e.g. that 
environmental consideration ought to be part of decision-making, the public must be 
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involved, and SEA should lead to changes in practice (e.g. Ren and Shang 2005, Hilding-
Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir 2007).  
The researchers within the field are, however, generally not articulating their reflections and 
concerns about collaboration and change orientation in their articles. This lack of articulation 
hampers the theoretical and practical development on how to collaborate within research and 
practice in the field of SEA. The few articles that have an explicit reference to action research 
or the mentioned related approaches concerns public involvement, e.g. Sully and Pope (2010), 
indigenous people (Stevenson 1996), and planning processes (McCarthy et al. 2010). The 
studies argue for the relevance of action research to facilitate organisational learning and 
capacity-building, to ensure that aboriginal communities control the local research agenda, 
and to explore the relations between SEA and related planning processes. The authors are, 
however, not explicit about the potentials and challenges on action research.  
Change agent research and research into how decisions are made have an important common 
interest in human behaviour. Therefore, a range of research bridges these two fields: 
Stensaker et al. (2008) emphasise the relation between sense-making and change in showing 
the importance of change agents' sense-making activities in implementation efforts. Allard-
Poesi (2005, p. 171) underlines that action research makes it possible for researchers to "fully 
engage in sensemaking with organization members and recognize the socially constructed 
aspect of all sensemaking activities". Action research has furthermore been the basis for 
sense-making methodologies like 'The Cynefin Framework' (Kurtz and Snowden 2003) and 
'Action Sensemaking' (Dymek 2008). Besides Allard-Poesi's theoretical considerations on the 
implications of sense-making theory for change-oriented research, the potential inspiration 
from sense-making literature to change agent research seems unexplored. 
In the light of the state of the art on change agent research within the field of SEA, the 
contributions of this thesis are: 
- Knowledge about the implications and potentials of change agent research within the field 
of SEA. 
- Articulation of potential inspiration to change agent research from insights of sense-
making literature.  
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CHAPTER 2:  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE 
 
 
The threefold ambition of the Ph.D. project, the problems outlined above and the state of the 
art of the main areas of research are in the following leading to research questions that are 
structuring the thesis. 
The overall research question is: 
What do a combination of a change agent research approach and a conceptual 
combination of decision-making and sense-making provide of insight into how 
SEA can be meaningfully applied in the strategic decision-making processes in 
the Danish energy sector? 
This overall research question is guided by sub-questions within the three research areas 
outlined, which all are important elements of answering the overall research question: The 
way of doing this research, the conceptual basis for this research, and the empirical 
investigations. The state of the art on change agent research showed limited discussion of this 
approach in the field of SEA and limited articulation of the implications and potentials of 
how researchers collaborate with practice in order to facilitate a change. The sub-question of 
this area of research is: 
i. What does acting as a change agent within the field of SEA involve and what 
potentials and relevance does it have for research and practice? 
The state of the art on research that combines theories of decision-making and sense-making 
indicated a limited understanding of these two views on human choice as concurrent 
processes. The intension of combining decision-making and sense-making theories in a model 
of human choice is to increase understanding of strategic decision-making and SEA 
processes. The model is to be an element in the conceptual framework on strategic decision-
making processes that is constituted by a continuum of perspectives at different levels of 
detail. The sub-question for this area of research is: 
ii. How can decision-making and sense-making be combined as concurrent 
processes in a model of human choice and how can this model contribute to a 
continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making processes? 
The state of the art on research within SEA of strategic decision-making in energy sectors 
showed limited insight into how to apply SEA in a meaningful way, hereunder a limited 
understanding of how strategic decisions are made and to what extent environment is 
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included. This limited knowledge highlights the need to investigate the characteristics of 
strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector. Thus, the sub-questions for 
this area of research are: 
iii. When in the development of Danish energy infrastructure are strategic 
decisions made that are potentially decisive for environmental aspects and how 
are these choices made? 
iv. How should SEA be applied in order to approach the characteristics of 
strategic decision-making in the energy sector? 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This Ph.D. thesis is written as a hybrid between a monograph and a collection of papers. The 
idea has been to write in a format of stories that have a content and format that is equal to 
papers. In this way, the thesis would provide a range of stories that potentially could become 
journal articles and at the same time constitutes a coherent report. The journal articles are 
therefore not separated but integrated in the thesis. 
Framed by introductory and concluding chapters, these papers are divided into three parts 
reflecting the sub-questions. An overview of research questions and the basis for answering 
these within these three parts are visualised in figure 1. Part A is the outset of the 
investigations that is developing and explaining the research approach, the conceptual 
framework and the combination of methods. The sub-question about the potentials and 
implication of change agent research in the field of SEA is answered through a published 
empirical investigation conducted in cooperation with colleagues at AAU and a critical 
reflection on experiences in this Ph.D. project. The sub-question of how decision-making and 
sense-making can be combined as concurrent processes in a continuum is answered through 
a theoretical analysis and synthesis of the two fields. 
Part B is the empirical investigations of the energy sector with different levels of perspective 
on the strategic decision-making processes following the conceptual framework. The sub-
questions of when and how strategic decisions are made and how SEA should be applied to 
approach the sector's characteristics are answered in this part. The answers to these sub-
questions are primarily found in three investigations of decision-making processes of which 
two draws on insight from participation in Energinet.dk's strategic development and one is 
reporting on an experiment of how practitioners make sense. The experiment has been 
conducted and reported in cooperation with Lone Kørnøv. Special focus is on the non-
programmed and unstructured decision-making processes that are argued to pose a 
distinctive challenge on SEA application as there are no routines or experiences that fit the 
non-programmed decision-situation. 
Part C is "spin-offs" of to the focus on strategic decision-making processes. This part 
elaborates on the important discussions with actors in the Danish energy sector during the 
Ph.D. project. These spin-offs concern the scope of the SEA legislation in terms of energy 
sector plans and programmes and the discourses on how to apply SEA among the actors 
involved, hereunder Energinet.dk and the Danish Energy Agency. The spin-offs are 
interlinked with the investigations in Part A and B as ambiguities about scope and 
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responsibilities have been main troubles in the change agent approach as well as explicit or 
implicit questions in the processes reported in the investigations.  
The list of published and submitted articles is as follows: 
- Kørnøv, L, Lyhne, I, Larsen, SV and Hansen, AM, 2011, 'Change agents in the field of 
strategic environmental assessment: What does it involve and what potentials does it have 
for research and practice?'. Journal of environmental assessment policy and management, 
13(2), pp. 203-228. 
- Lyhne, I 2011. Between Policy-making and Planning: SEA and Strategic Decision-making 
in the Danish Energy Sector. Journal of environmental assessment policy and 
management, 13(3), pp. 319-341. 
- Lyhne, I 2011. How strategic dynamics complicate the framing of alternatives in an SEA 
process. Impact assessment and project appraisal. Accepted (under review). 
- Lyhne, I and Kørnøv, L 2011. How do we make sense of significance? Findings from a 
laboratory experiment on an SEA case. Submitted to Journal of Environmental 
Management (October 2011). 
Co-author statements with declaration of co-authorship and work-sharing are found in 
appendix G. 
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Figure 1: The structure of the thesis. 
Research problem: Strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector seem 
characterised as being unstructured and non-programmed and no existing SEA solutions may thus 
be adequate. At the same time, SEA practice in the energy sector is weak and there is a need for 
understanding decision-making to develop a meaningful way of applying SEA.  
Research question: What do a combination of a change agent research approach and a concep-tual 
combination of decision-making and sense-making provide of insight into how SEA can be 
meaningfully applied in the strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector? 
Part A: Research, conceptual and methodological frameworks 
Sub-question i: What does acting as a change agent within the field of SEA involve and 
what potentials and relevance does it have for research and practice? 
 
Answer based on: Investigation of change agents research in the field of strategic 
environmental assessment and reflection on experiences 
Sub-question ii. How can decision-making and sense-making be combined as 
concurrent processes in a model of human choice and how can this model contribute to 
a continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making processes? 
Part B: Unravelling through empirical investigations 
Sub-question iii: When in the development of Danish energy infrastructure, are strategic 
decisions made that are decisive for environmental aspects, and how are these choices 
made? 
Sub-question iv: How should SEA be applied in order to approach the characteristics of 
strategic decision-making in the energy sector? 
Answer based on: Theoretical analysis of the two disciplines, review of efforts of 
combining these, and synthesis. Testing through empirical investigations. 
Answer based on: Empirical investigations of the strategic decision-making processes 
in the Danish energy sector based on participation in Energinet.dk and an experiment  
Answer based on: Discussion of the answers to sub-question iii in relation to 
experiences and practice within the field of SEA. 
Part C: Spin-offs. Elaboration of important discussions on scope and role of SEA 
Synthesis of the parts into elements of a meaningful way of applying SEA and ways forward 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 AS CHANGE AGENT RESEARCH 
 
"[O]ne area of concern [for good quality of assessments is] differences between research 
and other technical contributions intended to strengthen assessment methodologies and 
the types of assessment methods considered usable by practitioners" (Lee 2006, p. 57). 
"We need to consider new strategic positions closer to the knowledge production being 
carried on within the organizations we study, without assuming that immediate relevance 
is our primary objective" (Huff 2000a, p. 288) 
"We are well past the time when it is possible to argue that good research will, because it 
is good, influence the policy process […]. The relation is both more subtle and more 
tenuous. […]. So long as researchers presume that research findings must be brought to 
bear upon a single event, a discrete act of decision making, they will be missing those 
circumstances and processes where, in fact, research can be useful. However, the 
reorientation away from "even decision making" and to "process decision making" 
necessitates looking at research as serving an "enlightenment function" in contrast to an 
"engineering function" (Rist 2000, pp. 1002-3) 
 
How we do research is important for how the research is used in practice. If there is no 
linkage between research and practice, research may be inadequate as Lee points at in the 
quote above. As outlined in the introduction, this Ph.D. project has an inherent change 
orientation towards co-creating a meaningful SEA practice in the energy sector. The research 
conducted is intended for practice and how the research is formed and conducted is therefore 
crucial for the possibilities for changing practice. As a point of departure for the discussions 
in this chapter, the two other quotes above argue for a need for consider the relation between 
research and practice, arguing that a closer positions and more continuous interaction is 
necessary. This closer cooperation needs, however, to be balanced with a critical position by 
the researcher in order not to assume that immediate relevance is the primary objective, as 
Huff argues. 
This chapter presents the framework for the research conducted in this Ph.D. project and the 
considerations of how to interact with practice as a researcher. The chapter explores the ways 
of doing research with focus on the change agent research approach as a way to bridging 
research and practice. It thus forms the answer to the first sub-question: "What does acting as 
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a change agent within the field of SEA involve and what potentials and relevance does it 
have for research and practice?"  
The investigation of relevance and potentials of the change agent research in the first 
subchapter is in the second subchapter supplemented by a detailed and critical discussion of 
the experiences with this approach in this Ph.D. project. The second subchapter is a 
description of how the research approach has revealed itself in practice with personal 
considerations on how to impact practice and theory towards a better practice on SEA and a 
better understanding of strategic decision-making processes. This includes considerations of 
how to navigate between the research partners' interests. 
The research framework is complemented by the conceptual framework and the 
methodological framework in the following chapters and it is therefore focused narrowly on 
the research approach and reflections on choices made during the process. 
 
 
3.1 CHANGE AGENT IN THE FIELD OF SEA 
Knowledge is produced in a variety of social settings that all have unique strengths and 
weaknesses. The characteristics of the social settings influence to what extent the findings are 
accepted, applied, and retained in organisations and society. Researchers working with 
sustainability and aiming at changing practice therefore ought to be reflexive on what social 
settings they do research within.  
Specification of the social setting of knowledge production increases transparency of the 
research. Transparency is typically connected to the methods used and data collected, 
however, transparency on the social settings in which the research is conducted is of equal 
importance: Is the research paid and ordered by a company to promote certain interests? Is 
the research co-produced with the collaborating partners of the research to increase insight? 
Is the research a result of a sustained critical view that is made possible by distance and 
autonomy to the researched? Specification of the social setting thus assists the audience's 
making up its mind about the intensions and interests behind the research. 
The social setting of research is discussed among proponents of divergent settings in terms of 
the relevancy and "scientific" merit of specific settings. Greenwood and Levin (2000) are for 
instance criticising university based social research and Jamison (2001) is criticising Mode 2 
research. Research aimed at sustainability and change is not limited to specific social settings 
and research in a variety of settings is most likely necessary to achieve the needed change. A 
main argument in this subchapter is that research focusing on decision-making and SEA 
would benefit from a combination of a close relation to the actors studied and a critical 
distance.  
This subchapter presents an investigation of the change agent research approach that is 
dominating this Ph.D. project. Change agent research is categorised as a distinctive mode of 
knowledge production and the implications and potentials are explored in the field of SEA. A 
summary of the investigation is presented in figure 2, which is a reproduction of a poster 
presented at the Nordic Research Day on Impact Assessment 2010. In the literature, change 
agents are given a variety of names, e.g. "implementation agents" (Spillane et al. 2002) with 
different nuances on the role and perspective on the change.  
Research framework 
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Figure 2: Poster presented at the Nordic Research Day on Impact Assessment in 2010 
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The concept of 'change agent' is used in different contexts: Change agents can be practitioners 
in an organisational setup as described in Buchanan and Boddy (1992) or academics in an 
organisational or societal setup as described in the action research tradition (e.g. Aagaard 
Nielsen and Svensson 2006). Despite a notable difference between the two contexts in terms 
of the position of the change agent and the content of the related literature, both traditions 
give valuable inspiration and advice to change agent research. The theoretical basis of the 
change agent approach described in this subchapter portrays the social setting of research as 
four ways of doing research given by the dimensions of strategic interdependence and 
organisational autonomy. 
The intension of exploring and discussing the change agent research is not to disdain other 
ways of doing research, neither generally nor within the field of SEA. The exploration of the 
change agent research is meant to supplement rather than supplant other ways of doing 
research. Part of the supplement is to show relevance and potentials in certain social setups.  
Within the field of SEA, change plays an important role for both researchers and 
practitioners. Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir (2007) describe change as a indirect demand: 
"The generally stated desire that an application of SEA should and can contribute to 
integration [of environmental concerns into planning processes]… is, in effect, an indirect 
demand that something needs to be changed in the operating mode of planning in relation to 
environmental perspectives, concerns, and information" (p. 675). This demand is spelled out 
in the objective of the EU Directive on SEA (2001/42/EC): "The objective of this Directive is to 
provide for a high level of protection of the environment and to contribute to the integration 
of environmental considerations into the preparation and adoption of plans and 
programmes". This indirect demand for change is the framework which SEA change agent 
researchers and practitioners work within. 
 
SOCIAL SETTING OF THIS PH.D. PROJECT 
This Ph.D. project is partly funded by Energinet.dk (1/3) and by Aalborg University (2/3). As 
described in the introduction, the project has a threefold ambition of empowering practice to 
change, to communicate experiences from practice, and to contest assumptions and propose 
developments to the literature in terms of the relation between SEA and strategic decision-
making processes. The ambitions are formed as a merge of interests between Energinet.dk, 
Aalborg University and me as a Ph.D. fellow. The navigation among these interests is 
elaborated in subchapter 3.2. 
The cooperation with Energinet.dk and other actors in the energy sector during the project 
period has varied in terms of the distance between what I investigated and me as a 
researcher. The variation of distance concerned both physical distance as well as mental 
distance to practice. This variation has influenced the content of the critical stance towards 
the investigated: In highly participatory phases, the critical stance has been materialised as 
suggestions to practice, whereas in distanced phases, the critical stance has been materialised 
in a wider critique of the system and its practice. Figure 3 shows the varying distance to the 
investigated processes and actors in a crude categorisation of periods in the Ph.D. project. 
The first year of the project was carried out in the head office of Energinet.dk and the last two 
at AAU. The varying distance is partly a deliberate choice and partly determined by private 
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needs. The deliberate part was based on an idea of learning to know practice from the start to 
avoid building up additional prejudices or a resilient point of view. The distance became a 
matter of slight concern in Energinet.dk in the beginning of 2010 after the period at their head 
office, which also is mentioned in the following article. The subsequent period was 
characterised by more distanced research and a more critical stance towards Energinet.dk 
and other actors.  
 
  
 
Figure 3: Distance to the researched during the Ph.D. project. 
 
Transparency of the social setting of this project is visible in each article with different 
emphasis: The article on change agent research (Kørnøv et al. 2011) is transparent on the 
settings of the cases and the investigations of strategic decision-making (Lyhne 2011a, 2011b, 
and Lyhne and Kørnøv 2011) are transparent on support co-funding by Energinet.dk in the 
acknowledgement and two of the articles (Lyhne 2011b and Lyhne and Kørnøv 2011) refer to 
the change agent article to explain the setting in which the research is conducted. These 
descriptions could, however, easily be more elaborated on interests and intensions and 
therefore, this chapter supplements the brief indications of the social setting. 
The change agent article presented below reflects a common research approach and interest 
among a small group of researchers in The Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment. 
The reflections are formulated during one and a half year and finalised in January 2011. A 
basic driver for the reflections is a belief that reflexivity on the setup of research is important, 
especially when it comes to research that aims at influencing society towards a more 
sustainable development.  
Conceptual research 
Distanced 
research 
Participatory 
research 
Participatory research in 
Energinet.dk 
Time August 
2008 
2009 2010 2011 
Interviews and 
reporting 
Interaction with other 
actors in the energy sector 
 
26 
JOURNAL ARTICLE:  
 
CHANGE AGENTS IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 
WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE AND WHAT POTENTIALS DOES IT HAVE FOR RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE? 
 
Published in Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management 
Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2011) pp. 1–27 
DOI: 10.1142/S1464333211003857 
 
Kørnøv, L, Lyhne, I, Larsen, SV, and Hansen, AM, Aalborg University, Denmark 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
One of the challenges facing strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is finding ways to 
work in research and practice allowing critical interrogation and appropriate action to 
support sustainability. The point of departure for this article is the hypotheses that 
cooperative knowledge-production, where SEA researchers interact with the societal milieu 
as change agents, provides a potential for SEA research and practice to further sustainability. 
Based on literature and three cases, this paper seeks to contribute to two questions: ‘what 
does acting as a change agent within the field of SEA involve?’ and ‘what potentials does it 
have for research and practice?’ The three cases illustrate how SEA research and practice 
have complementary perspectives, and used together can support reflective SEA practice and 
practice-based SEA research. Theoretically the current understanding and discussion on 
change agents is sharpened through the focus on real-life linkages, putting forward the 
contextual influence and the unpredictability related hereto. 
 
Keywords: Change agent, Mode 3 research, strategic environmental assessment, knowledge 
production. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The point of departure and underlying assumption behind this paper is that to produce 
knowledge through SEA and impact decision-making, science and practice needs to be 
connected.  
During the last decade science and technology have increasingly been harnessed in the quest 
for a transitioning towards sustainability, among other things grounded in the belief that for 
knowledge to be useful from a sustainability perspective, it generally needs to be coproduced 
through close cooperation between scholars and practitioners (Clark and Dickson 2003). The 
important scholarly discussion about the role and effectiveness of environmental assessment 
(EA) as a tool to promote sustainable development has simultaneously increased over the last 
years, and it has been questioned if EA has the wanted impact on the planning and decision 
making process. The discussion involves questioning whether EA tools are too often 
developed from an expert-driven perspective without sufficient attention to contextual 
circumstances including the practitioners’ needs and capacities (Emmelin 2006) and without 
sufficient understanding and recognition of the actual non-linear decision making processes 
(Richardson 2005; Kørnøv and Thissen 2000; Lawrence 2000; Nilsson and Dalkmann 2001; 
Bina 2001). The reasons for the experienced gab between EA research and practice can be 
found in these arguments, and can be due to a scientific non- or low collaborative knowledge 
production, with a clear demarcation between science and practice. 
The practice of connecting theoretical knowledge with practical problems, including a high 
personal engagement, is by Andrew Jamison (2001; 2008), called ‘change-oriented research’ 
and refers to a knowledge making which is problem-based with the aim“…to intervene 
creatively and constructively in an ongoing social or political process: to contribute to change. 
Rather than the traditional notion of enlightenment, by which is usually meant that the role 
of the scientist is to provide insights for the broader society, derived from a “disinterested” 
pursuit of the truth, change-oriented research is about empowerment, where the researcher 
applies knowledge gained from experience to processes of social learning, carried out 
together with those being ‘studied’” (Jamison 2010, p. 9). This engagement of the researcher 
as a change agent is in different fields of research referred to by other names like e.g. 
participatory planning, empowerment and action research. Research, which is closely linked 
to current societal needs and is undertaken in cooperation between science and practice, is 
also termed ‘Mode 3’ (Huff and Huff, 2001; Kurek et al. 2007). Kurek et al. (2007) provides an 
analytical framework for studying the strategic positioning of the researcher, which makes it 
possible to distinguish between modes of research. 
Such a situated form of knowledge making can from the authors’ point of view be seen as 
having a potential to help reconnect research and practice concerning SEA, with an aim to 
serve the needs and concerns of society in relation to sustainability. This paper is inspired by 
both Jamison's normative framework and argument about the need for change-oriented 
research, and by the analytical framework developed by Kurek et al. (2007). These 
frameworks are used for discussing experiences with connecting science and practice, and 
thereby approach the mentioned insufficiencies in the field of SEA. The hypothesis, which 
this paper is based on, is that combining the frameworks so that the SEA researcher acts a 
change agent within a Mode 3 positioning has a potential to improve the connection between 
research and practice and promote sustainable development. 
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AIM 
At Aalborg University’s Department of Development and Planning, three research projects 
on SEA are conducted by researchers acting as change agents. This paper seeks to collect and 
communicate experiences from these cases. The paper is aimed at contributing to the 
following questions: 
- What does acting as a change agent within the field of SEA involve? and 
- What potentials does it have for research and practice? 
The analyses in this paper make up an illustrative collection of experiences, illuminating 
possible ways of conducting SEA research in Mode 3 and the potentials it may have. It is not 
the aim of the paper to compare research modes, but rather to develop an analytical 
framework that may be used for discussing different modes of research. 
With this aim, first an analytical framework is developed through a discussion of different 
research modes in section 2. In section 4, this framework is used for presenting and analysing 
the three cases, in terms of what it involves to conduct Mode 3 research, and acting as a 
change agent within the field of SEA. This covers discussions of strategic positioning in 
relation to the formal and informal frames for the research projects. In section 5 this is 
followed by an analysis of the potentials of Mode 3 research, based on the authors’ and 
collaborating organisations' observations and assessments of the research projects. Thus focus 
is on the potentials of conducting Mode 3 research, both seen from the perspective of the 
researcher and from the perspective of the organisation. This underpins the objective of the 
paper: to identify if and how this specific setup of research provides potentials in terms of 
practice in the organisation and in terms of research. 
 
THE DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH MODES 
When discussing the different modes of research with focus on the connection of research 
and practice, the contribution of Gibbons and colleagues in "The New Production of 
Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies" from 1994 is 
found very relevant and inspiring. This work is an influential contribution to the ongoing 
discussion of the need to improve research relevance and knowledge flows from science to 
practice. Gibbons et al. distinguish between two modes of knowledge production. 
Mode 1, typically produced in universities and named 'ivory tower research' by critics, has 
the characteristics of largely being discipline-based, intra-scientifically produced and not 
related to a specific context for application (Gibbons et al. 1994). In Gibbons words “This 
structure provides the guidelines for researchers about what the important problems are, 
how they should be tackled, who should tackle them, and what should be regarded as a 
contribution to the field. In its social dimensions, it also prescribes the rules for accrediting 
new researchers, procedures for selecting new university faculty, and criteria for their 
advancement within academic life” (Gibbons 1999, p. 9).  
The strength of the structured research in Mode 1 is widely acknowledged. However, when it 
comes to research aiming at changing practice, Mode 1 research meets criticism, e.g. the risk 
of limited relevance of research for society. Mode 1 research on SEA does not necessarily take 
point of departure in experienced problems in certain contexts, and therefore it may not be 
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relevant and it may not be applied. In line with this criticism, Gibbons (1999) point at a need 
for knowledge production, which is ‘socially robust’, ensured through a new social contract 
between research and society. It becomes not just a matter of how knowledge is produced but 
also what knowledge is produced. Here Mode 2 research offers a different approach. 
In Mode 2 the relationship between science and practice is characterised by interaction and 
cooperation, which according to Gibbons and colleagues leads to change-oriented science in 
which “the boundaries between the intellectual world and its environment have become 
blurred” (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 81). The characteristics are knowledge produced trans-
disciplinarily, jointly and bound to a specific context. Therefore, Mode 2 research is validated 
by its relevance for practice. Compared to mode 1, mode 2 is argued to be "more timely, more 
practical, more democratic" (Huff 2000a, p. 291)  
Huff (2000a) criticizes Mode 2 research for having limitations "especially as it moves away 
from science and technology into management” (p. 291). According to Huff (2000a, p. 292), 
Mode 2 research is too pragmatic and tends to make "big bets on the basis of limited 
evidence". Another criticism of Mode 2 is the commercialisation of research, e.g. raised by 
Jamison in ‘The Making of Green Knowledge’. Research is defined by market interests in 
funding organisations rather than by the interest among researchers (Jamison 2001). 
Furthermore, Jamison (2001, p. 124) criticizes Mode 2 for limited change “…many of the 
actual practices of the companies they run and/or represent all too often continue to follow a 
‘business as usual’ strategy”. 
The discussion of research modes and trends in knowledge production has received 
considerable scholarly attention (Nowotny et al. 2001). In the midst of these discussions the 
concept of Mode 3 arose. 
 
Strategic positioning and Mode 3 
In line with Jamison’s discussion of the need for a ‘change-oriented research’, the limitations 
of Mode 2 lead Huff and Huff to suggest Mode 3 knowledge production with the purpose 
“…to assure survival and promote the common good, at various levels of social aggregation” 
triggered by “…appreciation and critiques of the human conditions, as it has been, is, and 
might become” (Huff and Huff 2001, p. 53). The researcher within this Mode 3 is closely 
linked to societal needs and compared to Mode 2 is capable of influencing his milieu by 
creating demand for the scientific knowledge instead of supplying on an external demand 
(Kurek et al. 2007).  
Some characteristics, used in the literature on Mode 3, are multiple stakeholder involvement 
and interdisciplinarity, conversation and cooperation, community driven, engagement in 
study field, high organisational autonomy and strategic interdependence (Huff and Huff 
2001; Kurek 2008). The normative element of Mode 3 is explicated by the goal of a ‘future 
good’ (Huff and Huff 2001) and ‘giving voice’ through science as social advocacy (Jamison 
2009).  
Whereas in Mode 1 the researcher mainly is accountable to oneself, and in Mode 2 
accountable to the milieu and financing organisation, the researcher in Mode 3 is mainly 
accountable to the people and/or environment affected both in the research process and the 
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research outcome. Mode 3 involves not only personal, active engagement and intervention in 
on-going processes, but also a normative framework within which the researcher works.  
The relationship between the change agent and the milieu (researchers, government, industry 
and NGO) is established through negotiation, and the researcher in Mode 3 must make on-
going choices of how much he is willing to let others influence the research. An analytical 
model of the strategic positioning of the researcher within the milieu is developed by Kurek 
and colleagues (Kurek et al. 2008). The model is based upon two dimensions – organisational 
autonomy and strategic interdependence – and provides a typology with the different modes 
of researchers positioning, see figure 4.  
 
High       
  Mode 2  Mode 3  
Strategic 
interdependence 
     
    Mode 1  
Low       
 Low  Organisational 
 autonomy 
 High 
 Figure 4: Three modes of strategic positioning. (Based on Kurek et al. 2007, p. 503) 
 
We understand Mode 3 as being characterised by high organisational autonomy and strategic 
interdependence, and at the same time attributed a normativity guiding the ongoing 
knowledge making and negotiation process taking place between the researcher and the 
milieu. Mode 3 is building on and incorporating both Mode 1 and Mode 2 research in the 
process a researcher within a project and time period often will choose interplay between the 
different modes. A pure choice of one mode seems unrealistic or unfavourable. 
In Mode 3, like in Mode 2, the researcher and milieu share resources (money, time, 
knowledge) but at the same time the researcher “…autonomously determine directions of 
research. He retains his responsibility for directing a project” (Kurek et al. 2007, p. 504). So in 
Mode 3 both the researcher and the milieu are strong enough to sanction each other, and both 
the strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy is high. This also means that the 
normative framework, guiding Mode 3 research, is developed by and acceptable to both the 
researcher and the milieu. The difference is visualised in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: The relation between the researcher and external milieu in the three modes of research.  
 
Thus we are distinguishing between three different modes of research, all with distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. The focus of this paper is to shed light on experiences with 
Mode 3 research, answering the questions of what Mode 3 within SEA research involves and 
what potentials it may have. However, before turning to these questions the cases and 
methods applied are presented in the following section. 
 
 
CASES AND METHODS 
The analysis in this paper is based upon case studies, from which experiences with Mode 3 
research is drawn. In the following the three cases are introduced, and the methods applied 
in the two analyses are presented. Further information about the three cases is presented 
continuously in the paper, where it is included in the analysis. The analyses deal with the 
strategic positioning of the researchers and the potentials for SEA research and practice. The 
empirical basis for the analyses is document analysis, the researcher’s personal observations, 
and subjective assessments by the researchers as well as the contact person in the 
organisations.  
 
CASES STUDIED 
The study comprises three cases, where Ph.D. researchers are working on their projects in 
close cooperation with an organisation outside the university. The three research projects 
have different foci in relation to SEA and different reasoning for the cooperation between 
SEA research and practice. In all three cases the organisations have co-financed the research 
projects.  
Case 1 is carried out in cooperation with the Danish company Energinet.dk, in charge of 
Danish energy infrastructure. The project is organised with an AAU-based professor as 
supervisor and the head of Research and Environment section as main contact person at 
Energinet.dk. 
Mode 1: No external support 
and decision on frames for 
research
Mode 2: External support and 
decision on frames for 
research
Mode 3: External support 
from milieu and joint decision 
on overall frames for 
research
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Aim and methodology: The project concerns the first generation of SEA of plans and 
programmes in relation to the national energy infrastructure in Denmark (gas and electricity). 
In this case, Energinet.dk faced implementation of SEA and without sufficient internal 
professional resources, they initiated cooperation with AAU that ended up with the project 
aimed at developing and implementing SEA in the energy sector, including SEA 
methodology targeted at the strategic decision making processes in the sector. The project has 
theoretical basis in decision-making theory and sense-making theory, which are used to 
understand practice and develop methodology. The project is based on an interactive 
research approach, in which the researcher is situated at Energinet.dk for a year, participating 
in meetings and planning processes. To maintain a critical distance, the remaining two years 
of the project is carried out at AAU, however, still with periodical participation in meetings at 
Energinet.dk. The research conducted from AAU is widely based on document analysis and 
interviews.  
Case 2 is carried out in cooperation with the Greenlandic Self Government and is furthermore 
co-funded by the independent Alcoa Foundation. The project has an AAU-based professor as 
main supervisor and the head of the department of physical planning from the Greenlandic 
Self Government as co-supervisor.  
Aim and methodology: The project concerns SEA of mega industry in Greenland in a system 
with no legislation or guidelines in place. This case is rooted in the environmental and 
democratic challenge of planning and assessing an aluminium smelter in Greenland (Hansen 
and Kørnøv 2009), with the aim of the research project was to secure a critical and 
independent view upon the processes and effect of carrying out SEA. The project is 
conducted as a case study of the SEA and the planning process of an aluminium reduction 
plant in Greenland. A theoretical approach is taken, combining power theory with impact 
assessment theory on the concept of effectiveness. These theories are used to setup an 
analytical frame for the case study. Document analysis is used to determine the chronology, 
and thus the backbone of the mapping of decisions in the project. Participant observation and 
statements are collected primarily by qualitative interviews with key persons from the central 
actor groups, and by attending meetings as an observant. The interviews supplement the 
document review concerning the case activities and behaviour, also regarding identification 
of interests among the actor groups and their access to resources. Based on this, reflections 
regarding effectiveness and power structures relating to the use of SEA as a decision making 
tool when planning new industries in Greenland will be made in terms of development of 
process and methodology.  
Finally, the project in case 3 is carried out in cooperation between AAU and the major Danish 
engineering consultancy Rambøll. It is organised with an AAU-based professor as main 
supervisor and a head of department from Rambøll as co-supervisor.  
Aim and methodology: The research takes point of departure in the Danish process of 
preparing river basin management plans (RBMPs), implementing the EU's Water Framework 
Directive, and preparing SEAs of these plans. Currently, climate change as an environmental 
factor has been excluded from the planning process, with the reasoning that there is not 
enough knowledge about climate change to assess its consequences for the water 
environment and the RBMPs. On this background, the project is aimed at developing the 
work with climate change in SEA of the RBMPs. A theoretical approach is taken, using 
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sociological risk theory as a framework for research. Document analysis, interviews, and a 
survey is utilised to uncover the attitudes of different actors towards inclusion of climate 
change in the RBMPs, while a document analysis and interviews are used to assess the 
experiences with climate change in SEA in Denmark. Based on this, reflections regarding 
integration of climate change in SEA will be made in terms of development of process and 
methodology.  
 
ANALYSING WHAT IT INVOLVES TO BE A CHANGE AGENT WITHIN THE SEA FIELD 
The conclusion upon the formal strategic positioning of the researchers in the three cases, and 
thus whether and how they conduct Mode 3 research, is first and foremost reached by 
analysing the content of the project contracts. The standard issues like e.g. time schedule is 
not perceived interesting and relevant for this paper, but the non-standard and unique issues 
are more interesting and symbolise the negotiated parts of the cooperation. The analysis of 
the contracts is focused on the explicated objectives and the clauses. Both are used to indicate 
the strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy and thereby map the research 
mode. In addition informal positioning and negotiation takes places in an ongoing dialogue 
between the SEA researcher, the university and the collaborating organisation. The analysis 
of the informal process, influencing the research intention, the methods applied, and the out-
put of research, is based upon the researchers observations and experience. 
 
ANALYSING WHAT POTENTIALS ACTING AS A CHANGE AGENT HAS FOR SEA 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE? 
As stated previously, the hypothesis behind this paper is that Mode 3 research can support 
SEA and sustainable change via its potentials for connecting research and practice. This 
constitutes the point of departure for the analysis of what potentials Mode 3 research has. 
Two sources form the basis for the analysis: The first part is assessments from the researchers 
that point at potentials for research. These assessments are substantiated by examples from 
the projects. The second part is based upon open questions related to the potentials for 
influencing practice. The questions are answered by the contact persons at the organisations. 
The questions formulated are: 1) “How has the involvement of NN and his/her research 
influenced the organisation? 2) How has the involvement influenced the broader society?, 
and 3) “In which way has the involvement and cooperation influenced the SEA 
(understanding of SEA, the SEA process, the documents)?” and 4) “How would you 
characterise the strengths and weaknesses of the setup of the cooperation between your 
organisation and the researcher?" 
In respect to the premature concept of Mode 3 research, the sources are (intentionally) not 
constrained by mode classifications or characteristics. The sources are in stead held open to 
any impact of the research and this inductive approach may support a refinement of the 
Mode 3 concept. As the three cases are ongoing research projects, the analysis is primarily 
focused on the process rather than the outputs. The cases do, however, outline a picture of 
the potentials of the research mode. 
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WHAT DOES ACTING AS A CHANGE AGENT WITHIN THE FIELD OF SEA INVOLVE? 
The Mode 3 research is analysed in terms of the strategic positioning of the researchers in the 
three cases, and thus it is assessed whether and how they carry out Mode 3 research. Focus is 
both on formal and informal frames for the research, and these frames will show what it 
involves to do Mode 3 research. 
The analysis begins with the strategic interdependence and the organisational autonomy in 
accordance with the model of strategic positioning proposed by Kurek et al. The analysis 
presented in table 1 and 2 are inspired and to a large extent based upon the work of Kurek, 
Geurts and Roosendaal (2007; 2008) who build upon Talcott Parsons' theories on social 
systems. Table 1 gives an overview of the parameters chosen to describe and analyse the 
strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy. These parameters are inspired by 
Parsons' model of social systems in which four media can function as exchange means: 
Inducement (e.g. money), deterrence (negative sanctions), commitment and persuasion 
(Parsons 1963).  
 
Strategic interdependence 
- Understood as the deliberate sharing of 
heterogeneously distributed resources, assets 
and capabilities between the partners in 
order to achieve a joint goal. 
Organisational autonomy 
- Understood as the researcher’s degree of 
self-governing the research. It is analysed in 
relation to the researchers autonomy to 
decide upon: 
Economic interdependence 
Interdependence on exchange of information 
sources  
Interdependence on engagement 
Research goals  
Acquiring information 
Working place and working balance 
Writing and publishing research results  
Table 1: Parameters chosen as basis for describing and analysing modes of research. 
 
Common for the research projects is that most of the strategic positioning is happening in an 
on-going and informal process between the researcher and the cooperating organisation. This 
will be analysed and discussed in the following, where the strategic interdependence and the 
organisational autonomy are analysed separately. 
 
Formal and informal strategic interdependence  
Table 2 shows the analysis of whether and how the researchers and organisations have 
strategic interdependence. The analysis shows an economic interdependence in all three 
cases. This is partly evident from the contracts and partly evident from the informal 
negotiations. The economic interdependence gives both parties a possibility for sanctioning.  
The analysis of the second parameter, dependence on exchange of information sources, as 
shown in table 2, reveals some differences. Only case 1 is really highly dependent upon the 
collaborator. This has to do with the nature of the SEA research: This project has a focus of 
getting the right environmental information to the right people at the early stage in decision 
making, and to do so the researcher is very dependent on understanding the processes within 
the collaborating organisation. The contract in case 1 is a standard contract added restrictions 
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on confidential data that may only be used after approval by Energinet.dk. However, both 
case 2 and 3 do experience some dependence upon information from other actors in the 
milieu, which the collaborating organisation either informally hinders or supports access to. 
Another kind of interdependence is engagement in the project. The researcher is dependent 
on engagement from the organisation, since it is necessary that the organisation continues 
internal activities relating to the research and is able and willing to consider and use the 
research to achieve change in these activities. If the organisation is not engaged, the 
researcher cannot change anything. The organisation is likewise dependent on the 
engagement of the researcher to fulfil the expectations of changes. In case 1, the researcher is 
dependent on the engagement of the collaborating organisation developing its SEA system, 
since this is the object of study and change. At the same time, the company relies on 
engagement from the research in this process of development, e.g. by securing adequacy in 
terms of regulation. In case 2 the interdependence is similar, since it also revolves around 
change in the collaborating organisation. Case 3 is different from this, because the change, 
which is aimed for, is not restricted to the collaborating organisation, but a wider range of 
actors.  
 
 High interdependence       <-> Low interdependence 
Economy  
 
Researcher is either fully or partly 
funded by the organisation and 
the organisation must get return of 
their investment in the project 
 Researcher is economic 
independent and the 
organisation is not dependent 
on return of their investment. 
Formal Case 1, 2 and 3   
Exchange of 
information 
sources 
The organisation is an essential 
source of information for the 
researcher and the organisation 
needs information from the 
research society 
 Researcher is not dependent 
on information from the 
organisation and opposite 
 
Informal Case 1 Case 2 and 3  
Engagement  The researcher and the 
organisation are mutually 
dependent on the other parts' 
engagement in the project 
 Neither the researcher nor the 
organisation is dependent on 
engagement from the other 
part in the project. 
Informal Case 1 and 2 Case 3  
Table 2: Analysis of the SEA researcher’s strategic interdependence in relation to the collaborating 
organisation. Whether the dependence is explicated formally (in the contract) or informally in the 
process is indicated in the left column. 
 
Formal and informal organisational autonomy 
Table 3 shows the analysis of whether and how the researchers in the cases have 
organisational autonomy. Regarding to what extent the researchers set research goals 
autonomously, the analysis shows both high and medium organisational autonomy for all 
cases. Formally, based upon the contracts, the autonomy is assessed as high/medium as all 
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cases include a loosely formulated goal for the research. In case 2, the contract emphasises the 
need for an autonomous researcher, providing critical and independent guidance based on 
“insider” knowledge/understanding. It is furthermore emphasised that the researcher must 
work independently and with high validity in relation to the second co-funder Alcoa 
Foundation. Differing from this, in case 3 the consultancy expects the Ph.D.-study to “enter 
directly into Rambøll's work with developing services and having dialogue with costumers”, 
which is limiting the autonomy for setting research goals. Within the broadly stated research 
goals, the researcher informally decides on the research in negotiation with the collaborating 
organisation. 
 
 High autonomy Medium autonomy Low autonomy 
Autonomy to decide 
on research goals 
Researcher sets 
research goals within a 
negotiated overall 
frame. 
Research goals are 
based upon the 
problems of the 
organisation involving 
the researcher.  
The organisation set 
specific research 
goals. 
Informal and formal Case1, 2 and 3  
Autonomy in the 
acquisition of 
scientific knowledge  
Researcher decides on 
how and what data is 
collected 
Joint decisions are 
made 
Decisions on data 
collection are made by 
the organisation. 
Informal Case 1, 2 and 3   
Autonomy to decide 
on working place and 
working balance 
Researcher decides 
upon where to work 
and to what extent he 
will do research related 
work with the 
organisation. 
Joint decisions are 
made continuously. 
The organisation 
decides upon the 
working conditions. 
Informal and formal Case 2 Case 1 and 3  
Writing autonomy Researcher suggests the 
content of publications 
and gives argument 
why certain theories 
etc. are chosen.  
Researcher edits or re-
writes publications 
partly or fully. 
Researcher comment 
on drafts. 
Informal Case 1, 2 and 3   
Table 3: Analysis of the SEA researcher’s organisational autonomy in relation to the cooperating 
organisation. Whether the dependence is explicated formally (in the contract) or informally in the 
process is indicated in the left column. 
 
The contracts do not mention methods of data collection, besides the data collected through 
interaction between researcher and collaborating organisation. In all cases the researchers 
thus have a high autonomy in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.  
For case 1 and 3, the organisational autonomy regarding working place and working balance 
is assessed as medium. For both cases this is due to informal negotiation between the 
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collaborating organisation and the researcher, but also due to the researchers own interest in 
being close to what is being studied. Additionally, for case 3, the contract is more explicit and 
includes the expectation that the researcher “…spends the main part of the time at our office 
in Virum.” For case 2, the organisational autonomy is assessed as high, as there are no 
restrictions or expectations from the collaborating organisation regarding working place and 
working balance. 
Writing autonomy is high in all cases, as the researchers decide on what should be included 
in publications, and in which journals to publish their results. In all cases, the milieu has 
interests in certain media, however, which media to use, remains the researchers' decision.  
The two analyses presented in table 2 and 3 show that the cases represent predominantly 
Mode 3 research, which for the researchers involves high and/or medium strategic autonomy, 
and primarily high organisational autonomy. The Mode 3 research carried out involves a 
high engagement in the study field and cooperation with exchange of sources and views. At 
the same time the researchers retain the responsibility for directing the research and freedom 
to be critical. For the researcher it thus involves freedom to govern the project within a 
broadly given frame, which differs from the other modes of research, as shown in figure 5 
and discussed in the following. 
Despite the categorisation of all three projects as predominantly Mode 3, the analysis reveals 
that in practice there are differences between what this involves. The differences observed are 
e.g. different levels of how much the researcher identifies with the study field at a personal 
level, as well as different levels of critical participation in the processes studied. These 
differences indicate that within Mode 3 many nuances exist, and that Mode 3 research does 
not lead to one specific research design and practice. Mode 3 research can be undertaken in 
various ways, depending upon the specific context including personal preferences, timing, 
resources etc. After having clarified what conducting Mode 3 research involves in the 
examples of the three cases, the next step is to analyse the potentials for research and practice. 
 
 
WHAT POTENTIALS DOES ACTING AS A CHANGE AGENT HAVE FOR RESEARCH 
AND PRACTICE? 
The second part of the aim of this paper is to investigate the potentials of mode 3 research for 
research and practice. This is done by investigating two issues: 1) if and how being a change 
agent in relation to SEA influences the research process and content and 2) if and how the 
research and cooperation influence the organisation and its work with SEA. These two 
questions are treated in the following by interpreting the Mode 3 research cases in terms of 
influences enabled by the combination of high autonomy and high interdependence. The 
interpretation is based on experiences and observations of the researchers and contact 
persons respectively. 
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POTENTIALS FOR RESEARCH: THE RESEARCHERS' EXPERIENCE 
The first analysis of the potentials for research of Mode 3 research is based on the researchers' 
experiences from the three cases. This section is organised around main issues of access, 
dialogue on direction and ownership of the research. 
 
Access to people, processes and information  
The researchers point at the potential of access in the close association with the organisations: 
Access to the right person at the right time and place makes it possible for the researcher to 
make suggestions that test hypotheses or theories. With high strategic interdependence, the 
researcher is provided with insight and access to follow processes in the organisation. At the 
same time, the researcher has high autonomy, which means that the researcher potentially 
can make suggestions that are relevant for practice and at the same time tests hypotheses or 
theories as part of the research process. An example of this potential is from case 1, where the 
researcher has continuously taken part in organisational processes, which has given 
possibilities for testing hypotheses, e.g. about the timing of decision aid put forward in 
theories of organisational decision-making.  
At the same time the researcher is allowed to use the information independently, which may 
improve the research, e.g. by getting feedback on the research from a wider research 
community. An example of this potential is from case 2, in which the researcher was allowed 
to use confidential documents on assessment practice as basis for research. The confidential 
data was a key source for research, which included recommendations for how to improve 
practice. These recommendations would not otherwise be made, as no one else has interest in 
using this material for this purpose. The combination of interdependence and autonomy thus 
made it possible to publish research with a highly relevant content.  
The close association with the cooperating organisation through the high strategic 
interdependence has also been experienced as limiting the research, when the researcher is 
trying to gain access in areas with opposition towards the associated organisation. For 
example in case study 3, the task of performing SEA of the river basin management plans, 
which is the topic of the research project, was tendered and won by a competing consultancy. 
This meant that the researcher being closely associated with a competing consultancy was 
excluded from studying the process. In other situations, the high organisational autonomy 
may make it possible for the researcher to go beyond the organisation and interact with 
competing organisations. Such an act may be validated by a belief that the result of it is 
(more) beneficial for the research project and the collaboration. This has been possible in case 
2, in which the researcher has experienced being excluded from access because of her 
association with the respective organisations. The researcher used her autonomy and built 
her own relationships beyond the cooperating organisation, emphasising her relative 
independence from it.  
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Dialogue on direction of research 
The researchers point at dialogue about the direction of the research as an important potential 
of the Mode 3 setup. The dialogue is seen as an opportunity for enhancing the relevance to 
practice and society. 
The high interdependence in the cases is likely to ensure a dialogue with the organisation as 
the organisation has interest in the output of the research. In the three cases, the dialogue has 
given valuable input from a practical angle to keep the project relevant to practice. The 
organisational autonomy means that the researcher is still free to develop the research design 
and secure a scientific rigour independently of the practical wishes of the organisation. In 
case 1 and 3 this influence has been experienced through the fact that the research results are 
continuously being “reality-checked” by practitioners from the organisation. In this way the 
researcher gets a valuable input on whether suggestions are relevant for practice.  
This dialogue also poses a challenge for researchers because the researcher constantly has to 
balance between the interests of the organisation, scientific demands and the researcher's 
own interest. In case 3, for example, the organisation has clear wishes for immediately usable 
methodology, while the scientific community expects more time to be spent on issues such as 
theoretical angle and research methodology.  
 
Ownership of outputs of autonomous research 
The last influence identified by the researchers is connected to the utilisation of the results of 
the research projects. The Mode 3 setup is experienced to give the organisations ownership of 
the output of the autonomous research, meaning that the output is more likely to be used in 
the organisations. This support is especially relevant as the researcher - retaining the 
organisational autonomy - may have chosen approaches and theories that the organisation 
would not have preferred at first although the researcher found these more beneficial. The 
combinations of interdependence and autonomy may in such situations make it possible to 
improve research and practice by double-loop learning processes (Argyris 1977) in the 
organisations. For example, case 1 is aiming at this by using theory that is not previously 
related to the field, and the organisation has supported the researcher's choice.  
The experience from the case studies is that for the organisations, the sense of ownership is 
related to getting a return for their investment, cf. table 2. The organisations have invested in 
the research projects and have had influence on the direction of the research, so that it has 
relevance, and they will, if at all possible, try to benefit from it in their organisations. The 
organisations may even work as platforms for disseminating the research results to society 
and other practitioners. Case 3 is an example of this, because Rambøll will strive to 
implement any methodology developed, in their subsequent consultancy work, thus 
communicating it to their clients. The ownership and backing from the collaborating 
organisation is in case 2 furthermore experienced to give the output of the research a higher 
status among related institutions. 
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POTENTIALS FOR PRACTICE: THE ORGANISATIONS’ EXPERIENCE  
The organisations' responses to the questions of potentials shed light on the cooperative 
mode of research seen from practitioners' experiences. This section is organised around main 
issues arising in the written response: The importance of linking research and practice 
closely; the influence observed and assessed; and the risk and weaknesses. 
 
The importance of close linkages between SEA research and SEA practice  
The respondents in general stress the importance of a close relationship between research and 
practice. The respondents from Energinet.dk and Rambøll e.g. express the value for SEA 
research as: 
“The strength is that SEA theory is challenged by reality’s diversity of asymmetrical 
courses and sudden political and strategic changes.” (Head of Section, Energinet.dk) 
“Sanne gets input for understanding everyday life and problems of the practitioners. 
Thereby the research study adjusts to a more societal beneficial approach.” (Head of 
Department, Rambøll) 
The contextual aspects of practice are hereby put forward as important for enhancing 
relevancy of SEA research, even though this does not guarantee an easy implementation in 
practice. The importance for SEA practice is also raised and related to the organisations' 
motivation for entering a Mode 3 setup. Energinet.dk chose to initiate the cooperation with 
Aalborg University because they wanted research input to how to practice SEA, on which 
plans and especially how to integrate SEA into decision making: “It has always been – and 
still is – the attitude in Energinet.dk, that SEA shall not be a shallow paper exercise. SEA shall 
enter the decision making processes at a time and with content that makes SEA an active 
element”. The same line of motivation is found in the Self Rule who puts it this way: 
“I like to see the units' cooperation with Anne as an expression of a greater openness to 
external challenges than some other units' …Whether it can be said to be evidence that we 
to a higher degree operate with ‘governance’ administration principles, I will leave for 
others to objectively assess – but it is what I as manager of the unit strive for as a 
principle.” (Head of Department, The Greenlandic Self-Rule) 
While Energinet.dk and the Self Rule emphasise both the short and long term perspectives in 
their views upon the importance of a close relationship between SEA practice and SEA 
research, Rambøll especially stresses the motivation as short-term business expansion 
through a competency development. On the long term Rambøll views the importance of 
cooperation with research for the SEA practice in general: 
“Rambøll gets access to Aalborg University on a more personal level and thereby easier 
access to future sparring and development of other cooperations.” (Head of Department, 
Rambøll) 
The researchers’ high engagement in practice is by two respondents underlined as important 
for the cooperative mode and the content of the research. The following statements from 
Energinet.dk and the Greenlandic Self Rule exemplify this and point to the importance of 
grounding research in an understanding of specific contextual circumstances: 
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“Ivar has from the first day shown genuine interest in the dilemmas of Energinet.dk, and 
has very thoroughly acquainted himself with the atypical decision processes behind a 
decision on large scale infrastructure projects.” (Head of Section, Energinet.dk) 
“In relation to the societal perspective, it has been an unconditioned benefit – supposedly a 
precondition – for Anne, that she is an integrated part of the Greenlandic society.” (Head 
of Department, The Greenlandic Self-Rule) 
The physical affiliation, involving staying in the environment for periods, is part of the high 
engagement by the researchers and is stressed as an important basis for the influence on their 
SEA work. The first-hand acquaintance with the actual projects and issues are mentioned as a 
positive consequence of physical affiliation – in addition to the possibility of involving the 
SEA knowledge in the processes and to challenge the work undertaken continuously. The 
researcher becomes integrated and “… not just an external consultant or observant” (Head of 
Section, Energinet.dk). 
 
The influence observed and assessed 
A general observation in the answers from the respondents is the conclusion that the close 
cooperation has influenced the respondents’ competences through the developed 
understanding and actual work on SEA: 
 “On the concrete and praxis-related level, it have had great impact for progress and 
development of the specific SEA, that Anne has ‘wafted over the water’ in different 
matters. Anne has through the whole process been a really good sparring partner for me 
being responsible for the SEA.” (Head of Department, The Greenlandic Self-Rule) 
Rambøll who also refers to the personal competency development, but finds it difficult to 
assess the direct competency development for others and the company in general supports 
this. The reason put forward is, that the application-oriented part of the research is not yet 
finished. This may have to do with the character of the company being a consultancy, and the 
expressed need for tool making. Energinet.dk raises the influence on the competences on a 
more institutional level: 
“It has qualified the research project and brought valuable knowledge on SEA from Ivar. 
Several internal workshops have been held to qualify key employers within SEA. Ivar has 
participated in the development of internal and external minutes on SEA to be used for 
establishing a proper SEA policy”. (Head of Section, Energinet.dk) 
And continues to stress the influence for other actors and society in general: “Energinet.dk 
and other authorities have a need to get the SEA processes defined and coordinated properly 
– in that case the project has already been of great importance”. 
The hidden influence, or indirect influence, for which it is difficult to establish a clear causal 
relationship between the research and changes in practice, is discussed as important. The 
respondent from Greenland explains this indirect influence - due to publication, involvement 
of informants and just general presence by the researcher - through examples like these: 
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“In relation to The Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) and Anne's insistence on 
getting access to the (so-called) SEAs written by BMP, I think that this insistence has had 
an impact on the decision that BMP in January 2010 for the first time has started to 
publish their SEAs.” 
“It is difficult to express but it has to do with a small society, and here Anne's 
contribution to the debate has made the media image a bit more nuanced – not on the axis 
advocate versus opponent, but on the axis unreflective versus reflective.”  
These influences are from the authors' perspective related to Mode 3 research, with the 
normative sight on e.g. democratic SEA processes, supplemented at times with a Mode 1 
research to secure the necessary distance to keep a critical stance. 
 
Risks and weaknesses 
Working as closely as it has been the case in the three research projects can also be associated 
with different risks. One is that researchers do not use the synergies between the three modes 
of research and get too involved in the specific contextual setting with a risk of not keeping 
enough distance to be critical. The respondent from Energinet.dk raises this risk: 
“A potential weakness in the cooperation model is if Ivar is not capable of getting the 
necessary distance to the experiences in Energinet.dk. If he becomes part of the processes 
because they are interesting, it might be difficult to keep the appropriate academic distance 
to the experiences… Energinet.dk has in general not experienced these weaknesses…more 
to consider as observation points”. (Head of Section, Energinet.dk) 
Another risk put forward by the respondents is the unpredictability in the research process 
and thereby the actual possibilities of creating synergies between practice and research. 
Rambøll experienced a lower degree of synergies due to lack of jobs of relevance to the 
research project: 
“We tried to get jobs within the core of the research field, but unfortunately failed. Had we 
won just one of these jobs, and especially the environmental assessment of the river basin 
management plans, it would presumably have meant a greater involvement of Sanne in 
the production.” (Head of Department, Rambøll) 
The opposite situation was the case for Energinet.dk, since they during the research period 
experienced massive intake of large projects, which has given a large empirical base for the 
research project. These experiences raise the need to acknowledge the unpredictability in 
having cooperative processes, and that the benefits for SEA and the organisation as such 
might appear later than assumed. For Rambøll it was also an unexpected experience that the 
close cooperation between Rambøll and Aalborg University limited the access to the process 
of preparing SEA of the new RBMPs: “We were very surprised to experience, that the process 
was so closed, and that Rambøll's cooperation with the university and Sanne in that respect 
was hindering the openness of the authorities” (Head of Department, Rambøll). Still the 
research has a role to play, but the influence is more on the societal level than for the 
company as such: “…the research project can give the Danish approach to integration of 
climate in environmental assessments a lift…” (Head of Department, Rambøll). 
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Another risk mentioned, is the lack of engagement from the organisation in general. It is 
experienced by the respondents that a risk with the cooperative model is that only the key 
person is fully engaged in bridging SEA research and practice: 
“Rambøll only benefits from the cooperation, if individuals in Rambøll have 
time/interest/will in getting involved in the cooperation – our conditions for this has 
actually not been the best.” (Head of Department, Rambøll) 
In the Self Rule the cooperation has also been solely coupled to the key person, which has not 
given beneficial and automatic access to other parts of the organisation: 
 “Some specific conditions have meant that I have right of disposal over necessary 
resources and at the same time taken the necessary decision competence for the cooperation 
to become a reality, but I do not hold a sufficiently high position to personally spread ‘the 
happy message’ to other parts of the Self Rule. This work should have been done by others, 
but unfortunately no one else has taken on this task.” (Head of Department, The 
Greenlandic Self-Rule) 
Trough examples as above it is stressed by the respondents that the members of the 
organisations need to be open and accessible to make a bigger difference. This is in line with 
the emphasis on interdependence in the Mode 3 setup. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The article has raised the potentials of SEA research being involved in engaged knowledge 
making starting with the environmental problem. The point of departure has been the 
international questioning whether SEA is effective in influencing planning and decision-
making processes in the quest for sustainable development. The authors further question 
whether the experienced gab between SEA research and SEA practice can be due to a 
scientific non- or low cooperative knowledge production. The article, based upon theories on 
knowledge production and empirical analysis of three cases of SEA research intervention in 
ongoing processes, reveals results presented and discussed in the following.   
 
WHAT SEA RESEARCH AS MODE 3 INVOLVES 
The cases analysed show that Mode 3 research involves predominantly high interdependence 
between the researcher and the organisation, mainly in terms of economy and engagement. 
Also a predominantly high organisational autonomy is present, mainly related to acquisition 
of scientific knowledge and writing. Also there is a measure of autonomy in deciding on 
research goals, where in Mode 3, research goals are set through a negotiation. The cases also 
show that doing SEA research can involve different issues, such as different degrees of 
involvement. Borrowing terminology from Andrew Jamison (2009), three roles for SEA 
researchers in the process of inclusiveness are shown: 
1. “Taking side”: The researcher identifies with the field of study (The Greenlandic case in 
which the researcher develops a kind of partisanship with the Greenlandic society 
possibly impacted by the drive for implementing new mega industries). 
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2. “Helping out”: The researcher becomes a ‘critical friend’ (The Energinet.dk case in which 
the researcher critically participates in the processes in the organisation to find ways for 
SEA to influence decision making). 
3. “Giving advice”: The researcher keeps an academic distance in advising the organisation 
(The Rambøll case in which the researcher gives professional input to the development of 
SEA of water plans and incorporation of climate change in SEA). 
The three cases indicate that Mode 3 researchers work in a variety of ways. This variety may 
be triggered by different situations that the researchers adapt to in the process of doing 
research. 
 
POTENTIALS FOR MODE 3 TO INFLUENCE SEA RESEARCH AND SEA PRACTICE 
The empirical analysis, based upon the experience and reflection of both the researcher and 
the key person in the cooperating organisations, shows that in the three cases Mode 3 
influences SEA research and practice in other ways than Mode 1 and 2.  
The engagement and involvement in what is being studied has developed a timely and real-
life correlated understanding of the processes in which we are trying to integrate and use 
SEA as a means for sustainable development. The context is being brought to the forefront, 
which is assessed by all parties in the three cases as positive and important for research to 
increase relevance for SEA practice and influence this. Some of the main potentials 
experienced by researchers and organisations in the three cases are: 
- The research mode renders possible a critical review of planning, assessments and 
decision making processes, as well as of research  
- The research mode furthers development of attitudes towards SEA and development of 
specific assessment skills within the organisations. 
- The research mode assists in building bridges among actors within the organisation, and 
between the organisation and external actors, and eases the communication of SEA results 
to e.g. the public.  
By cooperating on knowledge making, the researchers have also gained benefits by getting 
increased access to information and processes. This is assessed as improving both the quality 
of research, and ongoing dissemination of knowledge and research results in non-academic 
forum.  
The high autonomy in Mode 3 means that the suggestions of the researcher are likely to go 
beyond the assumptions and rules that govern practice in the milieu. 
The overall conclusion from the study is that potentially a researcher, with high autonomy 
and interdependence, functions as a change agent for more environmentally sustainable 
decisions by being part of and influencing the field studied – without devaluing or 
compromising the traditional scholarship.  
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THE CHALLENGES FOR MODE 3 SEA RESEARCHERS AND THE ORGANISATIONS 
INVOLVED 
Being part of Mode 3 knowledge making is experienced as challenging in different aspects. 
First, the researcher is putting himself ‘in game’. One needs to know and recognise own 
knowledge, values and delimitations - and at the same time recognise others'. Second, Mode 
3 research is, and needs to be, personally driven, based upon a high engagement and 
clarification of own values. An overall pitfall of Mode 3 research is also the balance of having 
a close cooperation and at the same time retaining the critical approach of a researcher. It is a 
challenge to have a high interdependence and at the same time maintain high autonomy, i.e. 
without compromising slightly with your ability or willingness to be critical to the 
organisation with which you are associated. For the organisation the study especially shows 
challenges in getting a broader organisational engagement and commitment in the SEA 
research.  
Despite the focus on Mode 3, the analysis also shows Mode 2 and 1 characteristic in some 
parts of the Mode 3 research: From time to time, the researcher's work resembles a 
consultancy for the benefit of the cooperation and in other periods the researcher's efforts 
resemble traditional science in detailed studies of a specific. In addition to autonomy and 
interdependence, what distinguishes the Mode 3 researcher from these other modes is also 
the reflexivity that precedes and follows the efforts resembling other modes. In this way 
Mode 3 is by the authors seen as a complementary mode to doing research: Incorporating to a 
certain extent Mode 2 and 1 and thereby combining the benefits of modes. An issue of 
interest for further interest is a mapping of which modes of research is currently used by 
researchers in the SEA field. 
The point of departure for the article is that if the SEA research society is to make a difference 
for practice, we need a wide and deep form of cooperation between researchers and 
practitioners. This cooperation can be achieved through Mode 3 research entailing co-
funding, co-formulation of research questions and co-production of results. We as SEA 
researchers can choose to be close to the SEA practitioners, decision makers and affected 
parties and at the same time create temporary space of distance to the relevance demands 
coming from the co-operators to safeguard rigour. The contextually based Mode 3 research, 
and the appertaining critical pragmatism, can give us one way to minimise the gap between 
SEA research and SEA practice. Preconditions for this to happen prove to be personal 
engagement, shared wish for research to make a difference for SEA practice and dialogue 
with a confrontation of own research intention listening to the intentions of the society. 
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POSTLUDE: EXPANDING CHANGE AGENT CONCEPTS 
The article opens up a range of interesting questions of which a few is addressed in this 
section: How is the 'critical friend' role conceptualised? How can the concept of change be 
understood? What competences should the change agent possess? Is the mode more 
important than the substance of the knowledge production? 
 
THE CRITICAL FRIEND ROLE 
The article depicts my role as a 'critical friend' that is helping Energinet.dk and the energy 
sector out of a problem of applying SEA meaningfully, but what is a 'critical friend'? Costa 
and Kallick (1993) describe the critical friend as "a trusted person who asks provocative 
questions, provides data to be examined through another lens, and offers critique of a 
person's work as a friend. A critical friend takes the time to fully understand the context of 
the work presented and the outcomes that the person or group is working toward. The friend 
is an advocate for the success of that work" (p. 50). Costa and Kallick use the metaphor of an 
ophthalmologist to explain how the critical friend suggests different lenses to the partner to 
help the partner to learn which ones fits best. Some authors point at the contradiction 
between the words 'critical' and 'friend', and with point of departure in that critique Swaffield 
(2002) suggests that "The tension could be seen as the point of balance along a continuum 
from ‘total friend’ to ‘total critic’" (p. 3). She argues that being a critical friend requires finding 
an appropriate balance between support and challenge, and she suggest that a solution could 
be to separate task from people by being a friend to the persons and critical to their actions. 
Although this solution may sound reasonable, it may be difficult in practice, especially in the 
project like this Ph.D. project, where there is a need to challenge the practice of a broad range 
of actors and no resources for building up that many 'friendships' in order to being a critical 
friend. On the one hand, separation of persons and actions sounds like basic elements of 
constructive feedback and on the other hand, this separation is difficult in terms of actors, 
whose identity is closely related to their actions or where I as a researcher have not had time 
to build up a friendship. 
The critical friend may have several concerns: What if the partner does not listen or do not 
prioritise the time (although it seems obvious to the critical friend that he would benefit from 
trying other lenses); what if the partner is a heterogeneous organisation that needs different 
lenses to different people? What if being a friend is not enough? How to balance trust and 
change when you cannot have both? These concerns came into the Ph.D. project when 
discourses of a passive role of SEA seemed to dominate in Energinet.dk half-way in the 
project (see chapter 10). To generate change and change practice on SEA in this situation, the 
critical friend approach seemed insufficient to change this passive approach, however, I 
choose to await the situation and focus my research on other actors in the energy sector for a 
period. Using Coghlan and Brannick's (2005) forms of insider research, the passive approach 
changed the character of the research collaboration with Energinet.dk from a 'large-scale 
transformational change' to 'individual engaged in reflective study of professional practice' 
(p. 49). In terms of the research, the passive approach reduced the possibilities for doing 
research on SEA in practice and it reduced the partners' potential benefit of the research 
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collaboration. On the other hand, the passive approach gave insight in the political and 
organisational issues of SEA application and it leaved time for cooperation with other actors.  
The critical friend role is to some extent a double role in the cooperation between a researcher 
and an external organisation. Kim Behnke points at this mutuality in the article by stating 
that the strength in the cooperation is not only getting critical input from the researcher to the 
work in Energinet.dk, but the researcher's experiences of processes in the energy sector may 
also constitute a critical input to the established theories. Thus, the relation between the 
researcher and the external partner is a 'critical interdependence'; a two-way criticism 
between practice and theory with the change agent as facilitator. The critical interdependence 
is also reflected in the interaction and feedback described in the methodological frame.  
The critical interdependence may overcome some of the inherent contradictions in Kurek's 
dimensions of organisational autonomy and strategic interdependence: Although this 
framework is relevant for explaining elements of change agent research, it seems 
impracticable to be highly interdependent and highly autonomous at the same time. 
Organisations that are highly dependent on research will most likely steer their research 
resources in their benefit. Thus, researchers that strictly adhere to the Mode 3 knowledge 
production may likely face difficulties of getting funding. 
 
COMPETENCES OF THE CHANGE AGENT 
Researchers acting as change agents need to be skilled both as researchers and change agents. 
Andrew Pettigrew (2003b) argues that in order to understand change, the researcher must 
have competences of a social anthropologist, a historian, and a political analyst. Other 
literature put more emphasis on the 'research competences' such as data collection, writing 
skills, and planning and execution of learning cycles (e.g. Coghlan and Brannick 2005). The 
change agent is in Paul Pettigrew's (2003a) description entailed in "inherent ethical, political, 
and personal turmoils and issues around multilevel dynamics, role ambiguity, power games, 
political entrepreneurship, and “shadows of the past.”" (p. 375). In this turmoil, the setup is 
important as the change agents need "good support mechanisms and bestowed power in 
order to challenge vested and powerful interests" (p. 375). In their book about change agents, 
Buchanan and Boddy (1992) refer to a portfolio of power skills and manipulative techniques, 
and they mention activities like: "politicking, the wheeler-dealing, the fixing and negotiating, 
the coalition building and the trade-offs" (p. 29). The support mechanisms and bestowed 
power of this Ph.D. project have primarily been the SEA legislation, which must be fulfilled, 
and a group of powerful people supporting the project. 
More specifically on the role of a critical friend, trust is central: Access crucially depends on 
establishing interpersonal trust between the researcher and the organisation under scrutiny 
(Cohen et al. 2007). The centrality of trust put up limitations on Buchanan and Boddy's 
'backstage activities', as manipulation and collation building risk leading to distrust. Or as 
Cohen et al. (2007) describe it, "The researcher has to negotiate a potential minefield" (p. 123) 
not to be seen as an informer or as doing activities that are against the interest of the 
participants. Having the 'critical interdependence' in mind, trust is a concern for all the 
partners of the research. 
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Buchanan and Boddy (1992) argue that change agents have to "support the 'public 
performance' of rationally ordered and logically phased and visibly participative change with 
'backstage activity' in the recruitment and maintenance of support and in seeking and 
blocking resistance. Despite the access to people and information in Energinet.dk and to some 
extent among other actors in the energy sector, I have not been very active in the political part 
of backstage activity; I have found that research ethics and transparency traditions have been 
more in line with the 'public performance' activities of visibly participative change (although 
most likely not 'rationally ordered'). I have felt that my role as a critical friend was in line 
with public performance activities, whereas the backstage activities were the responsibility of 
key persons in organisations that may use my input. This choice can be criticised for being a 
passive approach to change, however, ownership of efforts cannot be 'given' from a critical 
friend. Buchanan and Boddy argue that the two performances must be supplementing each 
other to make change, and the limitation of the change generated through this Ph.D. project 
may especially be due to limited activity 'backstage'. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE 
An important aspect of change agent research and modes of knowledge production not 
touched upon in the article is how the organisation or society is intended to change. Weick 
and Quinn (1999) propose a distinction between episodic change and continuous change that 
is highly relevant for agents of change and their partners. The distinction relates to the 
characteristics of the organisation, especially how it develops. Episodic change is the planned 
and infrequent change of organisations that is related to an understanding of organisations as 
stable and controlled organisations. The episodic change tends to be externally driven and 
following the Lewinian model of unfreeze-transition-refreeze. In contrast, continuous change 
is related to a view on organisations as emergent and constantly changing. The continuous 
change is "a pattern of endless modifications" (p. 366) in continuous cycles of freeze-
rebalance-unfreeze: First, sequences are freezed in stories, maps ors schemas; then, these 
freezed sequences are reinterpreted or relabelled; finally, the sequences are unfreezed to 
resume improvisation and learning. The role of the change agent is widely different between 
the two types of change: In the episodic change process, the change agent is the creator of 
change by influencing practice at certain points in time, whereas the change agent in the 
continuous change process redirects change by managing language and unblocks learning 
and improvisation. In the latter, "change agents become important for their ability to make 
sense of change dynamics already under way" (Weick and Quinn 1999, p. 38). The relevance 
of the two types of change seems to depend on how structured and routine-based the 
organisation is as well as the type of change intended. 
Several models have been developed for how to understand and manage the substance of 
change. Leavitt's (1965) model of organisational change is an often cited model, in which the 
main point is that focus tends to be too much on technology (for instance SEA), as we forget 
other relevant aspects that interact with the technology, especially actors, structures, and task 
definitions. In this Ph.D. project, actors, structures and task definitions have been more 
important than the SEA tool itself, as the challenge of implementing SEA primarily has been 
the aspects 'around' the tool, rather than 'within' it. 
Research framework 
49 
In this Ph.D. project, the change orientation towards developing an SEA practice in the 
energy sector was in the beginning based on a traditional episodic change understanding 
with an unfreeze-transition-refreeze approach. Energinet.dk was intended to unfreeze its way 
of developing infrastructure projects in order to integrate SEA and thereafter to settle on this 
practice. The SEA pilot on the natural gas security of supply plan, see subchapter 7.1, was a 
part of this unfreeze-transition process, but it was disturbed by unresolved issues of 
responsibility and scope, see chapter 10. Instead, the change orientation in this Ph.D. project 
widely has developed into a continuous change orientation with continuous approaches to 
relevant actors and an effort of influencing language and concept used on environmental 
integration at strategic level. This shift is similar to the argument in the quote by Rist above, 
in which he argues for an reorientation towards processes and an enlightenment function of 
the research rather than an engineering function: This Ph.D. project started out as an 
engineering job of developing an meaningful SEA methodology and ended up as an 
enlightenment or empowering mission. The specific actions in this 'mission' are described in 
the following subchapter. 
 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION: SUBSTANCE VERSUS BRIDGE 
Weick (2001) disputes the importance of debating bridges between university and the 
surroundings in certain modes of research by arguing that it is of minor importance 
compared to the importance of raising the right questions. The questioning is the problem 
rather than the cooperation: "relationships between practitioners and academics are tense, not 
because there is no bridge over the relevance gap, but rather because there is a bridge that 
satisfies no one" (Weick 2001, p. S72). The bridge, Weick provokes, is unsatisfactory since it is 
based on defective assertions about what are important questions and aims, and the 
relevance problem is due to practitioners' unwillingness to "set aside their fads and begin to 
work with fundaments" and to academics' unwillingness to "set aside their disciplines and 
begin to work in a transdisciplinary manner" (p. S72). The field of SEA is not without fads 
and discipline glorification, but judged from the literature and conference debates, it seems 
widely transdisciplinary and willing to question fundamental issues the basic need and 
relevance of SEA. Weick's point about the right question should lead to an equal awareness of 
bridge and questions, since these are interdependent; they mutually define and facilitate each 
others in efforts of change. 
The combination of disciplines in the conceptual framework can be seen as an 
acknowledgement of a need to work interdisciplinary in order to deal with some relevant and 
fundamental aspects of SEA and decision-making processes. The main disciplines in play in 
this project are the disciplines of decision-making, sense-making, (strategic) environmental 
assessment, and energy planning (to understand the basis for infrastructure development). 
Among these disciplines, sense-making was entirely new to me and the project partners. In 
the thesis, the three first mentioned are most prominent. 
Starkey and Madan (2001) combine the questions of content and bridge. They argue, 
"[c]losing the relevance gap requires that the different stakeholders involved in management 
research creatively address issues of research content, research process and research 
dissemination" (p. S3). The creative way of addressing these issues has in this project partly 
been the staging of the Ph.D. fellow as an independent agent with opportunity of being a 
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critical friend without hindering objectives, tasks, or affiliations. The experience of the project 
is that when realising the independency, some actors in the energy sector finds such a critical 
friend a welcoming and needed sparring partner. The strategic independent change agent 
role thus provided a unique insight and openness to the dilemmas and challenges in practice 
and thereby provided a basis for doing research that may bridge the relevance gap. This 
independent position also provides a relevant form of dissemination of the research in the 
continuous and open dialogue and knowledge production with relevant actors. 
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3. 2 APPROACHES TO PRACTICE AND THEORY IN THIS PH.D. PROJECT 
 
"Action Researchers work on the epistemological assumption that the purpose of academic 
research and discourse is not just to describe, understand and explain the world, but also 
to change it” (Coghlan and Brannick 2005, p. 7) 
"Change is as much concerned with changing the world view or the organizational view 
of those involved, as it is with changing decision-making processes… or organization 
structures. This means challenging, questioning and breaking down the existing shared 
assumptions, or 'interpretive schemes', or 'cognitive coping mechanisms', held by the 
organization's members, in order to change attitudes and behaviour" (Buchanan and 
Boddy, 1992, p. 25). 
 
This second subchapter supplements the exploration of relevance and potentials of the 
change agent research in the previous subchapter with details and critical considerations of 
my experiences of doing research in the change agent approach. The subchapter builds on 
what Coghlan and Brannick in the quote above term an epistemological assumption of action 
research; that the purpose of research is also to change the world. In the following, the 
content and actions in the change process is described. An interesting part of this process is 
the changing of worldviews as Buchanan and Buddy point at in the quote above. It is 
important to note that the orientation to change in change agent research has two 
dimensions: To improve the research to better approach the problems of practice meanwhile 
being critical and to improve practice towards a normative setup. Both dimensions are 
inherent in this thesis and treated in the following. 
'Approaching' is used here to in line with the critical friend role described above; I have seen 
my role as activity suggesting, advising, inspiring, facilitating, and criticising rather than 
'forcing' people to change at the one extreme and uninterestedly reporting findings in 
journals without considering audiences in the at the other extreme. The approaching is thus 
to be seen as input in the streams of events that practitioners and academics face, and 
whether the input are noticed and retained depends on the people's mental framework, 
resources and situation. At the same time, the approaching is to be seen as a personal 
learning process for me as a Ph.D. fellow both in terms of a personal 'How can I know what I 
think until I hear what I say?' process (see the conceptual framework) and in terms of 
learning from feedback and responses. 
The balance between approaching practice and approaching theory can be related to the 
balance between immediate and long term relevance. At the 1999 Academy of Management 
meetings, March argued that the academic research that contributes to knowledge is more 
important than the research aimed at relevance. According to March, the key role of 
university is "in raising fundamental issues and advancing knowledge about fundamental 
processes affecting management […] not in the solution of immediate managerial problems" 
(Huff 2000b, p. 55). He warns against "a contemporary enthusiasm for immediate relevance 
[… since researchers] who pursue immediate relevance are likely to produce knowledge that 
is both redundant with what managers already know, and useful only over a limited time 
and under limited conditions." (p. 55). This project both concerns the immediate relevance of 
developing a meaningful practice on SEA in the Danish energy sector, but it also concerns the 
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more long-term and fundamental contributions e.g. to the understanding of how strategic 
decisions are made and how sense-making influences SEA processes. Long and short term 
issues are, however, related as long-term may have an immediate relevance in helping actors 
in the energy sector "become better reflective practitioners" (Starkey and Madan 2001, p. S4) 
and the immediate relevance problems may be valuable input to the long-term and 
fundamental issues. 
 
APPROACHING PRACTICE: SEA AND THE ENERGY SECTOR 
The threefold ambition of empowering practice to change, to communicate experiences, and 
to contest assumptions and propose developments to the literature has involved an approach 
to a range of actors within or related to the Danish energy sector. An overview of these actors 
is presented in table 4. 
 
Organisation People Main questions discussed 
Energinet.dk Technical analysts, project 
developers, managers 
How should SEA legislation be interpreted? 
When to apply SEA in energy infrastructure 
development to make the most of it? What is 
'reasonable alternatives'? EA practitioners, including a 
North European working group 
Managers and employees 
playing a key role on 
environmental considerations 
How is environment integrated and when is 
systematic environmental considerations and 
public participation relevant? 
Employees coordinating 
external research 
How to do SEA on research programme? 
Consultancy 
companies 
System analysts, energy 
planners 
When is energy planning within the scope of 
SEA legislation? What is 'reasonable 
alternatives'? 
DEA Employees on wind planning 
and oil investigation in DEA. 
Working group on strategic 
planning.  
When is energy planning within the scope of 
SEA legislation? How to apply SEA in energy 
context? What decisions to approach? 
Regional envi-
ronmental centre 
Employee working on SEAs When is energy infrastructure subject to SEA? 
Municipalities Planners Is 'voluntary' heat planning and energy 
planning subject to SEA? 
NGOs (nature) Members engaged in 
environmental assessments 
How to participate in strategic discussions? 
What role does SEA play? 
AAU Students within energy 
technique, energy planning, and 
environmental management 
Who is responsible for SEA application? 
Table 4: Organisations and people approached to change practice on SEA and the main questions 
discussed. 
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The table shows that a recurrent issue in the approach to the actors in the energy sector is 
how to interpret legislation in terms of what decisions are subject to SEA. The confusion and 
discussion on this subject may partly be due to the nature of decisions in the energy sector 
that differs from the spatial orientation that is inherent in the Danish legislation on 
environmental assessment. Another recurrent discussion is the interpretation of 'reasonable 
alternatives' (EU Directive 2001/42/EC, article 5.1), which at the strategic level is a concern 
since radical alternatives may give rise to politically unwanted debates. 
As an example of the interesting discussions is whether SEA reports should include 
statements like "Overall, the positive impacts far outweigh the negative impacts" 
(Energinet.dk 2010c, p. 22). In the example, a (anonymised) consultant in the SEA team for 
Energinet.dk's natural gas security of supply plan argued that the formulation was 
reasonable as the planning was expected to cause major societal GHG benefits and minor 
local disturbances on nature, and that the legislation on SEA did not prohibit such 
formulations. Furthermore, the formulation was argued to help 'scarce-attention' politicians 
understand (i.e. making sense of) the assessment. The argument was, however, not that 
simple, I disputed, as the statement included a weighing of impacts of different 
environmental aspects. If political targets on these aspects were weighed against each other, 
it would have been possible to conclude on the relation between impacts, but political targets 
seldom are, and in this example, the statement was a political weighing of impacts on nature 
versus GHG savings. In the end, the formulation was included in the final SEA report. 
The efforts of approaching the actors have often been in the form of personal discussions, and 
therefore they are rarely documented. The exceptions are found in formal documents. My 
approach to the Århus Regional Environmental Centre which made the EIA of the Østerild 
test centre was, without intend, included in the hearing comments in the EIA process (DASEP 
2009a). My approach to Energinet.dk is reflected in the official formulation of SEA intensions 
in Energinet.dk that can be found in appendixes to the company's strategy plan documents 
(Energinet.dk 2008b, 2010b). And my approach is reflected in the hearing statement on the 
revision of the law on environmental assessment of plans and programmes (DASEP 2008). 
Besides the directly visible effects, the approaching has led to more detailed explanation than 
planned in the pre-analysis of Kriegers Flak grid connection (Energinet.dk 2009a) and 
influence on the scoping of the SEA of the gas infrastructure planning (Energinet.dk 2010c). 
Furthermore, the research have had a range of less tangible influences, which Rist (2000) 
describe as "policy researchers work with policy makers and their staffs over time to create a 
contextual understanding about an issue, build linkages that will exist over time, and strive 
constantly to educate about new developments and research findings in the area" (p. 1003). 
The indirect influence is in line with Weiss' (1988) notion of enlightenment: "Research on 
knowledge utilization has disclosed that the results of one study rarely influence the 
direction of the program that was evaluated. But decision makers indicate a strong belief that 
they are influenced by ideas and arguments that have their origins in research and 
evaluation. Case studies of evaluations and decisions tend to show that the generalizations 
and ideas that come from research and evaluation help to shape the development of policy. 
The phenomenon has come to be known as 'enlightenment'" (Weiss 1988, p. 11). The influence 
of this Ph.D. project may thus be difficult to measure in short and quantitative terms. 
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The approaching efforts have been guided by decision-making theory e.g. in being aware of 
decision windows for influencing. Still, much of the approaching efforts have been 'a shot in 
the dark' without knowing the potentials and limitation of the 'windows'. As a learning 
process, these considerations have iteratively sharpened my understanding of who to 
approach and when. It has been an aim to approach all relevant actors in the energy sector 
and at the same time focus on the actors that have most interest in cooperating with me. I 
have not investigated their motivations for cooperating with me, but my impression is that in 
grasping and interpreting a new legislation and concept like in the case of SEA, there is a 
need for a strategic independent change agent to answer immediate questions about how to 
cope with SEA and to create dynamics in organisational routines and awareness; some 
questions may be embarrassing to ask the Ministry which formulated the legislation and 
some questions may seem too sensitive to ask a consultant. The interdependence with 
Energinet.dk created good opportunities for such an autonomous change agent role. 
 
APPROACHING THEORY: INTRODUCING SENSE-MAKING IN THE EA COMMUNITY 
 
"[C]ertain situations encourage divergence: for example, in order to get a Ph.D., it is in 
the interest of a history student to challenge the accepted account, or its interpretation, so 
that the originality which he brings to the subject is clearly apparent." (March 1998, p. 
8) 
 
In line with March's description of a Ph.D. project as a mechanism for divergence, the 
intension of the Ph.D. project in terms of approaching theory was to use sense-making theory 
to enhance understanding of the strategic decision-making with characteristics like the 
choices in the Danish energy sector. Sense-making theory, I hypothesised, was a way to 
enhance the theoretical understanding of strategic decisions and their relation to SEA. 
Besides sense-making, the efforts of approaching theory also concerned reflexivity of the 
social setup of research, as described in subchapter 3.1. Table 5 presents an overview of the 
actors that are approached in the efforts, the media, and the content of the discussions with 
these actors. 
The table shows the variety of media through which I have approached theorists, hereunder a 
webpage on sense-making and impact assessment which I made as a follow up on the 
discussions at the IAIA'10 conference, see appendix E. Especially the conference 
presentations and the webpage have generated discussions on sense-making, including what 
differs sense-making from other constructivist theories and how it may be used in practice. In 
line with the critical friend role, my intension has been to give input to the interested rather 
than convince them about the relevance of sense-making, and the IAIA and AESOP 
(Association of European Schools of Planning) conferences have shown to be relevant arenas 
for approaching interested and relevant people. The conference presentations have also 
constituted a test for the framing and use of sense-making in regard to SEA and planning, 
and the feedback has e.g. lead to interest in sense-making in specific situations. The 
conference discussions have not only been interesting for academics as many (reflexive) 
practitioners have engaged in discussions on sense-making by relating sense-making to 
puzzling events, see appendix E.  
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Organisation Media People Content of discussions 
The assessment-oriented 
research community within 
the International 
Association of Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) 
The planning-oriented 
research community within 
the Association of European 
Schools of Planning 
(AESOP) 
EA journals 
Webpage and 
news list on 
sense-making 
Visitors of my 
webpage on 
sense-making 
What is special about sense-
making? How to use sense-
making in practice? Sense-
making explanation of specific 
events? 
How to bridge the gap between 
research and practice? 
Poster, papers 
and presentation 
Conference 
participants 
Journals Unknown 
reviewers and 
readers 
Relation between change agent 
research and other modes. 
How to understand 'tiering' of 
decision-making. 
AAU Lectures Students, 
researchers 
How does sense-making differ 
from other theories?  
Table 5: Organisations and people approached to enhance theoretical understanding of strategic 
decision-making and the content of the discussions. 
 
As examples of the discussed topics are sense-making as a way to make the tacit activities in 
the beginning of SEA process explicit and the possibilities and ways to improve sense-
making abilities (although the latter is an interesting question, it is not directly dealt with in 
this thesis). The discussions revealed great understanding of the significance of sense-making 
processes in screening and scoping stages of SEA, and the discussions were at the same time 
pointing at a need for turning sense-making theory into practical tools and advice. 
The effect of the approach to theory is difficult to measure. Judged from correspondence, an 
effect is awareness and acknowledgement of the relevance of sense-making theory in an SEA 
perspective. The discussions at the conferences showed reflexivity among participants on 
their own practice and stances. At the IAIA Geneva conference in 2011, the "Sense-making 
and impact assessment" poster reproduced in figure 6 was part of competitions for public 
choice of best poster and the IAIA jury's choice of best poster. According to the President of 
IAIA at that year, Nick Taylor, the sense-making poster was second in both competitions and 
it was complimented for proposing an innovative angle to impact assessment and for its 
ways of communicating the main points. 
The considerations in the efforts of approaching theory were e.g. related to how to present 
sense-making theory to be easily accessible for theorists. Learning from discussions at 
conferences and in Energinet.dk I changed strategy from presenting sense-making as a 
separate frame for understanding human behaviour to combine it with decision-making 
theories of human behaviour, see chapter 4. This new strategy seemed more appropriate 
when approaching actors that are acting and perceiving within a decision-making paradigm; 
by relating sense-making and decision-making and show similarities and differences, it 
became much easier to communicate and achieve a fruitful discussion of where sense-making 
may provide new answers. 
The choice of giving Weick's sense-making theory a prominent role in the Ph.D. was based on 
an acknowledgement of the plausibility of the theory to explain what I experienced, 
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hereunder 'gaps' in the explanation provided by decision-making theory. Thus, the choice 
was based on a mixture of personal experiences, perceived theoretical shortcomings, and the 
potential for SEA literature. Weick's sense-making theory is inspired by a range of other 
theories and therefore shares assumptions and understandings with a range of related 
theories. This has made the separation of sense-making from other theories a recurrent issue 
during the Ph.D. project. Introducing yet another theory into the IA community risks 
contributing to an existing "confusing proliferation of definitions and conceptualizations that 
fail to converge into a coherent whole" (Popper and Lipshitz 2004, p. 181), however, to make 
sense of complex patterns of social activity, people need, according to Weick (2009, p. 306) to 
complicate themselves. Sense-making has been my effort on complicating my self in the Ph.D. 
project.  
Focus on sense-making should be seen in relation to the elephant story of understanding 
phenomena (March 1995, p. 111), so that sense-making is relevant for a certain part of the 
studied 'elephant' and irrelevant for others. In this thesis, sense-making is hypothesised to be 
especially relevant for the non-programmed and strategic choices, as argued in chapter 4. The 
choice of a relatively narrow approach to human behaviour involves biases in terms of 
interpretation of findings in the extent that these may be better explained by other theories. 
Related aspects are therefore discussed in subchapter 4.2 and included in the reflections 
throughout the thesis. 
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Figure 6: The "Sense-making and impact assessment" poster presented at the IAIA conference in 
Geneva, 2011. 
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NAVIGATING BETWEEN PARTNERS' INTERESTS 
 
"[B]eing an Action Researcher implies a double task which is not easy to balance: to 
satisfy the needs of the client and at the same time combine this with research that could 
add to existent knowledge, some new and, if possible, generic knowledge open for a critical 
and reflective discussion […] in the scientific community" (Westlander 2006, p. 54) 
 
In line with Westlander's description of the double task of balancing the interests of the client 
and the scientific community, this section presents reflections on how to navigate between 
interests of the partners in this research project. Navigating between these interests has been 
an important part of the Ph.D. process and the navigation is closely interlinked with 
important decisions made on research and actors during the process. The section is inspired 
by the frank description of learning to do research and cope with the many not debated 
contradictions in interdisciplinary research that Cerwonka and Malkki give in 'Improvising 
theory' (2007). 
This Ph.D. project is constituted by the intersection of three primary actors' interests: Aalborg 
University, Energinet.dk and me. The two former are of course heterogeneous organisations 
with several interests of varying dominance and the university interests concerns e.g. 
incentives in the financial allocation system to universities and interests in the research centre 
I am attached to. Furthermore, these partners' interests are embedded in a context of interests 
in the society. What binds these partners together is a common interest in changing practice 
on SEA in the energy sector, although this common interest has divergent basis. The basis 
and the influence on choices on research and practice made throughout the project as 
explained in the following. 
Energinet.dk's main interest in the project is to benefit from SEA rather than just fulfilling 
legislation: "SEA should not be an empty paper-activity. SEA must enter the decision-making 
processes at a time and with a content that make SEA an active element" (Behnke 2010). This 
main aim is positioned in a context of caution as Energinet.dk acts within public scrutiny, 
political debates, and discourses of effectiveness and legitimacy. The pressure on 
Energinet.dk is reflected in a news paper feature by the chairman of Energinet.dk's board 
Niels Fog (2011) in which he writes: "The citizens - taxpayers - would be shocked if they 
knew how much good and qualified working time is used on totally unfounded stories from 
media-focused, semi-educated researchers [mediehungrende halvstuderede forskere], who 
do not realise or do not care about how big costs they impose on the society through at best 
half finished work or in worst case politically sabotaging subjective analyses". Although, this 
attitude seems more radical than the attitudes I have met in Energinet.dk, it does indicate 
Energinet.dk's caution towards publicity and research on sensitive topics. As a critical friend, 
I therefore have been cautious about my formulations in my criticisms and I have chosen to 
favour internal criticism instead of public criticism. As an example of this choice, the co-
authored SEA policy formulation in Energinet.dk's Strategy Plan appendix (Energinet.dk 
2010b) was not critical about electricity infrastructure developments that had avoided SEA 
attention and might have been SEA mandatory. My assessment at that point in time was that 
both Energinet.dk and the change agent process seemed to benefit more from enthusiasm 
and forward looking engagement in the SEA policy rather than disputes on previous possible 
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mistakes. The critical discussion on practice was taking place in other forums and did not 
seem to be appropriate in the company's public strategy. 
Energinet.dk's interest is also indirectly reflected in the insight I have gained. My insight in 
SEA considerations and choice processes in Energinet.dk is per definition restricted by what I 
am told and who I am talking to. In some instances I have been depending on persons few 
persons' openness and willingness to devote time for my questions, and in some instances I 
have found it necessary to "do a little of the gatekeepers bidding rather than not to do the 
research at all" (Cohen et al. 2007, p. 124) by approaching other persons than the primary 
contact persons to learn about the untold. 
The interest of the university system is reflected in the Ministerial order on Ph.D. 
programmes at universities (no 18 of January 14. 2008), which among other things prescribes 
quality of the research. Within the quality requirement and without an official pressure, the 
university furthermore has an interest in publication of journal articles with a view to the 
bibliometric research indicator, which was introduced by the Danish Government in 2010 as a 
performance based funding mechanism. The interest in publications has had an increasing 
influence on the communication of this project although it to some extent is in conflict with 
the change agent approach: If the research and interaction with others are not made through 
journals on the bibliometric list, they are in principle not rewarded. Similarly, regulation on 
the Ph.D. assessment committee is favouring university position levels rather than 
competences of making relevant research.  
The quality of the research includes how choices and research is reasoned and 
communicated. The norms in research seem to be highly favouring rational and logic choices 
and disfavouring the coincidence and chances that is inherent in a complex and equivocal 
world. Starbuck (1983) has a similar view on the ideologies governing research and practice: 
"actions taken unreflectively without specific reasons are irrational and irrationality is bad" 
(p. 94). For a similar critique, March proposed the Myth of Rationality (March 1995) in which 
"[a]ctions are “explained” by reference to some consequences that are (or were) anticipated at 
the time of the action" (March 1998, p. 4). The myth of rationality is present in at least two 
levels of research: a) the expectation of explaining what is observed as rational behaviour, 
and b) the expectation of explaining our own behaviour and choices as researchers as 
rational. March criticises social science for insisting on rational explanations of actions (March 
1995, similar critique in Weick 1995, p. 178) and argues that the insistence have made people 
incredible skilled in explaining our actions rationally. March's critique is a way to articulate 
that choices on research also is made in other ways: Fundamental choices made in a Ph.D. 
project like choice of theory or stay abroad involves more aspects than what a human mind 
can comprehend, why Ph.D. fellows besides efforts on rational choice also rely on gut-
feelings, intuition, or non-research elements such as "What country would be most interesting 
to experience?".  
Finally, my interests in the Ph.D. project centres around the issues of personal challenges and 
changing practice to something more sustainable than the present use of resources and 
pollution of our planet. For these purpose, the Ph.D. project is a good possibility for 
interacting with actors that (in principle) accepts the change agent role and at the same time 
keeping (and be rewarded for) a critical stance. Basically, the interests are grounded in ethical 
and identity perceptions of a need to actively foster and be part of such change. Besides 
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personal motivation of creating change, the project is motivated by what Lund (2009) terms 
"our “public service” obligation" as (p. 75) as public funded researchers. The attractiveness of 
the research opportunities in the Ph.D. project is of course flanked by basic interests such as a 
salary and career options.  
My interests brings norms into the research, e.g. on SEA: Despite criticism (see appendix B), I 
regard the SEA tool in its essence a tool with many qualities that is relevant in a wide range 
of contexts. In principle, SEA is just one of a "myriad sophisticated tools" (Buchanan and 
O'Connell 2006, p. 33), however, the legislative requirement makes it more topical than many 
other tools. The norms and convictions that I brought into the project have developed with 
the growing insight in strategic decision-making processes. As an example, my ideas about 
public participation have been nuanced from an always necessary element to a pragmatic 
understanding that in some technical or strategic questions, it may not be meaningful to aim 
at involving the broad public. Technical questions may instead benefit more from being 
consulted with NGOs, research institutions and others that in broad terms represent interests 
of the public. 
 
Learning to play jazz as a critical friend 
The navigation between the three actors' interests has similarities with what some 
organisation scholars describe as an exercise of playing jazz (see the special issue of 
Organization Science, vol. 9, No. 5 1998, Cerwonka and Malkki 2007): Jazz is improvisation 
with other people's input based on basic techniques, experience, intuition and playfulness. 
The jazz-perspective is in the following used as a framework to show the improvisation 
during the project. 
Change agent research is not conducted in isolation, and I 'playing' with a range of persons. 
Most notable are Kim Behnke and Lone Kørnøv who played central instruments in the 
change melodies. The improvisation has been most concrete in situations with unpredicted 
developments and a need for redirection. An example is the official suspension of the 
planning process on natural gas infrastructure, which the SEA pilot in Energinet.dk was 
attached to. The research was focused on this project in satisfaction of all partners' interests 
and the reaction to the cancelling was to change focus from natural gas to SEA challenges in 
the electricity planning. Another example is the realisation that there are no obvious plans or 
programmes on which to do an SEA in Energinet.dk, and this understanding challenged the 
plan-orientation in the SEA legislation. Thus, I changed strategy from a planning-orientation 
to a project-orientation of being involved in early stages of the development of specific 
project to look for 'plan-like' choices or relevant stages in the processes to do SEA. In a time 
when internal questions in Energinet.dk were blocking further progress on SEA, I shifted 
towards theoretical questions, still with the purpose of benefitting SEA practice and in line 
with the actors' interests. 
The jazz metaphor is in line with March's understanding of evolving preferences, see 
subchapter 4.1, as the directions and 'interests' of melodies and rhythms evolves when 
playing jazz. In the project, changing preferences is found e.g. in the ideas of how to apply 
SEA in Energinet.dk and the contextual changes e.g. to the natural gas planning changed the 
rhythm and style of the participation. 
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As a novice in jazz (both literally and metaphorically), I find my navigation perplexed by 
personal and ethical doubts like: Should I persistently insist on my ideas on environmental 
considerations in project planning although Energinet.dk employees are of another opinion? 
How can I defend deviating from established SEA norms when interfering with something as 
important as environmental governance at strategic level in the Danish energy sector? Should 
criticism from time to time be 'bended' in favour of cooperation as a critical friend? Many of 
the doubts are related to the tension between relevance for practice versus scientific rigour, 
which is a recurrent theme in action research. Kemmis and McTaggart (2000) review action 
research experiences and point at the tension between methodological rigor and timely 
results: "In most action research, including participatory action research, the researchers 
make sacrifices in methodological and technical rigor in exchange for more immediate gains 
in face of validity: whether the evidence they collect makes sense to them, in their contexts" (p. 
591, emphasis original). They argue that in this trade-off, "some loss of methodological 
sophistication is a price worth paying in most practical contexts of transformative social 
action" (p. 592) and that concerns about methodological sophistication increase with the 
distance to the investigated and when the results have to stand the scrutiny of researcher 
communities rather than the people involved. Although, there has been some tension 
between theoretical sophistication and practical contributions, the trade-offs have been minor 
in the change agent approach in this project. Although the project started out with focus on 
practice and relevance, this was related to 'sophisticated' considerations as explained in 
chapter 4.1.  
As an example of 'failed' navigation, and a major frustration (compared to my initial targets 
and expectations), is my lack of ability to approach hesitations towards SEA among actors in 
the energy sector. I have not been able to reveal the reasons for some of these hesitations, 
which frustrates in the efforts to change. It may be a matter of path dependency and inertia of 
social systems, but such explanations are of minor consolation in trying to fulfil project aims 
and personal interests. The insight in some of the hesitation has, however, been an interesting 
experience, arguably also of interest to other practitioners. In favour of the cooperation with 
actors in the sector, these findings on hesitation and reasons behind are, however, not 
published. The 'failure' may also be due to my understanding of the critical friend role as not 
going 'backstage' to get political influence. Buchanan and Boddy (1992) found that change 
agent practices frequently are faced with problems of interlocking that impede changes, e.g. 
in waiting for decisions and actions to be taken by other actors or in unclear responsibility. 
Therefore, the hesitations experienced in the Ph.D. project are likely to be a natural part of 
change agent practice. 
Learning to play jazz in this project has also been learning how to improvise in discussing the 
research content and results. The shift from presenting sense-making as a separate discipline 
to combine sense-making and decision-making as continuous process is one example. 
Improvisation in discussions and interactions has also been a learning process in how to cope 
with "vested feelings", e.g. in taking responsibility for co-produced results that may involve 
compromises in terms of research norms. And to learn to engage with people that have 
different values and practices (or musical training and inspiration) on the topics of the 
research.  
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
As an answer to the first sub-question, this chapter has clarified relevance and potentials of 
the change agent way of doing research in the field of SEA. Relevance and potentials are of 
course context dependent and the change agent way of doing research will have other 
characteristics when used in other context. In this Ph.D. project, high strategic 
interdependence has improved the content and relevance of the research and high 
organisational autonomy has made it possible to act as an autonomous change agent and 
approach the actors and processes that seemed relevant. 
The detailed and critical reflections on the approach to theory and practice in this chapter 
show dilemmas and experiences of the change agent. It indicate a challenge in terms of focus 
and quality of the research and interaction as it may be difficult for the change agent during 
the process to have a clear idea of who, what and how it is most relevant to approach in order 
to change practice towards more sustainable actions and decisions. Experiences and learning 
processes may improve the change agent' skills and actions, however, a change agent process 
most likely involves a range of non-programmed and unstructured decisions that make 
routines and existing solutions potentially inadequate. The change agent processes will thus 
always need elements of learning and adaptation of the researcher and its partners; in other 
words "a bit of jazz improvisation". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
“Decision making presupposes meaning, an understanding of the way things are and 
might be, a basis for engaging others in discourse about what is possible and what has 
happened. Those meanings are often interpretations of fate and nature, but they are 
human constructions, and decision processes are one of the sites within which the 
constructions take place.” (March 1994, pp. 258-259) 
"Organizations today face an increasingly turbulent external environment, which is 
characterized as uncertain, ambiguous and populated by equivocal cues that result in 
discontinuous rather than evolutionary change. […] Greater uncertainty can lead to 
confusion and an over-cautiousness that paralyses organizations and their managers into 
inactivity. Alternatively, ignoring complexity can lead to misplaced over-confidence 
where decision-making is undertaken with important cues being rejected as they do not 
conform to existing mental models. One challenge then, is for organizations to be better 
prepared for escalating uncertainty, for managers to develop their capacities to make sense 
of phenomena, and to develop a perspective of the future that replaces naïve determinism 
with social pluralism." (Wright 2005, p. 86)  
"The tendency in policy research and analysis has become ever more centrifugal, spinning 
off more methodologies and variations on methodologies, more conceptual frameworks […] 
A number of critics of the current scene of policy studies […] have argued that any 
improvements in the techniques of policy research have not led to greater clarity about 
what to think or what to do." (Rist 2000, p. 1001) 
 
Finding a meaningful way of applying SEA in strategic decision-making processes requires 
an in-depth understanding of the decision-making processes. As argued in the introduction 
and indicated by March above, sense-making has a potential of explaining some of the less 
understood elements of decision-making processes. A similar argument is put forward by 
Wright in the quote above in which he points at the challenges of an increasingly turbulent 
environment and greater uncertainty. Sense-making is important for studying non-
programmed strategic decisions, as it is centred on ambiguous and equivocal situations and 
provide a framework for understanding how people make sense of these. 
Decision-making and sense-making is in this chapter sought combined in a framework since 
they are seen to supplement each other in a number of ways; sense-making theory depicts the 
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generation of meaning that is interacting with the act on deciding depicted in decision-
making theory; decision-making primarily concentrates on fixed entities and phases, whereas 
sense-making is about the vague questions and "muddy answers" (Weick 1993, p. 636); sense-
making is about getting to an understanding of a situation, whereas decision-making is about 
getting from understanding to decision. The relations between decision-making and sense-
making are in the first subchapter clarified in order to combine these into a single model of 
human choice. The second subchapter integrates this model into a conceptual framework for 
investigation of strategic decision-making processes that is constituted by a continuum of 
levels of perspectives. 
This chapter constitutes the conceptual framework of the investigations in the thesis. The 
framework is a continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making with different level of 
details. The chapter shows that whereas the overview of strategic decision-making is often 
found in SEA literature, the detailed insight into how we make decisions is rarely explored. 
Therefore, the chapter is dominated by this detailed perspective and theories of decision-
making and sense-making are combined into a model of human choice with a view to 
increasing the understanding of strategic decision-making and SEA processes. The chapter 
thus forms the answer to the second sub-question: "How can decision-making and sense-
making be combined as concurrent processes in a model of human choice and how can this 
model contribute to a continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making processes?" 
The answer to the sub-question concentrates on elements within decision-making and sense-
making which explain human behaviour. It should be kept in mind that decision-making and 
sense-making theory involves a range of other significant elements than what is presented 
here, e.g. about control and division of work. The three main authors used in this chapter are 
James G March, Herbert A Simon, and Karl E Weick and their writings include a wealth of 
insight in other aspects of organisations and decision-making than what is included in this 
chapter. March is a political scientist and professor in organisation theory, Simon was a 
political scientist, psychologist and economist, and Weick is an organisational theorist 
focusing on organisational psychology; all three are highly distinguished professors. It 
should also be kept in mind that research into human behaviour has been progressed in a 
variety of disciplines such as mathematics, sociology, psychology, economics and political 
sciences. Decision-making theory - and to a wide extent also sense-making theory - is 
constituted on and inspired by insight from a range of these disciplines, however, some 
aspects of human behaviour may be better explained by other disciplines. With overlap in 
roots and focus, decision-making and sense-making is here regarded "supplementary 
domains of knowledge" (Simon 1997) and developments in the theories of human behaviour 
is regarded more about "fashion" than paradigm shifts (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 30). The 
combination of decision-making and sense-making in this chapter is not a paradigm shift in 
the understanding of human behaviour, although it may provide for a new way of thinking 
within the literature on SEA. 
The combination of decision-making and sense-making is primarily motivated by their 
mutual supplements, which is hoped to lead to better understanding of decision behaviours; 
both disciplines involve a genuine insight in strategic decision-making processes from 
conceptual as well as empirical investigations. The combination is furthermore intended to 
counteract the centrifugal tendency of research as criticised by Rist above. This centrifugal 
Conceptual framework 
65 
tendency seems widespread in SEA literature and bringing yet another fragmented theory 
into the field seems of little benefit. Finally, the intension of the combination is that the 
insight of sense-making is easier to communicate and adopt by other researchers and 
practitioners.  
 
 
4.1 COMBINING THEORIES OF DECISION-MAKING AND SENSE-MAKING 
Is 'decision' a retrospective attribution of the observer, namely an account of a cognitive 
community that attempts to form a coherent view of particular organizational outcomes 
and the processes that led to them, or does 'decision' signify a distinct empirical event, a 
moment of actors' choice whereby a course of action has been purposefully committed to? 
The confusion … has long generated conceptual difficulties…" (Tsoukias 2010, p. 380) 
 
Decision-making theories are on the one hand a powerful discipline and "the established 
church of social science (March 1988, p. 2), but on the other hand it is a discipline with widely 
recognised problems (Reed 1991). One of these problems is the confusion of the ontology of a 
decision as argued by Tsoukias above and the ontological understanding of a decision is one 
of the striking differences between the theories of decision-making and sense-making. As this 
subchapter will show, decision-making and sense-making have a range of similarities and 
differences that have to be dealt with to combine the theories in a single model. 
This subchapter presents how the theories of decision-making and sense-making depict 
decision-making processes. The relations between the two disciplines and existing efforts on 
combining these are point of departure for combining insight from the disciplines into a 
single model of human choice. The subchapter is in line with Simon's plead to emphasising 
the similarities of different theories of human behaviour rather than stage theories as 
something new and different; the aim is thus to 'reconcile' sense-making and decision-making 
processes in a choice circles model. 
To concentrate on the core of decision-making theory, the theories of decision-making that 
are presented in this thesis are the 'roots of strategic decision-making theories' in the shape of 
Herbert A. Simon, James G. March and Henry Mintzberg's writings from the 1940'ies to 
1970'ies (some books used here are later editions). These pieces are in this thesis seen to 
provide the "gross characteristics" (Simon 1955, p. 100) of decision-making that through 
subsequent research have been added nuances and insight on processes within these 
structures. As Simon (1979, p. 293) puts it: "Its references are now badly out of date, but its 
theoretical structure does not appear to have been superseded by any subsequent work, and 
indeed has obtained considerable new empirical support." Through comprehensive empirical 
scrutiny, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) concluded that empirical research clearly supports 
decision-making characteristics similar to the writings of Simon, March and Mintzberg. 
Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (2000) investigated cognitive aspects and argued that their 
results and analyses "are consistent with the conception of bounded rationality originally 
presented by Herbert Simon" (p. 220). The choice of the roots excludes branches of decision-
making theory that to a wide extent overlap with sense-making aspects; some formulations 
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on ambiguity and interpretations in March (1994) are very similar to those of Weick (1989, 
1995). 
The presentation of sense-making theory is concentrated on Weick's writings from the 60ies 
to the 90ies, especially Weick's "The Social Psychology of Organizing" from 1979 (the second 
edition from 1989 used in this thesis) and "Sensemaking in Organisations" from 1995. The 
latter is called "the theory itself" (Eisenberg 2006, p. 1695) as an elaboration of the ideas from 
his early writings. In reviewing Weick's work Eisenberg concludes "What I find is that the 
core ideas have not changed much over three decades, but have built upon each other" (p. 
1704). The presentation of sense-making is concentrated on the basic properties and processes 
of sense-making, e.g. plausibility and retrospectively noticed cues, without covering the 
supporting empirical research that in part conflates with the research conducted within 
research on decision-making.  
The chosen pieces of decision-making and sense-making have some general characteristics 
that may ease the combination and increase the relevance for exploring strategic decision-
making processes and SEA: They have a social or organisational perspective, they are 
primarily descriptive on the processes that characterises choice and the choice process, and 
they are opposing the rational models of choice. The chosen pieces furthermore constitute a 
time of change from avoidance of the ambiguous and equivocal to focusing on the situations 
characterised by these. The early writings of Simon are an introduction to human behaviour 
in general, whereas March and Mintzberg - and indeed Weick - is more focused on the 
ambiguous, the novel, the unstructured strategic decision-making processes.  
 
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AS EXPLAINED IN DECISION-MAKING THEORY 
 
"Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which the decision-
making process is programmed. At one extreme we have repetitive, well-defined problems 
(e.g., quality control or production lot-size problems) involving tangible considerations, to 
which the economic models that call for finding the best among a set of pre-established 
alternatives can be applied rather literally. In contrast to these highly programmed and 
usually rather detailed decisions are problems of a non-repetitive sort, often involving 
basic long-range questions about the whole strategy of the firm or some part of it, arising 
initially in a highly unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the kinds of search 
processes […]. In this whole continuum, from great specificity and repetition to extreme 
vagueness and uniqueness, we will call decisions that lie toward the former extreme 
programmed, and those lying toward the latter end non-programmed. This simple 
dichotomy is just a shorthand for the range of possibilities we have indicated." (Cyert et 
al. 1956, pp. 237-238) 
 
Some authors argue that most strategic decisions are non-programmed (e.g. DuBrin 2009, p. 
147). Other authors even equal strategic decision-making and non-programmed decision-
making (e.g. Christensen 1968). Decision theory includes conceptual as well as empirical 
insight into this type of decision-making, which Cyert et al. describe in the quote above. 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the non-programmed choices, programmed decisions 
are also presented as they play important roles in conserving "scarce and costly decision-
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making time and attention" (Simon 1997, p. 89) that then can be used to grasp the non-routine 
situations, and in being explanation for defective action when people do not diagnose novel 
situations as novel. The descriptions of decision-making as problem-solving and routine 
activities are complemented by a presentation of Simon and March's views on preferences 
and rationalities. 
In the quote of Cyert above, decision-making is depicted as a continuum of responses to 
stimuli with one extreme what March later describe as "explicit calculation of its 
consequences in terms of objectives" and the other extreme being routines and rules of 
behaviour. Simon later adds the 'novel' and 'consequential' to the definition of non-
programmed decisions (1960, p. 6). The classification of situations as novel depends on the 
actors involved; a situation may be novel to some actors and well-known to other actors. 
 
Decision-making by problem-solving activity 
Rational behaviour is a normative starting-point for a range of theories of decision-making 
(March 1978). Rational choice is basically the considerations of all relevant consequences and 
alternatives to a fixed problem in terms of stable and comparable preferences (see e.g. Cyert 
et al. 1956). The rational model is influential to much theory since "no other theory of 
judgment and decision can ever match it in scope, power, and simplicity" (Kahnemann and 
Tversky 2000, p. 221). When it comes to empirical findings, the rational model quickly falls 
short in explaining behaviour: "If we try to use this framework to describe how real human 
beings go about making choices in a real world, we soon recognize that we need to 
incorporate in our description of the choice process several elements that are missing from 
the economic model" (Cyert et al. 1956, p. 237). Instead, Simon and March depict humans as 
"intended rational", e.g. in the "administrative man" (Simon 1955, p. 114), and a main theme 
of their writings is the boundaries to the rational behaviour: In an important sense, all 
decision is a matter of compromise. Decision-making, Simon argues, is "bounded in terms of 
limitations on mental capacity, information, clarity of preferences, and consistency between 
individual's and organisational goals. The alternative that is finally selected never permits a 
complete or perfect achievement of objectives, but is merely the best solution that is available 
under the circumstances" (Simon 1997, p. 5).  
Simon (1997, p. 62) proposes that decision-making can be seen as two major segments: A) "the 
development of a system of intermediate values, and an appraisal of their relative weights" 
and B) "a comparison of the possible lines of action in terms of this value system". The two 
segments are interacting, e.g. as choices may construct new preferences (March 1978). Within 
the second segment, Simon depicts decision-making a deliberate choice process consisting of 
three phases (Simon 1960, pp. 2-3): 
- Intelligence; searching the environment for conditions calling for decisions 
- Design; inventing, developing, and analysing possible courses of action 
- Choice; selecting a course of action from those available. 
The progression in phases of decision-making is complex and cyclic. The design phase 
involves 1) listing alternatives, 2) determination of consequences of the alternatives, 3) 
comparative evaluation of the sets of consequences (Simon 1997, p. 77). Simon later 
acknowledges that 'Administrative Behavior' from 1947 lacks focus and inappropriate 
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explanation for how the agenda is set, how problems are constructed and how alternatives 
are generated (Simon 1997, p. 122). 
 
Decision-making by routines and rules 
The limitation of mental capacity leads Simon to formulate the often cited fallacy of thinking 
that "more information is better" (Simon, 1973, p. 271) as attention rather than information is 
the scarce resource. The scarcity of attention makes routines and rules an important part of 
organisational behaviour as social routines and formal rules allow people to simplify the 
world to "reduce the difficulty of dealing with a complicated, uncertain and threatening 
world (Cyert and March 1963, p. 197). In 'Organizations' from 1958, March and Simon (1993) 
explain organisations' use of performance programs to "routinize" repetitive stimuli. Thereby, 
choice becomes a simple "stimulus-response pattern" (Simon 1997, p. 117). Adequate 
classification of stimuli is a requirement for adequate routine reaction and interpretation of 
events is therefore important (March and Simon 1993, p. 184 and p. 188). The simplification 
processes of situation-response, Simon argues, "serve to explain many of the phenomena of 
organizational behaviour" (Simon 1955, p. 114). Decisions made by routines and rules have a 
close relation to preferences, which are described below. 
Routines and rules include standard operating procedures, rules of thumb, cultural norms 
and professional standards (Cyert and March 1963). Simon (1997) illustrates how routines 
and rules may be part of organisations' "decision premises" that are used to influence 
decision-making among organisational members. The premises "tell organization members 
how to reason about the problems and decisions that face them; where to look for 
appropriate and legitimate informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, and what 
techniques to use in processing these premises" (Simon 1991, p. 126-127). Legislation and 
guidance on tools like SEA prescribe such decision premises for practice in organisations. 
 
Preferences and rationalities 
Both problem-solving activities and routines relates to preferences and rationalities. March 
argues that individual preferences may be fuzzy and inconsistent, individuals may manage 
or avoid preferences, preferences may be conflicting in organisations, and future preferences 
are uncertain as they are developing (March 1978). In line with the two segments described 
above, March emphasises that rational decisions involve guesses about uncertain 
consequences as well as ambiguous preferences: "We try to imagine what will happen in the 
future as a result of our actions and we try to imagine how we shall evaluate what will 
happen" (March 1978, p. 589). This rational approach has been and is still influential on SEA 
and other impact assessment tools. 
The width of rationalities in decision-making is nicely outlined in the description of forms of 
rationalities in March (1978, pp. 591-593): Calculated rationality in which decisions follow 
from calculation of consequences in terms of objectives; limited rationality in which people 
simplify due to limitations; contextual rationality in which choice behaviour is affected by the 
context; game rationality in which decisions are affected by people's pursuing of individual 
objectives in processes like coalition formation; process rationality in which outcomes are 
secondary to the orchestration of the process; adaptive rationality in which decisions are 
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affected by learning; selective rationality in which choice is dominated by standard operating 
procedures; and posterior rationality in which action is conceived as being antecedent to 
goals.  
The game rationality is rooted in an understanding of organisations as political systems of 
conflict, coalition and bargaining (March 1962); a "certain amount of empirical support" (p. 
675) supports this understanding, in which choices and information are made part of the 
political game. March later acknowledge that theories of conflicts in decision-making are "for 
the most part, also rational theories" (1991, p. 105) added the complication of multiple actors. 
 
The process of non-programmed choices 
In contrast to the rules and routines described above, the novel, non-repetitive, and 
consequential aspects are in focus in theory related to non-programmed decision-making. 
Simon and Newell (1958) argued that "the majority of decisions that executives face every day 
- and certainly the majority of the very most important decisions - lie much closer to the ill-
structured than to the well-structured end of the spectrum" (p. 5). Simon (1960) emphasised 
that "There is no cut-and-dried method of handling the problem because it hasn't arisen 
before, or because its precise nature and structure are elusive or complex, or because it is so 
important that it deserves a custom-tailored treatment". In situations like these, Simon 
emphasises psychological processes as judgement, intuition, and creativity as possible drivers 
of decision-making. 
An important investigation of non-programmed decision-making processes was done by 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt in 1976. Although they used the term "unstructured", 
they defined it similar to Simon's non-programmed decisions: "Unstructured refers to 
decision processes that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for which no 
predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the organization" (p. 246). They 
refer to the work of Witte (1972) who empirically found that decision-making is not a linear 
process, but "a constant relationship between the activities of "information gathering," 
"development of alternatives," "evaluation of alternatives," and "choices" over the total time 
period" (Witte 1972, p. 180). In line with Simon's and Witte's work, Mintzberg et al. (1976) 
depict decision-making as three iterative phases:  
- The identification phase. It involves the routines of decision recognition in which 
opportunities and problems are recognised and thus evoke decision-making activity: 
"Most strategic decisions do not present themselves to the decision maker in convenient 
ways; problems and opportunities in particular must be identified in the streams of 
ambiguous, largely verbal data that decision makers receive" (p. 251); and diagnosis, in 
which people seek to comprehend the stimuli. 
- The development phase. It involves the routines of search of ready made solutions and 
design of custom-made solutions. 
- The selection phase. It involves a screening routine to eliminate unfeasible alternatives 
and an evaluation-choice routine to select course of action by either judgment, bargaining 
(political), or analysis (deliberate calculation), and an authorisation routine to ratify the 
choice in the organisation. Mintzberg et al. are not detailed about the nature of 'judgment' 
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that is defined as "procedures that [decision-maker] does not, perhaps cannot, explain" 
(p. 258).  
The three phases in the model are influenced by "dynamic factors" (p. 263) that are e.g. 
delaying the process or restarting it. The political importance and element of managerial 
control is emphasised by Mintzberg et al.'s as they propose a political routine to deal with the 
political forces and decision control and communication routines as supporting routines. A 
simplified understanding is shown in figure 7 which should be understood as including 
numerous iterations and disruptions between the phases.  
 
Figure 7: Organisational decision-making as an iterative sequence driven by diagnosis and 
interruption of events. Adapted from Mintzberg et al. (1976) and (March and Simon 1993) 
 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) note that despite much focus on evaluation-choice in literature, this 
routine is "far less significant in many of the decision processes we studied than diagnosis or 
design. Particularly in the case of the custom-made solution, evaluation-choice often 
appeared to be a kind of trimming on the process, a ratification of the solution that was 
determined explicitly during design and in part implicitly during diagnosis as well" (pp. 257-
258). 
In theories of decision-making, non-programmed strategic decision-making is thus explained 
as a custom-tailored process based on a recognition-diagnosis-search/design-choice sequence. 
This sequence is made within a context of dynamic factors and it is a complex and iterative 
process. For the understanding of strategic decision-making processes, decision-making 
theory includes a wealth of insight in the role of preferences, rationalities, and rules. 
Although these may not be as important in the non-programmed and strategic decisions, 
they will be part of the experiences that decision-makers try to make use of in the novel 
situations. 
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STRATEGIC CHOICES AS EXPLAINED IN SENSE-MAKING THEORY 
 
 “How do I know what I think until I hear what I say?” (Weick 1995, p. 18) 
"[W]henever people are said to make a decision, what really happens is that they are 
working retrospectively. … The decision actually has already been set in motion before 
people declare that it has been made. … What is crucial about this is that a decision is an 
act of interpretation rather than an act of choice." (Weick 1995, pp. 184-185) 
 "… the more general point is that organizations can be good at decision making and still 
falter. They falter because of deficient sensemaking. The world of decision making is about 
strategic rationality. It is built from clear questions and clear answers that attempt to 
remove ignorance […]. The world of sensemaking is different. Sensemaking is about 
contextual rationality. It is built out of vague questions, muddy answers, and negotiated 
agreements that attempt to reduce confusion." (Weick 1993, p. 636) 
 
In contrast to theories of decision-making, theories of sense-making primarily deal with 
situations that resemble non-programmed and strategic choices: Sense-making is triggered by 
situations in which the experienced does not match the expected and cannot be dealt with 
without making sense; sense-making is about discrepancies and equivocality of the situations 
that people face (Weick 1995, pp. 4,92). Routine organizational behaviour also includes sense-
making, however, this sense-making has a less conscious or active character. Sense-making 
aspects are important in routine behaviour as people’s sense can be "modified in intricate 
ways out of awareness via assimilation of subtle cues over time" (Gioia and Mehra 1996, p. 
1229). Rather than making decisions, the focus of sense-making is to make sense of the 
equivocality of the context, and Weick (2001) suggest that "thinking about human existence as 
a series of decisions may be less fundamental than thinking about existence as the search for 
meaning by means of sense-making" (p. S71). He frames decision-making in a process of 
selecting meaning (Weick 1989, p. 175): "The selection process houses decision-making, but it 
is crucial to remember that decision-making in the organizing model means selecting some 
interpretation of the world and some set of extrapolations from that interpretation and then 
using these summaries as constraints on subsequent acting". 
Several authors have contributed to the development of sense-making theory. Therefore a 
range of definitions of sense-making are put forward, each emphasising specific parts of 
sense-making processes: 
- Organisation perspective: "To make sense is to organize, and sensemaking refers to 
processes of organizing using the technology of language – processes of labeling and 
categorizing for instance – to identify, regularize and routinize memories into plausible 
explanations" (Brown et al. 2008. p. 1055). 
- Deliberate perspective: "[S]ense making as the way that humans choose between multiple 
possible explanations of sensory and other input as they seek to conform the 
phenomenological with the real in order to act in such a way as to determine or respond 
to the world around them" (Snowden 2005, p. 46). 
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- Communication approach perspective: "Sense-Making is an approach to thinking about 
and implementing communication research and practice and the design of 
communication-based systems and activities. It consists of a set of philosophical 
assumptions, substantive propositions, methodological framings, and methods" (Dervin 
2005). 
- Action-interpretation perspective: "Sensemaking is about the interplay of action and 
interpretation rather than the influence of evaluation on choice. When action is the central 
focus, interpretation, not choice, is the core phenomenon” (Weick et al. 2005, p. 409). 
- Process perspective: "… sense making is a continuous, social process in which individuals 
look at elapsed events, bracket packets of experience, and select particular points of 
reference to weave webs of meaning" (Choo, 1998, p. 70).  
- Meta-theoretical perspective: Sense-making "is best described as a developing set of ideas 
with explanatory possibilities, rather than as a body of knowledge" (Weick 1995, p. xi) 
and "[t]he sensemaking perspective is a frame of mind about frames of mind that is best 
treated as a set of heuristics rather than as an algorithm" (Weick 1995, p. xii) 
 
Weick's sense-making 
Besides Snowden's deliberate perspective and Dervin's communicative perspective, all the 
perspectives on sense-making above can be found within Weick's writings. In this thesis, the 
emphasis of specific perspectives depends on the use of sense-making. Thus, the meta-
theoretical perspective is emphasised when relating sense-making to research, and the 
process and action-interpretation perspectives are emphasised when relating sense-making to 
decision-making and SEA. In general, sense-making is here understood in accordance with 
Weick (2009, p. 95): 
"When people in an ongoing social setting experience an interruption, they often enact 
something, retrospectively notice meaningful cues in what they previously enacted, 
interpret and retain meaningful versions of what the cues mean for their individual and 
collective identity, and apply or alter these plausible meanings in subsequent enactment 
and retrospective noticing." (Original emphasis) 
Weick refers to sense-making as the process of "structuring the unknown" (1995, p. 4) in a 
process of enactment, selection and retention (see the figure in the next section). The 
'unknown' is something unique or unfamiliar for people and may relate to e.g. content and 
actions. Weick does not categorise sense-making, and he does therefore not distinguish 
between 'good' or 'bad' sense-making. Instead, he warns against situations, where sense-
making collapse, e.g. when schooling makes fire-fighters unable to sense and make sense of 
important stimuli in a threatening situation (Weick 1993). In terms of effectiveness, he state 
that "some sensemaking frameworks lead to more effective behaviors than others do, but the 
criteria of effectiveness are many and inconsistent, and perceivers usually can appraise 
effectiveness only in retrospect" (Weick 1995, p. 191). Related to effectiveness, Weick suggest 
that "The ambiguity and complexity of their worlds imply that perceivers may benefit by 
using multiple sensemaking frameworks to appraise events; but perceivers are more likely to 
act forcefully and effectively if they see things simply, and multiple frameworks may 
undermine organizations' political structures" (p. 191).  
Conceptual framework 
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Weick (1995) describes seven properties that suggest "what sensemaking is, how it works and 
where it can fail (Weick 1995, p. 18). These properties constitute ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological claims: 
- Grounded in identity construction. Identity is influencing how people make sense of 
situations. This inherent in Weick's famous phrase: "How can I know what I think until I 
see what I say?" (1995, p. 18). Identity is not only individual, but formed by the social 
interaction (see the social property below). How people interpret and act is depending on 
how they conceive their and their organization's identity: Images of the organisation is 
formed by and form actions and interpretations. 
- Retrospective. "To learn what I think, I look back over what I said earlier" (Weick 1995, p. 
61). Or in the words of Helms Mills and Weatherbee (2006, p. 270): "we rely on what we 
know to help us make sense". Weick has been criticised for excluding a forward-looking 
prospective sense-making in 'Sensemaking in Organizations' (Gioia and Mehra 1996) as 
he hold on to the understanding that sense can only be made from experienced events 
(Weick 1995). In later writings, Weick opens up for prospective sense-making (Weick et 
al. 2005) concurrent with other authors (e.g., Wright 2005). 
- Enactive of sensible environments. This property covers Weick's concept of enactment: 
"The term ‘enactment’ is used to preserve the central point that when people act, they 
bring events and structures into existence and set them in motion." (Weick 1988, p. 306). 
Enactment is related to beliefs and experience, why sense-making may be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: "People make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already 
imposed what they believe" (Weick 1995, p. 15).  
- Social. "Sensemaking is never solitary because what a person does internally is contingent 
on others" (Weick 1995, p. 40) or put differently: "What I say and single out and conclude 
are determined by who socialized me and how I was socialized, as well as by the 
audience I anticipate will audit the conclusions I reach" (Weick 1995, p. 62). Sense-making 
is contingent on interaction with others and interacting with organisations' rules, routines 
and language. Stories, for instance, that are formed through sense-making "can guide 
action before routines are formulated and can enrich routines after those routines are 
formulated" (Weick 1995, p. 129). 
- Ongoing in nature. "Sense-making never starts", Weick argues (1995, p. 43), since people 
are always in the middle of things. People are continuously sensing their surroundings, 
and when they sense anomalies, cues are retrospectively selected and plausible stories are 
developed. Karnøe (1997) explains the ongoing property of sense-making as driven by "a 
chronic slippage between cognitive maps and the phenomena to which they refer. The 
reason is that words and languages are imprecise and discrete labels on subject matter 
that is continuous" (p. 426). 
- Focused on and by extracted cues. "Extracted cues are simple, familiar structures that are 
seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring." (Weick 1995, 
p. 50). This means that some cues are extracted while ignoring others: "The "what" that I 
single out and embellish as the content of the thought is only a small portion of the 
utterance that becomes salient because of context and personal dispositions" (Weick 1995, 
p. 62). Cues are found in flows of events: "people chop moments out of continuous flows 
and extract cues from those moments" (Weick 1995, p. 43). The context affects what is 
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extracted as a cue and how the cue is interpreted (Weick 1995). Cues are extracted by use 
of frames (Weick 1995) and perceptual filters, which are described by Starbuck and 
Milliken (1988, p. 40) as "[t]he processes that amplify some stimuli and attenuate others, 
thus distorting the raw data and focusing attention". Shrivastava (1985) state that 
"Strategy makers' frames of reference are critical determinants of useful strategic 
knowledge… They allow decision makers to make sense and meaning by imposing order 
on a confusing array of raw data" (p. 97). In contrast to theories of interpretation, sense-
making "is concerned with how the cues were internalized in the first instance and how 
individuals decide to focus on specific cues." (Weick 1995, pp. 7-9) 
- Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. Accurate perception is not necessary to fuel 
action, and it may be neither possible (if possible to tell when it is) nor desirable (cf. the 
critics of rational behaviour above). To underline the sufficiency of plausibility, Weick 
(1995) tells a story of Hungarian soldiers that were lost in the snow in the Alps and found 
their way by use of an old map, which they later experienced was a map of the Pyrenees; 
"[s]ensemaking is about accounts that are socially acceptable and credible" (Weick 1995, 
p. 61).  
Added to these properties are distinguishing features of sense-making described by Weick et 
al. (2005). These include that the genesis of sense-making is disruptive ambiguity, that sense-
making is organising of flux, beginning in acts of noticing and bracketing, about labelling, 
about presumption, about action and about organising through communication. In terms of 
the labelling feature, the importance of labels for acting is described by Hernes (2008): "[T]he 
mind establishes labels in order to understand what is going on, but then the labels become 
part of what is going on" (p. 149).  
 
The process of sense-making 
In an organisational perspective Weick uses the model of enactment-selection-retention, 
which is visualised in figure 8. In the enactment with the surrounding people are "bracketing 
some portion of the stream of experience for further attention" (Weick 1989, p. 45). In the 
selection process people are "imposing some finite set of interpretations on the bracketed 
portions" (p. 45), and in the retention process, people are storing interpreted segments for 
future application. Weick (1989, p. 134) suggests that the enactment-selection-retention 
sequence in terms of information could be understood as data-meaning-knowledge. In this 
respect, the model is the reverse of the phrase "How can I know what I see until I hear what I 
say?" with 'seeing' representing giving meaning and 'saying' representing the data. 
 
 
Figure 8: Sense-making in an organisational perspective (Weick et al. 2005, p. 414 and Weick 1989, pp. 
133-134) 
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The ongoing interaction between ecological change (the surroundings) and people's 
enactment includes "sensemaking activities of sensing anomalies" (Weick et al. 2005, p. 414). 
People enact the surroundings by punctuating the "flux of circumstances" (Weick et al. 2005, 
p. 414) and imposing "categories of the portions they enact" (Weick 1995, p. 35). Weick (1989, 
p. 177) emphasises the importance of 'cause maps' in enactment: "What people impose in 
their attempts to be reasonable are previous interpretations of causal sequences that have 
worked - that is, cause maps of previously enacted environments. When current 
equivocalities are filtered through these prior enactments, some things go unnoticed while 
others are labeled as familiar, strange, relevant, and so on". If the previous interpretations are 
not appropriate, sense-making "is biased either toward identifying substitute action or 
toward further deliberation" (p. 409). In this situation, meanings are still ambiguous. Weick 
(1989) further emphasises that "The enacted environment is artificial rather than natural in 
the sense that it is laced with preferences, purposes, idiosyncratic punctuations, desires, 
selective perceptions, and designs" (p. 176). The 'data' that enters the meaning creation 
process is thus "the environment of the breeder" (p. 176) and far from objective data. 
The process of selection is a "retrospective elaboration of cues made salient during enactment 
[that] justifies and makes sense of priori action" (Weick 2009, p. 237). In the process of 
selection people "sort through prior cues, label them and connect them, which often result in 
plausible stories that are good enough to keep going" (p. 237). Mental frameworks, identity 
and articulation are important elements in the process of reducing multiple meanings and 
generate locally plausible story" (Weick 1995, p. 414).  
A story is retained in the organisation if it continues to be plausible and gets connected to 
identity. It gains solidity and then becomes guidance for future action and interpretation. 
Stories become symbolic coding of action that involves "know-how, recipes, scripts, rules of 
thumb, and heuristics" (Weick 1995, pp. 125-126). Weick et al (2005) emphasise the close 
relation between sense-making and organising; "[P]eople organize to make sense of equivocal 
inputs and enact this sense back into the world to make that world more orderly" (p. 414).  
In terms of strategic choices, the processes between enactment and retention are in this thesis 
regarded of special importance, as it is within these processes that meaning is created. Figure 
9 is therefore zooming in on these processes. Like the illustration of the decision-making 
process, this figure is simplified and not showing the numerous cycles and interaction 
between the processes. The figure emphasises that when people are experiencing 
discrepancies and equivocality in their ongoing sensing, they are 'disturbed' (the stippled 
box): They first look for reasons to resume to action in frameworks or cause maps. These 
frameworks may be "Institutional constraints, organizational premises, plans, expectations, 
acceptable justifications, and traditions inherited from predecessors" (Weick et al. 2005, p. 
409). If no reasons are found, they label and notice cues in order to generate plausible stories. 
If these stories seem to be adequate, they are retained as guidance for future action and 
interpretation. 
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Figure 9: The process of sense-making (adapted from Weick 1995) 
 
The portrayed "action-driven processes of sense-making" (Weick 1995, p. 155) are 
complemented by "belief-driven processes of sense-making" (p. 133). Both involve beliefs and 
action, but they differ in their point of departure for generating structures of meaning. When 
beliefs are the driver, sense-making is an "orderly interaction around arguing in an effort to 
reduce the variety in beliefs that are thought to be relevant, variety in what is noticed, and 
variety in what is prophesied", or an "orderly interaction around expecting" in which foresight 
activities such as strategic planning, prediction, and extrapolation are processes through 
which "people's expectations become better articulated, stronger, and potentially more 
capable of being a potent force in their own validation" (Weick 1995, pp. 134-135). This is in 
contrast to action-driven sense-making that also covers the "considerable autonomous action 
that unfolds independent of formal system requirements and in response to a variety of 
signals [… that] leave puzzles for sensemaking in their wake" (p. 134). In this situation, action 
"is not prophecy driven. Instead, there is an outcome in search of a prophecy" (p. 134). The 
action-driven sense-making processes involve 'manipulating' "an otherwise unstable set of 
events so that it is easier to explain them" and 'committing' through "interpretation focused 
on explaining behaviors for which people are responsible" (Weick 1995, p. 135). Both belief-
driven and action-driven processes have point of departure in some disruption from which 
meaning is made through a similar process; it is the concrete activities in that process that 
differs. Processes within tools like SEA seem to involve both belief- and action-driven sense-
making and the dominance seems to depend on the situation and the activity. 
In theories of sense-making, non-programmed strategic decision-making is thus explained as 
a process of generating meaning out of equivocal stimuli. Sense-making theory provides 
insight in how people enact surroundings, label stimuli and create plausible stories. 
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RELATING DECISION-MAKING AND SENSE-MAKING 
 
"Decision making and sensemaking may at first seem to be an odd pair of terms to 
reconcile. The two have very different perspectives on quite dissimilar domains of human 
behavior. One quality that does unite them, however, is that decision making and 
sensemaking are intimately related to the human being as an actor." (Boland 2008, p. 55) 
 
What is evident from contrasting DM and SM? Besides the quality of decision-making and 
sense-making of being related to the actions of human being, there are a number of relations 
between the decision-making and sense-making disciplines. First of all they both rely on an 
understanding of human knowledge as something subjective and constructed. With 
differences in vocabulary, issues of ambiguity, retrospective sensemaking, confused and 
unstable preferences, negotiated goals, and limited rationality are highlighted in the writings 
of both March and Weick (Dooley et al. 2008) and to some extent in the work of Simon. 
Added to this list is a range of similarities:  
- Diagnosis of stimuli as basis for choice (Simon and March 1993, p. 160) and meaning 
(Weick 1995, p. 3) 
- Critical about the sacred ritual of decision-making with its symbolic activities (March 
1987, p. 160, Weick 1995, p. 11) 
- The importance of interpretation, which is central to Weick and to the construction of 
preferences in decision theory (March 1978, p. 596) 
- The filtering processes executed e.g. by mental frameworks in Weick (1995, p. 190) and by 
'filtering rules' (Cyert and March 1963, p. 130) 
- The importance of beliefs for perception (March and Simon 1993, p. 172) and sense-
making (Weick 1995, p. 155) 
- The process of satisficing on courses of action (Simon 1997) and on plausible stories 
(Weick 1995) 
- Routines that are important in decision-making theory (e.g., Cyert and March 1963) and a 
social constructed product of sense-making (Weick 1995, p. 36) 
The focus on similar issues is reflected in the fact that the authors are quoting each other (e.g. 
March 1978, Simon 1997, and Weick 1995). Simon (1997) mentions Weick's writings as one of 
many progresses of his model of administrative behaviour (p. 330), and Weick uses March 
(especially on ambiguity) and Simon's theories and empirical material to support the 
explanation of sense-making processes.  
Although March (1994) shows understanding for the argument that "understanding and 
explaining decision behaviour requires recognition of the centrality of interpretation" (p. 218), 
March and Simon (1993) state that they will not go as far as to replace choice with meaning as 
the central aspect to life. In this thesis, decision-making and sense-making are regarded so 
interrelated that neither of them are dominating. Instead, their combined insight and 
explanatory abilities are given a dominant focus. 
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The difference in focus on human behaviour processes gives rise to tensions between the 
presented theories of decision-making and sense-making, which are shown in figure 10. Some 
of the tensions have been put forward in other literature, but all are relevant for the effort of 
combining the disciplines. 
 
Figure 10: Key tensions between the presented theories of decision-making and sense-making. 
 
These key tensions are in the following elaborated by discussion of ontological and 
epistemological similarities and differences between the presented theories of decision-
making and sense-making. It should be kept in mind that the decision-making theory that is 
basis for this chapter is the core theories of the 1940-70'ies. This core has been centrifuged in a 
range of directions in the present theories of decision-making, including in the direction of 
sense-making. Similarly, sense-making theories are developing in a range of directions. The 
centrifugal tendency may lead to a dilution of the powerful simplicity of the theories into an 
ambiguous plurality of perspectives that confuses more than it clarifies human behaviour. 
The tensions and supplements between decision-making and sense-making would in the 
present plurality not be as clear and the mutual inspiration and benefits of combining their 
simplicity would be minor compared to the original core theories. 
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ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
"[D]ecision making and sensemaking seem to compliment each other, but we cannot easily 
combine them, because they have such different ontological and epistemological 
foundations." (Boland 2008, p. 59-60) 
 
Blaikie (2000) describes ontology as "claims and assumptions that are made about the nature 
of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how 
these units interact with each other" (p. 8), and epistemology as "claims or assumptions about 
possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality […] claims about how what is assumed 
to exist can be known". (p. 8) 
Whereas rational choice theory due to its origins in economy theory often is characterised as 
positivism (e.g. Koppl and Whitman 2004), Simon and March's writings are (gradually) 
mixing the positivist ontology with other claims and assumption on reality and human 
behaviour. Weick's theory seems to be within interpretivism (Hatch and Cunliffe 2006), 
although some co-authored publications (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984) and references (e.g. to 
Kahnemann in Weick 1995) have character of positivism. Weick do not deny the 'real', but 
focus on the enacted environment, which he sees as a 'surrogate' environment for the world 
'out there' (Weick 1979 referred in Weick 2009). In general, Weick aims at softening the 
categories and boundaries, e.g. between an organisation and its environment. Figure 11 
shows ontological and epistemological claims of the presented theories of decision-making 
and sense-making. The differences partly reflect the different periods in time in which the 
'gross characteristics' of the theories were made. 
Focusing narrowly on the early writings of Simon (e.g. his doctoral thesis from 1947), it has 
some relevancy to argue that it is a purely positivist ontology. 'Administrative Behavior' 
includes formulations that make consequences and alternatives seem 'given': "At any moment 
there are a multitude of alternative (physically) possible actions, any one of which a given 
individual may undertake" (Simon 1997, p. 3) and Simon (1956, p. 136) state that "there exist 
clues in the environment". Later, Simon (1997) acknowledges that problems and alternatives 
are generated by humans. Thus, I follow Boland's (2008) argument, that there seem to be a 
tendency that decision-making theories are describing these aspects as more 'given' than in 
the sense-making literature. 
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 Decision-making Sense-making 
Ontology 
Nature of reality In the early writings of Simon, reality 
is regarded objective; true reality exists 
which is consisting of stable pre-
existing patterns or order (e.g. causal) 
that can be discovered.  
The later writings (e.g. March 1978) 
depicts reality as ambiguous and thus 
closer to constructivism. 
The world "is largely unknowable 
and unpredictable" (Weick 1989, 
p. 364). 
Reality is enacted and interpreted. 
Nature of human 
beings 
In the early writings of Simon, humans 
are seen as intended rational.  
Later (e.g. March 1978), other 
rationalities were emphasised. 
Similarly, history shows a shift from 
predicting to explaining human 
behaviour. 
Humans are continuously 
organizing reality by making 
sense of events in interaction with 
each other. 
Human action is affected by 
identity and structuring effects. 
Epistemology 
Nature of knowledge 
  
Reality can only be imperfectly 
grasped due to boundaries. People's 
understanding of reality is therefore 
"subjective estimates" (Cyert and 
March 1963, p. 80). 
Propositions about human behaviour 
(e.g. March and Simon 1958) are tested 
against empirical evidence. 
Knowledge is constructed and an 
accumulation of our intellectual 
inventions. Human knowledge is 
bound by the constraints and 
categories they enact (Weick 1989, 
p. 365). 
Propositions about human 
behaviour (Weick 1995) are tested 
against empirical evidence. 
Figure 11: Ontology of decision-making and sense-making. 
 
A notable difference in the ontology of decision-making and the ontology of sense-making is 
the implicit view on the relation between 'understanding', 'outcome', and 'action'. Boland 
(1984) describes "rational-analytical approaches to social problem solving" as a process of 
creating a model of the world out there as a basis for actions, and consequences of the action 
may lead to revision of the model. In contrast, sense-making has point of departure in action 
and outcomes lead to retrospective understanding that imposes order on the actions and 
outcomes (see e.g. Swieringa and Weick 1987). This ontological difference is visualised in 
figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Ontological difference between decision-making and sense-making. Inspired by Boland 
(1984, p. 870) 
 
Weick's use of references from positivistic research is criticised by Helms Mills et al. (2010) as 
a "paradoxical treatment of sensemaking as drawing on interpretive insights that are often 
times presented as grounded in a more positivist notion of epistemological certainty" (p. 187). 
Weick rarely touches upon the issues of ontology and epistemology, and he even downplays 
the importance of a fixed ontological stance: "People who study sensemaking oscillate 
ontologically because that is what helps them understand the actions of people in everyday 
life who could care less about ontology" (1995, p. 35). He later (1998) elaborates this into an 
interpretative stance, see the figure above. The ontology of this thesis is described below. 
In terms of epistemology the presented theories of decision-making and sense-making have 
equal understanding of human knowledge as something subjective and constructed. This 
equal understanding covers a notable difference: Knowledge is subjective in decision-making 
theory as people only are able to see a part of the real and biased by their perception 
capacities, and subjective in sense-making as people enact their worldview through 
enactment. Another main epistemological difference is the prospect-retrospect tension 
illustrated above. The presented theories of decision-making theory and sense-making are 
equal in their use and empirical support of propositions about human behaviour. None of the 
authors have a stated aim of developing a grand theory of human behaviour, but to explain 
behaviour through supporting evidence.  
Some efforts of combining decision-making and sense-making theories have been proposed. 
These have different couplings and different emphasis on decision-making versus sense-
making. Notably, all efforts are found in recent publications. The main part of these efforts 
has point of departure in decision-making and regards sense-making as a preceding process 
of understanding signals to create a basis for decision-making (see appendix C). The main 
part of these efforts thus seem to be within a decision-theory understanding rather than a 
sense-making understanding, as action precedes meaning in sense-making theory. Boland 
(2008) and Greitzer and Podmore (2008) are the only identified efforts that describe sense-
making and decision-making as integrated elements without fitting sense-making into a 
decision-making framework. A recurring conclusion among the authors is that combining 
decision-making and sense-making makes it possible to improve practice within decision-
making or strategy. Despite these overall similar conclusions, there is a considerable variety 
and inconsistency between the authors' conceptions. Decision-making and sense-making are 
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interpreted and combined in widely different ways, which may be due to the contemporary 
plurality of decision-making and sense-making theories. Although the efforts show 
interesting elements of the relation between decision-making and sense-making, none of 
them provides a convincing combination of insight from decision-making and sense-making 
in a concurrent process. Instead, the insight is fragmented into separate phases despite the 
overlap of the insight. 
 
 
COMBINING DISCIPLINES: CHOICE AS THE CENTRE OF FOUR CIRCLES 
Based on the above presentations and inspired by the existing efforts of combining the 
disciplines described in appendix C, decision-making and sense-making are in the following 
combined into a model of human choice that embraces the insight from both disciplines. The 
point of departure is that neither of the disciplines will be favoured. Thus, the central aspect 
of human choice in the model is neither the making of sense nor the making of a decision. 
The model is aiming at being true to the primary aspects of each theory and the focus is 
narrowly on the process and not the motivations or reasons for the choices.  
Combining decision-making and sense-making requires a stance on the ontological and 
epistemological tensions outlined above. The pragmatism of the change agent approach 
suggests a need for a meta-theoretical framework that is flexible and usable for conducting 
research that is relevant for practice. In line with Weick's ontological oscillation, the point of 
departure for the combined model is an ontological position that elements of the world are 
given notwithstanding the human perception and that our knowledge of reality and our 
social systems, which are the main focus area in this thesis, is constructed by our perceptions, 
interpretation, and actions. The ontological difference on the relation between choice and 
meaning outlined above is approached by a more intimate relation in the proposed model. 
Modelling for non-programmed strategic choices has to include a deliberate activity as the 
situation is novel and no routine is sufficient. Learning from sense-making, it furthermore has 
to emphasise the process of noticing and labelling whatever is dealt with. Finally, it has to 
emphasise uncertainty in the choices made and iteration in the choice process. In contrast to 
Simon's writings, it does not make sense to describe strategic choices as consequential, as the 
consequences of choices cannot be determined in the moment of choosing. The modelling 
therefore relates to all novel and non-programmed choices at a strategic level regardless of 
whether they are part of design processes, formal decision processes or implementation 
processes. 
The combination of decision-making and sense-making in a process perspective on strategic 
choices is not straightforward. The process of reaching an adequate model is explained in 
appendix C as including an exercise of fitting sense-making into a model of decision-making 
and vice versa. The preliminary models in the appendix reveals that the exercise of fitting 
insight from the disciplines into one of the discipline's process understanding results in an 
inadequate fragmentation of the insight of the other discipline; adding the process insight 
from sense-making into decision-making e.g. results in a fragmented meaning creation 
process in each step of decision-making. This inadequate fragmentation reduces the strength 
of how human choice is explained in each discipline. The problem is approached by 
Conceptual framework 
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proposing choice as the centre of recurring circles of enacting, diagnosing, search/design, and 
settling on an option, see figure 13. This simple model emphasises that the strategic decision-
making process is cyclic and iterative, but at the same time involving distinctive processes. In 
this way it supports conflicting empirical evidence of distinct phases and iterations between 
these. The use of circles is inspired by the inventive early writings of Weick (1989) that among 
other things emphasises circularity in social interaction and in search processes: "Suppose 
you thumb through books to find the answer to some question you have. Your first 
temptation might be to say that the question caused focused searching. But that's not the way 
it works. Searching is circular. You start with a question, you stumble onto some apparently 
relevant item, which in turn affects subsequent searching, which in turn redirects your 
question, etc" (Weick 1989, p. 86). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The choice circles model in which strategic decision-making processes are modelled as four 
circles centred by choice. 
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The model specifically proposes a linkage between a circle, the choice and the other process 
circles: 
- Settling on an option interacts with enactment, as enactment is a trial of plausibility before 
retaining meanings and as retention of meanings guides action. This circle furthermore 
interacts with elements of diagnosis and labelling, e.g. when a meaning is gaining solidity 
as an adequate way of understanding. Finally, the settling on an option is interacting with 
the development of options as the developed options may not stand the test of time or 
scrutiny and thus need rethinking or more development.  
- Enactment interacts with diagnosis, as enactment defines what can be labelled, and as 
labelling influences how we enact our surroundings. A similar interaction is found in the 
relation with the search/design circle. The bracketing in the enactment brings the process 
to the diagnosis circle. 
- Diagnosis interacts with search/design of options, as diagnosis of the situation determines 
what options may be relevant, and as discoveries during search/design may redefine the 
interpretation of the situation.  
- Search/design of options interacts as mentioned with the other circles. It does not end the 
process anymore than any of the other circles, but as the three other circles, it involves 
element of choice and play an important role in what will be regarded as the overall 
decision. 
In comparison with Weick's model, this choice circles model divides the creation of meaning 
into two circles, one about on creating meaning of stimuli and one about creating meaning of 
options. This may seem to favour decision-making, but a similar divide is also found in 
Weick's writings: In relation to retention, Weick (1989, p. 217) suggests to divide the meaning 
creation into one part on interpretation guided by the questioning "[k]nowing what I know 
now, should I change the way I label and connect the flow of experience?" and another part 
on enactment guided by the questioning "[k]nowing what I know now, should I act 
differently?". Weick (1989, p. 136) also indicates this distinction in the selection phase by 
exemplifying both "observing through binoculars" (meaning of situation) and "path findings" 
(options forward) as part of the selection process. 
The concept of choice in the model is not necessarily a deliberate act, but also a not 
articulated settlement on meaning, or coincidence in action. Choice is a transition from one 
circle to another, but it is tentative and provisional. At the same time choice is the product of 
all four circles as they in total constitute a process of choosing an option. The basic of choice 
in the proposed model is satisficing and plausibility, which Weick et al. (2005) describe as: 
"People may get better stories, but they will never get the story" (p. 415). Satisficing and 
plausibility are determined by identity, mental models, and behavioural structures in the 
highly subjective processes of making sense of what is at stake. Satisficing and plausibility are 
restricted and 'disturbed' by deadlines and formal legislative requirements, like in Boland's 
(2008) account of design processes: In the case of SEA, creative processes of meaning making 
and generating preliminary options interrelate with organisational deadlines on presentation 
of material, hearing periods, etc. The choices may be expressed in formal elements like 
reports as snap-shots of how the situation was understood at a certain point in time.  
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The model serves as an analytical framework for investigating choice processes in novel 
situations. In this perspective, the model has certain characteristics that may facilitate 
increased understanding of human choice: 
- It is plotting the making of a choice as iterations between interacting processes. 
- It is shedding light on the choices made during the problem-solving activity. 
- It is emphasising the relation between meaning-making and action. 
- It is emphasising the creation of a plausible story of relevant options in terms of both 
preferences and consequences. 
- It is shedding light on how cues are internalised and chosen prior to interpretation and 
deliberate analysis. 
The model may be criticised for separating sense-making of the situation in one circle and 
sense-making of options in another, which may not be fully in line with Weick's writings. 
Instead, it is in line with e.g. March's (1995) distinction between an interpretation level and 
action level in organisations. The intention is not to force a separation between these 
elements, but to emphasise that both aspects needs consideration. The emphasising of the 
two elements creates an interesting tension between the sense made of a situation and the 
sense made of options, which will partly be investigated in chapter 8. The model can 
furthermore be criticised for not explicitly including e.g. the political aspects of decision-
making. The model is so generic that it may also be relevant for investigating how people 
make sense of their political or tactical situation and options. The discussion of political 
aspects and other not explicitly included aspects are discussed in the following subchapter. 
The circularity of the model is provocative - especially in a decision-making theory context - 
in the sense that it does not offer an 'end' in the sense of a final solution. This is provocative to 
the field of SEA as the 'rational behaviour' inspired SEA process is designed to be sequential 
progress towards the best possible account of a developments impacts in the shape of an 
environmental report. The circle most similar to a 'decision' is the settling on an option circle, 
although it is depicted as temporary and continuously in development. 
The proposed model of a human choice is in the following subchapter integrated in the 
conceptual framework for the investigations of strategic decision-making processes. In this 
framework, it constitutes the detailed level in the continuum of levels of perspectives. 
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4.2 PROPOSING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Many things are happening at once; technologies are changing and poorly understood; 
alliances, preferences, and perceptions are changing; problems, solutions, opportunities, 
ideas people, and outcomes are mixed together in ways that make their interpretation 
uncertain and their connections unclear; actions in one part of an organization appear to 
be only loosely coupled to actions in another; solutions seem to have only modest 
connection to problems; policies are not implemented; decision makers seem to wander in 
and out of decision arenas. (March 1991, pp. 107-108) 
 
This conceptual framework aims at facilitating understanding of strategic decision-making 
processes which takes place in what March in the quote describes as 'many things happening 
at once'. The conceptual framework initially defines the type of strategic decision-making 
studied in this thesis. This definition has reference to the non-programmed and unstructured 
characteristics outlined in the previous subchapter and adds dimensions of formality and 
strategic character. 
The framework furthermore portrays strategic decision-making processes as a continuum of 
perspectives of different level of detail. The main argument behind this continuum is that to 
understand strategic decision-making processes it is neither enough to investigate these 
processes through a detailed perspective on the social processes involved in the minor 
choices nor is it enough to investigate the overall developments. An in-depth understanding 
necessary for developing a meaningful way of applying SEA requires insight into the entire 
continuum of perspectives.  
Imagine that a 'meaningful' way of applying SEA is determined solely on the basis of insight 
into when ultimate decisions are made and who makes these. Such SEA application would be 
ignorant of the reasons of these choices, the external influences, and how the persons 
involved made sense in order to make a decision. In this vein, Miller et al (1996) argue 
"traditional emphases on decision-making may over-concretize the rather ambiguous, 
uncertain processes of change and underplay the continual re-definition, re-shaping and 
reformulation through which strategies arise" (Miller et al 1996, p. 305). On the other extreme, 
a 'meaningful' way of applying SEA determined solely on the basis of insight into how 
people determine need for SEA application and significance of environmental impacts risk 
being inadequate in terms of how strategic decision-making progresses. The combination of 
decision-making and sense-making in the previous subchapter is e.g. ignorant of the insight 
from the Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). 
This model emphasises the temporal dimension and describe what elements have to be in 
place at a certain moment for a choice to be made. The insight from the Garbage Can model is 
integrated in the continuum through a perspective of overview of strategic decision-making. 
The decision-making and SEA literature provides a wealth of models on different level of 
details that are more or less feasible for understanding strategic decision-making processes. It 
is not possible to cover the amount of possible investigations and models in the continuum in 
this thesis. Instead, three models for investigations at specific levels provide the point of 
departure for three empirically investigations that provide insight into how SEA is 
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meaningfully applied. These three levels include the two extremes and one in between. 
Besides facilitating insight into strategic decision-making processes, the three models aimed 
at contesting certain elements of the SEA concept. 
The more detailed perspective on strategic decision-making processes, the more inspiration is 
found in Weick's writings. The relating and combining of decision-making and sense-making 
in the previous chapter facilitates a fluent and unproblematic "zoom" between the levels of 
detail. 
 
 
THE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES STUDIED IN THIS THESIS 
The strategic decisions studied in this thesis are defined as: 
 
Non-programmed, formal as well as informal decisions at a strategic level that are 
potentially decisive for subsequent decisions on environmental aspects 
 
In order to ease the communication, this definition is referred to by use of 'strategic 
decisions'. The non-programmed element is described in the conceptual framework as 
decisions of a non-repetitive sort with a highly unstructured form dealing with stimuli that 
are novel. Novel means in the following chapters novel to the actors in the Danish energy 
sector. Non-programmed is regarded a dimension and the question is therefore not whether 
decisions are non-programmed, but to what extent they include non-programmed elements. 
The formal and informal element emphasises that the decisions under study are both made in 
a formal system or made outside the formal system. A formal system may e.g. is constituted 
by legislatively or organisational structures like legislatively required planning documents. 
The strategic element is related to the concept of 'strategy', which has a Greek origin: 
"Strategy is derived from the Greek word strategos or the "art of the general", that which has 
to do with determining the basic objectives and allocating resources to their accomplishment" 
(Noble 2000, p. 206). According to Noble (2000), the strategic element is about determining 
long-term objectives and principles for courses of action and allocation of resources necessary 
to achieve these goals. Strategic decisions are part of strategy-making, but they are not strictly 
defined by organisational or societal hierarchy of decision-making: Strategic decisions may be 
made by actors at different organisational or social positions and roles. As the following 
chapters show, a range of actors make a range of decisions which have a strategic element for 
the organisational or societal strategy-making. The strategic element is therefore in this thesis 
decisions related to "the art of the general" in terms of goal-setting, developing, or planning.  
The decisive element are similar to what JF Kennedy terms 'ultimate decision' (see the 
introduction), or what Etzioni terms 'fundamental decisions' (Etzioni 1967). Etzioni proposes 
the concept of 'fundamental decisions' in contrast to incremental decisions, and gave the 
example of the fundamental decision of "a declaration of war" (p. 387). Fundamental 
decisions "set basic directions" (p. 388) and "set the context" (p. 387) for numerous 
incremental decisions. Similar to Etzioni's fundamental decisions, environmentally decisive 
strategic decisions are setting the context for or 'contextualises' environmental aspects in the 
following decisions. Etzioni acknowledged the interrelation between fundamental and 
incremental decisions as the "fundamental decisions are frequently 'prepared' by incremental 
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ones in order that the final decision will initiate a less abrupt change" (1967, p. 387). The 
understanding of a type of decisions that are more decisive than others is explicitly and 
implicitly found in environmental assessment literature, e.g. "critical policy level decisions" 
(Sanchez-Triana and Enriquez 2006, p. 1), "key decisions" (Therivel 2004, p. 33), "major 
decisions" (Kennedy 1999, p. 101), and "decisions most critical to the environmental impact" 
(Caratti 2002, p. 1). Acknowledging the difficulties in predicting whether a decision will be 
decisive for future action, the definition includes the formulation of 'potentially decisive'. 
Thus, the strategic decisions studied in this thesis may not have been decisive for 
environmental aspects, but has the potential for being so. 
 
THE CONTINUUM OF LEVELS OF PERSPECTIVES AND OPERATIVE MODELS 
Having defined the strategic decisions studied and proposed a model for combining sense-
making and decision-making, the continuum of perspectives is proposed in the following and 
visualised in figure 14. Using an analogy of a camera, the perspectives in the continuum 
constitute different lenses with which to scrutinise decision-making; the super ultra-wide 
angle lens is very useful for the overview and broad pictures and the macro lens is very 
useful for the minor details in the close up photos. The combination of decision-making and 
sense-making theory into the choice circles model constitutes the lens for the detailed part. 
The aim is that the continuum makes it possible to investigate strategic decision-making with 
a fluent change of lenses and with synergies between the perspectives. 
The 'Series of choice' model depicts decision-making as a series of minor choices. An ultimate 
decision on e.g. energy infrastructure is in this understanding given by a number of choices 
made in some kind of progression. The model has the potential to reveal the important 
choices made in practice and show the entry points for a meaningful SEA application. The 
model is presented in detail in the journal article in subchapter 6.1. This model draws on 
insight from the concept of 'decision windows' (Dalkmann et al. 2004), which has been 
inspired by the Garbage Can Model and Teisman's (2000) Rounds Model. The 'Series of 
choice' model is used in an empirical investigation of strategic decision-making processes in 
the Danish energy sector in the period 2008-2010. The analytical framework for the 
investigation in the article emphasises when environmental considerations were included in 
the series of choices, in which choices the public was consulted and what choices were 
transparent for the public. 
The 'Contextual interaction' model depicts the contextual developments to a given strategic 
decision-making process and the interactions between the decision-making process and the 
SEA process. The model has the potential to reveal the nature and influence of the context as 
a point of departure for discussing how SEA can be meaningfully applied. The model is 
presented in detail in the journal article in subchapter 7.1. The model is inspired by Cyert, 
Simon and Trow's (1956) influential study "Observation of a decision" of the feasibility of 
using electronic data-processing equipment in a medium size corporation. This study shows 
among other things how the team making this decision acted and reacted to changes in order 
to make a decision. The model is furthermore inspired by studies that depict the relation 
between SEA and decision-making, e.g. Partidário and Coutinho's (2011) study of the Lisbon 
new airport. The analytical framework for the investigation in the article emphasises the 
challenges of framing alternatives in a context of considerable strategic dynamics. 
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Figure 14: The continuum of perspectives with sketches of the models used to investigate decision-
making processes at different 'zoom levels'. The figure furthermore state the SEA concept contested 
through the empirical investigations by use of the sketched models. 
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The choice circles model is developed and presented in the previous chapter. It is here used 
for its potential to reveal how persons make meaning of situations and options in order to 
settle on a decision. It is used in an experiment of how practitioners make sense of a strategic 
choice. The analytical framework in the experiment is focused on how people determine 
significance, hereunder what they notice and how they create meaning of the stimuli. 
These three models are complementing each other in terms of what they facilitate explanation 
about. There is an overlap between the 'Contextual interaction' model and the two other 
models, however, this overlap only underpin the relevance of studying strategic decision-
making processes through a continuum of perspectives. The framework could be criticised 
for inconsistency between the understanding of 'decisions' in decision-window inspired 
series of choices model and the ongoing element of choice in the choice circles model, 
however, the series of choices model is in itself a criticism of the idea of a single, ultimate 
decision, since the model split up this ultimate decision into a series of choices. 
The figure also shows the SEA concepts that are critically examined and contested in the 
investigations. The decision window-model is used to examine the concept of tiering between 
policy-making and planning in the strategic decision-making of the Danish energy sector. 
The contextual interaction-mapping is used to critical examine the possibilities for adapting 
to contextual changes in an SEA procedure in a case of strategic dynamics and unpredictable 
developments. Finally, the choice-model is used to critical examine the reminiscences of 
rational decision-making in implicit assumptions of accuracy and use of checklists and formal 
procedures. 
 
 
ASPECTS RELATED BUT EXCLUDED 
 
"Sensemaking strikes some people as naïve with regard to the red meat of power, politics, 
and critical theory." (Weick et al. 2005, p. 418) 
 
The simplicity of the proposed model does - of course - exclude elements that are important 
for understanding choice processes and organisational behaviour. The simplicity is not 
necessary bad and can be seen as a condition for a meaningful model; Weick (2003) points at 
the risk of multiple variables as "scholars say less and less about more and more" (p. 93). To 
acknowledge the importance of related aspects, some key related aspects are presented in the 
following including a discussion of the relation to the conceptual framework. These aspects 
are attended to in the thesis when the model does not provide sufficient explanation for the 
investigated. The presented aspects are learning, institutions, and power. 
Learning plays an important role in decision-making and in sense-making. Learning is what 
keeps sense-making elements such as categories relevant. Learning is furthermore what 
connects sense-making to structures such as routines and rules that are modified when 
people learn from their making sense of actions. Weick and Westley (1996) emphasise the 
"intimate and continuing connection between the two" (p. 445), and point at the paradox that 
learning is about increasing variety, whereas organizing is about reducing variety. They also 
distinguish between first and second order learning, although second order learning is 
regarded rare (p. 451). Gnyawali and Stewart (2003) distinguish between modes of learning 
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similar to a typical distinction between emphasis in decision-making and sense-making: The 
informational mode of learning is processes of collecting, analysing and distributing 
information, and the interactive mode of learning is processes of creation and transformation 
of schemas through actions and interactions. They argue that the mode of learning depends 
on the perception of uncertainty and equivocality, and propose a typology relevant for 
strategic decision-making processes. March and Olsen (1989) put equal importance on 
learning and decision-making theory as they see learning as one of two fundamental 
processes of organizational intelligence (the other is rational calculation). March and Olsen 
(1989) and March (1994) point at cognitive and evaluative limitations to learning and 
emphasise that learning depends on an interpretation of the experienced. In the proposed 
model, learning may occur in the interaction between the circles, e.g. when enactment show 
relevance or irrelevance of retained stories. Learning is therefore closely related to the 
conceptual framework. 
Institutions are not often emphasised in literature on sense-making, which may be due to 
differences in levels: "work drawing on institutionalism has focused primarily on extra-
subjective macro-level structures, while sensemaking research has emphasized local and 
subjective micro-level processes" (Weber and Glynn 2006, p. 1640). The link, however, seems 
to be a close relationship as "[s]ensemaking is the feedstock for institutionalization" (Weick 
1995, p. 36), and Weick refers to Giddens' (1976) insight that "social structures simultaneously 
are created by and constrain the process of meaning creation" (1995, p. 67). Like rules and 
routines, institutions may constrain orientations: "… rules provide a pre-existing 
sensemaking tool that contributes to the plausibility of an interpretation or the likelihood of a 
cue to be extracted as meaningful" (Helms Mills et al. 2010, p. 190). Weber and Glynn (2006) 
argue for interactions between sense-making and institutions in proposing a relation in which 
"institutions are antecedent to (as contextual mechanisms) and emergent from sensemaking 
(via transformational mechanisms)" (p. 1640). An important point made by Karnøe (1997) is 
that individuals perceive different meanings for institutionalised norms and rules in their 
making sense of these, and people enact institutional rules depending on the situation. Thus, 
sense-making imposes a 'filter' between institutions and people. The vocabulary of 
institutional theory is often used in decision-making theory, e.g. by March and Olsen (1989). 
Here, institutions are connected to action, meaning, and power. The model does not explicitly 
include institutional theory, but institutions are part of the structures that in a dynamic way 
influence and are influenced by the choice circles. 
Power perspectives are rarely dealt with in the writings of Weick, which has been criticised 
by Helms Mills et al. (2010). Power and sense-making do, however, touches upon some of the 
same issues, e.g. the framing of knowledge as described by Richardson (2005, p. 347): "The 
construction of EA methodologies becomes a moment where certain knowledges get framed 
as being significant, as others are sidelined or ignored (this is the construction of rationality)". 
Power and meaning creation also overlaps in terms of the agenda setting preceding decision-
making as described by Christensen and Daugaard Jensen (1986) and Albrekt Larsen and 
Goul Andersen (2004). In a more abstract sense, Helms Mills et al. (2010) argue for the 
importance of "how organizational power and dominant assumptions privilege some 
identities over others and create them as meaningful for individuals" (pp. 188-189) and 
Balogun et al. (2005) argue that the power of meaning is "a process of symbol construction 
and use designed to legitimize one's own action and delegitimize those of opponents… It is 
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less about agenda-setting, for example, than shaping the language and thought processes 
through which any agenda item is examined" (p. 263). Also empirical studies have shown 
clear connections between sense-making and power (e.g. Hope 2009 and Dervin 1998). Power 
has been introduced to sense-making through the idea of sense-giving (Gioia and Chittipeddi 
1991, p. 442) as a "process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality". In the sense-
giving perspective, sense-giving and sense-making "occur in a sequential and reciprocal 
fashion, whereby cognitive stages of understanding (sensemaking) alternate with active 
stages of influencing (sensegiving)" (Corvellec and Risberg 2007, p. 307). Sense-giving is 
criticised for resting "on a non-explicit assumption that sense can be owned by top 
management and that it can be ‘‘given’’ to the personnel or to other audiences in a way that 
recalls of a material gift" (Corvellec and Risberg 2007, p. 321). Instead, Corvellec and Risberg 
argue that sense cannot be controlled or given, and that sense is "uncertain, fluctuating and 
hard-to-locate outcome of the rhizomatic connections that developers ceaselessly seek to 
establish for audiences" (p. 322). The proposed framework does not emphasise power 
aspects, although the references show the importance of these for decision-making. Sense-
making is further related to power and politics as people may not only make sense of things, 
but also of power aspects and their political options. A possible separation between sense-
making and power aspects could be Albrekt Larsen and Goul Andersen's (2004, p. 11) 
distinction between meaning creation as creation of problem understandings and preferences 
as well as agenda setting as selection of problems and putting these on the political agenda. 
The exclusion of these aspects determines the ability to explain the investigated strategic 
decision-making processes. A conceptual framework is a balancing of a holistic framework 
facilitating broad interpretations versus a narrow framework facilitating in-depth studies. 
The conceptual framework in this thesis favours the in-depth scrutiny of processual aspects 
of decision-making and sense-making rather than the related aspects of power, institutions 
and learning. Power, institutions, learning and other frameworks would facilitate other 
interpretations of the empirical investigations with other benefits for practice, which 
underline that this thesis should be seen in relation to other research rather than a universal 
explanation of practice in the Danish energy sector. With characteristics of the Danish energy 
sector of drama and power struggles outlined in the introduction into account, there is 
certainly a need for supplementing the results of this thesis with research into such aspects. 
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PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIALS FOR SEA THEORY 
 
"The myth of rationality gives an advantage to interpretations of managerial life that are 
tied to contemporary calculations of consequences. It tends to exclude, or treat as 
anomalies, interpretations tied to rule following, the obligations of identities, the search 
for meaning, or the confusions of ambiguity and contradictions." (March 1998, p. 4) 
 
Especially the use of sense-making theory in the conceptual framework seems to challenge 
the SEA tool in a number of ways. A key challenge is the break with what March terms the 
myth of rationality, as the model gives rise to understanding of choices as following from the 
search for meaning, interpretation and identity. The detailed discussion of implications in 
terms of SEA will follow the empirical investigations based on the conceptual framework, 
however, some preliminary implications are discussed here to guide the investigations and 
the methodological choices: 
- It challenges the view on the relation between decision-making processes and SEA, which 
is often simply modelled in SEA literature. Examples of such simple models are found in 
World Bank (2011) and Therivel (2004).  
- Compared to concepts like 'decisive moments' and 'windows of opportunity', the choice 
circles model blurs these temporal units by emphasising the ongoing element of human 
choice. 
- It emphasises the socio-psychological processes involved in choice processes, which 
contrast the emphasis on prediction and calculation of impacts and predictable decision-
making processes in SEA literature.  
- It puts attention to the story behind SEA documents as it directs attention to the earlier 
events leading to the presented SEA documents rather than taking these as a starting 
point for scrutiny or decision-making. It thereby criticises the retrospective noticing of 
cues in the documentation, which may oversimplify causality and overemphasise order 
(Weick 1995, p. 28). 
- It equals prospect with retrospect in the interaction between action and meaning creation, 
which contradict the emphasis on prospect in SEA theory. The model may e.g. lead to a 
potential of hearing as an action-driven sense-making process following Weick's "How 
can I know what I think until I hear what I say?" 
- It replaces accuracy with plausibility so that the aim of SEA becomes assessments and 
alternatives that are plausible for the actors rather than accuracy of impacts and the 
sufficiency of mitigation options. 
The models support the growing understanding of important choices being made outside the 
formal approval of plans and programmes, which SEA legislation is oriented towards. 
The relation and implications for impact assessment tools like SEA is touched upon in the 
conference poster in figure 15. The poster relates sense-making to a concrete assessment 
process and articulates the sense-making and sense-giving processes in the process. It 
furthermore challenges practice by questions like: "Are we reflective about the labels we put 
on impacts and their uncertainties?" 
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Figure 15: Poster on sense-making presented at the Nordic Research Day 2010 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
As an answer to the second sub-question, this chapter has presented a proposal for a model 
of human choice that combines decision-making and sense-making theories. This model is to 
be applied in an experiment to gain insight in human choice as well as to test the model. 
The chapter furthermore proposes a conceptual framework constituted by a continuum of 
perspectives of different levels of detail. The continuum is operationalised by three different 
models of decision-making of which the proposed choice circles model are used to 
investigate the details of strategic decision-making processes.  
The intension with the chapter was to combine the core of the theories of decision-making 
and sense-making through influential and early works. This intension can, however, be 
criticised for being out of date compared to the present decision-making theories in which 
e.g. March has more focus on the importance of meaning in decision-making. As described in 
the chapter, the gross characteristics of the theories have not changed and the early works are 
therefore a relevant entry point. Some of the existing efforts on combining decision-making 
and sense-making (see appendix C) are based on contemporary decision-making theories and 
these end up with similar understandings on the relation of the two disciplines. 
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CHAPTER 5:  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
"Fully acknowledging that our sensemaking of the sensemaking process is an active, 
purposeful and subjective sensemaking process in itself implies that we re-engage in 
sensemaking processes. The postmodern route, on the one hand, invites us, through 
deconstruction, to engage against our sensemaking as a way of uncovering both the 
constitutive and the undecidable character of sensemaking activities. The pragmatist (or 
participative) route, on the other hand, suggests that, through participative action 
research, we fully engage in sensemaking with organization members and recognize the 
socially constructed aspect of all sensemaking activities." (Allard-Poesi 2005, p. 169,) 
"The proliferation of persons, institutes, and centers conducting policy-related work has 
led to more variations in the manner by which problems are defined, more divergence in 
the ways in which studies are designed and conducted, and more disagreement and 
controversy over the ways in which data are analyzed and findings reported". (Rist 2000, 
pp. 1001-1002) 
 
To understand strategic decision-making we need to understand how we make sense. In the 
quote above, Allard-Poesi outlines two routes of being either critical or pragmatic to how our 
sense-making influences the research. The change agent approach described in chapter 3 cuts 
across this division and aims at being both critical and engaging as a critical friend. This 
critical engagement is to position itself in a jumble of ways and opinions on how to do 
research as pointed at by Rist above.  
Whereas the research framework primarily deals with the relation between the social setup of 
research and the conceptual framework deals with the theoretical understanding that 
governs the research, this chapter deals with the methodological framework used to answer 
the research question. The methodology thus provides a frame for consistency between the 
research and conceptual frameworks and the specific investigations. In the following, 
emphasis is on the research design, case material, and data collection methods. Research 
design is in the following understood as the questioning of: "Given this research question (or 
theory), what type of evidence is needed to answer the question (or test the theory) in a 
convincing way?" (De Vaus 2001, p. 9). Table 6 presents a brief overview of the relations 
between research questions, research design, case/material, and methods.  
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The methodological framework is in the following structured by sections of generic 
methodological considerations, methodology for the frameworks, and methodology for the 
empirical investigations of strategic decision-making processes. 
 
 Research questions Research design Case/material Methods 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 f
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 
I: What does acting as a 
change agent within the 
field of SEA involve and 
what potentials and 
relevance does it have 
for research and 
practice? 
Abductive reasoning based 
on three research projects on 
SEA with a change agent 
approach. 
Deductive development of 
frame for analysis based on 
CA literature. 
Three Ph.D. projects 
within SEA and 
change agent 
approach (two 
colleagues' projects 
and this project). 
Questions to 
partners of the 
projects.  
Reflections by the 
researchers. 
Analysis of 
contracts. 
C
o
n
ce
p
tu
al
 f
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 
ii. How can decision-
making and sense-
making be combined as 
concurrent processes in 
a model of human 
choice and how can this 
model contribute to a 
continuum of 
perspectives on strategic 
decision-making 
processes? 
Combination is deductive 
theory building based on 
review of key writings in 
early decision-making and 
sense-making literature. 
Continuum is deductive 
conceptual development 
inspired by literature on 
decision-making and SEA. 
Both are tested by 
investigations in the thesis. 
The writing of Karl 
E Weick, James G 
March, and Herbert 
A Simon. 
 
Review of key 
authors' writings 
for descriptions 
of strategic 
decision-making 
processes. 
Review of 
existing efforts on 
combining the 
theories. 
U
n
ra
v
el
li
n
g
 o
f 
st
ra
te
g
ic
 d
ec
is
io
n
-m
ak
in
g
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
iii: When in the 
development of Danish 
energy infrastructure, 
are strategic decisions 
made that are 
potentially decisive for 
environmental aspects, 
and how are these 
choices made? 
 
Empirical 
investigations 
by use of the 
three models 
of the 
conceptual 
framework as 
inductive 
development 
of knowledge 
about strategic 
decision-
making. 
The 'series of 
choice' 
model. 
Four strategic 
decision-making 
processes in the 
energy sector 
Energinet.dk's 
conceptualisation of 
decision-making 
Participation in 
meetings and 
assessments of 
strategic 
development 
Energinet.dk. 
Examination of 
news media and 
ministerial 
reports. 
Interview and 
review by 
involved actors. 
The 
'contextual 
interaction' 
model 
The SEA pilot in 
Energinet.dk on 
natural gas plan. 
The choice 
circles 
model 
The Ll. Torup gas 
storage EIA process. 
Experiment with 10 
persons on sense-
making on a given 
case. 
Recording of 
sense-making 
and analysis of 
transcriptions. 
iv: How should SEA be 
applied in order to 
approach the charac-
teristics of strategic 
decision-making in the 
energy sector? 
Inductive synthesis of the 
empirical investigations 
The cases of the 
empirical 
investigations 
- 
Table 6: Brief overview of the research design and method for each sub-question. 
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5.1  GENERIC METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
"It seems like people can make sense of anything. This makes life easy for people who 
study sensemaking in the sense that their phenomenon is everywhere. But effortless 
sensemaking is also a curse for investigators because it means that they are more likely to 
see sense that has already been made than to see the actual making of it" (Weick 1995, p. 
49) 
"We as SEA researchers can choose to be close to the SEA practitioners, decision makers 
and affected parties and at the same time create temporary space of distance to the 
relevance demands coming from the co-operators to safeguard rigour" (Kørnøv et al. 
2011) 
 
This methodological framework is inspired by sense-making literature in how to investigate 
and grasp what is under scrutiny. As Weick comments in the quote above, studying of how 
humans make sense may be both easy and a curse. Critical reflections on how we as 
researchers make sense of how people make sense may therefore be a 'double curse' of being 
critical towards effortless sense-making of people's effortless sense-making. The following 
generic considerations also concern quality criteria for research and as a follow up on the 
change agent article quoted above, the subchapter discusses rigour of research. As far as I am 
aware, sense-making, SEA, and change agent research have never been combined before 
despite their common interest in how people's understanding of things shapes their actions 
and experiences. 
This subchapter presents methodological considerations that are generic for all investigations 
in this thesis. The considerations concern quality criteria for research combining the fields of 
sense-making, change agent research approach, and SEA. The considerations furthermore 
concerns reasoning and design of research. The generic considerations are elaborated and 
contextualised in the more detailed description of methodology in the following subchapters. 
As part of a change agent research, the research designs have been developed in the context 
of strategic interdependence and organisational autonomy. The designs have therefore been 
open towards developments and oriented to opportunities for participants to reflect on and 
possibly change their worldview and practice.  
 
QUALITY CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH ON SENSE-MAKING, CHANGE AGENT, AND SEA 
The quality criteria outlined in the following are reflecting the qualitative orientation as well 
as the constructivism inherent in a sense-making inspired understanding of research. 
The insight into how we make decisions presented in the conceptual framework is also 
relevant for reflecting on the decisions made in research: Research process and findings 
depend e.g. on the participants' mental frameworks in what is noticed and what stories are 
generated and retained. With reference to the quote of Allard-Poesi above, acknowledging 
this is not an easy task. Change agent research can thus be seen as a sense-making process in 
which the researcher and the studied actors interact by providing stimuli to each other, by 
developing shared frameworks for interpretation and by arguing for certain interpretations 
of events. The investigations are an enactment and each investigation is a process of selecting, 
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processing, understanding and communicating parts of the events and flows of information 
accessible. Research is in this perspective 'locally' constructed and contextual. Therefore, 
research elements like themes, ideas, approaches, and methods are a product of cognitive 
frameworks, shared meanings, experienced disruptions, and local resources. 
This locally constructed character of the research is in this thesis balanced by scientific 
standards in journal review processes and interaction with research communities. These 
standards concern different forms of validity (e.g. Calder et al. 1982, Lincoln and Guba 2000), 
which in the social science can be framed as two main positions on validity: "The first, 
borrowed from positivism, argues for a kind of rigor in the application of method, whereas 
the second argues for both a community consent and a form of rigor - defensible reasoning, 
plausible alongside some other reality that is known to author and reader - in ascribing 
salience to one interpretation over another and for framing and bounding an interpretive 
study itself" (Lincoln and Guba 2000, p. 178). The latter argument follows the constructivist 
understanding that "there is no one "correct" interpretation" (Janesick 2000, p. 393). 
In his writing on theory construction, Weick (1989) at the same time argues for accuracy of 
theory and subjective criteria such as "interesting, plausible, consistent, or appropriate" (p. 
520) or even "aesthetically pleasing" (p. 517). Whereas accuracy in Weick's writings is related 
to testing of hypotheses and range of instances explained by a set of assertions, the 
subjectivity is related to the social, historical, political, and cultural dimension. Weick argues 
that "[t]heory is a dimension rather than a category" (p. 516) and that quality of theory 
depends on accuracy in the problem statement that triggers theory building, the conjectures 
that attempt to solve the problem, and the selection criteria used in the testing of conjectures. 
Quality of research is in the action research literature often related to an argument that "ideas 
and practices should be judged in terms of their usefulness, workability, and practicality and 
that these are the criteria of their truth, rightness and value" (Reason 2003, p. 104). In this 
perspective, validity "centers on the workability of the actual social change activity engaged 
in, and the test is whether or not the actual solution to a problem arrived at solved the 
problem" (Greenwood and Levin 2000, pp. 96-97). The choice circles model has high quality 
and validity if it is accepted by the actors of the energy sector and if it is a relevant point of 
departure for changing practice. Reason and Bradbury (2001) broaden the quality of action 
research through five questions for action research: 1) Is it explicit on the cooperation? 2) Is it 
guided by a reflexive concern for practical outcomes? 3) Does it include a plurality of 
knowing and conceptual-theoretical integrity? 4) Does it engage in significant work? 5) Does 
it result in new and enduring structures? Most of these quality questions are touched upon in 
the research frame in chapter 3 and they are as such part of the concerns in the setup and 
negotiation of the research. The criteria of significance of the work and enduring structures 
emphasise in line with Huff (2000a) that attention should not be limited to immediate 
relevance as a longer perspective is needed. This emphasis furthermore converges with the 
sustainability normativity of the research frame. The action research quality criteria of 
rightness and value are in line with Weick's emphasis on appropriate and interesting, 
however, learning from the conceptual framework the determination of usefulness and 
practicality may be complicated by a plurality of preferences and understandings among the 
partners involved in the research.  
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The change agent article points at a need to safeguard rigour in the cooperation with practice. 
Rigour is by Tobin and Begley (2004) defined as "the means by which we demonstrate 
integrity and competence" (p. 390). They argue for the need for "placing [rigour] within the 
epistemology of their work and making it more appropriate to their aims" (p. 390). In this 
thesis, rigour concerns the consistency pointed at above as well as reliable (or dependable as 
proposed by Lincoln and Cuba 2000) meaning that is repeatable. This is achieved by being 
"logical, traceable and clearly documented" (Tobin and Begley 2004, p. 392). The dynamics of 
the studied objects and constructivist elements of the research would in practice complicate 
the possibility for repeating the research and get similar findings, however, in principle 
repeatability is an important character of science. The elements of transferability and 
objectivity that are often related to scientific rigour are not of major concern in this thesis.  
Inspired by these positions on quality of research, the criteria governing the research in this 
Ph.D. project and the main ways to test these criteria are primarily: 
- Social validation of research: Findings validated by commenting of involved actors and 
the usefulness of the research in practice 
- Scientific validation in research: Discussion with academics and journal reviewers on 
reasoning and the plausibility of constructs 
- Methodological rigour: That the research is repeatable for others 
- Plausibility: Relating the model to experience and insight in discussion with theorists and 
practitioners e.g. at conferences, see subchapter 3.2. 
- Consistency: Iterative process of developing and testing the research towards the 
theoretical point of departure and the phenomena that the research concerns. 
- Significance of the work: Considering the change potential of the setup of each 
investigation 
These criteria play an important role in enhancing consistency between the research frame, 
the conceptual frame, the methodological frame, and the empirical studies. The criteria have 
different weight depending on the character of the specific investigation and the opinions of 
the actors involved. Social validation is e.g. more important in participatory investigations 
than in the theoretical investigation in the conceptual framework. A similar argument is also 
found in e.g. Calder et al. (1982). 
The generic research design urges data collection methods that achieve insight in decision-
making processes as they unfold. How these methodological requirements are met in the 
Ph.D. project is described in the following section. 
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REASONING AND APPROACH 
The reasoning in the investigations in the thesis is partly deductive in developing and testing 
of the conceptual framework and partly inductive in generating theories from empirical 
cases. As an overall process, the research is characterised by abductive reasoning (Alvesson 
and Skjöldberg 1994, p. 42) of interactive reinterpretation of theoretical knowledge and 
empirical data. Orton (1997) describes a similar reasoning within studies of organisations as 
"iterative grounded theory" in which researchers make use of both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Like Orton's study, this study of strategic decision-making in the Danish energy 
sector is in a field of limited existing knowledge of what is happening.  
Discussing the Thorngate (1976) dictum that a given study could not simultaneously be 
general, accurate, and simple, Weick (1989, p. 35) portrays the dictum as a clock face, see 
figure 16. The clock face has 'general' at 10:00, 'accurate' at 2:00, and 'simple' at 6:00. Weick 
argues that "If you try to secure any two of the virtues of generality, accuracy and simplicity, 
you automatically sacrifice the other" (p. 35). Orton (1997) argues that "deductive researchers 
would center around theory at the 10.00 position, while purely inductive researchers would 
center around data at the 2:00 position. Most organizational process researchers seem to be 
centered around the 12:00 position, simultaneously grounded in general theory and accurate 
data, but very far away from the simplicity of 6:00" (p. 422). To come around this dictum, 
Weick suggests incorporating complementing research of others or developing theory by 
alternating among approaches and data that each provides the different elements; he prefers 
the solution "in which I alternate my research style and systematically try to move among the 
various positions over the duration of a year or a career" (Weick, 1989, p. 41). Orton is more 
idealistic in arguing that the challenge is "to find a way to present their complex 12:00 
findings in a simple 6:00 format" (1997, p. 422).  
 
  
Figure 16: Weick's clock face on the Thorngate dictum. 
 
In this thesis, the research framework is around 08.00 and the empirical investigations of 
strategic decision-making processes in the energy sector are around 3.00 (accuracy 
understood as plausibility). The conceptual framework is trying to cut across the clock face 
by incorporating complementing research areas and proposing a continuum of perspectives. 
It is thus intended to be general in the sense of being applicable to any context, accurate in the 
9 3 
12 
6 
Accurate 
Simple 
General 
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sense that each model facilitates a plausible reflection of part of the reality, and simple in its 
final structure (although the development was not simple). 
Positioning the empirical investigations around 3.00 is in line with Cyert et al. (1956), who 
initiate their conclusions by "We do not wish to try to transform one swallow into a summer 
by generalizing too far from a single example of a decision process". The cases are thus seen 
as empirical insight in context specific processes that may illustrate and suggest certain 
characteristics of decision-making. The extent to which the empirical findings may be 
generalisable to other decision-making processes and other contexts is discussed in the 
synthesis. The impossible aim of making fully generalisable research in a socially constructed 
context is coined by Lincoln and Denzin (2000, p. 1058): 
 
"The problem of representation will not go away. Indeed, at its heart lies an inner tension, 
an ongoing dialectic, a contradiction that will never be resolved. On the one hand, there is 
the concern for validity, or certainty in the text as a form of isomorphism and 
authenticity. On the other hand, there is the sure and certain knowledge that all text are 
socially, historically, politically, and culturally located. We, like the texts we write, can 
never be transcendent"  
 
A way to deal with the contextually located aspects is to use case study methodology. In line 
with Yin's (2003) work on case study methodology, case studies are in this thesis regarded 
"the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator 
has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with 
some real-life context" (Yin 2003, p. 1). 'How questions' are dominating the research questions 
of this thesis and the change agent research approach is not including control of events in the 
real-life collaboration. Furthermore, the thesis is concentrated on contemporary phenomena. 
In terms of the change agent collaboration, case study methodology has relevant 
characteristics like the potential for learning through cases: "the case study produces precisely 
the type of context-dependent knowledge which makes it possible to move from the lower to 
the higher levels in the learning process" (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 71). As indicated in table 6, case 
studies are used in the empirical part of the thesis. Table 7 presents an overview of the cases 
used in the thesis, the investigation they are used in, and what they are a case of. 
The investigated cases vary in terms of the degree of non-programmedness, however all cases 
are considered to have a considerable element of novelty or of non-repetitive problems: Some 
have a few novel elements, whereas others are characterised by novelty in a range of aspects 
such as politics, technology, actor composition, legislative setup, etc. How these non-
programmed elements challenge SEA application is part of the investigation. 
The methodological descriptions in this chapter are to some extent a misleading 
simplification of the iterative and - in some instances - complex interaction between the 
efforts of determining data, methods, questions, and purpose. During the Ph.D. process, I 
have not deliberately sought to reduce the 'messy' process, but utilising the flexibility and 
openness of a concurrent determination of the key elements of the investigation. The messy 
process may reduce the rational-scientific value of the investigations in the sense that a more 
ordered process may provide better opportunities for choosing methodology and sample that 
to a wider extent meets the original objectives. On the other hand, the messy process seems 
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more adequate for social interaction in change agent research, in which preferences and 
relevance changes during the research process due to learning and strategic developments. 
This practice is supported by Flyvbjerg's (2001) criticism of the expectation of rational and 
rule-based research: "Researchers do not need to be able to formulate rules for their skills in 
order to practice them with success. One the contrary, studies show that rules can obstruct 
the continuous exercise of high-level skills. There is nothing which indicates that researchers 
at expert level - those who have achieved genuine mastery in the field - use mainly context-
independent rules or traditional rationality in their best scientific performances, even though 
they might depict it as such when they get around to writing their scholarly articles and 
memoirs" (p. 34).  
 
Investigation Cases Case of 
Change agent 
research  
(chapter 3) 
Three co-funded Ph.D. projects involving 
collaboration with practice 
A change-oriented way of doing 
research with organisational 
autonomy and strategic 
interdependence 
Between policy-
making and 
planning  
(chapter 6) 
Four decision-making processes: 
- The National Test Centre for Windmills 
- The Offshore Wind Action Plan 
- The Natural Gas Plan 
- The Kriegers Flak Interconnection 
Strategic decision-making 
processes in which some choices 
are made by politicians and 
some choices are made by 
planners 
Decision-making 
in Energinet.dk  
(chapter 6) 
Energinet.dk's conceptualisation of its 
decision-making process from strategic 
probings to concrete projects 
How a key actor in the sector 
conceptualises strategic 
decision-making and the timing 
of SEA 
Strategic 
dynamics  
(chapter 7) 
The context and development in the Natural 
Gas Security of Supply Plan and the 
accompanying pilot SEA 
A planning process that is 
influenced by a range of 
contextual changes 
Sense-making in 
an EA process 
(chapter 8) 
Three persons' perception of changes and 
description of actions in the EA process of 
the Ll. Torup gas storage re-leaching 
How persons make sense and 
act on events in a real life 
context 
Public 
consultation 
comments 
(chapter 10) 
- The National Test Centre for Windmills 
- The Offshore Wind Action Plan 
 
Concerns expressed in public 
consultation comments in EA 
processes of Danish energy 
infrastructure 
Table 7 Overview of cases used in this thesis, the investigation in which they are used, and what they 
are a case of. 
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5.2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE SPECIFIC PARTS OF THE THESIS 
Within the frame of the generic methodological considerations, the methodologies applied in 
the Ph.D. project is described and discussed in the following. The subchapter is divided into 
methodology for the frameworks and methodology for the empirical investigations. 
 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE FRAMEWORKS 
This section presents the methodological considerations relate to the research framework as 
well as to the conceptual framework. The presentations are brief as each chapter describes the 
methodology used. The performance in terms of the quality criteria outlined above is stated 
in table 8. 
 
Abductive research methodology on the change agent approach within SEA 
The research question of "What does acting as a change agent within the field of SEA involve 
and what potentials and relevance does it have for research and practice?" is explored in the 
chapter on the research framework. The research design is characterised by abductive 
reasoning (Alvesson and Skjöldberg 1994) as it has point of departure in theories of change 
agent research, which is deduced into an analytical framework for empirical cases and the 
findings is induced into a categorisation of roles of change agents. The data collection 
methods used in the article are a combination of analysis of the contracts on the Ph.D. 
projects, open questions to contact persons in the cooperating organisations, reflections by the 
researchers on their experiences, and review of the article by the cooperating organisations. 
The details about these methods are found in the article. The potentials and implications have 
been validated by discussions with Energinet.dk and with practitioners at the IAIA'10 
conference at which the authors of the article articulated ways of doing research; a significant 
part of the practitioners as well as researchers expressed they were acting as change agents 
and acknowledged the identified potentials and relevance. 
The quite general demonstration of potentials and relevance of the change agent approach in 
the article is supplemented with a detailed and critical reflection on the experiences of this 
Ph.D. project. Methodologically, this detailed reflection has character of a structured 
narrative of the personal experience of events and choices made during the Ph.D. process. 
The data for the investigation is email correspondence and notes taken at meetings 
throughout the project period. The draft versions of the experiences have been discussed with 
the partners in the Ph.D. project represented by Kim Behnke (Energinet.dk) and Lone Kørnøv 
(Aalborg University). The aim of the discussion was not a common interpretation of the 
experiences, but to clarify eventual misunderstandings. 
The answer to the research question about potentials and relevance of the change agent 
approach is reconsidered in the Synthesis based on the findings of the entire thesis. 
 
Deductive development of the conceptual framework 
The research question of "How can decision-making and sense-making be combined as 
concurrent processes in a model of human choice and how can this model contribute to a 
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continuum of perspectives on strategic decision-making processes?" is explored in the 
chapter on the conceptual framework. The research design is dominated by deductive theory 
building based on a literature review of insight into how we make decisions in what I define 
as key writings in early decision-making and sense-making literature: The writing of Karl E 
Weick, James G March, and Herbert A Simon. In order to combine the two disciplines, the 
research design includes a review of decision-making and sense-making literature on existing 
efforts on combining the theories. The conceptual framework is only indirectly socially 
validated through discussions on the empirical investigations based on the models with Kim 
Behnke and Malene Hein Nybroe, Energinet.dk. These discussions did not specifically 
concern the models. 
The development of the framework has been an iterative development between theory and 
empirical findings and the published journal articles may therefore include fragments of 
previous version of the framework.  
The deductive theory development is part of the overall abductive approach as the theory is 
tested by the empirical investigations in order to propose amendments and ways forward in 
the Synthesis. 
The modest performance of the conceptual framework on validation is intended to be 
improved by discussions in the future, e.g. on an upcoming research seminar on Weick's 
writing in 2011. The high scores of the change agent approach partly follows from the 
intension of the change article of facilitating improvements and partly from the interaction 
with practice. 
 
Quality criteria Change agent framework Conceptual framework 
Social validation of 
research by involved 
actors 
High: Agreement on the relevance 
and potentials among project 
partners and practitioners in general. 
Low: Discussions of the model with a 
few actors. 
Scientific validation 
in research 
High: Discussion with other 
researchers and journal reviewers. 
Low (The research will be discussed at 
a research seminar). 
Repeatable for others High: The method is transparently 
described (the results are context 
dependent). 
Medium: The process is transparent, 
however, the complexity of theories 
would likely lead to other nuances. 
Plausibility in terms 
of experience and 
insight 
High (personal): The research is 
based on experiences and insight. 
High (personal): The models are 
selected based on experiences and 
insight. 
Consistency between 
theory and 
phenomena 
High: Theory and phenomena are 
closely related as heory is developed 
upon empirical findings. 
High: The framework has been 
developed in interaction with 
empirical studies to reflect 
phenomena. 
Change potential of 
the work 
High: The argument is that change 
agent research can bridge the gap 
between theory and practice. 
Medium: Despite synergistic 
potentials, the conceptual framework 
will likely not lead to significant 
changes in practice or theory. 
Table 8. A rough judgement of the performance of the methodology for the change agent and 
conceptual framework in terms of the quality criteria of this thesis. 
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METHODOLOGY FOR THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
This subchapter presents the research design and methods for data collection for the 
empirical investigations that constitutes the unravelling of strategic decision-making 
processes in the Danish energy sector. All investigations besides the experiment are similar in 
their research design and use of methods, why these are grouped in this chapter. Differences 
in the details can be found in the description of approach in the specific investigations. The 
performance in terms of the quality criteria outlined above is stated in table 10. 
 
Research design for the empirical investigations 
The considerations on research design have point of departure in a short review of research 
designs of studies with a theoretical basis similar to the conceptual framework in this thesis. 
The review is point of departure for developing a research design for the empirical 
investigations. More detailed descriptions of methodology of the specific investigations are 
found in the respective sections of the thesis. 
The short review of existing combinations of sense-making and decision-making in the 
conceptual framework included only highly theoretical publications. To get insight into and 
inspiration for how to investigate decision-making processes in a way that is in line with the 
conceptual framework, a number of publications with empirical investigations are reviewed 
below. These publications are identified by use of the snow-balling method starting from 
Weick's and March's writings. The criteria for the review of research designs are: 
Transparency on the research design, focus on empirical data, resulting in knowledge about 
decision-making, especially in line with the choice circles model elements of diagnosis of 
situation and/or search/design of options by noticing cues, labelling events and creating 
stories. The short review of research designs is summarised in table 9. 
As seen from the table, managers are often in focus in investigations with a similar 
conceptual framework. This may be due to the importance of their decisions and their need to 
relate to ongoing events. The issues in focus vary from specific instances (e.g. restructuring) 
to ongoing activities (e.g. problem formulation). Furthermore, the setup of the investigations 
varies from created situations (experiment) to 'real' organisational processes, however, all are 
framed similar to a case study. A majority of the reviewed investigations are qualitative, 
which is in accordance with the conclusion made by Craig-Lees (2001, p. 1790) on studies 
within sense-making in organizational research. Evidence about the organisational processes 
is both first hand (observation/participation) and second hand (interview/questionnaire). A 
recurrent strategy for linking evidence to the research question is an analytical process of 
categorisation followed by conceptualisation. Weick seems to favour cases of extreme actions 
or accidents to investigate sense-making (e.g. 1990, 1993), however, although situations with 
extreme pressure on humans seem to bring about interesting aspects of sense-making, the 
majority of the investigations reviewed above develop valuable insight from far less extreme 
cases. 
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Author(s) Research topic Research design Evidence 
Lyles and 
Mitroff 
(1980) 
How do 
organisations 
become aware of 
problems and what 
characterises 
problem formulation 
processes 
Analysis of indicators (from 
study and literature) of how 
managers sensed organizational 
problems. Statistical analysis of 
importance of individual 
characteristics of the managers  
Data about 33 managers' 
perceptions of the problem-
formulation process in their 
organisations 
(in hindsight, distanced) 
Bargh 
(1982) 
How people select 
information for 
further processing 
1) Statistical analysis, 2) 
interpretation of results in terms 
of existing knowledge. 
Data about people's 
awareness of stimuli in 
different tasks 
(experiment) 
Lüscher 
and Lewis 
(2008) 
How managers make 
sense and act in 
restructuring 
Categorisation of perceptions and 
actions. Interaction with 
managers during the 
restructuring 
Data about managers' 
perception of and actions in 
restructuring process 
(ongoing, participating) 
Thomas, 
Clark and 
Gioia 
(1993) 
How top managers 
process information 
about environmental 
change 
1) Statistical analysis including 
test of hypothesis, 2) 
interpretation of statistics in 
terms of hypotheses generated 
from existing literature 
Data about how managers in 
health care industry scanned 
and interpreted scenarios.  
(in hindsight, distanced) 
Maitlis and 
Lawrence 
(2007) 
Conditions that 
trigger sense-giving 
and conditions that 
enable it 
 
1) Development of sense-making 
narratives, 2) Identification of 
issues in which people engaged 
in sense-giving, 3) 
Conceptualisation of conditions 
for sense-giving. 
Data about sense-making 
processes with issues in three 
symphony orchestras, 
including who was engaged 
in sense-giving on what 
issues, the ways they did so, 
and the reasons behind. 
(ongoing, observing) 
Boland 
(1984) 
Managers' sense-
making of projected 
accounting data 
Interpretation of managers' 
cognitive and emotional 
experiences 
Data about how a 
management group created 
future account based on a 
scenario and used it to make 
sense of the development 
until the future account. 
(experiment) 
Corvellec 
and 
Risberg 
(2007) 
How developers 
stage their project 
and provide it with 
direction 
 
1) Analysing recurring elements 
in accounts of what developers 
do to categorise activities, 2) 
conceptualising the categories 
based on argumentation and 
performance theory. 
Data about how energy actors 
describe their activities and 
documents on the 
development processes 
(in hindsight, distanced) 
Weick 
(1993) 
Disintegration of role 
structures and sense-
making 
1) Analysis of disintegration, 2) 
Conceptualisation. 
Data about fire-fighters 
actions and reasoning in a fire 
(in hindsight, distanced) 
Table 9: Review of research designs with a conceptual framework similar to this thesis. 
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The research design for the first empirical investigation in this thesis based on the 'series of 
choice' model is a dominantly inductive reasoned characterisation of the interplay between 
policy-making and planning at strategic level in the Danish energy sector. The model is on 
the fringe of the research designs reviewed above with its quite distanced and outlining 
character. The design is an analytical framework for mapping that is inspired by literature on 
SEA and decision-making, but it is developed in a process of interaction between existing 
theory and relevant elements of the empirical data. The findings of the mapping are 
categorised and discussed in a theory development process. The second 'series of choice' 
investigation concerns the conceptualisation of strategic decision-making and SEA made by 
Energinet.dk and it has similarities with an interpretative analysis focusing on the meanings 
of the conceptualisation text. The analysis is point of departure for a discussion of the 
conceptualisation in terms of the conceptual framework and the SEA literature. The findings 
are discussed with Kim Behnke from Energinet.dk and partly with Mette Cramer Buch from 
the Danish Energy Agency. 
The research design for the investigation based on the 'Contextual interaction' model is 
similar to the first 'series of choice' investigation: It is also an inductive reasoning based on a 
mapping of decision-making and categorisation of the findings. The focus on influences and 
reasons for choices in the investigation has similarities with Boland's study of sense-making 
of accounting data above and Lyles and Mitroff's investigation of managers' perceptions. 
Parts of the investigations are discussed with participants at the IAIA'09 and AESOP'10 
conferences and part of the research is discussed with Kim Behnke and Malene Hein Nybroe 
from Energinet.dk.  
 
Quality criteria The empirical investigations in the unravelling 
Social validation of research 
by involved actors 
Medium: The research is discussed with representatives of the involved 
actors, but there is no broader social acceptance of the findings. 
Scientific validation in 
research 
Medium: Part of the research is discussed with other researchers and the 
research is to some extent validated through journal review. 
Repeatable for others High: The research has a fixed point of departure in models and a clear 
analytical approach, which makes it repeatable. 
Plausibility in terms of 
experience and insight 
Medium: The research is regarded plausible by the (limited amount of) 
persons that have commented on it. 
Consistency between theory 
and phenomena 
High: The theories are induced from the analysis of the phenomena. 
Change potential of the 
work 
High: The unravelling of strategic decision-making and the relation to 
SEA is a key step in developing a meaningful way of applying SEA. 
Table 10. A rough judgement of the performance of the methodology for the empirical investigations 
in terms of the quality criteria of this thesis. 
 
The research design for the investigation based on the 'choice' model on the Ll. Torup case is 
in line with the research based on the two other approaches; it is also based on a mapping of 
developments that leads to inductive categorisations. It has similarities with a range of the 
reviewed studies above, e.g. Risberg and Corvellec's study of how information is staged and 
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Lüscher and Lewis' study of how persons make sense of events. The research design is based 
on a case study of an environmental assessment process in Ll. Torup covering different 
periods of time to investigate developments in how actors make sense of events and 
information. 
The high performance of the empirical investigations determined in table 10 is due to the 
change agent research approach in which social validation, consistency between theory and 
practice, and change potential are prioritised. 
 
Combination of methods in the empirical investigations 
The methods used in the empirical investigations are to a wide extent a triangulation of 
participative insight, distanced documentation, and feedback from or interview with the 
involved actors. The involvement and participation aim at giving a necessary insight into 
strategic decision-making processes as well as to approach practice. The distanced 
documentation mainly through literature studies as well as the feedback of involved persons 
aim at enhancing reliability and validation. These three methods are described in the 
following. 
Insight into choice processes have been gained by participation in planning of energy 
infrastructure in Energinet.dk and in planning processes of other authorities. As an example 
of the participation is participation in a meeting on how to integrate environmental concerns 
in the international interconnection in the Kriegers Flak project. The participation in 
Energinet.dk was facilitated by a work space at the head office and involvement in planning 
processes and meetings for the first year of the Ph.D. project, which include participation and 
observation of a wide range of meetings at different levels in the organisation, see subchapter 
3.1 and table 11. A brief review of notes and email correspondence shows interaction with at 
least 20 persons from at least six different sections in Energinet.dk, who were somehow 
involved in environmental assessment or strategic choices. My choice of participation prior to 
(more) theoretical immersion is in line with Weick's (1996) advice of 'drop your tools' in order 
to be receptive of what is really going on rather than what your schooling prescribes you to 
see; strictly adhering to heavy methodological and theoretical tools may make "researchers 
move more slowly and with less agility and make them more susceptible to being overrun" 
(p. 311). My participation in Energinet.dk was based on a general theoretical introduction 
from the master thesis, but it was - in my mind - not guided by 'heavy' analytical frameworks 
or theoretical frames that would exclude me from seeing what was going on. 
The participative research approach in the early period of the Ph.D. project was in line with 
Bjørner Christensen's (2003, 2005) description of his research approach: "I do not formulate 
working hypotheses or set up a research plan in advance. I do not use organizational 
diagnoses, models or methods for gathering data. On the contrary, I use the opportunities I 
have in daily work, in ordinary meetings with clients, taking part in different conversations. 
During these conversations, or sometimes after them, I reflect and make notes on how I have 
conducted my work and how I have understood especially what I have experienced as 
striking moments." This approach emphasises open-mindedness towards the experienced 
and limited disturbance of the organisational processes that are experienced continuously 
without interruptions by formal interviews. My choice of this approach made it possible to 
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describe the story and my making sense of it as it unfolded. Coghlan and Brannick emphasise 
the concurrent element as part of the critical process of articulating sense-making: 
 
"The critical process with respect to articulating your sense-making is making your tacit 
knowledge explicit. This involves not only providing an analysis of what you think is 
going on in the story, but also of how you are making sense of it as the story unfolds 
(Weick, 1995). In other words, sense-making is not only a retrospective process, but is also 
a process which is concurrent with the story, and in terms of the action research cycle 
actually shapes the story." (Coghlan and Brannick 2005, p. 30)  
 
The ongoing reflections on my sense-making and working notes were categorised and dated 
for later use, and theoretical ideas were continuously formed in an abductive approach. The 
choice of the open-minded approach contrasts well-planned investigations and could be 
criticised for not fulfilling scientific standards and for being unstructured. The open-minded 
approach is according to Weick a point of departure for research into sense-making: 
"Research and practice in sensemaking needs to begin with a mindset to look for 
sensemaking … and a search for those outcroppings and ideas that fascinate" (Weick 1995, p. 
191). At the beginning of the Ph.D. project, the open approach seemed the right way to go 
forward since I had little knowledge about the nature of strategic decision-making processes 
in the energy sector. Weick (1995) quotes Starbuck and Milliken (1988) for disapproving 
uncritical reliance on hypotheses: "People investigate hypotheses from the viewpoint that 
they are correct, and as long as result can be interpreted within current frameworks, the 
frameworks need not change, or even be evaluated" (p. 192). The open-minded approach was 
thus a balancing of being blinded by hypothesis and knowing what to look for in the 
participation. 
The participatory research in the first year involved challenges of explicating knowledge and 
steering the research. Achieved through participation, the insight in the strategic decision-
making processes has been tacit as well as explicit knowledge about how decisions were 
made. The tacit knowledge, e.g. about work processes and assumptions, has been a natural 
part of the participation, however, for the critical research and change efforts it had to be 
made explicit. Questioning the basis for conclusions and discussions with other researchers 
were main elements of making tacit knowledge explicit and this was a process of seizing the 
opportunity when it arose rather than creating forced and unpleasant situations for the 
actors. Furthermore, changes in the ongoing processes complicated ethical aspects of 
informing and agreeing with participants on the content and consequences of the research 
when 'negotiation access' (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p. 42)  
After the first year of daily participation in Energinet.dk, I shifted working space to Aalborg 
University, see the change agent prelude, and the participation in Energinet.dk became 
fragmented in time and therefore more distanced. Still, the research was characterised by co-
development of the overall ideas of the research and insight into the strategic decision-
making. The change in distance to Energinet.dk is reflected in the authoring: The first year 
involved co-authoring of e.g. SEA methodology (Energinet.dk 2008a) with Energinet.dk, 
whereas the co-authoring with Energinet.dk in the distanced period was limited and 
primarily based on feedback.  
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The achievement of insight is in line with the methods that Weick (1995) identifies as relevant 
for studying sense-making. Among other methods, Weick specifically mention grounded 
theory, work diaries, field observation, interviews, and participant observation (p. 172). 
Interviews were in many instances redundant as many interview-like questions were asked 
as part of the participation and continuously noted. If events needed further clarification, 
small-talk was used for retrospective accounts of the experienced. Interviews risk being 
retrospective and rationalised reconstruction of events based on memories which become 
increasingly blurred over time. Using the words of Kundera (1995, p. 126): "Man proceeds in 
the fog. But when he looks back to judge people of the past, he sees no fog on their path. 
From his present, which was their faraway future, their path looks perfectly clear to him, 
good visibility all the way. Looking back, he sees the path, he sees the people proceeding, he 
sees their mistakes, but not the fog". The reconstructions may furthermore unintendedly or 
intendedly be affected by the individual's shifting emotional states and political interests. 
Therefore, insight in processes as they unfold is favoured. 
In some investigations, access to the unfolding of experiences has not been possible and a 
range of interviews has therefore been conducted, see the overview in table 11. To prioritise 
flexibility, these interviews have been semi-structured: "It has a sequence of themes to be 
covered, as well as suggested questions. Yet at the same time there is an openness to changes 
of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up the answers given and the stories 
told by the subjects" (Kvale 1996, p. 124). Due to the distance and "a point in time" character 
of the interview situation, it is vulnerable in terms of misinterpretation, ambiguity of 
questions, over-emphasis of specific themes and attention, etc. Interviewees have been asked 
to account for their experiences of events prior to questions of explaining and interpreting 
these events. This sequence has increased the possibility for understanding the interviewees' 
sense-making and positions.  
To the extent that it did not disrupt the flow of the conversation, summative questions and 
validating questions have been asked. Furthermore, the interview questions have concerned 
concrete events and examples to support and explain the opinions of the interviewees. To 
prioritise trust in the change agent approach, questions that included sensitive opinions and 
political aspects have not been audio recorded. In most interviews, the interviewees were 
careful to state what they did not want to be cited for. When possible and suitable, the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. Thus, the thesis is based on nearly 100 pages of 
transcribed interviews with key actors in contemporary strategic decision-making processes 
in the energy sector. 
Learning from the properties of sense-making, the insight and research that I achieve and 
produce is influenced by my mental frameworks and my identity. The thesis is thus basically 
a personal account of how I perceive research, SEA, and the strategic decision-making 
processes in the energy sector. The personal influence is sought reduced by discussions with 
involved actors and other researchers, and influenced by reviewers of conference papers and 
journal articles. Despite possibilities for reducing the personal element, it is unavoidable and 
partly what makes research fulfil the criterion of interesting. The personal element is 
influenced by the social structures within which I engage, although it has been a priority to 
be continuously critical towards these. 
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Interviews 
Use in thesis Interviewed persons Time 
Data on sense-
making in the Ll. 
Torup case [8.1] 
Svend S Dahl, DN 
Sigvald Fihl, Limfjordsvenner 
Twice during 
2010-2011 
Henriette Hansen, DOF and private Summer 2010 
Feedback and 
clarification of the 
gas planning [6.1 
and 7.1] 
Malene Hein Nybroe, senior project leader, Energinet.dk Summer 2011 
Insight and 
discourses on 
decision-making and 
environmental 
integration in 
Energinet.dk [10] 
Vibeke Hørlyck, environmental coordinator 
Torben G. Nielsen, manager for the electricity division 
Steffen Østermark, chief economist 
Peter Jørgensen, manager in the electricity division 
Marian Petra Kaagh, responsible for EIA and SEA 
Lennart Johann Dahlquist, controller, business support 
Jens C. Hygebjerg, project manager 
Hans E. Kristoffersen, chief secretariat, management 
Dorte Vinther, development director 
Aksel Gruelund Sørensen, project manager 
Summer 2011 
 
Data in the 
experiment of how 
people are making 
sense of significance 
[8.1] 
Anja Weis, Ph.D. fellow, AAU 
Christian G Simonsen, Energinet.dk  
Lotte L Andersen, Middelfart Municipality 
NN, professor, AAU 
Kristian Olesen, Ph.D. fellow, AAU 
Per Christensen, professor, AAU 
Sanne V Larsen, associate professor, AAU 
Stine Rabech Nielsen, Rambøll 
Summer 2011 
Meetings 
Use in thesis Persons participating Time 
Validation of policy-
planning article and 
insight in decision-
making processes 
[6.1 and 6.2] 
Kim Behnke, head of research and environment, 
Energinet.dk 
4-5 times,  
2008-2011 
Marian Petrea Kaagh, responsible for EIA and SEA, 
Energinet.dk 
3 times, 2008-
2011 
Stine Poulsen, Danish Energy Agency Autumn 2011 
Natural gas security 
of supply plan and 
SEA [7.1] 
Malene Hein Nybroe, senior project leader, Energinet.dk, 
COWI consultants and the rest of the SEA team 
3 times, 2008-
2010 
Kriegers Flak 
connection and 
environment [7.1] 
Hanne Kortegaard Nielsen, Project manager and system 
analyst, Energinet.dk, et al. 
Spring 2009 
Windmill planning 
& SEA [6.1 and 9] 
Rebekka Falk and Mette Cramer Buch, Danish Energy 
Agency 
Summer 2010 
Offshore oil & gas 
and SEA [9] 
Katja Scharmann, Danish Energy Agency (telephone) Spring 2011 
Table 11: An overview of interviews and meetings and the use of these in the thesis. The numbers in 
square brackets refer to the chapter or subchapter in which the interview or meeting is referred to. 
 
 
114 
The insight into the energy sector has been 'formalised' through documentation by public 
material. In this regard, the thesis has similarities with Lund (2009) who in an action-oriented 
research approach substantiates insight and experience by use of a range of formal plans and 
other written material. The process of documentation has been a process of transferring 'tacit' 
knowledge gained by participation into 'explicit' knowledge with reference to an official 
framework of the activities in the energy sector. Thereby, the research is sought to fulfil 
scientific requirements of being testable and replicable. Where no official framework or 
interview possibility existed, the limits on documentation were limiting the use of insight in 
the investigations. 
The insight in the form of memories, notes, working documents and emails have prior to 
publication undergone a process of being documented by formal reports, news articles, and 
other documents. This process has from time to time been difficult as some elements of 
strategic decision-making processes are not - and are not wanted to be - official. The official 
version is, however, necessary to present a reproducible account of the not-reproducible 
observations of the decision-making processes. An example of the official documentation can 
be found in the mapping of series of choices on energy infrastructure (Lyhne 2011a).  
The documentation has when relevant included a process of getting feedback from the 
involved actors. The feedback has been a process of "cross-check our work through member 
checks and audit trails" (Janesick 2000, p. 393) that in practice depended on the actors 
involved and publication process. The feedback from the involved actors has been an open-
minded dialogue about the findings or a possibility for commenting on draft texts. All 
empirical investigations have been given a direct feedback from the involved actors and the 
more theoretical ideas or general findings have been given an indirect feedback through 
conference discussion, etc. The feedback achieved has varied greatly with some relation to 
how important the research was to the persons. The feedback does, however, play an 
important role in the triangulation of methods and has in many instances given valuable 
supplementing information and improvements. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The methodological framework constitutes the final part of the trinity of the frame for the 
investigation. It provides criteria and designs that link the research approach and the 
conceptual framework with the empirical investigation in the following chapters. The 
methodological framework reflects the constructivism and change orientation of the thesis 
and outlines considerations on how these are treated in empirical studies. One of the 
articulated methodological issues is problems of retrospective accounts, which are 
problematic in a sense-making perspective and unavoidable in a thesis like this. The issue of 
retrospection is a recurrent consideration in the following chapters.  
The framework furthermore outlines methods for data collection for the investigations in the 
following chapters. The investigations are primarily based on a triangulation of participatory 
insight, documentation through official documents, and review by involved actors. The 
triangulation reflects the qualitative orientation of the thesis and although some investigated 
aspects could have been supported by more quantitative investigations, the methods 
constitute a coherent approach to answering the research questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNRAVELLING 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AS A SERIES OF CHOICES 
 
CHAPTER 7  
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AS CONTEXTUAL INTERACTION 
 
CHAPTER 8  
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AS HUMAN CHOICE 
 
 
This part of the thesis are constituted by empirical investigations related to the aim of the 
Ph.D. project in assisting Energinet.dk and the energy sector in developing a meaningful way 
of applying SEA. It specifically relates to the research questions of "When in the development 
of Danish energy infrastructure are strategic decisions made that are potentially decisive for 
environmental aspects and how are these choices made?"  
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CHAPTER 6:  STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 AS A SERIES OF CHOICES 
 
Given the fragmentation of authority across multiple bureaus, departments, and 
legislative committees, and the disjointed stages by which actions coalesce into decisions, 
the traditional model of decision making is a highly stylized rendition of reality. 
Identification of any clear-cut group of decision makers can be difficult. (Sometimes a 
middle-level bureaucrat has taken the key action, although unaware that the action was 
going to be - or was - decisive.) The goals of policy are often equally diffuse, except in 
terms of "taking care of" some undesirable situation. Which options are considered, and 
which sets of advantages and disadvantages are assessed, may be impossible to tell in the 
interactive, multi-participative, diffuse processes of formulating policy. The complexity of 
government policy making often defies neat compartmentalization." (Weiss 1982, p. 627) 
 
Strategic decision-making at the policy-making level may be complex, diffuse, interactive, 
and defy 'neat compartmentalisation' as described in the quote of Weiss above. This chapter 
investigates exactly such decision-making processes in order to discuss SEA application. 
The point of departure for this chapter is the indication found in the short review in 
subchapter 1.1 that the existing literature on SEA includes limited knowledge about how to 
apply SEA meaningfully in strategic decision-making in energy sectors and limited empirical 
understanding of 'decisive moments'. The chapter is the first of three investigations of the 
strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector. It is based on the 'series of 
choices' model presented in the conceptual framework, and it is based on empirical data 
achieved through participation in Energinet.dk as explained in the research and 
methodological frameworks. Together with the investigations in the two following chapters, 
this chapter constitutes the basis for the third sub-question: "When in the development of 
Danish energy infrastructure, are strategic decisions made that are potentially decisive for 
environmental aspects, and how are these choices made?" 
The investigation of strategic decision-making processes as series of choices is based on five 
contemporary cases of strategic decision-making investigated in the first subchapter and on 
the conceptualisation of strategic decision-making in Energinet.dk in the second subchapter. 
The answer to the sub-question is thus based on actual decision-making processes as well as a 
conceptual understanding made by one of the main actors in the strategic development of the 
energy sector. The investigations are primarily oriented towards strategic decision-making on 
energy infrastructure at the national level.  
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6.1 SEA BETWEEN POLICY-MAKING AND PLANNING 
 
"The higher the level of the strategic action, the more complex the interplay of actors 
becomes" (Bina et al. 2004, p. 58) 
"While much of the early literature on SEA made little differentiation between application 
to each of [policy, plan and programmes], there is growing recognition of the need to 
consider different approaches and techniques for SEA of policies vis-a-vis SEA of plans 
and programs (Nitz and Brown 2001, p. 330) 
"[T]here is, arguably, an urgent need to apply the principles of environmental assessment 
to the major shifts that are occurring in energy production, and there are organisational 
openings where this is becoming accepted and practised. On the other hand, fundamental 
changes in the sector have undermined the relatively unified structures and purposes that 
would have facilitated the adoption of SEA for energy production in a more coherent 
fashion. Even where there is broad regulatory force behind the application of SEA, the 
public service background and ethos of SEA do not equip it well for engaging with the 
intricate workings of the new energy markets." (Jay 2010, p. 3495)  
 
The interplay at the higher level of strategic decision-making is at focus in this chapter. As 
Bina et al. state above, the complexity of this interaction increases with the higher level of 
strategic decision-making. Much literature on SEA has, however, focused on the need to 
separate strategic decision-making in levels rather than acknowledging the interaction. The 
aged quote of Nitz and Brown above even point at a growing recognition of considering 
policy-making and planning as two different setups requiring two different sets of 
approaches and techniques in SEA. 
In the beginning of the Ph.D. project, efforts on pointing out strategic decision-making in 
Energinet.dk for SEA application were accompanied by frustration as it seemed not possible 
to locate ultimate decisions at either policy or plan level. Meanwhile many pivotal choices 
were made without preceding SEA processes, despite the SEA legislation that came into force 
in 2004. This frustration was the driver for this article.  
Details on methods and data are found in the article as a supplement to the methodological 
framework in chapter 5, and the retrospective mapping is critically discussed in the postlude 
below. 
 
PRELUDE: INTERACTION IN LEGISLATION AND LITERATURE 
The main problem dealt with in the following article is that interaction between policy-
making and planning in strategic decision-making complicates issues like assignment of 
responsibility for the decisions and the application of SEA. The interaction challenges SEA 
legislation and literature that is oriented towards segregated levels of decision-making, cf. the 
Nitz and Brown quote above. As a prelude to the article, the questions of who and when to 
apply SEA according to the Danish SEA legislation are introduced in the following. 
Furthermore, the prelude includes a short review of how - if at all - key works within the SEA 
literature describe and prescribe SEA in terms of the interaction between policy and 
planning. 
Strategic decision-making as a series of choices 
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Danish SEA legislation: The question of when and who 
The Danish legislation on SEA prescribes that SEA must be applied in the preparation of 
plans and programmes, so that it can contribute to the integration of environmental 
considerations during preparation and adoption. The SEA thus has to be conducted prior to 
decisions on the final approval or adoption of the plan or programme in question (Executive 
order no 936 of 24/09/2009, §1, §3 and §6). The legislative requirement on when to apply SEA 
is thus limited to 'during' preparation of specific plans and programmes. As the article will 
show, policy-making and planning in the energy sector are ongoing and interactive activities, 
in which specific plans and programmes only are parts of an overall choice process; these 
plans includes choices, but each are not representing the overall decision. In such contexts, the 
'during' concept risks having no precise fix point, which complicates the application of SEA. 
According to the law, the authority of the planning in question is to determine SEA 
obligation, consult, announce decisions, and prepare the SEA report. The original Danish law 
on SEA from 2004 stated that the law applied to plans and programmes that were prepared 
by a public authority pursuant to legislative requirements. The present edition of the law is 
almost a direct translation of the EU Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC) and the Danish 
legislation has thus been added plans and programmes prepared by an authority for 
adoption through a legislative procedure by the Parliament or prepared with reference to 
administrative provisions (Executive order no 936 of 24/09/2009, §1, 3). The interaction 
between authorities in the process of developing and choosing options as investigated in the 
article brings these jurisdictional formulations to a head: Who is the authority when elements 
of the 'decision' is settled on by different actors in different forums and separate points in 
time?  
As an elaboration of these legislative aspects, the interpretations on the question about 
whether Energinet.dk is obliged to do SEA is discussed in chapter 10, and the question of 
what decisions in the energy sector are SEA mandatory is discussed in chapter 9. 
 
Interaction between policy-making and planning in SEA literature 
The article builds upon the perception that the interaction between policy-making and 
planning is not notably dealt with in SEA literature, which instead follow the 'tiering' line of 
thinking suggested in article 4(3) of the EU Directive on SEA: " Where plans and programmes 
form part of a hierarchy, Member States shall, with a view to avoiding duplication of the 
assessment, take into account the fact that the assessment will be carried out, in accordance 
with this Directive, at different levels of the hierarchy". This perception of limited treatment 
of interaction in SEA literature is not substantiated in the article, and therefore a few key 
works in the literature is considered here.  
Reporting on an early study on SEA application, Nooteboom (2000) defines that "Two 
environmental assessments are tiered to each other if they are linked to tiered decisions". 
Tiering of environmental assessments are therefore depending on the decision-making 
processes, which they are applied on, and these "may, or may not, have a formal linkage" (p. 
152). Nooteboom states that "If decision-making about a particular project or activity takes 
place in several tiers, an earlier tier is, by definition, more strategic than a later tier" (p. 152). It 
is hierarchical assumptions like Nooteboom's, which the articles argue against. Nooteboom 
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acknowledge that there are 'grey zones' in which the tiering is uncertain, e.g. "as to whether a 
[policies, plans, or programmes] or a lower tier is the project consent decision" (p. 156). 
In "Analysing strategic environmental assessment towards better decision-making" (Caratti et 
al. 2004), the interaction is not directly dealt with, but implicit in the ANSEA concepts' 
disregarding of formal hierarchies of decision-making. In Dalkmann and Bongardt's (2004) 
exemplification of ANSEA on transport infrastructure development, the interaction is 
apparently not found or not significant. The interaction is visible in the examples on strategic 
decision-making processes provided in Bina et al. (2004, p. 86), although the implications are 
not commented upon. "In Strategic Environmental Assessment in Action", Therivel (2004) 
sticks to an hierarchical, one-way understanding from policy to project, although she 
acknowledges that reality "is not so clear-cut" (p. 13), since decision-making skips stages, 
since confusion prevails whether a document is a plan or a policy, and since "'higher' or 
'earlier' decisions depends on the 'lower' or 'later' ones" (p. 152). Glasson et al. (2005) note that 
in practice, tiers "are amorphous and fluid, without clear boundaries" (p. 342), and decisions 
"evolve in an incremental and unclear fashion" (p. 344), however, they still propose a 
traditional, hierarchical tiering of environmental assessments. Key SEA works seem thus to 
be unclear on the interaction as they reject the neat compartmentalisation of decision-making 
hierarchy and at the same time widely stick to a tiering understanding. 
Within EIA and SEA literature, the view of decision-making as a series of choices seems rare, 
however, with some notable exemptions. After a review of conceptual approaches to 
literature, Teisman (2000) develops the idea of decision-making "as an intertwined 'clew' of a 
series of decisions taken by various parties". The ANSEA project basically regards decision-
making processes as a series of choice opportunities (Dalkmann et al. 2004). Looking beyond 
environmental assessment literature, the understanding is found in many and diverge 
instances: The design of highways is seen to involve a series of choices that may affect the 
environment (The National Academies 2002); Nova Scotia’s 2009 Energy Strategy "makes a 
series of choices about how to deploy our limited resources" (Nova Scotia 2009); the scope of 
impact assessment is in a manual of project management defined as "action or a series of 
actions" (The Republic of Kenya 2009). 
Strategic decision-making as a series of choices 
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impacts are decided these years, often without preceding SEA processes. The mapping shows 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite more than a decade of application and research into SEA, integration of SEA into 
strategic level decision-making is still regarded a challenge (Sadler 2005). One explanation for 
the problems of integrating SEA at the strategic level may be underestimation of the 
interaction between policy-making and planning. In this interaction, policy-making frames 
planning and planning influences policy-making; political agendas and horse trades may, at 
the same time, be based on and frame technocratic calculations. SEA literature widely focus 
on policy-making and planning as distinct and separate levels of decision-making and treat 
the relations between these levels through the concept of 'tiering' (e.g., Therivel 2004). This 
article shows that it may not always be appropriate to treat policy-making and planning 
separately, and the concept of tiering may have to be refined. 
This article presents an investigation of the nature of strategic decision-making processes 
based on the hypothesis that these are characterised by an interaction between policy-making 
and planning. A strategic decision-making process is understood as a series of choices that, as 
a whole, constitute a formal strategic decision. Progression in the series of choices is mapped 
to determine the extent of interaction. If the interaction is profound, it calls for considerations 
of how to approach such interaction through SEA. 
The empirical data is composed of contemporary strategic decision-making processes in the 
Danish energy sector, in which strategic decision-making seems to be characterised by 
considerable interaction between political settlements, socio-economic calculations, geo-
political interests, and technical assessments. This interaction may be a contributing factor to 
the rare application of SEA in the sector; only one formal SEA has been carried out since the 
Danish legislation on SEA became effective in 2004. Although SEA has been undertaking on a 
range of policies and plans within the energy sector (Jay 2010), SEA application in the sector 
is complicated by the importance of the private sector (Marshall and Fischer 2006) and the 
fragmentation of the sector (Jay 2010). 
The Danish energy infrastructure is under major development as a result of a decline in 
domestic fossil fuels and political targets of 30 percent renewable energy in 2020 
(Energinet.dk, 2009a). To exemplify the magnitude of consequences of decisions made within 
the sector, the 0.8 billion dollars electricity cable between Norway and the Netherlands 
disturbed 580 km of seabed including environmentally sensitive areas, required 9,000 tonnes 
of copper and 12,000 tonnes of lead for the cable, and it took 10 years to complete 
(EngineerLive 2009).  
The mapping of strategic decision-making processes shows that the strategic level decision-
making processes in the Danish energy sector are characterised by a continuous interaction 
between policy-making and planning taking place in windows of opportunities rather than 
formal approvals of plans and policies.  
 
THE CHALLENGE OF APPROACHING STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
Strategic decision-making is what Slack (2009) terms a process of intervention. Policy-making 
and planning represent parts of a process of intervention (Slack 2009) and possess different 
characteristics. Inspired by Wood and Djeddour (1992) and Slack (2009), policy is here 
Strategic decision-making as a series of choices 
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defined as a set of objectives and a broadly stated course of action to solve perceived 
problems. The policy-making process is related to attributes like "diffuse" (Lynn 1987), 
"apparent disorder" (Lindblom 1968), and "change rapidly" (Therivel 1997, cited in Bailey and 
Dixon 1999). It is formed through political negotiations and power relations (World Bank 
2010). Planning is understood as a more specific outline of a course of action, i.e., the 
implementation of policies (Slack 2009). Planned actions are deduced from described 
situations and expected achievements over given periods of time. Rational procedures and 
instrumental logic are dominant in planning as opposed to political decision-making (Bryson 
2004). As summarised in table 12, planning and policy-making are thus conceptualised as two 
separate activities distinguished by differences in nature, order, and output. 
 
 Policy-making Planning 
Nature of decision-making Political - decisions as results of 
negotiations and depending on 
power relations 
Rational - decisions as results of 
analyses and rational 
procedures 
Order in decision-making 
processes 
Policy-making as apparent disorder 
and unpredictable 
Planning as sequential and 
predictable steps 
Output A set of objectives and broadly 
stated course of action 
A specific outline of a 
coordinated course of action. 
Table 12. Differences between policy-making and planning 
 
During the last decade, SEA literature has increased its focus on decision-making with 
theorisations based on decision theory literature (e.g., Nilsson and Dalkmann 2001, Cherp et 
al. 2007, Kørnøv and Thissen 2000), with numerous investigations of how SEA is integrated 
into decision-making (e.g., Vicente and Partidário 2006, World Bank 2005, Nitz and Brown 
2001), and with conceptualisations of SEA approaches (e.g., Sheate et al. 2001, Caratti et al. 
2004). One of the challenges of SEA methodology in terms of decision-making is the ‘paradox 
of timing’ (Nooteboom and Teisman 2003) stating that impact assessments are either too late 
or too early: "It is too late because the relevant influential stakeholders already prefer a 
specific solution, and it is too early because the problem definition used in the assessment is 
always redefined during the decision-making process, resulting in an irrelevant assessment" 
(p. 288). 
In this wealth of SEA literature on decision-making, planning and policy-making are often 
treated by distinct SEA methodologies and guidance. Institutions like the World Bank have 
been drivers of the development of the policy-oriented SEA (World Bank 2005) and the EU 
has maintained focus on the plan-oriented SEA through the EU Directive 2001/42. This 
distinction may derive from reservations about SEA at the policy level during the 
development of the SEA concept in European countries. In the development of the UNECE 
protocol on SEA, reservations about approaching the policy level were "political and 
institutional as much as procedural or methodological" (Sadler 2005, p. 5). Policy-oriented 
SEA and plan-oriented SEA have different forms (Morrison-Saunders and Arts 2004) and 
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"distinct methodological tasks" (Fischer et al. 2002 p. 170). In short, policy-oriented SEA 
approaches are characterised as simple and flexible (Therivel 1997, cited in Bailey and Dixon 
1999). They take place less formally and with greater variability (Nitz and Brown 2001, Sadler 
2005). Plan-oriented SEA approaches, on the other hand, are characterised as widely rational 
(Nitz and Brown 2001) and structured (Fischer 2003). 
The interaction between policy-making and planning is to some extent considered in the 
concept of tiering in which a tiering of environmental assessments should follow a tiering of 
strategic actions (Therivel 2004). Tiering is widely understood as a hierarchy of decision-
making in which "a higher, earlier tier influences a lower, later tier" (Nooteboom 2000, p. 
152). It is argued that tiering "helps to concentrate on relevant alternatives" (Hildén et al. 
2004, p. 527); that "foreclosure may be prevented, postponement of detailed issues may be 
permitted and assessments can be better scoped" (Arts et al. 2005, p. 1); and that tiering 
"could lead to better decisions and to more efficient resource allocation, since assessments 
would be conducted at the “right” timing and would feature increasing levels of detail, as 
needed" (Sánchez and Silva-Sánchez 2008, p. 516).  
Especially within the last decade, the concept of tiering has been criticized for "its implicit 
assumption of a linear planning process [that] does not fit well with the dynamic nature of 
planning and decision-making in practice" (Arts et al. 2005, p. 1). Bina (2007) notes that 
"behind the hierarchical system evoked through [policies, plans, and programmes] and 
‘tiering’ is a less coherent reality; one that EA theorists have appeared unwilling to engage 
with (at least until the late-1990s)" (p. 590). Time-lags (Hildén et al. 2004) and tiering taking 
place "in the reverse direction" (Gunn and Noble 2010, p. 5) contribute to a blurred picture of 
practice that does not correspond to the theoretical assumptions behind tiering (Hildén 2005). 
In line with these arguments, Fischer et al. (2002) propose a tiering framework that engages 
with the less coherent reality and note that: "Although the framework presents an inevitably 
oversimplified rational approach, it includes feedback mechanisms between the different 
tiers in order to reflect `real' decisionmaking, which might not follow a hierarchical and 
logical sequence of predetermined steps […] In reality, this often consists of a continuous 
interaction and negotiation process by different parties" (pp. 167-168). The investigation of 
the interaction between policy-making and planning in this article contributes to the debate 
on tiering in regards to the empirical understanding of the reality behind the theoretical 
assumptions. 
One of many possible explanations of the interaction between policy-making and planning is 
to view the interaction as a result of the network society (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) in which 
policy-making often happens in configurations that do not conform to the old formats (p. 8). 
Another break with old formats was introduced with the Garbage Can Model of decision-
making (Cohen et al. 1972) in which decisions are made when independent streams of 
problems, solutions and participants collide in "choice opportunities" (p. 2). This 
understanding of decision-making emphasises that "Choices are frequently negotiated 
outside the context of explicit decision processes…" (March 1994, p. 226) The Garbage Can 
Model does not pay attention to the level of decision-making and does not rely on the formal 
systems of planning and policy-making. Therefore the model is of relevance when 
investigating the interaction between policy-making and planning. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD 
Inspired by Cohen et al.'s concept of choice opportunities and the ANSEA project (Jiliberto 
2004), the analytical framework of this article is centred on a mapping of series of choices in 
strategic decision-making processes. This approach makes it possible to identify the policy-
making versus planning character of each choice and thus determine the interaction between 
these in the progress of the investigated processes. Each choice constitutes a framework for 
the output of the decision-making process, and only choices with an environmental 
dimension are mapped. These choices are of special importance in terms of SEA, since each 
choice concludes a moment of influence; if environmental considerations are to be included, 
information about environmental consequences must be provided prior to the making of 
choices.  
The approach is in line with the ongoing SEA implementation by one of the main actors in 
the Danish energy sector, the transmission system operator Energinet.dk. Energinet.dk 
implements the Danish SEA legislation from the point of departure that important strategic 
decisions with potential environmental impacts are often made in windows of opportunities 
rather than by a formal approval of a plan (Energinet.dk 2008a). As this understanding is 
based on insight into the sector, it supports the relevance of viewing strategic decision-
making as a series of choices. 
Each mapped choice is characterised in terms of its policy-making versus planning character 
using the characteristics given in table 12. The characterisation is added an examination of 
when key elements of environmental assessment methodology are conducted; i.e., public 
consultations, systematic environmental analysis, and considerations of alternatives. The 
intention is to clarify the point of departure for approaching the interaction through SEA.  
The mapping and characterisation of the decision-making processes give indications of the 
extent of interaction between policy-making and planning and an overview of patterns of the 
current application of environmental assessment elements in this interaction. The analytical 
framework is illustrated in figure 17. 
The mapping covers only a small part - a sequence - of ongoing decision-making processes in 
the energy sector. These sequences cover, in average, important choices made in a period of 
two years. The previous choices that provide the point of departure for the mapped series of 
choices are summarised as drivers. To be able to visualise the series of choices, the mapping 
is a severe simplification only illustrating who makes what decision in which order. The 
progress in the series of choices may therefore seem predictable and simple; however, the 
mapping would be very complex if non-decisions and contextual input were included. For 
practical reasons, the number of choices is limited to a maximum of five for each decision-
making process, and these are subjectively identified as the most important choices in terms 
of environmental consequences of the strategic decision-making processes. No distinction is 
made between what is officially regarded as formal or informal decisions and both are 
included in the analysis. 
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Figure 17: Analytical framework 
 
The method for mapping the series of choices has been two continuous processes of 1) 
achieving insight and grasping progress and consequences by observation and participation, 
and 2) documenting the insight by review of publications and news media. Insight into the 
decision-making processes has been gained by participating in the meetings and internal 
communication of the Danish transmission system operator (TSO), Energinet.dk. 
Energinet.dk is responsible for the energy infrastructure planning in Denmark and, thus, 
plays a role in all the investigated decision-making processes. Energinet.dk is established as a 
state-owned institution with its own board and with the purpose of ensuring "efficient 
operation and expansion of the overall electricity and gas infrastructure" based on "coherent 
and holistic planning" (Energinet.dk 2005). The participation has involved more than 70 
meetings and numerous informal conversations at different levels in the organisation in the 
period from August 2008 to July 2009. The meetings included section and division meetings, 
planning, management orientation and public consultation. Most of these meetings included 
information about the investigated decision-making processes or relevant information about 
the energy sector. Since the beginning of the participation, the insight has, to the extent 
possible, been documented by the analysis of publications from ministerial agencies and 
news media articles. These publications have primarily been reports, plans, and press 
releases, which have primarily been published by the Ministry of Environment and the 
Ministry of Climate and Energy. In the effort of documenting insight, political decisions have 
been problematic, since these have a tendency of being communicated without transparency 
in terms of underlying political horse trades and bargaining.  
The mapping of the processes has been discussed with representatives from the Danish 
Energy Agency and Energinet.dk to validate the understanding of the progression and the 
importance of the choices made. This informal review has reduced the potential bias of a 
subconscious tendency of making the result match the hypothesis of interaction between 
policy-making and planning. It has, furthermore, given other perspectives on the relevance 
    
Choice A Choice B Choice C Choice D 
  
Choice E Driver 
 
Mapping 
 
Characterisation 
For each choice: 
 - Policy-making or plan character, cf. table 1 
 - Public consultation, systematic environmental analysis, and/or transparency on alternatives 
 
Extent of interaction between policy-making and planning in strategic decision-making 
Patterns in application of environmental assessment elements in the interaction 
 
Evaluation 
Decision-
making 
process 
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and the order of the included choices and the logic between these, which has helped reduce 
another bias: "People seem to see past events as much more rationally ordered than current or 
future events, because retrospective sensemaking erases many of the causal sequences that 
complicate and obscure the present and future" (Starbuck and Milliken 1988, p. 36). 
 
FOUR CONTEMPORARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE DANISH ENERGY 
SECTOR 
The mapping covers four contemporary decision-making processes related to Danish energy 
infrastructure: 1) The National Test Centre for Windmills, 2) The Offshore Wind Action Plan, 
3) The Natural Gas Plan '09, 4) The Kriegers Flak Interconnection. The processes represent 
different scales and types of energy infrastructure, different approaches to the development 
of infrastructure, and different drivers of the development. Also the extent of environmental 
considerations varies between the decision-making processes, both formally and informally. 
Since the processes are contemporary, they in part reflect the global economic crisis, the 
political attention to renewable energy and climate change, and the decrease in fossil fuel 
resources. 
All decision-making processes constitute a framework for the future development consent of 
a spatial area and are therefore likely to be within the requirements of the EU Directive on 
SEA. Furthermore, the Danish regulation requires environmental assessment of government 
proposals (Elling 2005), which in part applies to the policy level of the decision-making 
processes. The processes are visualised in figure 18 followed by an elaboration of the 
mapping.  
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Figure 18: Mapping of strategic decision-making processes on energy infrastructure as series of choices. Boxes in italic font style represents choices with policy-making 
character, and boxes in normal font style represents choices with planning character. Choices that include public participation are marked by [*], transparency on 
alternatives [¤], and systematic environmental analysis [×]. The choice in the dashed box is not yet made, but expected. 'Government' covers decisions at different 
governmental levels. 
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prepares the report 
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1) The National Test Centre for Wind Turbines 
[A]: The Danish wind power industry is a powerful actor in Danish politics. Organised in the 
partnership MEGAVIND, it has strongly argued for the development of offshore wind 
turbine technologies as a necessary means of keeping the leading position in offshore wind 
energy (MEGAVIND 2008). In 2009, the Government's Economic Committee acceded to the 
wind industry's interests and chose to establish a test centre by law (DASEP 2009b). 
Characterisation: The Economic Committee is constituted by the Government's ministers, and 
it prepares the Government's economic policy. The choice of making a test centre must 
therefore be seen as a part of the policy-making. The choice involved no public consultation 
or transparency of alternatives, although the choice initiated and framed a certain 
intervention. 
[B]: Following the Economic Committee's choice, the Danish Agency for Spatial and 
Environmental Planning (DASEP) initiated a screening process for suitable areas. Actors 
related to the wind power industry as well as a wind research institution were consulted in 
terms of criteria for location. The consultation ended up with four criteria concerning average 
wind speed, distance to housing, international spatial restrictions, and area size. DASEP 
screened the entire country in accordance with these criteria and ended up with 14 potential 
locations. These areas were examined, and only one area was termed suitable (DASEP 2009b). 
Characterisation: Based on systematic analyses, the choice of suitable areas is of planning 
character. In this case, the planning seemed to be hurried as the public was not consulted, 
and environmental considerations were reduced to certain spatial restrictions and distance to 
neighbours. The test centre was to be placed in a national protected forest that had to be cut 
down to create optimal wind potentials. Although some alternative locations were presented, 
there was limited transparency of how the criteria were chosen and what was included in the 
examination of the 14 areas. 
[C]: Based on the DASEP proposal for location, the Economic Committee chose to work for a 
test centre at the suggested location, which the Minister of Environment publicly announced. 
Shortly after this choice was made, a scoping consultation document for the following 
environmental assessment of the law proposal was published. The document included a 
description of the test centre in general terms, including the location, and an invitation to a 
public meeting near the location (DASEP 2009c). 
Characterisation: The politicians' early choice of a certain location was likely driven by the 
wind power industry's condition that it would support this specific location if it was ready 
for testing within a certain, short time period (Danish Wind Industry Association 2009). 
Months later, DASEP published a brief minute of the assessment of the 14 areas that also 
involved environmental considerations. The public were neither informed nor involved in 
the choice of the location. The scoping consultation was characterised by opposition from a 
strong NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) movement, and many comments concerned the 
location and alternatives rather than the project (DASEP 2009d), although the location in 
practice was settled by the Government's public announcement of the location. 
[D]: The law proposal and the EIA were produced within two months. The EIA was made by 
the regional environment centre and based on judgements by experts, e.g., on the presence of 
bat species in the area. 
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Characterisation: The choices made in relation to producing the law proposal and the EIA 
were characterised by systematic analysis and scientific knowledge and were thus of 
planning character. No alternatives were treated in the environmental assessment besides the 
0-alternative. The consultation process seemed to be led by a strategy of aiming at as little 
awareness as possible: The 11 days scoping consultation period covered a one week autumn 
leave, the consultation period for the EIA report was intended for the Christmas period 
(DASEP 2009e), and the initial press meeting was announced within hours at a location 
several hours away from most NGOs and news media (Danish Ministry of Environment 
2009). Due to inputs in the consultations, the location of the test centre was moved some 
hundred meters (DASEP 2009f), and other minor changes were made. 
[E]: Encouraged by the public's criticism, a considerable parliament debate took place prior to 
the adoption of the law. The test centre was part of a broad energy settlement, and the 
adoption of the law therefore required a broad support for the centre. Parties of the 
settlement required a detailed environmental analysis of two alternative locations prior to 
settling the agreement. These analyses were debated and the alternatives were found 
inappropriate. With a minor delay compared to the time schedule, the law was adopted with 
stronger restrictions on the construction and operation of the centre, e.g., on the extent of tree 
felling. 
Characterisation: The adoption of the law was characterised by political bargaining on 
environmental issues reflecting differences in political profiles. Representatives of the public 
presented their views to the Technical and Environmental Committee. As a standard practice, 
the official political discussions on the centre and its alternatives were broadcasted; however, 
the key negotiations were presumably made in the corridors.  
 
2) The Offshore Wind Action Plan 
[A]: Denmark has a long tradition of creating possibilities for wind energy development, and 
offshore wind has been part of the Danish energy production since 1991 (DEA 2005). In 1997, 
a national plan for offshore wind power production was made (DEA 1997), and a national 
plan was again on the political agenda in 2005 as part of the Government's energy initiative 
(Danish Ministry of Transport and Environment 2005). The initiative included a decision to 
update previous analyses of locations for future offshore wind power. The Committee for 
Future Offshore Wind Power Sites was appointed with the commission of making a technical 
report on sites for the development of offshore wind turbines.  
Characterisation: The political choice of developing offshore wind was a policy change 
triggered by a severe criticism of the Government's decision of cancelling the expansion of 
offshore wind capacity in 2001. The political choice was not transparent in terms of 
presenting alternatives. Environmental benefits seemed to be a central reason for the choice, 
but apparently the discussion did not include negative impacts. Furthermore, the choice 
included specific directions for the Committee's work that had to emphasise economic 
efficiency and streamline administrative procedures (The Committee for Future Offshore 
Wind Power Sites 2007). 
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[B]: The Committee analysed the Danish waters for potential areas, taking a range of interests 
into account. Based on the analyses, the Committee pointed at seven main areas (The 
Committee for Future Offshore Wind Power Sites 2007).  
Characterisation: The choice of areas was of planning character as it was based on systematic 
analysis and rational procedures. A strategic environmental assessment was made of the 
Committee's report on future offshore wind power sites, since it constituted a frame for 
development (DEA 2008a). The SEA report included no other alternative than the 0-
alternative, and only alternatives of cable technology were described in the Committee's 
report. The public consultation led to a sensitivity analysis of the Committee's report (DEA 
2008b). 
[C]: A political settlement over energy policy in 2008 formed the choice of developing an 
action plan for offshore wind (DEA 2008c). A new site was included in addition to the 
Committee's report, and the politicians changed the order of the development of the sites 
(DEA 2008a). 
Characterisation: The political choices were the results of a political bargaining of the content 
of the energy settlement. The choices were not transparent in terms of presenting alternatives 
besides the political suggestions, and the choices were apparently made without systematic 
environmental analysis. 
[D]: Shortly after the settlement, the DEA prepared the Offshore Wind Action Plan based on 
the Committee's report and with an order of establishment of the specific locations (DEA 
2008a).  
Characterisation: The preparation of the action plan was coordinated with electricity 
infrastructure planning; it involved an update of the Committee's report on economy and 
integrated the political choices of the settlement. The changes were transparently described, 
but as the plan was primarily a reproduction of the Committee's report, it neither involved 
consultation nor environmental analyses. There was no official SEA screening of the 
significance of the changes that were made after the SEA process. 
 
3) The Natural Gas Plan '09 
[A]: No new major national energy infrastructure for transmission of natural gas has been 
constructed in Denmark the last ten years, as the system has been of adequate capacity for the 
transport and export of domestic natural gas resources. The domestic resources are, however, 
running out, and this creates a new situation with a projected need for import of natural gas. 
Therefore, Energinet.dk initiated the planning of natural gas infrastructure and proposed the 
use of the Open Season approach (see De Joorde and Van Oostvoorn 2006) to let the gas 
actors' demand for capacity influence the location of new gas transmission pipelines 
(Energinet.dk 2009b).  
Characterisation: The planning of natural gas infrastructure was a continuation of earlier 
analyses of economic, social, and environmental consequences of potential gas infrastructure 
developments (Energinet.dk 2007a). The analyses had not included public consultation, and 
only a summary was made publicly available. The analysis included several development 
alternatives in the expansion of the infrastructure. AN SEA process of the planning was 
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initiated, but it was cancelled due to the consequences of the economic crisis (described 
below). 
[B]: In 2008, the Minister of Climate and Energy accepted Energinet.dk's proposal of an Open 
Season process (Energinet.dk 2009b). 
Characterisation: The Minister's acceptance of the market-based approach to the development 
of natural gas infrastructure signalled a political endorsement of the change in the planning 
procedure and a political strategy of including the natural gas system in the future efforts 
related to climate change mitigation and the introduction of biogas. No official considerations 
were given on how a market-based approach would influence the decision-making process, 
including how and when environmental concerns were to be included. Likewise, no public 
consultation was made and no transparency was presented in terms of considering 
alternative approaches. 
[C]: To structure the Open Season process, Energinet.dk delimited the bidding options to 
certain corridors in the tender documents (Energinet.dk 2009c).  
Characterisation: The delimitation of options was based on technical and market-based 
analyses and was thus of planning character. The delimitation was decisive to the potential 
environmental impacts, but it included no transparency on how environmental 
considerations were integrated. The public was not consulted in the delimitation of options in 
the tender documents, and the reason for the choice of options was not explicated. 
[D]: The 2009 Open Season process was influenced by the global financial crisis as the 
developers of a promising project on a gas tube from Norway to Sweden and Denmark chose 
to "suspend further project activities due to increased commercial risk combined with the 
global economic developments that have given an uncertain view on future gas demand" 
(Energinet.dk 2009d). Based on the biddings on the remaining options and a socioeconomic 
analysis, Energinet.dk chose to work on an expansion of the capacity towards Germany 
(Energinet.dk 2009e). 
Characterisation: The choice and the reason for the project were publicised, but no public 
consultation was made. The consultation only involved market actors. The expansion 
towards Germany was included in the previous environmental analyses, and no new analysis 
of environmental consequences was made before the EIA. 
[E]: The Minister required a detailed analysis of consequences for natural gas producers 
before giving the final consent to the capacity expansion (DEA 2010b). The analysis was 
made, and the consent to proceed was given. 
Characterisation: The natural gas and oil producers in the North Sea are powerful players in 
the Danish policy-making on energy. Therefore, the Minister seemingly wanted to be sure of 
the consequences for these actors before giving the final consent to the development. The 
political focus seemed to be on financial and stakeholder interest rather than environmental 
consequences.  
 
4) The Kriegers Flak Interconnection 
[A]: The Kriegers Flak area is divided between Sweden, Germany and Denmark, and all 
countries have plans on offshore wind power plants in the area. In 2009, Energinet.dk started 
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analysing the potential benefits of combining the wind power plants to utilise the cables for 
transnational electricity transmission in periods with little wind energy production, and to 
test technologies for offshore transnational electricity grids. Cooperating with the Swedish 
and German TSOs, Energinet.dk analysed the potentials and implications of the 
interconnection and prepared the ground for a choice of a technical solution (Energinet.dk 
2009g). 
Characterisation: The proposal of the Kriegers Flak interconnection was of planning character 
and involved environmental considerations at an early stage. Alternative locations of offshore 
wind were considered in the offshore wind process, so the Kriegers Flak proposal only dealt 
with alternatives in terms of interconnection possibilities and cable technology. No 
consultations were made on the environmental considerations, but the analysis was 
publicised. 
[B]: Due to the global economic crisis, the European Commission and Parliament launched a 
European Economic Recovery Plan with funds for major energy infrastructure projects 
(European Commission 2009a). Among a wide range of funds to infrastructure projects, EU 
allocated 150 million euro for transnational infrastructure in Baltic and Kriegers Flak areas.  
Characterisation: A political decision to counteract the crisis thus interfered with the 
development of the Kriegers Flak interconnection and sped up the efforts. No assessment of 
environmental impacts or consultation was made of the EU Recovery Plan despite the plan's 
support to projects with considerable environmental impacts: "The urgency of the economic 
crisis calls for the fastest possible action, in line with the conclusions of the European Council. 
This means there has not been time for an impact assessment" (European Commission 2009c, 
p. 3). Furthermore, the applicants were urged to act in a hurry and be prepared to make 
considerable investments in the projects by the end of 2010. 
[C]: The TSOs applied for the recovery funds and became the only candidate in the pool for 
the 150 million euro (Bülow 2009). Therefore, the commission could not reject the 
interconnection, but negotiate it. 
Characterisation: The choice of applying for the funds was based on an analysis of the 
possibilities to speed up the process. By applying for recovery funds, Energinet.dk limited the 
time for environmental analyses and design optimisation in terms of environmental impacts.  
[D]: Shortly after the Commission’s allocation, the Danish Prime Minister praised the 
allocation of funds to the Kriegers Flak interconnection in the media (Information 2009) and 
in a parliament committee (The Danish Parliament 2009). He stressed that the Government 
would make the necessary initiatives to establish the interconnection and that it had to be 
done quickly to achieve the EU funds.  
Characterisation: Thus, in principle, the Prime Minister made the choice of establishing the 
project, before Energinet.dk's analyses were concluded. The EU funds and the Prime 
Minister’s praise made it unlikely that the project was abandoned due to environmental 
considerations. This principal decision was made without consultation and without 
systematic environmental analysis. 
[E]: The political approvals of the entire project have not been made, but the expectation is 
that the Danish and German Governments decide on their parts of the interconnection in 
2010. 
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INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICY-MAKING AND PLANNING 
The characterisation of the choices is summarised in table 13. All of the four strategic 
decision-making processes are characterised by a high alternation between policy-making 
and planning. The analysis indicates that it is within planning and not policy-making that 
alternatives in terms of infrastructure locations are considered, that public consultation is 
carried out, and that environmental aspects are considered. Policy-making seems to put a 
time pressure on the progress, as seen in the cases of the test centre and Kriegers Flak 
processes. 
 
Interaction 
between policy 
and planning 
High interaction in all four series of choices (three and four shifts between 
policy-making and planning out of four possible shifts) 
Public 
participation 
Conducted prior to choices of planning character in two out of four series of 
choices. Two decision-making processes are without public participation. 
Transparency on 
alternatives 
Limited range of alternatives considered in all series of choices. Except from 
one instance, consideration of alternatives are related to choices of planning 
character 
Environmental 
analysis 
Two series of choices included systematic and detailed environmental 
analysis related to choices of planning character. The other two series 
included minor considerations on environmental analysis, also related to 
choices with planning character. 
Table 13. Summary of the analysis 
 
The results of the mapping are in line with Buckley's (2000) description of practice in the 
1990s: "State and national governments, however, can, and commonly do, still adopt 
economic and industry policies, budgets, and legislation, and enter into international 
agreements on trade, investment, defence, intellectual property, and so on with little or no 
formal environmental assessment, and little or no opportunity for public consultation by 
their citizens and electorates except through informal political protest and lobbying" (p. 209).  
 
SEA IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERACTION 
The profound interaction between policy-making and planning relates to SEA literature and 
practice in different ways and challenges some of the existing norms and understandings. 
Although the empirical evidence for the interaction only covers four decision-making 
processes, the challenges are relevant to consider in terms of their potential influence. 
Firstly, the interaction challenges the relevance of focusing on either policy-making or 
planning in SEA application and literature. The study shows that it may not make sense to 
treat these levels separately, as both levels in a dynamic interaction form the development in 
question. The obvious need to approach choices at both levels in one process urges 
consideration of whether existing SEA methodologies are appropriate: Simple and less formal 
policy-oriented SEA approaches may be appropriate for the choices of policy-making 
character; however, these approaches will most likely be of less relevance to the choices of 
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planning character compared to plan-oriented SEA approaches. Similarly, the plan-oriented 
approach may not be flexible enough to approach the choices of policy-making character. 
Therefore, neither the policy nor the plan-oriented SEA methodologies seem adequate for 
approaching the interaction.  
Secondly, the study contributes empirically to the discussion of tiering by showing that the 
progression of choices at strategic level does not follow the decision-making hierarchy, but is 
constituted by interaction between policy-making and planning choices. The widely held 
assumption of a linear planning process should therefore be considered replaced by an 
assumption of a continuous interaction. SEA reports that typically provide the frames for 
what should be included in lower level environmental assessments, may therefore also have 
to include suggestions for higher level decision-making and assessment processes, including 
"diagonal tiering" (Arts et al. 2005, p. 3) to decisions in other sectors. 
Thirdly, the interaction makes it difficult to determine who has the responsibility at what 
stage in the series of choices. To keep a sense of perspective and enhance continuity in the 
integration of environmental considerations, it is relevant to consider whether it would be 
possible for a single actor to assume the overall responsibility for SEA application throughout 
the strategic decision-making process. Policy choices are not under the auspices of 
Energinet.dk, which therefore does not seem an appropriate candidate. Policy-makers are not 
aware of the early choices in planning induced interventions. It may, however, be possible for 
policy-makers to require SEA application and continuity of sequences of the decision-making 
processes.  
Fourthly, the interaction may make it difficult to approach the 'early stages' of decision-
making when the "maximum opportunity occurs to gain environmental leverage on 
alternatives and options from a SEA perspective" (Sadler 2005). The study shows that a range 
of actors make formal and informal choices of environmental significance in the development 
of energy infrastructures, which are likely to make it difficult for a single actor to identify the 
early stages. A manager within the energy sector explained the difficulties of determining the 
right time for SEA application with emphasis on the inertia of the process: "It is like we are 
seated in a high-speed train and through the window we see a sign saying 'SEA process', but 
it is too late to press the stop button". 
In the mapping, the choices are presented as political settlements, reports, committee task, 
etc., and not as a "plan" or a "programme". Thereby the choices often avoid attention in terms 
of environmental assessment requirements, as also concluded by Boothroyd (1995). In 2009, 
the Danish legislation on SEA was reformulated by broadening plans and programmes to 
"documents". The coming years will show how this formulation will work in practice, and to 
what extent it will cover the choices identified in the mapping.  
The study shows that public participation, transparency of alternatives, and systematic 
environmental analyses are conducted in relation to a limited amount of choices, primarily of 
planning character. This practice constitutes a point of departure for approaching the 
interaction through SEA, as the practice indicates the existence of competences and 
experiences at the planning level. The ongoing SEA implementation in Energinet.dk is likely 
to improve the practice at the planning level, and due to the profound interaction, it may 
very well enhance the application of SEA among policy-making actors in the sector. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector 
are characterised by a profound interaction between policy-making and planning that 
challenges the application of SEA. In the series of choices that form energy infrastructures 
and related environmental consequences, planning choices based on systematic analyses 
alternate with policy-making choices based on bargaining and horse trades. Public 
participation, transparency of alternatives, and systematic environmental analyses are 
conducted in relation to a limited amount of choices, and primarily related to choices of 
planning character.  
The findings represent a number of challenges to existing SEA literature and practice, 
including questions of whether it is possible to develop an SEA methodology which is able to 
approach both policy-making and planning characters; how to assign responsibility when 
responsibility continuously changes hands in the progress; how to identify early stages when 
no actor has an overview of the informal choices; and how to tier the environmental 
assessment process when the progress does not follow the decision-making hierarchy.  
The mapping will serve as an input to SEA implementation in the Danish energy sector. In an 
international perspective, more studies are needed to determine how widespread this 
interaction is in strategic decision-making processes. The study in itself may constitute an 
empirical input to discussions on how to approach strategic decision-making processes 
through SEA and how to increase the influence of SEA. 
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POSTLUDE: EXPLORING QUESTIONS RAISED 
The article raises more questions than it answers, which also was the intension. Some of the 
questions relevant for this thesis are: How important are the biases of the retrospective 
accounts? What can be learned from the article in terms of the conceptual framework of this 
thesis? What do the findings and implications indicated in the article mean for SEA 
application? These questions are discussed in the following. 
 
THE BIASES OF RETROSPECTIVE ACCOUNTS 
The article shortly mentions the bias of retrospective accounts with reference to Starbuck and 
Milliken's (1998, p. 36) point that the retrospect "erases many of the causal sequences that 
complicate and obscure the present and future". The dominance of interaction is, however, a 
recurrent picture as it is also supported by other cases in Energinet.dk like the Cable Action 
Plan (Energinet.dk 2009a), which was required by a political settlement, sketched by 
Energinet.dk, framed by policy-makers, developed by planners in Energinet.dk, adopted by 
policy-makers, and implemented by Energinet.dk and the regional system operators. Similar 
analysis could be made on the Lille Torup natural gas storage re-leaching and expansion 
(Environment Centre Århus 2010). 
A problem in the retrospective construction of decision-making processes as series of choices 
relates to how the article maps series of choices as isolated progressions: Langley et al. (1995) 
criticises the assumption that decision-making processes can be viewed in isolation from one 
another. Instead they argue that "strategic decision processes are characterized more by their 
interrelations and linkages than by their isolation" (p. 264). The article is showing the 
interrelations between policy-making and planning processes within the same decision-
making process, but it is subject to the critique as it isolates decision-making processes on a 
specific issue from decision-making processes on other issues. That other processes are 
influential is implicit in the context of political "horse trades" (Therivel 2004, p. 11), and the 
interactions has in Denmark been expressed in the political agreement on the Great Belt 
Bridge, the support of which has been argued to be 'paid for' by motorways in Northern 
Jutland (Kristiansen 2002). Another example is the location of a hospital in mid Jutland, the 
support of which has been argued to be 'paid for' by a motorway to west Jutland (Andersen 
2010). The political horse trades on energy infrastructure has not been articulated and 
therefore not described in the article. 
A counter-critique to Langley et al.'s criticism on isolation can be found in Weick's pragmatic 
understanding of learning. Commenting that decision-making is a retrospective construction 
of a history, Weick (1995, p. 184) argues that "Retrospective decisiveness erases those false 
starts and dead ends. Although all of this erasing may look like distortion, it is actually 
nothing but learning in reverse". Learning requires simplicity of the complex, and isolation of 
specific processes is therefore needed to learn from decision-making of the past. Furthermore, 
learning from the literature, studies based on retrospective construction and isolation of 
specific processes has given much insight in the nature of decision-making, see e.g. Nutt 
(1986). 
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INPUT TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The mapping of formal decisions seems especially relevant for showing how problems and 
options are modified and influenced during decision-making processes. The clarity of the 
progression of formal decisions in neat boxes is, however, no more than a deceiving and 
tempting presentation, since each decision is "an almost transcendent, peaceful, but brief, 
moment of order between the chaos of the formation […] and the chaos of the 
implementation […]" (Orton 2000, p. 231) 
The interaction between policy-making and planning has similarities with the iterations 
between stages of developing options and selection of options in Mintzberg et al.'s (1976) 
conceptualisation of non-programmed decision-making processes: The mapping seems to 
show a tendency of the actors at planning level to suggest options and the actors of the 
policy-making level to evaluate and decide on an option that frames subsequent 
development of options. Contrasting the independence of solutions and problems in the 
Garbage Can model, the reconstructed cases seem to be solution-oriented, e.g. the decision-
making process on the test centre in Østerild, which was oriented towards the centre as a 
solution rather than the problems of development and testing in the wind industry. If the 
process was problem oriented, the alternatives may have been more radical to include e.g. 
technical or regulatory solutions. Similar conclusion is found in Nutt (1986, p. 414): "Most 
decision processes were found to be solution centred, which seemed to restrict innovation, 
limit the number of alternatives considered, and perpetuate the use of questionable tactics". 
The solution-oriented tendency in this and Nutt's study is likely partly due to the 
retrospective approach, however, it may also be due to focus on the later parts of decision-
making processes in which the development in question has been named and conceptualised. 
Prior to this stage, streams of solutions, problems and participants may be more independent. 
The development of the National Test Centre for Windmills was not transparent for the 
public until the idea and location for the centre was settled. When the public learned about 
the process, it was thus in a solution-oriented mode rather than problem-oriented. The latter 
would have opened up the complex problem definition of what kinds of testing is needed, for 
which technologies, and what locations are adequate.  
Similar to the series of choice model, Cyert et al. (1956) propose to understand decision-
making as a series of "program steps from inception of the problem to selection of a 
consultant" with "subprograms" (p. 245). They find that "the reasons for switching from one 
subprogram to another were either the proved inadequacy of the first one or a redefinition of 
the problem" (p. 246), and note that other reasons can be imagined. The cases in the article 
can be seen as subprogrammes in a bigger perspective of problems in play in energy politics. 
Furthermore, the EU-funding in the Kriegers Flak case may be seen as a slight redefinition of 
the 'problem', since the EU funding strengthens the time pressure aspects of the problem. 
The relevance of 'decisive moments' and 'decision windows' are reflected in the actors' 
utilisation of e.g. the opportunity of getting EU support within a certain time frame. Similar 
conclusion is found in a study on transport infrastructure in Finland, in which Valve (1999) 
concludes that possibility for achieving EU funding leads a group of actors to emphasise the 
temporal opportunity: "The groups that stressed the necessity of the new investment 
schemes, in turn, pointed out that lengthy reconsiderations might cause a loss of a historical 
opportunity to develop the transport system" (p. 139). 
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The unexpected decisions found in the series of choices could be argued to represent 
'interruptions' in the actors' sense-making. These 'interruptions' change the line of thinking in 
the process as they force the involved actors to diagnose and create meaning of a new 
situation, e.g. when the Prime Minister unexpectedly settled on a strategy on Kriegers Flak in 
the media.  
Summing up, the overview perspective in the continuum of strategic decision-making 
processes thus has the potential of revealing and partly explaining the progress of decision-
making, hereunder the actors involved and the series of choices that constitute what at a first 
glance seems to be ultimate decisions. Finally, the unexplained developments in the series of 
choices clearly point at a need to understand the contextual interaction and the social 
processes behind these developments.  
 
WHAT DO FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS MEAN FOR SEA IMPLEMENTATION? 
To broaden the implications of the interaction pointed at in the article, the findings are in the 
following elaborated in terms of what the choices in the series involve and related to an 
article by March (1987) on design of information systems in equivocal contexts. This leads to 
a discussion of the possibilities of targeting unpredictable decisions. 
The article shows that potentially decisive decisions are made by different actors in 
interaction. As an emphasis of how the choices in figure 18 set the context for future 
decisions, figure 19 shows examples of what the choices settle upon. The range of 
environmental possibilities and alternatives are decreasing in the progress of decision-
making without broad discussion on the decisive choices. 
 
Figure 19: Environmentally decisive choices in the decision-making process on the National Test centre 
for Windmills '09 and examples of the consequences of the decisions. (Based on the journal article) 
DASEP 
proposes 
locations based 
on a few 
stakeholders' 
criteria 
Government 
chooses to 
create a 
centre and to 
implement it 
by law 
The govern-
ment decides 
to work for a 
specific 
location 
Choice A Choice B Choice C Choice D 
The 
Parliament 
decides on 
law for test 
centre 
Law 
preparation 
including 
EIA process 
form the test 
centre 
Choice E 
- Responsibility 
and costs are not 
the industry's. 
- No municipal 
democracy in 
the planning. 
- No open and 
transparent 
process leading 
to decision. 
- No broad 
discussion of 
criteria. 
- Limited 
environmental 
integration. 
- No broad 
discussion of 
the feasibility of 
the areas. 
- Environmental 
impacts partly 
settled. 
- Preliminary 
decision on need 
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and content of 
the centre, etc. 
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discussion of the 
centre despite 
public 
opposition. 
- Final decision 
on the centre,  
including 
environ-
mental  
aspects. 
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The profound interaction between policy-making and planning as well as unpredictable 
developments challenge the ability of SEA practitioners to influence decision-making. In an 
article on design of information systems, March (1987) emphasises the challenge of providing 
input in such unpredictable decision-making processes: "The conclusion is simple: one can 
design an information system around a precise, static decision structure, and for many 
elementary decision problems in organizations that is a good idea. But the more difficult and 
more important task for information engineering involves the design of a system for an 
imprecise, changing decision structure. The relevant question is: how do you construct an 
account when you do not know when that account is going to be used, or by whom, or for 
what purpose, or in what context" (p. 163). Although some tendencies of predictable 
structures can be found in the article, e.g. in the use of committees, the article also shows the 
variety and changing decision structure from one case to another. In this context, SEA risks 
being an “add on assessments” as termed by Emmelin and Lerman (2005, p. 180). March 
discusses ways of dealing with imprecise and changing decision structures and proposes that 
"At least in principle, it is possible to imagine designing a system for knowledge generation 
and dissemination that explicitly identifies the probable decisions to be made, prior 
knowledge about them, and the marginal expected return from various alternative 
knowledge instruments, given that structure" (1987, pp. 163-164). Based on experiences 
within science, journalism and education, March states that "In each of these cases, however, 
it is clear that the ex ante linkages among the expected uses of information in making 
decisions, its generation, and its actual uses are rather loose" (1987, p. 164).  
Within SEA literature, a similar idea of predicting and controlling decision-making has been 
proposed in the ANSEA project (Dalkmann et al. 2004), which has been criticised for its 
assumption of permanent rules and possibility for identifying 'decision windows' in the SEA 
process: "However, this “tailoring” of SEA to fit the planning process also faces certain 
limitations. Even the ‘tailor-made’ SEA or ANSEA presume that it is possible to establish a 
priori rules for a planning process. However, in practice planning rules are often changed 
during the process, with important decisions possibly taken at any time, not necessarily at 
specified 'windows'" (Cherp et al. 2007, p. 630). Discussions within Energinet.dk, see the 
following section, reflect both an interest in predicting such windows of opportunity for 
influence and a doubt about the possibilities in practice.  
An alternative to prediction is rapid response. Therivel (2004) states that "it is vital that the 
SEA process keeps pace with the decision-making process, which is often very rapid" (p. 160). 
The characterisation as rapid is also true for the energy sector as expressed in the high-speed 
train metaphor by a manager in the energy sector in the quote in the following section. As an 
alternative route to the idea of predicting decision-making, Therivel argues that to keep pace, 
it may be necessary to disregard "techniques that take much time, require much data, require 
data that are comprehensive and not just partial snippets of information, and rely on the 
skills of busy specialists" (p. 160). This route is based on the assumption that it is possible to 
respond when a decision-window is realised and before it closes, which may be difficult due 
to Danish requirements on consultation periods. 
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6.2  STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ENERGINET.DK 
 
"In order to explore further the uptake and potential of SEA within the energy sector, it is 
worthwhile to turn to the electricity transmission and distribution industry. This is partly 
because grid networks, by their very nature, must be operated in a strategic manner. The 
physical infrastructure of a grid system is diffused over a large geographical area, is 
designed to connect points of supply with demand, and must be managed in an integrated 
fashion. Development of a grid must take into account changes in the mode and location of 
generation and in the pattern of demand, including over the long term. Moreover, grid 
systems are associated with a number of environmental concerns of the kind that 
environmental assessment seeks to address." (Jay 2010, p. 3492) 
"It has all the time been - and still is - the attitude in Energinet.dk that SEA shall not be 
an empty paper work. SEA shall enter into the decision-making processes at a time and 
with content that makes SEA an active element. That ambition has been difficult to get 
materialised since there are many stakeholders and processes connected to Energinet.dk's 
activities, which are not organised with an eye to accommodating an SEA procedure." 
(Behnke 2010, translated) 
 
In line with the quote of Jay (2010) above, Energinet.dk's decision-making on energy 
transmission networks are seen as highly relevant entry-points in the exploration of SEA in 
the energy sector. The relevance are increased by the ambitious attitude on SEA in 
Energinet.dk, cf. the quote of Behnke. In a European perspective, several other TSOs are 
working with strategic environmental assessment. Among these are the Italian TSO (Terna 
2006), the Portuguese TSO (REN 2009), the British TSO (Nationalgrid 2009), and the Belgian 
TSO (Jay 2010). Some of these TSOs are in a similar stage of implementation as Energinet.dk 
with similar considerations, although possibly with other motivations for implementing SEA: 
In the case of Terna, implementation of SEA is driven by a motivation of using SEA to 
unblock social opposition by increased public participation (Ecorys 2010).  
The following investigation of the conceptualisation of strategic decision-making processes in 
Energinet.dk is the second part of the unravelling of strategic decision-making by use of the 
'series of choices' model. The investigation covers Energinet.dk's conceptualising strategic 
decision-making processes, which has been part of efforts of formulating an SEA policy in the 
company. Whereas the investigation in the previous subchapter focused on the interaction 
between policy-making and planning, this investigation focuses on the processes internal to 
Energinet.dk. The following investigation is thus a 'zooming in' on the planning part of the 
previous investigation. Strategic decision-making processes, which Energinet.dk are part of, 
are complex due to the number of private actors and authorities involved, the interrelation 
with other sectors, the scale and impacts of the developments, and a variety of technological 
options. Furthermore, the institutional setup was from the beginning of the SEA policy 
formulation not clear in terms of the sharing of responsibility between Energinet.dk and the 
Danish Energy Agency. 
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CONCEPTUALISATION OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND SEA 
In the following, Energinet.dk's conceptualisation of its strategic decision-making processes 
and SEA is presented and discussed. Energinet.dk's conceptualisation is an important part of 
understanding strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector as it reveals 
how one of the main actors at the strategic level in 2010 interpreted these processes and its 
own role. The conceptualisations are in the following critically discussed with point of 
departure in literature on SEA and international experience. 
Energinet.dk's conceptualisation of its strategic decision-making processes is related to the 
different discourses within Energinet.dk on the company's obligations on SEA, which are 
described in chapter 10. Of the four identified discourses, the following conceptualisation 
should is a product of the discourse termed the 'idealistic discourse'. Therefore, the 
conceptualisation should not be seen to reflect a homogeneous organisation, and arguments 
and elements of the conceptualisation is disputed by organisational members. The 
conceptualisation is primarily driven by an interest in targeting SEA when decisions are 
actually made. Involved in the authoring were the manager of the research and environment 
section Kim Behnke, the key person in the existing EA-work on the electricity transmission 
infrastructure, a key employee in the natural gas division conducting the pilot SEA, and me 
as an 'internal' Ph.D. fellow. The conceptualisation is furthermore formally adopted by the 
management board as appendixes to the 2008 and 2010 Strategy Plans.  
The methodology is a triangulation of participatory insight, text analysis, and feedback 
discussions with two of the key actors on SEA implementation in Energinet.dk. Insight into 
the thoughts behind the conceptualisation is gained through co-writing the published 
appendixes to the strategy plans and through participation in decision-making processes in 
Energinet.dk. Due to the co-writing, the following investigation is partly a critical reflection 
on Energinet.dk's and my personal understanding of strategic decision-making processes and 
SEA at these points in time. The analysis of the reports made it possible to check for 
consistency between the conceptualisation and the content and formulations in the SEA and 
strategy reports. Two key actors on SEA implementation in Energinet.dk read and gave 
comments to a draft on the following text. The feedback increased the validity of the 
investigation, provided a basis for sharpening arguments as well as the presentation of the 
company's motivation and thoughts behind SEA implementation. 
 
Presentation of the conceptualisation 
The approach to SEA in Energinet.dk is characterised by omission of two of the formal 
planning documents, Strategy Plan and System Plan, from the scope of SEA. The argument 
for this choice is "that the strategic decisions are not made by these legally required 
publications, but with strategic decisions on concrete infrastructure initiatives" (Energinet.dk 
2008a, p. 1). The omission of legally required plans at first seems in contrast to the legislation 
on SEA, however, the key aim of Danish legislation as well as the EU Directive is to influence 
decision-making (e.g. article 2 in Directive 2001/42/EC), and therefore it is more adequate to 
apply SEA on planning documents that are decided on by the management board prior to the 
legally required plans. Energinet.dk thus intends to apply SEA when decisions are made 
rather than in formal plans that are summarising decisions. This understanding has been 
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approved by the Ministry of Climate and Energy, the Energy Agency, and the Agency of 
Spatial and Environmental Planning (Energinet.dk 2010a). The approach is, however, not 
straightforward, and for instance in the case of the Cable Action Plan, the political pressure 
for action did not leave time for an SEA in the planning process: Following the political 
settlement in November 2008, Energinet.dk was given at deadline of March 2009 to deliver 
the comprehensive cable action plan. This deadline was agreed upon with a view to the time 
needed for the technical analyses, but time for the SEA procedure was not included (Gellert 
2008). The window for influencing the decision among strategic options in this planning 
process was thus too short. 
Energinet.dk's focus on the concrete infrastructure initiatives may be problematic since there 
is little opportunity for a holistic overview in the SEA process. The SEAs may thus be 
defective in terms of synergies and cumulative aspects. The overview may be obtainable for 
well-oriented employees in Energinet.dk, but it is most likely difficult to communicate the 
overview in consultations. The choice of targeting SEA to the individual projects thus seems 
to be a trade-off between overview and decisive moments. The alternative approach of 
targeting the legally required plans also include weaknesses: The pilot SEA was applied on 
the natural gas security of supply plan - not strategic decisions on concrete infrastructure 
initiatives - and the process showed that it was not easy to comply with the requirements of 
article 9 in the EU Directive on the information on the decision as no formal decisions on 
options have been made after finalising the SEA report. The corresponding document stated 
"There is in the plan not yet made decisions on which of the described alternatives should be 
implemented. The plan thus constitutes only a preliminary background for the further work 
towards a choice of concrete expansion of the gas supply network" (Cowi 2010, p. 4). 
In targeting strategic decisions on concrete infrastructure initiatives, Energinet.dk has "special 
focus on preparing SEA in the strategic decision-making process, which precede initiation of 
major infrastructure projects" (Energinet.dk 2008a, p. 2). In the work on the conceptualisation 
following the 2008 formulations, these preceding processes were specified not to include the 
management's informal probing of interests and possibilities at other transmission system 
operators (TSOs): "These probings take place on a superior level without actual decisions, 
why SEA is not relevant. The SEA process is getting relevant, when concrete strategic 
decisions are being made" (Energinet.dk 2010a, p. 3). Although the probings do not include 
'actual decisions', it is clear that these 'probings' play a decisive role for the strategic 
development of infrastructure as they create and delimit the options in play. The probings 
therefore constitutes a controversy between interest in initiating SEA in the early decision-
making processes and interest in informality and room for manoeuvre in a competitive 
environment between TSOs, which would not be possible with application of SEA. The 
'probings' are most likely also too transient and without sufficient firmness for a meaningful 
application of SEA, and other tools than SEA therefore seem needed for a integration of 
environment at this level of decision-making in Energinet.dk. As indicated in the article in the 
previous subchapter, the probings may be motivated by competition between TSOs, by 
market signals, by technical needs for increased capacity or security of supply, and other 
drivers. Following the probing phase, the decision-making process and SEA application in 
Energinet.dk is conceptualised as visualised in figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Decision-making from strategic considerations to construction in Energinet.dk and the 
relevant stages for SEA (Energinet.dk 2010a, p. 6). 
 
The provisional analyses that are made in interaction with the probings among other TSOs 
are also not conceptualised as within the scope of SEA. Choices made at this level are argued 
to be too insubstantial: "SEA is not part of this phase as it involves a plurality of analyses and 
considerations of which the most never is carried out" (Energinet.dk 2010a, p. 6). 
Environmental considerations seem minor compared to economic and technical aspects in 
decisions at this level, and like the probing level, there seems to be a need for strengthened 
environmental concerns by other tools than SEA: The provisional analyses hardly involves 
frames for development consent and are not decided upon without further elaboration. When 
these provisional analyses are concreticised into planning documents at the third level in 
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figure 20, SEA is argued to be relevant "since the planning forms the basis for decisions" (p. 
6). As an example of a decision at this level is a decision of establishing transmission 
connection to neighbouring areas (e.g. Norway, Sweden, or Germany) without considering 
concrete routes, but considering pros and cons of the possible connections.  
At level four in figure 20, the planning document accompanied by SEA leads to a strategic 
decision, e.g. on a specific connection. This decision is subsequently concretised into more 
detailed alternatives, e.g. on how to connect the decided connection to the existing system. 
The investigation of alternatives is in Energinet.dk accompanied by environmental studies to 
supplement the following EIA of the specific parts of the solution. The EIA regulation enters 
into the process when the infrastructure is at the project level and proposals for routing of the 
infrastructure are made. At this level, the decision concerns details on e.g. routing and 
technology of offshore and on-shore cables and constructions like transformer stations. Prior 
to the recent change of the Danish legislation on EIA in 2010 (Executive order no 1510 of 
15/12/2010), electricity cables were not EIA mandatory. Furthermore, the authority on energy 
infrastructure is divided between authorities, which seems to impede a treatment of the 
development in its totality: Infrastructure on land is under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Environment, whereas energy infrastructure off-shore is under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy. To deal with these two obstacles to a broad assessment, Energinet.dk 
used an SEA-similar procedure to consult and assess environmental impacts of cable projects.  
Besides the decision-making process initiated by probings with other TSOs, the 
conceptualisation also includes decision-making processes that follow from political 
decisions and instructions as pointed out in the article on interaction between policy-making 
and planning. In cases where political decisions are specific on what should be done, the 
range of strategic options to be considered on in Energinet.dk is reduced rather. In terms of 
SEA responsibility, it is notable that Energinet.dk regards environmental assessments of 
infrastructure that are imposed on Energinet.dk as the responsibility of ministries following 
the Prime Minister's Office's Circular no 159 of 16/09/1998 and Executive order no 936 of 
24/09/2009, and SEA is therefore in these cases not to be initiated by Energinet.dk 
(Energinet.dk 2010a).  
A second interaction in the strategic decision-making in Energinet.dk is the interplay with the 
planning in the formalised cooperation of TSOs termed the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). In interaction with national TSOs, 
ENTSO-E develops a Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) that point at needs for 
strengthening the European transmission network (ENTSO-E 2010). As a curiosity to the 
efforts on applying SEA at strategic level, ENTSO-E has decided that no SEA should be made 
on the TYNDP, since it is not basis for any decision and it is not made by an authority 
(Francescato et al. 2010). The TYNPD seems, however, to play a significant role in influencing 
the infrastructure initiatives in each TSO and EU initiatives on these. Furthermore, the 
TYNDP is required by EU trough the third internal energy market package (European 
Commission 2010b). According to Kremlis from the DG environment, the DG has informed 
the European member states that TEN energy initiatives should undergo SEA (Kremlis 2011). 
In this way, the TYNDP has to relate to SEA disregarding who is preparing the plans.  
A third interaction in the strategic decision-making in Energinet.dk is the interplay with the 
EU financial aid to energy networks, which includes considerable amounts of money. In this 
 
 146 
EU system, SEA is a formal part of the procedures, as the proposal submission form for 
community financial aid (European Commission 2009a) requires applicants to consider 
whether "the action results from a plan or programme falling within the scope of the SEA 
Directive". The form specifically asks into cumulative effects and for explanations for not 
applying SEA. Thus, there is a pressure from the EU system to consider SEA in funding-
seeking strategic decision-making in Energinet.dk. The European Commission furthermore 
becomes a more direct policy-making role in terms of energy infrastructure, e.g. by their 
"Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond - A Blueprint for an integrated 
European energy network" (European Commission 2010b). The criteria for assigning 
potential infrastructure status as European interests (European Parliament 2011a) have 
despite importance apparently not been assessed. 
The outlined interactions with the external context and the consequences for SEA application 
is further investigated in the following chapter. 
 
DISCUSSION OF ENERGINET.DK'S CONCEPTUALISATION 
Energinet.dk's conceptualisation of strategic decision-making and SEA in the company 
involves a range of interesting elements. In the following, the conceptualisation is discussed 
in terms of the nature of strategic decisions and the potential difficulties and benefits of 
applying SEA as conceptualised. 
The conceptualisation has a dominating emphasis on isolated, specific infrastructure 
developments as contrasted by a holistic conceptualisation of the development of the Danish 
energy infrastructure. This characteristic is partly caused by the competition between 
Energinet.dk and other TSOs on strategic possibilities for profitable interconnections. 
Energinet.dk therefore has to seize the opportunity when it arises rather than await a holistic 
planning process, and transparency may further hinder the company's competitive ability, 
see also the discourses on the role of SEA in chapter 10. The British TSO has a similar 
understanding of major plans only summarising decisions. Jay (2007, p. 77) reports that: 
"licence holders tend not to assign clear planning functions to SYSs [Seven Year Statements], 
but to see them as essentially descriptive documents. Officers typically refer to a SYS as a 
‘snapshot in time’ of the state of a network, which indicates no more than the constraints and 
opportunities for development". The SYSs are also omitted by the TSO from the range of 
legally required plans that are SEA mandatory, but in contrast to Energinet.dk this omission 
is based on the understanding that plans are not setting framework for development consent, 
since the British TSO is obliged to connect consumers and producers to the grid regardless of 
its plans. Jay challenges this understanding by arguing that " a SYS does set ‘a framework for 
development consent’ in the sense that it provides guidance to the wider industry about the 
preferred locations for system development, in a way that is analogous to a spatial plan 
indicating preferred patterns of land use to private developers" (p. 79). A similar reasoning 
could be made on Energinet.dk's plans, although the consumer and producer orientation - 
with the exception of offshore wind power plants - seems weaker at strategic level.  
The focus on actual decisions on specific infrastructure developments can be argued to give 
SEA a reactive rather than proactive role in the sense that it is strongly related to actual 
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decisions and 'decisions' can, cf. the conceptual framework, often only be identified in 
retrospect and the formal decisions may be late in a series of decisive choices.  
The portrayed levels of decision-making in Energinet.dk's decision-making process can be 
interpreted as sub-programmes (Cyert et al. 1956, p. 245), in which each level constitutes sub-
programmes that in various extents are programmed: The strategic level decision-making 
includes variation in mode, actors, and content and is thus likely non-programmed. At the 
lower levels, decision-making is programmed by e.g. EIA-legislation and organisational 
procedures. Seeing the levels in the figure as sub-programmes indicates the priority on 
environmental issues in the strategic decision-making: First tactical, cooperative aspects are 
considered in level 1 without SEA, then economic and technical aspects are considered in 
level 2 without SEA, and then environmental aspects enter in level 3. According to Behnke 
(2011), this view on the relation between financial, technical and environmental aspects is 
widely in accordance with the procedure in the company. Environment is thereby not central 
to the development of strategic developments, but something that has to be cleared after 
tactical, technical and economic aspects have formed the development. 
The intension to apply SEA on level three is most likely faced with challenges of creating a 
relevant public 'decision' document on this level. Judged from a year of participation, 
Energinet.dk does not have a tradition for actual planning documents at this level that show 
overview of options; decisions seem to be made on socio-economic calculations or internal 
notes on possibilities, see also subchapter 6.1. This characteristic is not only true for 
Energinet.dk, but also other actors in the energy sector: The political decision on the test 
centre in Østerild was seemingly made on internal notes in ministries rather than by an actual 
planning document. Thus, the success of SEA depends, in accordance with the argument of 
Fischer (2003), on the possibility for making new structures in the organisations' decision-
making as part of the implementation of SEA. Structuring the decision-making to fit SEA may 
be challenged by the path dependency of the existing routines and the existing expectations 
to the flow of decision-making that would be interrupted by a more than three month long 
SEA procedure. As described above, the cable action plan is an example of an externally 
induced time pressure that in practice prevented SEA application. This example emphasises 
the need to clarify the consequences of SEA legislation on schedule and progress for other 
actors. Time pressure is not only a problem in the energy infrastructure planning, but also in 
transport planning: Despite a university's scheduling of making decision aid for a potential 
Kattegat connection, the Danish Minister of Transport stated that the decision aid should be 
ready before the scheduled date and that he would work for a quicker process (Pauli 2011). 
The intensions of reducing overlap between SEA and EIA in Energinet.dk seem to have 
resulted in a 'very strategic' orientation of SEA: EIAs are made on routings of transmission 
lines and to avoid overlap, SEA thus has to be targeted a level of decision-making prior to 
any mentioning of routings. As seen in the figure above, SEA is therefore settled on a level 
where connections are described abstractly and without genuine spatial frames, which is at 
the edge of the scope of the EU Directive on SEA. A similar strategic emphasis is found in 
Nooteboom (2000), who comments that "The way to consider highly strategic environmental 
alternatives, is probably to apply SEA to the levels where they are still considered to be 
realistic options" (p. 159), which is before the stage in which an option in principle is settled 
upon. In the case of Energinet.dk's infrastructure planning, it seems that strategic 
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interventions are driven by interest in a specific infrastructure option, and other options can 
therefore only be said to be relevant prior to development of the specific energy 
infrastructure. The SEA approach in Energinet.dk risks being without the expected influence 
as it aims at targeting strategic decisions on specific infrastructure and these decisions are not 
formally made before the business case of specific infrastructure shows a firm benefit for the 
society. Energinet.dk's SEA approach seems thus to target formal decision moments and not 
the range of informal choices made prior to and shaping the formal decision. 
The conceptualisation in Energinet.dk does not seem to acknowledge the relevance of 
applying SEA to the input that Energinet.dk gives to the political decisions in the interaction. 
The political input is e.g. planning documents as seen in the article in the previous 
subchapter, but is also scenario work like the "Energi 2050 - Vindspor" report (Energinet.dk 
2011a), which illustrates the strategic aspects of the power grid development to realise the 
political vision of independency of fossil fuels in Denmark. The responsibility for conducting 
SEA at such political input is discussed in chapter 6.1. Applying SEA on political input risks 
being unfortunate if the input is not basis for political decisions. Furthermore, political 
decisions in the energy sector seem made on a range of political input from a range of actors, 
and the range of input can hardly be assessed as a whole; as an example, the Government's 
Energy Strategy 2050 was besides Energinet.dk's Vindspor analysis preceded by an energy 
strategy made by the Danish Engineer Association, an analysis made by a consultancy 
company, and a strategy made by the Danish Industry Association. Finally, the Government's 
Energy Strategy 2050 does not constitute decisions, but forms the point of departure for 
adopting laws on subjects, which a majority of the Parliament supports. Thus, the 
governmental strategy may be a more relevant document for applying SEA than the previous 
input - in accordance with the formulations of the SEA Directive; "during the preparation of a 
plan or programme and before its […] submission to the legislative procedure" (article 4). 
Similarly, the Offshore Wind Action Plan described in the previous subchapter was not only 
based on the work of the Committee for Future Offshore Wind Power Sites, which was 
subject to SEA, but also based on a concurrent work of the Electricity Infrastructure 
Committee, which was not subject to SEA. The development of the Offshore Wind Action 
Plan reveals another challenging character for the application of SEA: The priority of 
locations are seen as a continuous update to adapt to societal developments, and the 
priorities of the Committee report have been changed two times in the following two years 
due to developments in assumptions (DEA 2010a). These changes were not screened for 
significance in terms of the SEA Directive's article 3.3. 
Finally, the target of the SEA implementation in Energinet.dk seems optimistic. It is described 
as "to make environmental considerations a systematic part of the strategic decision-making 
process and secure that strategic decisions are made on a qualified and informed basis. 
Environmental aspects will thus be an equal part to economic and technical aspects" 
(Energinet.dk 2008a, p. 1). This statement is interesting in two respects: A) it is optimistic in 
terms of the consequences of implementing SEA, and B) it points only at a few aspects of SEA 
methodology and do not mention e.g. participation and transparency. The aim reflects high 
expectations to SEA of being able to provide a balance between economical, technical and 
environmental aspects in decision-making, which, as presented in appendix B on SEA, may 
be too optimistic. The systematic integration in itself does not require consultations or formal 
reports, and the formulation therefore provides room for integrating environmental 
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considerations in other ways than by an SEA process following the formal procedure, 
meanwhile applying the formal SEA procedure with transparency on strategic decisions 
when the strategic decision-making in Energinet.dk is formal and of less competitive 
disadvantage. Examples of such systematically consideration of environmental impacts of a 
strategic issue without a public participation process is Vattenfall's assessment of CO2, which, 
however, has been published (Eriksson et al. 2006). 
 
SALAMI-SLICING OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT?  
In the perspective of holistic planning, Energinet.dk's approach of applying SEA on 
individual infrastructure developments can be seen as a matter of "salami-slicing" (Sheate 
2003, p. 345) an overall plan for infrastructure development. At the project level, salami-
slicing has been used as a term for a tactic of splitting projects into sub-projects to avoid 
thresholds or opposition:  
 
"Salami-slicing refers to the practice of splitting an initial project into a number of 
separate projects, which individually do not exceed the threshold set or do not have 
significant effects on a case by case examination and therefore do not require an impact 
assessment but may, taken together, have significant environmental effects" (European 
Commission 2009b, p. 5). 
 
According to the European Commissions report on the application and effectiveness of EIA, 
the salami-slicing were recognised by the member states, and it was related to issues of 
considering cumulative impacts and thresholds on when EIA is mandatory to changes and 
extensions to projects. 
Apparently, the concept of salami-slicing has not yet been a discussion on strategic level, 
which may be due to an assumption of strategic level planning and assessment as holistic and 
as a way to avoid salami-slicing (see e.g. Agreco Consortium 2006). Salami-slicing at strategic 
level could be a practice of splitting up a holistic planning of developments into a number of 
individual development initiatives. It seems that such practice would have similar tactical 
potentials as at the project level in terms of the significance threshold in the EU Directive on 
SEA and in terms of reducing public awareness and opposition towards comprehensive and 
costly developments. For Energinet.dk the argument could be that the portfolio of energy 
infrastructure initiatives in its whole is too overwhelming for a range of actors in terms of 
economical and environmental consequences, why Energinet.dk would benefit from slicing 
the salami into individual developments. Although it seems that Energinet.dk's practice of 
individual infrastructure development is more guided by an interest in using SEA actively 
than by salami slicing, the avoidance of a holistic planning seem favourable to the company. 
Some actors articulate the magnitude of the total investments in interconnections in efforts of 
putting these on the agenda (see e.g. Blarke 2009). Energinet.dk's SEA approach targeting 
individual infrastructure initiatives will most likely be closer to the moment of decision-
making than SEA applied on the company's formal plans. However, this SEA approach risk 
facing similar salami-slicing issues as the project level EIA, e.g. in overview of cumulative 
impacts. 
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CHAPTER 7:  STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 AS CONTEXTUAL INTERACTION 
 
"Organizations today face an increasingly turbulent external environment, which is 
characterized as uncertain, ambiguous and populated by equivocal cues that result in 
discontinuous rather than evolutionary change. […] Greater uncertainty can lead to 
confusion and an over-cautiousness that paralyses organizations and their managers into 
inactivity. Alternatively, ignoring complexity can lead to misplaced over-confidence 
where decision-making is undertaken with important cues being rejected as they do not 
conform to existing mental models" (Wright 2005, p. 86)  
 
A meaningful way of applying SEA on non-programmed strategic decisions must also be 
meaningful within the extreme situations such as the increasingly turbulent environments 
with equivocal cues described by Wright above. This chapter focuses on strategic dynamics 
around the strategic decision-making in the Danish energy sector to clarify what characterises 
such strategic dynamics and to investigate what the dynamics means for SEA application and 
how the team conducting the SEA reacted to these changes. 
The investigation makes use of the 'contextual interaction' model described in the conceptual 
framework as an in-between the two extremes of the continuum of perspectives on strategic 
decision-making. The model thus includes both elements of overview and elements of the 
detailed choices made throughout the process. The investigation is thus part of the testing of 
the relevancy of the contextual interaction model and the continuum of perspectives on 
strategic decision-making. 
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7.1 STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FRAMING OF ALTERNATIVES IN SEA 
The following investigation of strategic decision-making processes by use of the contextual 
interaction model is focused on how alternatives are selected and presented. This framing of 
alternatives at strategic level is highly depending on the strategic dynamics internal as well as 
external to a company. The framing of alternatives is both a concern in the decision-making 
as well as in the SEA process, which makes framing of alternatives an entry point for 
investigating the relation between SEA and strategic decision-making. 
Besides a mapping of strategic dynamics that is giving overview of the interaction, the 
contextual interaction model is in the following also used to shed light on the details of 
decision-making: What involved actors perceive as relevant alternatives depends on how 
they make sense of "what the policy issue is about, what kind of problems are related to it, 
and which policy instruments are available" (Valve 1999, p. 126) and whether they perceive 
earlier commitments as constrains or as issues to be reopened for discussion.  
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the investigation is based on triangulation of 
methods of participation in the process giving insight and impressions, distanced factual 
documentation of the developments, as well as feedback and input from participants. 
 
PRELUDE: THE NATURAL GAS SECURITY OF SUPPLY PLANNING 
The investigation in this chapter focuses on a specific contemporary strategic decision-
making process, namely the natural gas security of supply planning. This planning was in 
2008 selected for a pilot project on SEA in Energinet.dk and the process therefore provides an 
interesting opportunity for relating SEA and strategic decision-making in the energy sector. It 
should be noted that the SEA pilot is not in fully in line with Energinet.dk's intension of 
applying SEA when decisions are made, since the focus is the statutory and annual plan 
rather than the decisive moments of infrastructure developments; the SEA pilot was 
conceptualised with point of departure in the legislative formulations prior to the emphasis 
on strategic initiatives. This brief prelude is an addition to the short introduction to the 
security plan in the article below.  
Energinet.dk is by law responsible for Denmark’s security of supply of natural gas. To ensure 
the security, cooperation with national as well as international actors is necessary. Among 
these are gas producers, gas storage facilities, consumers and organisations responsible for 
security of supply in nearby countries. The annual consumption of natural gas in Denmark is 
around 4 billion Nm3 per annum and the domestic production is declining (Energinet.dk 
2009i). 
The annual natural gas security of supply plan must account for the security of supply during 
the previous year and for how it will be ensured one and ten years ahead. Furthermore, it 
must account for how security of supply is maintained in emergency supply situations. 
Security of supply is defined as "in the event of full or partial interruption of the supply to the 
Danish market, the supply of uninterruptible consumers must, as a minimum, be maintained 
for: 3 days during particularly cold periods, which, on average, occur every 20 years and 60 
days during a normal-temperature winter" (Energinet.dk 2009i). 
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Although the planning is annual, it is influenced by a range of changes that may lead to a 
characterisation as non-programmed. As an example is the introduction of renewable gasses 
into the transmission system and the third EU liberalisation package in 2009 that created a 
new cooperation body termed the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Gas (ENTSO-G). This body will influence the relative independency of Energinet.dk in terms 
of the strategic development of the Danish gas sector. The package furthermore influenced 
the regulation on security of supply towards a more regional scale, which may lead to cross-
boarder cooperation. (Energinet.dk 2009i). 
The natural gas security of supply planning is complex due to the international scope and the 
many actors with many interests and worldviews involved. In this perspective, "[t]he 
formulation of alternatives is not only a technical problem. Environmental assessments 
function as arenas where interpretative struggles about the planning problem and existing 
freedom of action take place (Valve 1999, p. 140). Although interpretative struggles also are 
important in a Danish energy sector context, these are not part of the following investigation. 
 
 
_______________ 
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ABSTRACT 
Unpredictable and complex developments challenge the application of strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) e.g. in terms of timing, prediction, and relevance of the 
content of the assessments. Especially strategic level decision-making processes involving a 
range of actors on unstructured problems seem to be characterised by unpredictable and 
complex changes. Despite apparent implications, explorative investigations about how 
unpredictability influences SEA application in practice are rare, especially empirical 
investigations of how practitioners react on contextual changes.  
This article aims at shedding light on contextual influences and reactions to such influences 
by a case study of the specific SEA process of the Danish Natural Gas Security of Supply 
Plan. Special emphasis is given to the framing of alternatives in the SEA process, since 
alternatives are directly related to the contextual developments. Based on a participative 
approach, strategic dynamics are mapped and the reactions and concerns in the SEA team are 
outlined and discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental assessment must continually adapt to emerging trends, such as changing 
economic and environmental conditions, new technologies, developments in 
jurisprudence, and evolving public expectations. (CEAA 2010, pp. 5-6) 
 
Decision-making at strategic level has been described as complex and unpredictable, e.g. by 
de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (1999) in a multi-actor setup and by Deelstra et al. (2003) in the 
context of large projects. De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof have found that a multi-actor decision-
making process "typically jumps from one partial decision to another, each of them being 
‘locked into place’ for a shorter or longer period" (p. 181). Such partial decisions are made in 
arenas "characterised by a specific mix of political, financial and/or economical, legal and 
scientific rationalities" (p. 181), where the role of the different rationalities varies between 
processes. Therefore, they argue, the agenda can change continually and the speed of the 
progress varies. This description seems to share characters with Lindblom's (1968) 
description of public policy-making as 'apparent disorder', the Garbage Can model (Cohen et 
al. 1972) and Mintzberg et al.'s (1976) structure of unstructured decision-making processes. In 
practice, unexpected developments may be reason of delays in infrastructure development 
processes like the Nord Stream project, the Russian Sakhalin-II project, and the East Siberia-
Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (Mortished 2008).  
To the extent decision-making processes indeed are unpredictable, inflexible impact 
assessments tools are argued to be of limited use for decision-making (Kørnøv and Thissen 
2000; Lyhne 2011a). Kørnøv and Thissen argue that "impact assessors can only deal 
effectively with the dynamics and unpredictability of decision processes if they adopt a 
flexible, adaptive and learning approach themselves. If they do not, they run the risk of 
writing a thorough report based on an initial but fixed problem formulation, only to find out 
after a while that the policy agenda and issues have changed significantly in the mean time, 
as a consequence of which a well researched report remains unused and ineffective" (p. 198). 
To reduce the risk of ending up with a report of little use, contextual awareness and 
adaptation is generally pointed at as important in SEA application. Hilding-Rydevik and 
Bjarnadóttir (2007) point at a relationship between context sensitivity and success of SEA 
implementation and Hildén and Jalonen (2005) argue that in cases where strategic decision-
making is dominated by social struggles, "flexibility and sensitivity to context is a key to 
successful SEA" (p. 170).  
One of the aspects that may change due to the dynamics of decision-making processes is the 
relevancy of proposed alternatives. Framing of alternatives is the selection of a specific set of 
alternatives in a given setting by a group of persons responsible for the content of SEA. In 
strategic and ambiguous settings, several different framings may be relevant and the framing 
thus widely depends on the persons involved and their insight into the planning and its 
context. The framing of alternatives is argued to be a central part of the SEA tool (Noble 2000) 
and it is influencing the efficiency of the SEA process (Arts and Lamoen 2005). Learning from 
decision-making theory, the framing of alternatives constitutes an information filter in terms 
of the range of alternatives included in the decision basis made for decision-makers. Cyert et 
al. (1956, p. 246) assign such a filter "a large influence over the decisions the [managers] can 
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and does reach" and find that in non-programmed decision-making, the search for alternative 
courses of action is one of the most important processes in decision-making. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) empirically show how specific framings of options influences people's 
judgement and choice of options. In the SEA process, choice and framing of alternatives 
influence e.g. how the impacts are understood; "environmental impacts often appear most 
easily as distinctions between the alternatives" (Valve 1999, p. 140). 
At a strategic level, unpredictability and dynamics may pose major challenges to the framing 
of alternatives in SEA practice in efforts of avoiding an outdated SEA report. The question is: 
How is adaptation done in practice? How do SEA practitioners react to concrete instances of 
dynamics and unpredictability? How do strategic dynamics influence decisions made by the 
employees that decide on the content of SEA reports? These questions are in line with the 
stated need for empirical research into the potential of SEA to adapt to different decision-
making process (e.g. Brown and Therivel 2000). 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE FRAMING ALTERNATIVES IN STRATEGIC DYNAMICS 
Whereas much SEA literature prescribes models and methods for how to adapt to strategic 
decision-making (e.g. Dalkmann et al. 2004), research empirically showing how complexity 
and unpredictability influence practice and is handled by practitioners in SEA processes is 
scarce.  
Desmond's (2007) study of Irish practice is one of the few exemptions. Based on review and 
interview, she identifies a range of problems in the framing of alternatives: "Procedurally, 
there was a lack of guidelines for identification of alternatives […]. Institutionally, there was a 
lack of experience within authorities in the development of alternatives. […] Legally, time 
and resource limitations put severe constraints on identification of alternatives" (p. 267). 
These identified constraints relate to practice in general and may be amplified in cases of high 
strategic dynamics.  
In a study of a Finnish infrastructure planning, Valve (1999) points at the influence of power 
structures and political aspects in the framing of alternatives. She further comments that "It 
may be unclear [to the actors] what choices the assessment should shed light on" (p. 125). 
This unclearness seems to amplify the political struggles over the framing. In cases of high 
strategic dynamics and unpredictability, the actors may be forced to make a stand and act on 
a highly ambiguous basis. 
The influence of contextual developments on the framing of alternatives is indicated in 
Partidário and Coutinho's (2011) story about the decision-making process of the Lisbon new 
international airport; several framings on possible locations have been proposed during the 
long history of the airport development and in a number of instances contextual 
developments have influenced the framing of alternatives. 
 
CONTRIBUTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This article aims at shedding light on the influences of strategic dynamics and unpredictable 
developments on SEA processes through a case study of a specific SEA process of a strategic 
planning process. The specific planning process is the preparation of the Danish Natural Gas 
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Security of Supply Plans (NGSSP) of 2008, 2009, and 2010 made by the Danish transmission 
system operator Energinet.dk.  
Special emphasis is given to the framing of alternatives in the SEA process, since the framing 
of strategic alternatives is directly related to the dynamics of the context. The investigation 
thus empirically shows how the contextual developments influenced the decisions made by 
the team of employees responsible for the SEA content and how the team reacted. The 
research questions are: 
- What kinds of contextual changes influence the framing of alternatives in the SEA 
process of the NGSSP? 
- How are the contextual changes handled by the SEA team and what are the reasons for 
changing the framing of alternatives? 
 
 
METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS 
The investigation is based on a triangulation of methods. The point of departure is 
participatory insight, which is supported and contested by document analysis of public 
documents and feedback from an involved participant. The feedback was given by email and 
through semi-structured interviews in June (Vinther 2011) and August 2011 (Nybroe 2011) 
The participatory insight is gained by participation in the SEA team, hereunder in meetings 
and reviews of drafts in the SEA process on the natural gas security of supply plan (NGSSP). 
The SEA team meetings took place twice in the autumn of 2008 and twice in the 
summer/autumn of 2009. Besides the meetings, a range of decisions were made by email 
correspondence. The team that undertook the pilot SEA consisted of two consultants, three 
employees of the gas division in Energinet.dk, and the author of this article as a Ph.D. fellow. 
The tree employees of the gas division were key persons in the development of gas 
infrastructures and they thus coordinated the planning and SEA processes. The SEA was a 
pilot project on SEA implementation in Energinet.dk. Other people were included in an ad 
hoc basis, and experiences from the process were disseminated through two internal 
workshops with participation from relevant sections in the organisation. Insight in the 
strategic decision-making processes is increased by participation in other meetings and 
internal communication in Energinet.dk, see Lyhne (2011a) and Kørnøv et al. (2011). 
The following analysis of the natural gas security of supply planning is chronologically 
structured. The analysis of the framing of alternatives is focused on the planning process, the 
SEA process, contextual changes and Energinet.dk initiatives. The investigation has 
similarities with the narrative investigation of Cyert et al. (1956) of observing a business 
decision, although the following investigation is limited to the framing of alternatives, or 
more precisely, to what Cyert et al. term "substantial alternatives" (p. 247) as compared to 
"procedural alternatives".  
The following mapping of developments shows a clear-sightedness of retrospection that does 
not reflect the ambiguity and complexity of the process as it appeared to the SEA team when 
it unfolded. The simplicity of the mapping has been a compromise between reproducing 
complexity and making the mapping accessible to the reader and only the major and 
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influential developments are therefore included. Furthermore, the arrows in figure 21 
indicate linkages and not direct cause-effect relations, since filters and delays blur these 
linkages. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO ENERGINET.DK AND THE NGSSP 
Energinet.dk is the Danish transmission system operator on electricity and natural gas. It is 
an independent public undertaking owned by the Minister of Climate and Energy. 
Energinet.dk is by law obliged to prepare an annual plan for the security of supply of natural 
gas, cf. circular no. 884 of 21/08/2006. To uphold the security of supply standard, the plan 
may include frames for new natural gas transmission infrastructure and it is therefore to be 
considered in terms of the Danish legislation on SEA. 
The investigation covers the process of preparing the natural gas security of supply plan for 
2008 and onwards to the plan for 2010. Part of this planning process is also described in 
(Lyhne 2011a). Preceding the planning in 2008 are a number of analyses of possibilities for 
expansion of the natural gas transmission system, which among other things has been 
expressed in a public debate initiative on the strategic options (Danish Ministry of 
Environment and Energy 2001a), EIAs of an offshore gas pipe to Poland (Dong 2001) and 
related onshore gas infrastructure development (Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy 
2001b), a circular (no 16 of 25/01/2002) on an east-west expansion of the transmission system, 
and the Nord Stream gas connection from Russia to Germany (DEA 2006). Gas storage 
infrastructure has been developed in a parallel process to the transmission infrastructure 
development. It has included development of two gas storage facilities and considerations of 
a third. The Ll. Torup storage facility has concurrently with the period analysed in this study 
been subject to a re-leaching and expansion of gas storage project started in 2007 
(Energinet.dk 2007b).  
Despite many years experience of natural gas security of supply planning, the dynamics at 
strategic level make the planning of natural gas infrastructure in the period of 2008-2010 an 
unstructured decision-making process, since it has "not been encountered in quite the same 
form and for which no predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the 
organization" (Mintzberg et al. 1976, p. 246). 
 
THE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FRAMING OF ALTERNATIVES 
An overview of the contextual developments and influences on the SEA process is provided 
in figure 21 and figure 22 and 23 show the maps of alternatives presented in the SEA scoping 
report in 2008 and in the SEA report in 2010, respectively. 
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Figure 21. Development of natural gas security of supply plans in Energinet.dk with influences of external and internal activities and the relation to the SEA. Stippled 
arrows symbolise influence on SEA process and other arrows symbolise influence on planning process. 
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Figure 22. Map of alternatives presented in the SEA scoping report on Energinet.dk's NGSSP'08. The 
map shows the Skanled Connection to Norway and Sweden, the Egtved-Ellund connection to 
Germany, and the Baltic Pipe connection from Avedøre to Poland (Energinet.dk 2008d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Map of alternatives presented in the SEA report on the NGSSP10. The map shows three 
alternatives for connecting to Norwegian gas (A1, A2, A3), two alternatives for strengthening the 
domestic grid (B1, B2) and two alternatives for connecting to Poland (C1, C2) (Energinet.dk 2010g).
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THE SEEKING START IN 2008 
In order to gain experiences on SEA, Energinet.dk decided to use the natural gas security of 
supply planning as a pilot SEA application. The natural gas planning involved different 
options for infrastructure development, and since no infrastructures were decided upon at 
this point in time, the perception was that application of SEA had the potential to influence 
the planning. Furthermore, the legislatively required Natural Gas Security of Supply Plan 
was within the scope of the EU Directive (2001/42) as it in principle constituted frames for 
development; it was argued that Energinet.dk hardly could develop the infrastructure 
otherwise than what was described in the document. Furthermore, the plan included 
formulations of international infrastructures that without doubt would lead to significant 
environmental impacts. The aim of the SEA application was, besides gaining experiences 
with SEA, to systematically consider environmental effects of the infrastructure 
developments in play in the planning process. 
In 2008, it was evident that the Danish natural gas resources in the Nord Sea within a couple 
of years no longer was sufficient for covering the consumption of natural gas, why a future 
need for import was evident. Therefore the NGSSP involved several thoughts of linking the 
national natural gas network to the Norwegian gas network, the European mainland gas 
network, and the Scandinavian gas network (Energinet.dk 2008c).  
In the beginning of 2008, a political settlement on biogas was made that included an 
increased subsidy to biogas. This gave biogas a more prominent role in the long term 
planning of gas security of supply, and made it more relevant to deal with biogas as an 
alternative in the SEA. Biogas transport in the transmission network was still faced with 
uncertainty on the relevance and techniques for gaining the necessary quality for transport 
and the SEA team therefore chose not to mention biogas explicitly in the SEA scoping. 
The first draft of the SEA scoping report was prepared during the summer and based on the 
infrastructures mentioned in the natural gas planning at this point it time, it framed the 
alternative developments as a zero-alternative and five different international infrastructure 
developments: A strengthened connection to Germany from Egtved to Ellund, the Skanled 
infrastructure to Norway, the Baltic Pipe infrastructure to Poland, the Baltic Gas 
Interconnector (BGI) between Germany, Sweden and Denmark, and a new connection to the 
Nord Sea termed Europipe II.  
During the summer, the Gas Division in Energinet.dk prepared an Open Season approach 
(see De Joorde and Van Oostvoorn 2006) for strengthening the planning of new infrastructure 
by bids and contracts with market actors on natural gas transport capacity prior to 
development (Lyhne 2011a). The market orientation in the Open Season process made it clear 
that major infrastructure developments were not separable; a Baltic Pipe connection was not 
relevant without connection to the Norwegian gas resources. Therefore, the second draft of 
the scoping report combined Skanled and Baltic Pipe into one alternative and Europipe II and 
Baltic Pipe into another. The idea behind Europipe II was to make use of the existing pipes to 
the gas resources in the Nord Sea as the free capacity of these pipes was increasing with the 
decline in production. These pipes were, however, privately owned and concerns were raised 
about fees for gas transport through these pipes. Therefore, the Europipe II was excluded 
from the scoping report of the 2008 plan. Furthermore, the BGI was not found realistic. With 
only one possibility left for connecting Norwegian gas resources with East Europe, the final 
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SEA scoping report (Energinet.dk 2008d) therefore included a) a zero investment alternative 
with other fuels, b) a minimum alternative with expansion of the Egtved-Ellund connection 
meeting the consumption of gas, c) a 'main alternative' including establishment of Skanled 
and Baltic Pipe as well as an upgrading of domestic gas infrastructure, see figure 22. The 
scoping report was sent to domestic authorities for consultation and to Germany and 
Sweden, since the plan was expected impacted these countries.  
In the autumn of 2008 the economic problems in the Skanled project became increasingly 
evident among the partners. The insight of being a partner lead the SEA team in Energinet.dk 
to choose to await the development of the Skanled project to avoid ending up with an 
outdated SEA report: "We saw that the projects were being suspended and then an SEA did 
not make sense anymore" (Nybroe 2011). The original SEA deadline was postponed beyond 
the 2008 NGSSP, and the ongoing SEA process was suspended until the status of the Skanled 
was less ambiguous. 
In November, the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) published an updated five-year prognosis 
(DEA 2008d), which amplified the decline in domestic natural gas production. The decline 
again brought biogas into the planning and SEA discussions. 
 
THE SUSPENSION OF SEA IN 2009 
The European Commission reacted on the global financial crisis by presenting the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (European Parliament and Council 2009), which was granting 
Community financial assistance to projects in the field of energy. This programme allocated 
150 million euro to the Baltic interconnection and Skanled/Baltic Pipe. Despite the strategic 
decision of what connections to promote in the Commission's programme, it was exempted 
from the Commission's regulation on impact assessment: "The urgency of the economic crisis 
calls for the fastest possible action, in line with the conclusions of the European Council. This 
means there has not been time for an impact assessment" (European Commission 2009c, p. 3). 
The European Parliament and Council not only disregarded its requirements on their own 
proposals, they also pressured member states to speed up and get projects constructed fast: 
"They [member states] shall, in particular, make every effort to expedite the administrative 
procedures and authorisation, licensing and certification procedures to be fulfilled by the 
projects' promoters" (European Commission 2009c, pp. 19-20). In Denmark, this pressure led 
to an advancement of the Kriegers Flak offshore wind power plant, see Lyhne (2011a), 
without considering an SEA screening of the changes in the Offshore Wind Action Plan. In 
terms of the NGSSP, the relevance of the Skanled and Baltic Pipe options increased. 
Despite the EU grant, the Skanled project was suspended in April due to economic problems 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2009), which were due to decreased interests 
for transmission through that route. The suspension made the Baltic Pipe irrelevant, so the 
only alternative left was the Egtved-Ellund connection. In the autumn of 2009, Energinet.dk's 
management board followed the Open Season results and decided to work for an expansion 
of the connection to Germany (Brabo 2010). Based on the Government's pointing at a need for 
importing natural gas in 2007 (Danish Government 2007), Energinet.dk therefore initiated an 
EIA process in the late 2009. The decision was made independently of the annual NGSSP 
plans, why the SEA pilot did not approach it. 
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The Energinet.dk initiative of bringing energy systems together, which was initiated in the 
end of 2008, became part of the NGSSP process in 2009. The initiative led to considerations on 
the role of natural gas as regulation power, replacing individual gas furnaces with heat 
pumps or district heating, and use of natural gas and biogas in the transport sector. These 
aspects were not determined relevant by the SEA team to enter the SEA of the infrastructure 
development in the NGSSP, since the consequences for the infrastructure were too 
ambiguous to present and discuss. 
Biogas was increasingly discussed due to the DEA's prognosis of a biogas potential of 25 % of 
the gas consumption in 2009. Sweden and Germany had allowed biogas in the natural gas 
transmission system, and the EU Directive 2003/55/EF stated that member states has to 
provide access for biogas producers to the system. (Energinet.dk 2009i)  
Since the decision to establish the Egtved-Ellund connection was made prior to the plan, the 
NGSSP09 was not seen to include any decisions that set frames for development consent. 
Therefore, the SEA team judged that the 2009 plan was not falling within the scope of the EU 
Directive and an SEA was not made. According to a project manager in Energinet.dk a 
condition for the Minister's approval of the Egtved-Ellund connection was that Energinet.dk 
reconsidered the options for a connection to Norway (Nybroe 2011). This reconsideration 
became evident in the framing of 2010. 
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict on gas supply emphasised the relevance of multiple supply 
areas and storage facilities. The Russian cut of gas supply in January 2009 led to a proposal 
by the commission of a new decree for emergency prevention and response (European 
Parliament and the Council 2009), which put up requirements on capacity that entered into 
force in 2010. The regulation required security of supply in N-1 cases, where the biggest 
supplier is dropping out, and in a Danish context this urged a supplement to the supply from 
the Danish part of the Nord Sea.  
 
THE NUANCED FRAMING IN 2010 
In January, a regulation on biogas upgrading plants and quality was issued to pave the way 
for the first commercial biogas in the transmission system (Energinet.dk 2010d). It was 
expected to lead to injection of biogas into the transmission system in the end of 2010, and 
biogas therefore became highly concrete in the planning for development of the transmission 
system. The SEA team determined biogas relevant for the SEA process and included it as a 
strategic aspect to consider. The focus on upgrading biogas led to broader discussions on 
renewable energy gasses, e.g. including hydrogen made from wind power. These renewable 
energy gasses were determined not to be relevant in the SEA process, since they were not of 
immediate realisation. 
In April, the European Commission announced that Energinet.dk was allocated 100 million 
euro of the recovery plan grants to expansion of gas infrastructure (Energinet.dk 2010e). The 
EU funding would cover half of the decided investments of the expansion of the Egtved-
Ellund connection. Whereas the bidding in the Open Season process only made a compressor 
station economically viable, the recovery aid made it viable expand the capacity with another 
gas pipeline. The new pipeline was seen as a 'project' and not a 'plan' and was therefore not 
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subject to an SEA process. The pipeline was to be located parallel to the existing pipe to 
minimise environmental impacts and an EIA was made. 
In May 2010, the DEA published a report on the expansion of infrastructure for future import 
of natural gas (DEA 2010). It identified a need for a connection to the Norwegian natural gas 
resources and it recommended further investigation of solutions for import from Norway. 
Moreover, the report pointed at the possibilities for using gas fields in the Nord Sea as gas 
storage. The thoughts were reproduced in the NGSSP10 and in the SEA, but without a 
throughout treatment in the SEA, since the formulations was not regarded as constituting 
decisions.  
During 2010, focus on carbon capture and storage (CCS) increased due to EU priority on CCS, 
which e.g. was expressed by the Commission's support to large-scale demonstration projects 
(Europe rapid 2010). CCS was therefore mentioned in Energinet.dk's planning, but not in 
formulations that made the SEA team regarded it relevant to be included in the SEA of the 
NGSSP, despite possibilities for using the transmission system for transporting CO2. CCS is 
by many seen as a 'hot potato' in Danish politics, and the inclusion in a public institution's 
planning could result in a politically charged situation. 
The decided expansion of the Egtved-Ellund connection made it relevant to expand the 
system towards Norwegian resources without constructing any connection to Poland, 
although the Norwegian-Poland transmission still was the intension. The framing of 
alternatives in the NGSSP and SEA work was formed into three parts: Expansion of the 
system towards the Norwegian gas resources (new concept compared to Skanled), expansion 
of the east-west connection in Denmark, and a new connection to Poland (previous termed 
Baltic Pipe). Each of these parts included alternatives as seen in figure 23. Compared to the 
NGSSP08, the NGSSP10 opened up for more varieties for connecting to the existing system, 
and the suspension of Skanled gave room for rethinking connections to Norway. The 
alternatives were primarily technically motivated rather than environmentally motivated, 
except the C2 alternative of avoiding the Copenhagen area, which was environmentally, 
economically as well as technically motivated. 
Compared to the variations of alternatives mentioned in NGSSP10, the alternatives in the 
SEA report were less but more specified, e.g. only mentioning two compared to three 
connection possibilities into the Nord Sea from Nybroe (A1 and A2). The specification was 
based on pragmatic and communicative reasons arguing that it was not relevant to assess 
more than the mentioned alternatives; more alternatives would hamper comparison. The 
framing of alternatives was influenced by the EIA made on natural gas infrastructure in 2001 
(Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy 2001b) and the related permissions, since 
Energinet.dk had an interest in easing the permitting process. As an example, the Dragør 
connection was included due to an existing permission: "In the alternative with limited 
quantity for export to Poland, the export compressor can presumably be placed on the area in 
Avedøre, which is zoned in the existing EIA permission" (Energinet.dk 2010f, p. 77). Thus, a 
path dependency of alternatives was visible. The onshore expansion of capacity was 
motivated by model operations and the routes were partly motivated by considerations to the 
approval process (B1) and considerations to security of supply (B2). 
The NGSSP10 included thoughts on integration of biogas in the gas supply with upgrading of 
the quality of biogas prior to injection and transportation in the transmission system. The 
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transmission system was seen to play a role in optimising the use of biogas in power plants 
with higher efficiency and to other purposes. In the SEA, the biogas potential were translated 
into one of the benefits of expanding the gas transmission infrastructure, however, biogas 
issues did not influence the framing of alternatives; knowledge about biogas generation in 
different areas of Denmark was seen as still too ambiguous to suggest alternatives e.g. 
alternative routing of pipes covering areas with high production or high potential of biogas.  
The scoping report from 2008, which had been in hearing in Denmark, Germany and Sweden, 
was point of departure for the 2010 SEA report, which was in hearing in the autumn of 2010. 
The SEA report as well as the NGSSP10 was published in December 2010. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE FRAMING OF ALTERNATIVES 
The development of alternatives in figure 24 shows how changeable the set of relevant 
alternatives was in the NGSSP process. The changes in alternatives are partly reflecting a 
learning process among the participants in the SEA team, but they also indicate the 
contextual dynamics that made solutions relevant and irrelevant. In the 2008 process, SEA 
played a role of facilitating identification of what infrastructure developments were to be 
seen as relevant alternatives. The framing process in 2008 ended with an understanding of 
alternatives being mutually dependent, why these were coupled into a main alternative. In 
2010, the SEA framing played a role of determining the most realistic alternatives among the 
alternatives provided in the NGSSP. This role was partly motivated by the pragmatic 
consideration that it is neither relevant nor beneficial for the reader of the SEA report to judge 
a very wide range of alternatives. Except these roles, SEA only had a minor influence on the 
planning process, which also is indicated in figure 21 in which the arrows of influence are 
directed towards the SEA process and not to the planning process. This is in line with 
Nooteboom's (2000) conclusion that "The question as to what a decision is about, and which 
types of alternative are feasible at that level, is in the first place determined by the decision-
making system and the proponent, and not by the environmental assessment process, nor by 
environmental assessment legislation" (p. 159).  
The investigation reflects the difficulties in framing relevant alternatives in a SEA process. 
Valve (1999) proposes that "alternatives are relevant if they deal somehow with the most 
significant choices related to a decision" (pp. 125-126), while acknowledging that actors may 
disagree on what these choices are and that in practice alternatives are constructed through 
negotiation. The relevance of assessing alternatives in the case of NGSSP is, however, clear. 
Hvidtfeldt and Kørnøv (2003, p. 23, translated) propose that "Alternatives are judged to be of 
particular relevance in situations of political uncertainty or disagreement about what is the 
best solution; in situations of comprehensive changes in land use or location; in situations of 
very big investments, comprehensive intervention in the existing and comprehensive 
technological changes, or in situations of irreversible decisions". According to the project 
manager in Energinet.dk, the main criteria in the selection of alternatives in the NGSSP SEA 
was A) their strategic character - as opposed to alternatives relevant in an following EIA 
process; B) the likelihood of an impending decision on the specific infrastructure determined 
by their history; C) other considerations, e.g. on market developments and potentials (Nybroe 
 
 166 
2011). Despite these broad criteria, the alternatives concerned, besides from considerations to 
biogas, only infrastructure connections.  
 
 
 
Figure 24. The development in the framing of alternatives in the SEA of NGSSP 2008-2010. 
 
SEA literature does not include advice specifically concerning the question of framing 
alternatives in cases of unpredictability and strategic dynamics. Sadler (1996, p. ii) points at 
"appropriate timing in initiating the assessment so that the proposal is reviewed early enough 
to scope for development of reasonable alternatives" as one of the necessary ingredients to 
the effective application of environmental assessments. The NGSSP represent a type of 
strategic decision-making processes in which 'early enough' is diluted due to alternatives 
being in play for a range of years. As the manager in Energinet.dk remarks: "Baltic Pipe has 
for instance been in play for 15 years now… It is a dynamic long-term process". Rather than 
being early enough, the key challenge of framing alternatives in SEA application is deciding 
the relevance of the alternatives in play by a judgement of e.g. the likelihood of an impending 
decision. The problem of the investigated SEA process was to catch up with the contextual 
developments.  
The decision-making in Energinet.dk problematises a 'tiering' of alternatives from the 
planning level to the project level: In the NGSSP process projects like the Skanled and the 
Egtved-Ellund connection developed 'on their own' regardless of the overall planning efforts. 
A manager in Energinet.dk expressed the problems in terms of SEA application as: "It is 
actually very difficult to incorporate environmental considerations at an early stage. The 
world is just not put together so that when we are planning infrastructure connections, we 
are facing the entire range of options and then narrow the scope… It often happens in 
bilateral cooperation; it happens in an entirely different way in reality" (Vinther 2011).  
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As the investigation shows, the natural gas security of supply planning - and thereby the SEA 
of it - is developed in interaction with many contextual aspects: Changes in related initiatives, 
technology development, actors' interests, and politics all have effects on the decisions made 
on the content of the NGSSP. The decisions related to the framing of alternatives were e.g. 
highly influenced by the unexpected economic development. The 'problem' of the NGSSP 
therefore seems to be characterised by what Cyert et al. (1956, p. 247) describe as "a whole 
series of "nested" problems": Natural gas planning a problem of security of supply, but also a 
problem of market interests in capacity, a problem of predicting energy politics, a problem of 
determining potentials in biogas, etc.  
Strategic decision-making in the natural gas infrastructure development in this period seems 
thus to be out of Energinet.dk's control. Instead strategic decision-making on natural gas 
infrastructure have similarities with a 'commons' (Hardin 1968) in the sense that a range of 
actors have a stake in it, but no one controls it and it may not end up with an optimal solution 
for any actor. The character of a commons may be part of the explanation of a range of non-
decisions (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), e.g. on the use of transmission system for transport of 
CO2 as part of a CCS system. To the extent the process has such a characteristic, responsibility 
for SEA application also risk becoming a 'tragedy of the commons'.  
The consultations of authorities and the public did not provide much input to the framing of 
alternatives; either the comments articulated political aspects, e.g. on the use of natural gas in 
the future, or EIA-related aspects, e.g. on what to assess in a detailed assessment process. The 
minor relevance of the comments lead to disappointment in the SEA team in terms of the role 
of the SEA and doubts about whether it is possible to frame and articulate alternatives so that 
a fruitful discussion is gained. 
 
REACTIONS AND REASONS 
The investigation of the SEA pilot shows that motivations for proposing and changing the 
framing of alternatives stem form national politics, financial developments, geo-politics, 
market developments, and other actors' activities. Furthermore, the investigation shows that 
the framing may be influenced by path dependency and by the insight among the employees 
involved in the framing. The reactions and reasons are summarised in table 14. 
The reactions and reasons depicted in table 14 indicate a tendency of keeping alternatives 
within the planning discourses of Energinet.dk rather than using the developments to 
suggest new alternatives. As an example, biogas, which was not a legally required concern 
for Energinet.dk was not specifically framed as an alternative in the SEA report. 
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Contextual 
change 
Implication on planning Reaction in SEA and the reason why 
Economic 
changes 
Suspension of plans on 
infrastructure expansion 
Suspension of SEA process, since the planning 
no longer includes frames for projects with 
significant impacts 
Economic 
changes 
Attention to EU funds for 
infrastructure 
Inclusion of funded infrastructure due to an 
increased likelihood of a decision on 
establishing these infrastructures 
Changes in 
political 
priorities  
Increased subsidy to biogas 
increases the role of biogas in 
the long term planning 
Due to uncertainties about quality, biogas was 
not explicitly mentioned in the SEA scoping. 
Changes in other 
actors' planning 
DEA prognosis on a 
considerable potential of biogas 
increases the relevance of biogas 
Biogas was included in the SEA as a strategic 
aspect to consider, but not as an alternative as 
biogas was seen to play a minor role in the years 
to come. 
Changes in geo-
politics 
Uncertainty about gas supply 
from Russia leads to minor 
concern about security of supply 
Increased focus on supply from Norwegian gas 
fields. 
Changes in 
market signals 
Limited need for infrastructure 
in market bids 
Realisation of the interdependency between the 
alternatives. 
Table 14. Strategic developments, their implication on planning, the reaction by the SEA team and the 
reason for this reaction. 
  
Framing of alternatives as a iterative process 
Deelstra et al. (2003) investigate the use of research in decision-making on large projects and 
conclude that "[r]esearchers are forced to cope with the dynamic character of decision-
making" (p. 522). They advocate for a stepwise adaptation to the strategic dynamics, which, 
they argue, make it possible to provide knowledge that "may generate new insights and 
views for the involved actors, thus changing their perceptions and problem definitions" (p. 
522). As it developed, the SEA process of the NGSSPs of 2008, 2009, and 2010 can be seen as a 
stepwise adaptation to strategic developments, however, this adaptation exceeded the 
schedules of the annual formal plans.  
Similar to Deelstra et al., De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (1999) point at the challenge of timing 
in unpredictable decision-making. They argue that "[t]he idea that research can be restricted 
to a single moment in the decision-making process ignores the unpredictable nature of 
decision-making, which makes it uncertain whether sufficient time will be available for the 
research required. If the actors see a chance to undertake actions to support their interests 
during the research phase, they will do so" (p. 183). This may question the flexibility of 
national SEA legislation, which in Denmark requires an 8 weeks public hearing period. The 
project manager in Energinet.dk, however, comments that the length of the SEA process is 
not a major problem. Instead, she points at the distinction between 'project' and 'plan', e.g. 
when projects precedes plans (Nybroe 2011).  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
"Prospective decisiveness gets derailed over and over by unexpected events and 
unanticipated consequences of initial actions" (Weick 1995, p. 184) 
 
Unexpected developments and strategic dynamics complicate the framing of relevant 
alternatives. This study reveals a comprehensive dynamics at strategic level in a period of 
three years of the Danish natural gas security of supply planning. According to a project 
manager in Energinet.dk, the strategic developments analysed in this study were not more 
influential or comprehensive than previous years; "In my view, the variation is normal. It 
changes from year to year" (Nybroe 2011). There is thus no indication that the challenges of 
framing of alternatives on strategic level will be less in the years to come. The practice of 
framing alternatives at this level therefore needs to learn how to adapt to these changes and 
to gain flexibility in the assessment process.  
The study indicates that in some types of planning it may be relevant to balance the current 
focus in SEA literature on targeting decision-windows (e.g. Dalkmann et al. 2004) with a 
longer term perspective of acknowledging organisational learning and considering the use of 
the SEA reports in a longer perspective. Due to strategic dynamics, certain strategic 
alternatives in the natural gas planning may in some periods be relevant and in other periods 
be irrelevant. Considering what alternatives have been in play in a historical and general 
perspective may therefore be a relevant supplement to focusing on the details of a specific 
decision window; in decision-making process in a context strategic dynamics, SEA 
application may benefit from being attentive to the history of developments as well as the 
decision window in question. Knowledge about environmental impacts of certain solutions 
from SEA processes may thereby play a more extensive role in the organisational learning 
and infrastructure development processes. In the case of the NGSSP SEA, the final report 
ended up being part of the basis for future decisions on the assessed infrastructure and not as 
such focused on a specific decision. In retrospect, the SEA could have been applied on the 
framing of alternatives in the Open Season process, which lead to a ministerial decision on a 
certain infrastructure. Instead, the SEA report of the 2010 NGSSP most likely will be part of 
the basis for framing alternatives in future Open Season processes.  
In contrast to the SEA literature outlined in the introduction, the findings on decision-making 
in this article show that decisions in the planning and SEA processes are widely reactive to 
changes in the context. As a consequence of this reactive character, the influence of SEA is 
reduced to a few minor instances. The article is thus in line with Kørnøv and Thissen's 
argument that impact assessors need to adopt a flexible and adaptive approach and Hilding-
Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir's emphasis on the importance of the context. The contribution of 
the article to the field is an enhanced empirical understanding of how contextual changes 
influence the planning and SEA processes at strategic level. 
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POSTLUDE: CONSIDERATIONS ON FLEXIBILITY 
 
The flexibility which allows SEA to adapt to complex planning, policy-making and 
decision-making processes is essential if SEA is to be an effective tool which promotes 
sustainable development (CSIR 1996). 
 
The article centres on the issues of flexibility and adaptation of SEA to the contextual 
dynamic. As pointed at in the CSIR report above, flexibility is argued to be essential for 
effectiveness of SEA. The concept of flexibility is broadened in the following by discussing 
flexibility of legislation and flexibility of organisational routines on SEA. 
The EU Directive on SEA does not include prescriptions that hinder flexibility: There are no 
demands for the length of environmental reports, of the time needed for conducting the 
assessment. It does, however, include formulations like "appropriate time frames" that allow 
"sufficient time for consultations" in line with the Aarhus Convention from 1998. The 
Directive furthermore prescribes procedures for formal consultations of affected member 
states. The main constraints to a flexible SEA approach are thus the consultation 
requirements. This can be seen as a trade-off between consultation and flexibility, which SEA 
practitioners have to deal with. In the SEA of the NGSSP, the consultation of member states 
on the scoping report was made in the beginning of 2009 before the economic recession that 
led to suspension of infrastructure developments and made the SEA irrelevant. It was only 
by chance that the consultation of the scoping was appropriate for the 2010 SEA as the 
recession and EU financial recovery aid could have led to alternatives and needs, which were 
not part of the 2009 scoping report. 
The Danish legislation has translates 'appropriate time frames' into eight weeks for the public 
consultation. This was in line with the existing norms and legislation on spatial planning. The 
adequacy of eight weeks for strategic decision-making in dynamic context has not been 
publicly debated and added the consultation of the scoping report as well as the time needed 
for assessing and writing, the SEA cannot be conducted faster than in three months. As the 
article shows, a range of unpredictable developments can take place within three months and 
the appropriateness of scoping report and environmental report thus depends on the 
character of the changes in the context in the three months period. 
Besides legislative requirements, flexibility depends upon how SEA is applied in 
organisations. Energinet.dk took a step towards flexibility by deciding to approach pivotal 
decisions when they are made rather than their formal plans. An orientation towards formal 
plans would impede the timing and scope of the SEA in terms of the development decisions 
made in an organisation. Flexibility is also depending on openness to learning in 
organisations as settled routines may not leave room for new forms of developments or new 
needs for applying SEA. In the case of non-programmed strategic decision-making, decisions 
will per definition have new elements and flexibility to these new characters is therefore 
important. Finally, flexibility relates to the ability of identifying what SEA should be flexible 
towards. If new developments are not identified, SEA will not be applied at all. The issues of 
perception and how we make sense of stimuli are in focus in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8:  STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 AS HUMAN CHOICE 
 
"However, not only is EIA an aid to project authorization decision making, decisions are 
made at every stage of the process, from screening out those projects where EIA is not 
necessary, through the identification of significant impacts, to the choice of alternatives 
and mitigation measures and on to the project authorization stage and beyond […] 
Decisions are made by the developer, their environmental and planning consultants, the 
competent authorities and all the consultees in the process" (Weston 2000, p. 185). 
"Framing is problematic because it leads to different views of the world and creates 
multiple social realities. Interest groups and policy constituencies, scholars working in 
different disciplines, and individuals in different contexts of everyday life have different 
frames that lead them to see different things, make different interpretations of the way 
things are, and support different courses of action concerning what is to be done, by 
whom, and how to do it" (Rein and Schön 1993, p. 147). 
 
Strategic decision-making is constituted by a myriad of choices like the choices involved in 
environmental assessments as Weston outlines in the quote above. These choices are highly 
influenced by how the actors involved make sense of stimuli. Different views and multiple 
social realities can be seen as "problematic" as in the quote by Rein and Schön above, but the 
different views may also be an opportunity, e.g. in trying to make a holistic assessment of 
environmental impacts.  
This chapter has point of departure in the choice circles model, which is developed and 
presented in the conceptual framework. It is here used for its potential to explore the choices 
made in strategic decision-making and the potential for increased understanding through 
knowledge about how persons create meaning of situations and options in order to settle on a 
decision. The chapter investigates choices and sense-making in two complementary ways: An 
experiment is used for basic insight into how we make sense of a fictional case and an actual 
decision-making process in the energy sector is used to investigate choices and sense-making 
in a real-life context. 
Central in environmental assessments are the concept of significance. Significance is indeed a 
concept that in practice is highly influenced by how people view the world and how they use 
experiences to make sense of information. Therefore, significance determination is in this 
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chapter investigated in terms of how people diagnose information and create stories about 
what choices are about. 
Related to the choice-model, SEA can be seen as formal framework for creating a story of 
what is going on in line with Weick et al.'s (2005, p. 415) argument that "Sense-making … is 
about continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive, 
incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in the face of criticism". It will 
undoubtedly provoke authority employees to argue that similar to sense-making theory, SEA 
"is not about truth and getting it right" (p. 415). Truth is complicated when acknowledging 
the constructed nature of SEA reports and their representation of complex impacts. In this 
perspective, the aim of SEA would be to create a plausible story of what significant impacts 
may be expected and the plausible ways to treat these impacts. SEA can also be seen as what 
Brown (2003) describes as "convention-governed sense-making narratives" in which the 
developed narratives or SEA reports are characterised by the dominant - and not always 
appropriate - conventions. Brown (2003) critically shows how authorities are using "various 
forms of verisimilitude in order to bolster their authority". Vlaar et al. (2006) have a more 
positive view on formalisation as a means to deal with problems of understanding in 
interorganisational contexts.  
SEA is thus a formal framework that facilitates choices in all four circles of the choice circles 
models. Especially the screening and scoping stages have a character of enacting stimuli of 
the development to be considered and bracketing and labelling events in order to create a 
story of what is at stake and what is going on. At the same time SEA is a framework for 
making latent "disruptions" or "shocks" visible through a formal procedure requirements; by 
requirements on considerations on possible types of impacts and consultations, latent 
conflicts and uncertainty, among other aspects, may become visible and articulated and 
thereby urging action. 
The use of the choice circles model in this chapter intends to challenge existing SEA literature 
in terms of its focus on accuracy rather than plausibility as argued by Weick; on how to set up 
a team for an SEA process and whether it is possible to set a team that notice more events and 
creates more relevant stories; on the use of checklists and routines when strategic situations 
are ambiguous; on the orientation to formal procedures when decisions are made throughout 
the process. 
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8.1  MAKING SENSE OF SIGNIFICANCE 
 
"Since environmental impact assessment (EIA) is concerned primarily with significant 
environmental impacts, the concept of impact significance deserves to be defined and 
applied rigorously" (Duinker and Beanlands 1986, p. 1). 
 
Literature on decision-making and sense-making includes a range of investigations and 
conceptualisations of how people make a choice. The literature on SEA is, however, sparse on 
the details of socio-psychological aspects of human choice. This subchapter sheds light on 
these aspects through an experiment on SEA of a specific choice situation. The analytical 
framework of the experiment is focused on how people determine significance, hereunder 
what they notice and how they create meaning of the stimuli. As argued by Duinker and 
Beanlands in the quote above, significance is a key aspect that deserves attention. Prior to the 
journal article on this experiment, some ideas about significance and socio-psychological 
aspects in SEA literature are presented. 
Since the choice model was not published prior to submission of the journal article on the 
experiment on sense-making, the article does not refer to the choice model. The experiment 
is, however, in line with the choice model and as such an experimental testing of the model 
for explaining practice. 
 
PRELUDE: SEA LITERATURE ON HUMAN CHOICE 
The SEA literature includes some more or less implicit insight and claims on the socio-
psychological aspects of how we make sense and continuously making choices. Steinemann 
(2001, p.11) emphasises that subjective evaluations often determine alternatives before 
objective and rigorous analyses are made. She does, however, not describe how such 
subjective evaluations are made.  
Insight and claims are also found in SEA literature that emphasises the structural aspects that 
restricts - or concentrates - noticing and the design of options. As an example, Arts and van 
Lamoen (2005) use their experience to put forward an argument that the structural elements 
of the planning process concentrate the sense-making to increasingly narrow scope of reality. 
According to Weick (1995, p. 98), the “inability to extrapolate from current actions and to 
foresee their consequences” trigger sense-making, and these inabilities are central challenges 
in any assessment process. In considering climate change in the SEA of the river basin 
management plans in Denmark, the Ministry of the Environment decided "based on an 
argument of an inadequate knowledge base" (Larsen and Kørnøv 2009, p. 291) that climate 
change would not be taken into consideration in the first generation of RBMPs. In this 
instance, the Ministry's seemed to find it impossible to extrapolate in a way that were in 
accordance with the Ministry's norms of good practice. The making sense of climate change 
was thus formally short-circuited in what has similarities with what Weick (1993) terms a 
collapse of sense-making. 
Learning from the conceptual framework, significance determination may be related to 
mental frameworks and priorities among the persons that are determining significance. 
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Mental frameworks are constituted by people's profession, schooling, norms, and other 
societal influences in interaction with individual's identity. It may furthermore be seen as an 
act of what Weick terms belief-driven sense-making. Here, people deals with beliefs related 
to the future by articulating expectations and reducing the variety in beliefs that are thought 
to be relevant, variety in what is noticed, and variety in what is prophesied. 
The focus on how we make sense of significance is motivated by an understanding of 
significance as one of the most critical components in SEA. Sadler (1996, p. 118) points at this 
critical role in terms of effectiveness: "Evaluating the significance of environmental effects is 
perhaps the most critical component of impact analysis. The interpretation of significance 
bears directly on project approvals and condition setting. […] In sum, the attribution of 
significance continues throughout the EIA process, from scoping to EIS review, in a gradually 
narrowing “cone of resolution” in which one stage sets up the next". Despite the importance 
of significance, the understanding of how it is determined in practice is still shrouded in 
mystery. The experiment does not provide answers to everything about significant 
determination; rather it provides insight in some aspects in a given context. 
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ABSTRACT 
Determination of significance is widely recognised as an important step in strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) processes. Especially the screening and scoping stages are 
important since the SEA largely depends upon how these activities are practised. The 
prescriptive literature and guidance on significance determination is comprehensive within 
the field of SEA, whereas descriptive and explorative studies of how we go about making 
sense of actions to determine significance are few.  
This article makes use of sense-making theory to shed light on the process of determining 
significance. Focus is on the first encounter with a description of a strategic choice and thus 
the initial determination of significance. A laboratory experiment is designed and conducted 
to investigate how persons make sense of a specific SEA case to determine significance in a 
screening and scoping of the case. 
The findings reveal patterns in the test persons' sense-making, including important 
differences in the way individuals screen and scope in an assessment context. These patterns 
concern what we notice, how fast we frame the choice, and when we are critical about the 
provided information. Recognising that the early stages of SEA are inherently dominated by 
sense-making provides a basis for reflections on practice and has implications for how to set 
up a team for SEA screening and scoping. 
 
Keywords: Sense-making, significance, strategic environmental assessment, screening, scoping 
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INTRODUCTION 
Significance is a central concept in strategic environmental assessment (SEA), since 
significance formally is the threshold that prompts assessment processes in the screening 
stage and the threshold for including impacts and alternatives in the scoping stage. 
Informally, however, assessment of significance occurs throughout the SEA process and the 
following implementation, when decisions are made on what to include and investigate, how 
and at what level of detail, and finally if and how results of decisions (e.g. mitigation 
measures for significant impacts) are implemented in practice. Significance also plays an 
important role in regulations on SEA, e.g. in the scope of the EU directive on SEA (article 1 of 
the EU Directive 2001/42/EF) and in the Directive's instructions on public involvement, the 
content of the environmental report and monitoring. This article focuses on significance 
determination in the early stages of SEA; screening and scoping. 
To guide the significance determination, the EU Directive includes significance criteria that 
concern the characteristics of the effects, the area to be affected as well as the plans and 
programmes in question. Significance is, however, not further defined in the Directive and 
significance is argued to be one of the elements in the Directive, which "many lawyers and 
environmental assessment practitioners will be employed for many years in sorting out" 
(Thérivel 2004, p. 33). Canter and Canty (1993) reported that out of 2,346 cases concerning the 
US National Environmental Policy Act between 1970 and 1990, half were raising the issue of 
significant impacts. Other authors have pointed at fundamental difficulties in handling 
significance, e.g. Kjellerup (1999) in a Danish legal context. 
Despite the importance of significance in environmental assessment procedures, the concept 
is rarely defined in environmental assessment literature (Weston 2000, p. 193) and there is no 
international consensus on the concept (Canter and Canty 1993). Furthermore, significance is 
described as one of the limitations of environmental assessment procedures (Tullos 2009). 
Significance has been described as dynamic, contextual, political and uncertain (Wood et al. 
2004) as increased knowledge among involved actors, change of actors, development in 
actors' preferences and values, and societal developments may all influence perceptions and 
conceptions of significance in a given context. The contextual character is emphasised by 
Lawrence (2007b, p. 778) who points at the fact that "perceptions vary among populations 
and sectors of society regarding which impacts are positive and negative, and to what 
degree". 
Research shows that the initial meaning we assign to information and events can be very 
influential on the following process; Gawronski et al. (2010) refer to a large body of research 
that shows that people's unconscious evaluation of events can be "relatively rigid and 
difficult to change" (p. 683). In a SEA context, this means that our initial sense-making is 
important for the entire process as it unconsciously may hinder openness towards new 
information and other actors' opinions. 
 
SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION IN EA PROCESSES 
EA literature provides a manifold of checklists, criteria, procedures, and thresholds to guide 
significance determination (e.g. Wood 2008, Lawrence 2007b, Thérivel 2004, Thompson 1990). 
The literature also encounters a suggestion for inserting more “common sense” in the 
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assessment of significance (Ross et al. 2006) – however, without clarifying and reflecting upon 
differences in sense-making and thereby the non-existence of a uniform and shared common 
sense. Despite the manifold of thresholds and criteria, determination of significance is argued 
to involve "an element of judgement" (Thérivel 2004, p. 134), "subjective decisions" (Wood et 
al. 2007, p. 810), "personal opinions", "discretion of the decision-maker" as well as intuition 
(Canter and Canty 1993, p. 291). The process of determining significance has therefore been 
described as "subjective, normative and value-dependent" (Lawrence 2007a, p. 759), 
manipulatable (Wood et al. 2007), anthropocentric (Duinker and Beanlands 1986), contentious 
(ADEAT 2002), imprecise, context-dependent, political, and complex (Lawrence 2007a). The 
range of adjectives seems to be an indicator for how difficult significance determination is to 
grasp. 
The clash between the importance of significance and the complexity of significance 
determination has given rise to critical questioning of the concept (e.g. Lawrence (2007b), of 
the team determining the significance (e.g. DTEA 2002), the process of determining 
significance (e.g. Wood et al. (2004)), the timing and role of significance determination in 
practice (e.g. Nielsen et al. (2005) and Christensen and Kørnøv (2011)), and the trade-offs 
between priorities in significance determination in a developing country context (Rajaram 
and Das 2011). Few studies have dealt with how people in practice identify significance and 
very few - if any - have investigated what happens when SEA practitioners in their first 
encounter with a case try to make sense of information in order to determine significance. In 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA) context, Weston (2000) argues that "[m]ost 
research in EIA decision making has focused on the project authorization process and not the 
crucial decisions made at the earlier stages of screening and scoping" (p. 185) and Wood 
(2008, p. 23) points at a "paucity of research that critically examines and reflects upon the way 
in which significance is evaluated and communicated". 
The few studies of significance determination practice reveal elements of how we determine 
significance. By studying British local authorities, Wood et al. (2004) divide respondents into 
two profiles: People either demonstrated "a smooth, gradual and incremental appraisal of 
significance" or demonstrated a step change response "punctuated by sharp changes in 
relation to the size/scale of the proposal" (pp. 1 and 13). Wood et al. furthermore show that 
significance determination practice had no direct relationship with government guidance 
thresholds. The minor importance of official thresholds and checklist is also supported by the 
finding that only 2% of the local authority practitioners regarded checklists as the single most 
effective approach in screening practice (Wood and Becker 2005, p. 358). In a study of 
practitioners’ balancing of precaution and efficiency in EIA scoping in the UK, Snell and 
Cowell find a tendency of scoping issues in rather than excluding these due to the concern of 
legal challenges and thereby enlarging the environmental statements (Snell and Cowell 2006). 
Besides the British findings, significant determination processes in an environmental 
assessment context is under-researched (Snell and Cowell 2006). We still do not know the 
details of what happens when we as SEA practitioners or researchers are presented with 
some kind of action and asked to determine whether SEA must be applied and what impacts 
and alternatives are significant. Insight into similar processes can be found in other fields of 
study and the fields of socio-psychology and cognition seem especially relevant for shedding 
light on the first preliminary significance determination. Within these fields, sense-making 
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theory has gained increased importance in the last decades with its focus on how people 
"construct what they construct, why, and with what effects" (Weick 1995, p. 4). 
 
AIM AND CONTRIBUTION 
Whereas prescriptive and technical literature on significance determination dominates 
literature on SEA, this article has an exploratory approach to significance determination. The 
article investigates and reflects upon how to improve SEA by paying more attention to the 
sense-making, thus emphasising the social and cognitive elements of assessment - compared 
to the technical. The aim of the article is to uncover how we notice and make sense of 
information in order to determine significance. In contrast to Wood et al.'s (2004) 
retrospective investigation of significance determination, the aim is to uncover the process as 
it unfolds. For this purpose, a laboratory experiment is designed to investigate how SEA 
practitioners and researchers make sense of information and determine significant impacts 
and SEA relevance. The experiment is aimed at the very early sense-making, at what happens 
the first time we see a text. 
The research questions that are guiding the article are: 
- What patterns can be found in the way SEA practitioners notice cues and frame 
information in their process of making sense of a strategic choice? 
- How do such patterns influence significance determination? 
Since significance determination is a complex process, the investigation will not find 
universal patterns, but tendencies in a context. The article discusses these tendencies in terms 
of inspiration for improvements in practice. Due to the complexity of significance 
determination, clear answers may require comprehensive studies, which are not the purpose 
of this article; the aim is to draw attention to the initial significance determination processes 
and show tendencies and implications based on a minor group of test persons. 
The study is a part of a research project on SEA and strategic choices in the Danish energy 
sector (see Lyhne 2011a), and the experiment is using a hypothetical but realistic case of a 
strategic choice in the sector. 
In the next section, the article unfolds sense-making theory, through which an analytical 
framework is developed. We then present the design of the experiments, before setting out 
the findings of the research. The article concludes with reflections and ideas on how to 
acknowledge the sense-making taking place at the early stages of SEA. 
Strategic decision-making as human choice 
 181 
INSIGHT FROM LITERATURE ON SENSE-MAKING 
 
"[P]eople find themselves thrown into ongoing situations and have to make do if they 
want to make sense of what is happening [… They] do not have a stable representation of 
the situation: Patterns may be evident after the fact, but at the time the flow unfolds there 
is nothing but arbitrary fragments capable of being organized into a host of different 
patterns or possibly no pattern whatsoever" (Weick 1995, p. 44) 
 
Karl E. Weick's theory of sense-making describes human sense-making as a social process of 
continuously enacting events, extracting cues from these events and retrospectively making 
plausible stories (Weick 1995, p. 18). Sense-making literature is focused on how people make 
sense of stimuli; people "sort through prior cues, label them and connect them, which often 
result in plausible stories that are good enough to keep going" (Weick 2001, p. 237). Mental 
frameworks, identity and articulation are important elements in the process of reducing 
multiple meanings and generate a locally plausible story (Weick et al. 2005, p. 414), but it is 
not a clear-cut process: Starbuck and Milliken (1988, p. 49) argue that "people have to have 
numerous sensemaking frameworks that contradict each other. These numerous frameworks 
create plentiful interpretive opportunities - if an initial framework fails, one can try its 
equally plausible converse". Frames serve the function of separating signal from noise and 
the filtered information, Starbuck and Milliken argue, "is less accurate but, if the filtering is 
effective, more understandable". New situations or contexts constitute a challenge to the use 
of frames; Kaufman & Smith (1999, p. 165) argue that "when frames are transferred from one 
set of circumstances to another, an imperfect match may prompt solutions that do not 
respond to actual needs or conditions".  
To improve practice, Weick argues that it is less productive to follow the advice from 
behavioural decision theorists that are focused on errors, misperceptions, and irrationalities 
of humans. Instead, he suggests to "look at the filters people involve, why they invoke them, 
and what those filters include and exclude" (Weick 1995, p. 57). 
Sense-making literature is concentrated on equivocal situations and therefore "built out of 
vague questions, muddy answers, and negotiated agreements that attempt to reduce 
confusion" (Weick 1993, p. 636). In this context, Weick emphasises the close relation between 
sense-making and organising: "people organize to make sense of equivocal inputs and enact 
this sense back into the world to make that world more orderly" (Weick et al. 2005, p. 414). In 
a SEA context, practitioners organise the information and inputs around e.g. impacts and 
enact this sense and order back into the society through reports and technical summaries. 
Equivocal situations are accompanied by equivocality of terms. Jackson and Dutton (1986, p. 
34) conclude that "simple labels do not have simple meanings" when investigating how 
people understand the concepts of 'threats', and 'opportunities'. They elaborate: "The rich set 
of attributes attached to these cognitive categories suggest that the simple labels of threat and 
opportunity represent shorthand addresses for complex assumptions about issues so 
categorized" (p. 34). Weick emphasises the inevitable inaccuracy of terms we use to describe 
events: "People pull from several different vocabularies […] to focus their sense-making. 
[…]But all of these words that matter invariably come up short. They impose discrete labels 
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on subject matter that is continuous. There is always a slippage between words and what 
they refer to. Words approximate the territory; they never map it perfectly. That is why 
sensemaking never stops" (Weick 1995, p. 107). This continuous improvement of labelling 
and understanding what we are dealing with necessitates flexibility in the SEA process to 
reformulate and reconsider elements like the significant impacts. 
Details of the process of sense-making are illustrated in figure 25. Weick describes sense-
making as a process initiated when people are experiencing discrepancies and equivocality in 
their on-going sensing; they are 'disturbed' (the stippled box). They first look for reasons to 
resume to action in frameworks or cause maps. These frameworks may be "Institutional 
constraints, organizational premises, plans, expectations, acceptable justifications, and 
traditions inherited from predecessors" (Weick et al. 2005, p. 409). If no reasons are found, 
they label and notice cues in order to generate plausible stories. If these stories seem to be 
adequate, they are retained as guidance for future action and interpretation. The figure is 
simplified and does therefore not show the numerous cycles and interaction between the 
elements of the process. 
 
 
Figure 25: The process of sense-making (adapted from Weick 1995). 
 
Studies related to this field have indicated that informal sensing techniques play an 
important role in how managers become aware of significant problems and "that managers 
tend to ignore the indicators when they are formally reported" (Lyles and Mitroff 1980, p. 
116). Starbuck and Milliken (1988) report studies that have shown that "some stimuli are 
more available or more likely to attract attention than others" and "the characteristics of 
perceivers, including their current activities, strongly affect both the availabilities of stimuli 
and the abilities of stimuli to attract attention". According to Watzlawick, Weakland, and 
Fisch (1974), blind spots are found in all mental frameworks and the blind spots prevent 
people from solving some problems. Furthermore, Bargh (1982) argues that part of our 
attention to stimuli is managed by automatic and involuntary processes which "can either 
facilitate or inhibit active attentional processing" (p. 425).  
Learning from sense-making literature, we - as SEA practitioners and researchers - need to 
acknowledge that we cannot fully control what we notice and what we do not notice, the 
words we use are never accurate, and our initial interpretation may be rigid. Sense-making 
literature may provide the insight that is needed to better understand and improve how we 
read signals of importance and frame problems/opportunities (see Woodside 2000). 
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COMBINING SENSE-MAKING AND SEA SCOPING IN AN EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE 
Although the conception and use of 'significance' differ between sense-making and SEA 
literature, significance plays an important role in both fields and it thus becomes interesting 
and relevant to relate these fields in order to translate the two research questions into a 
specific experiment and analyses of how test persons make sense of significance. 
The first research question about how SEA practitioners notice cues and frame information in 
their process of making sense is translated into analyses of what the test persons notice and when 
they notice it and how the test persons frame the case. We know from SEA experience that 
different people point at different impacts in scoping processes, but sense-making leads to 
questions like: How is our determination of significance influenced by what and when we 
notice elements? Is it possible to identify patterns and profiles in how we notice and can we 
improve our noticing? The second research question about how patterns in noticing and 
framing influence significance criteria are part of the analysis of the patterns. 
To answer the research questions, SEA procedures and the insight from sense-making theory 
are combined in an experiment procedure. Thus, the processes of reading a text in order to 
determine significant environmental impacts, SEA relevance, and relevant alternatives are 
combined with the illustration of the process of sense-making above. In order to achieve 
insight into when test persons notice elements, the experiment includes a reading-discussing-
reading sequence. This sequence may furthermore reveal patterns in how communication on 
the significance determination may influence the significance determination process. The 
experiment procedure is presented in table 15. 
In order to achieve empirical and ongoing insight into significance determination, steps of 
test persons' reflections on their significance determination process (steps 5, 6, and 8) are 
added to the experiment procedure. Contrary to the rest of the experiment, these reflections 
do not provide ongoing but retrospective data about the test persons' sense-making of the 
case. The reflections do, however, play a role in verifying the data and interpretations made 
in this article. The analysis of sense-making is thus based on the underlining of words and 
sentences done by the test persons while reading the text as well as the transcription of the 
recording of their speaking aloud of thoughts and reflections during the process. 
Learning from Weick's recipe of "How can I know what I think until I hear what I say?", a 
confrontation of interesting statements made by the test persons is furthermore added to the 
experiment. The intention of this confrontation is to make the test person elaborate on 
interesting elements such as mental frameworks or individual sense-making processes. The 
number of confrontations per test person is limited to three. 
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Step Task Sense-making literature 
1 An SEA practitioner [A] reads a text and 
during the reading underlines and comments 
upon what is especially interesting/useful for 
understanding (interruptions for clarification 
if needed) 
Noticing and labelling of information in the 
enactment of the case. 
2 [A] is asked to explain what she/he noticed 
(retell the text).  
([A] is not informed of the following stages 
to avoid dominance of interpretation at this 
stage) 
Retrospective account of the noticing of 
cues, labelling of information and potential 
beginning of a story of what the case is 
about. 
3 [A] is asked to determine possible significant 
environmental aspects  
Creating stories of what is significant. 
4 [A] is asked how she/he would go on: Is EA 
needed, what analyses, alternatives and 
measures are especially important? 
Creating stories by searching for experience 
with relevant incidents. 
5 [A] is asked of her/his idea about why she/he 
noticed the specific cues and whether the 
noticing had a personal touch 
Retrospective reflection on the noticing 
process by the test person (steps 1 and 2) 
6 [A] is asked of her/his idea about why she/he 
pointed at the specific significant 
environmental aspects 
Retrospective reflection on the stories 
created (steps 1 and 4) 
7 Before concluding, [A] re-reads text to 
confirm his/her understanding (with a new 
pen colour) 
A test for a changed perceptual framework 
due to the thoughts in steps 4-6 and more 
detailed knowledge about the experiment 
8 [A] is asked about potential changes in 
understanding caused by the second reading 
in step 7.  
Retrospective reflection on potential 
changes and the reasons for these. 
9 [A] is confronted with statements uttered 
during the experiment. 
Confrontation of statements may give 
reactions in line with Weick's recipe of 
"How can I know what I think until I hear 
what I say?" 
10 As a recapitulation [A] is asked about 
reflections on and learning in the 
experiment. 
It may give indications of how the test 
persons think about their sense-making 
process 
Table 15: The steps in the experiment process and their relations to sense-making literature. 
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METHODOLOGY AND SET-UP OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment is simply described by one of the test persons when making sense of what 
the experiment is about: "I get a text, which I read. And meanwhile I read it, thoughts pop up 
in my head and I speak these aloud, so that you can follow my thoughts, when I read the text 
and underline it". 
The experiment is inspired by Thomas, Clark and Gioia's (1993) study of hospital managers 
that aimed at identifying linkages between the "strategic 'sense-making' processes of 
scanning, interpretation, and action" (p. 239). In a case-scenario methodology, they provided 
test persons with scenarios and asked a series of questions regarding diagnosis.  
Our design has been developed through internal testing and by use of a test person. This has 
helped formulate the text in a manner that minimised doubt among test persons as to the 
meaning of "unimportant" formulations of the text. The design and presentation of the 
experiment aim at being reproducible, so that everyone is able to follow the steps and get 
comparable results. 
 
EXPERIMENT SET-UP 
The cutting-edge research and strategic planning at Energinet.dk inspire the case of the 
experiment. It is thus a realistic case for the coming years of strategic energy planning. The 
case is formulated so that test persons most likely will recognise elements without being 
familiar with the situation. The formulation of the choice is sought to be abstract to encourage 
strategic considerations, but the preparation of the text showed a need for including concrete 
characteristics and examples to help test persons grasp what the (non-programmed) situation 
is about. 
The set-up of the experiment is: 
- A number of EA/SEA researchers and practitioners are test persons ('variable' mental 
frameworks). These are selected to reach a variety in the test persons' backgrounds and 
occupational positions, see considerations below. 
- The case text (as 'controlled' and limited stimuli) of a realistic energy storage choice is 
presented to the individual practitioner. The text is presented below.  
- Each test person does the experiment in isolation and the interviewers only interact during 
the test persons' sense-making of the information if clarification is needed. Furthermore, 
the interviewers aim at being neutral to reduce the influence on the test persons. 
- Before the experiment starts, the aim, duration and content of the study are explained to 
the test persons. They are instructed to continuously speak out loud, underline words in 
the text, which they regard as important for understanding, and explain thoughts and 
underlining during the reading of the text. To enhance trust and informality, it is 
emphasised to the test persons that their performance will not be graded or evaluated and 
that there are no trick questions. 
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- The process is audio recorded, subsequently transcribed, and given to the test persons for 
possible comments.  
Two ‘interviewers’ observe the test person. One of the interviewers guides the process, 
interrupts the test persons' sense-making if clarification is needed, and asks questions in the 
steps below. If the test person does not speak aloud, he/she is asked about thoughts and 
actions with questions like "Why did you underline that word? What do you mean by…? You 
seem to ponder upon something?" The other interviewer writes down statements made by 
the test person used in step 8, see table 16 below, to foster reflection by the test person in line 
with Weick's "how can I know what I think until I hear what I say?" recipe. If necessary, only 
one interviewer can conduct the experiment, but our experience is that more nuances and 
precision are gained by being two. 
Due to resource limitations, the number of test persons is set to nine. The selection of test 
persons has aimed at a variety in job positions, expertise in relation to the 
information/professional field of expertise, and educational backgrounds, see table below.  
 
 Non or little familiarity with SEA Very familiar with SEA 
Very familiar with the energy case Lotte, NN, Christian Per, Stine,  
Little familiar with the energy case Kristian Martin, Sanne, Anja 
Table 16: Test persons in the experiment. 
 
The variety is intended to make differences in mental frameworks more explicit. 
Furthermore, the variety is intended to reflect that environment professionals are not the only 
ones who conduct a SEA scoping on developments. In practice, the selection of test persons 
has resulted in a distribution of four university-based SEA researchers and practitioners, one 
consultancy-based SEA practitioner, one university-based energy planner, one municipality-
based energy planner, one company energy planner, and one university-based urban 
planner. 
 
THE CASE TEXT 
The case, which the test persons are presented with, is shown in box 1 with accompanying 
notes on the considerations on the formulations and content. The text is one A4 page in total 
and includes one table.  
The ideas behind the text are to give a somewhat likely strategic choice related to a need. To 
make it immediately understandable, the case description is composed as a 'problem-
solutions-characteristics-implications' sequence. The need, the selection of technologies, and 
the implications are described in a way that is a bit provocative and uncertain as to make it 
interesting to all test persons. For instance, the need for storage is specified as a single, large 
figure. A variety in content is sought so that it involves technical descriptions, a table with 
numbers, as well as concrete examples of implications. Locations known to the test persons 
and easily understandable examples are provided to facilitate personal relations and similar 
experiences. 
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Strategic choice of storage of renewable energy 
The high share of renewable energy (like sun, wind, and wave energy) in the future energy system 
makes it necessary to store large amounts of energy. 100 % renewable energy is discussed, of which 
windmills must constitute at least half. The periods between substantial wind speeds may last for 
weeks and sudden changes in weather can impact the stability of the electricity system. Therefore, 
the need for storage involves long-term storage and storage technologies with a short reaction time. 
The need for storage has been estimated on the basis of the longest period with surplus of wind 
energy which amounts to 100,000 MWh. The need is, however, dependent on other initiatives 
within intelligent control of the electricity network, consumer behaviour, development of other 
storage technologies, etc. 
A plan for the future energy system involves a strategic choice of storage possibilities. The 
Government's experts have determined that three technologies will be relevant in Denmark: 
- "Compressed Air Energy Storage" (CAES) in which energy is stored as compressed air below soil 
layers of various depths. Turbines convert the pressure into electricity. 
- "Energy islands" in which energy is stored by pumping up water into big reservoirs. The 
technology utilises the difference in potential energy between two water reservoirs of different 
heights, and energy is obtained by use of turbines. 
- "Hydrogen storage" in which energy is stored by splitting water into hydrogen (and oxygen). 
Energy is obtained by fuel cells. 
All possibilities have been tested and discussed among specialists. Different characteristics of the 
three technologies are specified in the table: 
Storage 
technology 
Storage period Capacity per 
facility 
Efficiency Investment cost 
[Sec] [Month] [MW] [%] [$/kWh] 
CAES X X 100-1000 75-80 Approx. 100 
Energy islands X X 100- 80-85 Approx. 100 
Hydrogen storage X X 10-1000 60 Approx. 500 
Geographically, the technologies are different. The energy which can be stored in energy islands 
depends on the area and the height of the plants. Among others, a proposal has been made to close 
the Limfjord in one end and put up turbines for utilising height differences, or to establish wind 
power plants on a ring of embankment, creating a short distance between production and storage of 
energy. CAES and hydrogen can be established as gas storages in underground soil layers, but a 
proposal to use artificial air cushions just below surface has also been made. Underground storage 
of air and hydrogen requires only minor facilities on the surface, and there are several places in 
Denmark with suitable underground. 
In relation to other sectors, hydrogen storage involves a dimension of being storage for hydrogen 
cars. The existing natural gas network may furthermore be relevant as a transport network. In terms 
of research, Denmark is a frontrunner in the development of fuel cells, and the area is mentioned as 
a possible new wind energy adventure. The oxygen which is split from the water with the hydrogen 
can be utilised by the industry. The energy islands can be combined with dams and road 
connections, and a dam across for instance Horsens Fjord would create a large reservoir. 
Box 1: The case description presented to the test persons. 
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EXPERIENCES AND BIASES 
Speaking out loud has generally not been a problem in the experiment, although some test 
persons had an initial tendency to read all text aloud and other had a tendency to forget to 
speak out loud. Guidance during the experiment has therefore been necessary, although kept 
to a minimum not to interfere with the sense-making process. 
A recurring event was that the test persons bemoaned the fact that they did not know what to 
emphasise before they had read the whole text and knew what it was about. One of the test 
persons expressed it like this: "I can very well speak aloud, but I do not want to speak aloud 
without having something to speak about, so I just have to see, what it is all about". By 
insisting on and explaining the interesting aspects in exactly this process, the test persons 
acknowledged this and agreed on proceeding. Trust and openness have been sought by 
carefully explaining the purpose and by meeting the test persons at their working place at a 
place they found comfortable.  
The filter between what is said and what is thought was evident in the experiment, for 
instance in sentences like: "I just have to consider what want to underline". The filter was 
expected, as it is not 100 % possible to speak aloud all thoughts.  
The set-up of the experiment includes limitations in comparison with a 'real-life' situation 
among people being presented to a case like this. One of the limitations is the test persons' 
simplification of the information in terms of the sender; in the experiment some test persons' 
sense-making of the case was explicitly influenced by their relation to and assessment of the 
interviewers: "When it comes from you, I trust the correctness of the text". 
The answer to the question of noticing (why noticing this?) often became a relative question 
of whether colleagues or other relations would do the same. The comparison group differs 
from person to person and is thus not easily analysable.  
A main critique of the experiment is that it is on an individual basis, whereas sense-making in 
practice is taking place in a social interaction between people. The individual basis is chosen 
to make the data simple and analysable; if two or more people were brought together, it 
would be impossible to concurrently access their thoughts as they unfold. The interaction 
experiment is therefore seen as a very relevant extension to the individual experiment. 
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The results of the three analyses are presented and discussed in the following subsections. 
The overarching findings from this experiment suggest the following: 
1. There are substantial differences in notifying and significance determination between 
first and second readings of text 
2. Personal and professional experience can only partly explain the difference in 
significance determination 
3. Framing of the case varies depending on familiarity and practical SEA experience: The 
older and/or more practically experienced, the faster and more firm framing 
 
WHAT WE NOTICE AND WHEN WE NOTICE IT 
The underlining made by the test persons is aggregated in the addendum and the 
aggregation shows tendencies of the first reading being primarily oriented towards the 
concrete details and examples mentioned in the text, whereas the second reading is primarily 
oriented towards establishing the context and the alternatives. This observed difference 
between the first and second reading of the text could be summarised as follows: 
- In the first reading the test persons focus on the technological aspects of the case, while 
- In the second reading the test persons take a more critical position, start asking clarifying 
questions and make critical evaluations of the nature and implications of the strategic 
choice and involving technologies.  
In the first reading, the underlining thus concerns the specific technologies presented (e.g. 
"Compressed air energy storage"), the concrete examples of the implementation ("Closing the 
Limfjord in one end", "artificial air cushion below the surface"), and the windmill context 
(which is seen as the driver of the 'problem'), whereas the underlining in the second reading 
concerns the strategic context (underlining "strategic choice" "high share", "wind, solar and 
wave", "store large amounts of energy”), the strategic alternatives to the presented 
technologies ("intelligent control of electricity system", "consumer behaviour", "other storage 
technologies"), and clarifying puzzling information, e.g. "The oxygen can be utilised by the 
industry", "Government experts have identified"). 
The analysis of the underlining shows that the highest scoring phrases are: The windmill 
context ("of which windmills must constitute at least half" by 7 out of 8 test persons) and the 
radical implementation example of hydro turbines ("closing the Limfjord in one end" by 7 out 
of 8). A common basis for the test persons’ sense-making seems to be: Windmill targets and 
implications for the fiord, which may be due to a practice of relating to something known 
(both well known in Denmark).  
Among the lowest scoring phrases are "strategic choice" (1 out of 8 test persons) and 
"Government's experts have identified" (oral by Anja and NN), which may be surprising. The 
text was, however, introduced as a strategic choice, for which reason it may not have seemed 
relevant for the test persons to emphasise it. 
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Concrete examples of implementation of technologies seem to play an important role in the 
test persons' sense-making; These are emphasised by a high share of test persons ("closing the 
Limfjord in one end" by 7 out of 8; "artificial air cushion below the surface" by 5 out of 8; "The 
existing natural gas network as transport network" by 5 out of 8).  
Much focus is on the spatial implications of the technologies, and three test persons even 
emphasise these in both the first and second readings. This double emphasis indicates a new 
meaning of the spatial aspects after questions on impacts and alternatives. 
In the second reading, the underlining reveals, as opposed to the first reading, a critical position 
towards e.g. the strategic choice, the size of the need, government experts and the 
technologies put forward. Some examples of critical stances among the test persons in their 
sense-making are shown in table 17. 
 
The strategic 
choice 
including 
premises 
Stine: "When it is this strategic level, I think it would be relevant to know the 
premises in terms of the projections and the expectations to the development" 
NN: "It looks like a text from a geography school book, which not yet has acquainted 
itself with the newest developments" and "It is a pure non-interdisciplinary technical 
approach. … It is a fascination paper" 
Size of the 
need 
Martin: "How big is the uncertainty of this number: Is it 100,000 MW or is it 250,000 
MW or is it actually only 10,000?" 
NN: "I do not know who it is that has estimated the storage need to 100,000 MWh. 
And I do not know the period… It really has to be clarified". 
Anja: "This time I noticed that the need is dependent on initiatives. And then I 
thought: 'Well, have they made calculations on that? What are the prognoses for 
consumption in 50 years for instance?" 
Government 
experts 
Per: "That there actually is a conspiracy behind it [Government expert determines 
technologies]" 
Martin: "I think it is appropriate to question whether the Government's experts are 
right or not. Without saying that they are wrong" 
Christian: "Some people just follow the experts' advice. In that respect, I am - because 
I work here [in the sector] and have experienced who so-called experts may be - 
aware that the experts also have an agenda and a political angle on such issues" 
Solutions/ 
technologies 
Kristian: "If they say that a decision is made and that this is what they want, then it 
influences the possible solutions - or at least the alternatives, which can be chosen" 
Anja: "[Wind mills on a ring of embankment] Then I think it becomes such a hard-
core engineer project, where the focus is more on the project than the energy" 
Martin: "The positive aspects of investment costs in terms of export is not calculated" 
Table 17: Examples of critical stances among test persons during second reading. 
 
The addendum shows instances where words or sentences were underlined in both first and 
second readings. Besides new structures of understanding imposed in the steps in between, 
the double underlining may indicate development in how the test persons label and 
understand these elements. This is when Weick argues that words never map elements 
perfectly and sense-making never stops. 
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The findings indicate that if significance determination through screening and scoping in 
SEA should secure reflection and critical stances, time is required for revisit the text. 
 
TEST PERSONS' REFLECTION OF THEIR NOTICING PROCESS 
In terms of the first and second readings, four of the test persons show awareness of their 
approach to the case description. Per comments that "by the first reading I try to establish the 
structure and by the second I patch it up, where I have overlooked something or maybe 
redefine something, because you would see that some other things go on in the text". A 
similar approach is described by Martin: "What I actually do is that I make an overview by 
first quickly reading the text through and then go deeper into it afterwards. That is how I 
work, really. Also ordinarily". Anja underlines her educational background in terms of a 
specific approach to the case: "I immediately think: 'Where is the problem and where is the 
solution' when I read things". Christian explains his way of remembering the content: "Then I 
have some specific elements that I look for, which means that I… I would not say that I 
memorise, but I remember the essence. Maybe remembering the content more than the 
meaning of the text. Also because when the text is processed several times, it may be that it is 
another meaning that you make of the text than the first time you read it through". For Lotte, 
emphasis on elements seems to be part of the process of creating meaning. She comments, 
"You underline it to understand what kind of technology we are talking about". 
Asked about new meanings in the second reading, Anja comments "It did not change my 
attitude towards it, because somehow, I got it in the first reading, I think". Sanne describes a 
more open role of the second reading: "When I read things again, then what I focused on in 
the first reading, I do not have to focus on again, which means that other aspects turn up". 
The difference in critical stance between first and second readings is explicitly reflected on by 
Martin: "What I do in the beginning is actually that I accept the premise about the future 
electricity system, which makes it necessary to store big amounts of energy. … Others may 
say "We need a discussion about this, before I go on". 
The experiment shows a tendency for critical stances to depend on the professional 
background, so that energy planners are critical towards the correctness of the energy 
problem and solutions, whereas the environmental managers are critical towards the 
environmental implications and the need for the energy infrastructure. Similarly, the urban 
planner is not critical towards the correctness, but concerned about spatial issues. Having 
experience within both the case field and SEA can change the framing of the case during the 
sense-making process. As a person with insight into energy aspects, Lotte initially focused on 
these, however, after questions related to environmental assessments, she changed her 
framework of understanding. One of her comments was on the following reflection: "In the 
first reading, I was most concerned about the technique, and now I thought about it in 
relation to environmental assessment".  
Whereas experiences and knowledge play an important role in understanding the text, the 
noticing of elements to be interpreted by use of experiences play a similarly important role: 
Martin is puzzled that despite working with green infrastructure and green export, he did 
not notice these elements in the text in the first reading. He argues: "I think it is characteristic 
that it is the lower sentences, where you are missing some things", but also comments that his 
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skipping may be related to the fact that it is something he knows about. Similarly, he argues 
that his limited knowledge of energy technology restricts his sense-making of the case: 
"[Solutions] which I cannot relate to because I am not an expert in this field". Thus, he argues, 
"It is a matter of believing in it". Stine has another approach to what she does not know; she 
continuously puts up questions for a range of elements, which she is not familiar with, and 
points at a range of elements, she would have to investigate more in detail. Still, in terms of 
alternatives she refrains from giving suggestions, as she finds it too technical. 
In their reflection upon how they notice and determine significance, the test persons bring 
other parameters forward than experience and knowledge: 
 Talking out loud triggers sense-making  
Kristian comments that his own speaking about alternatives and impacts made him notice 
the descriptions of initiatives and consequences in the text in the second reading: "Either 
it was you who said it or we talked about it. And then I noticed it, when I read it the 
second time". Before that, he did not realise that they were mentioned. His sense-making 
thus becomes a "How can I know what I mean until I hear what I say". Similar insight 
comes from Anja, who, when asked what she has learned, comments on the effect of 
speaking out loud: "I am aware of it [the information], but when I have to express it, you 
also become more attentive to it".  
 Concrete examples are help 
Kristian especially notices the concrete examples in the text. On the closing of the 
Limfjord he comments: "It is a concrete proposal for a solution, which actually gives a 
better picture of what it is all about… If I was to remember something from this case in 
two weeks, it is probably that". 
The closing of the Limfjord resembles a 'shock' in Lotte's sense-making: "Closing the 
Fiord! That is like "okay!" I especially notice that one, because that has indeed an 
environmental impact… It is absolutely absurd!" 
 Accessibility to numbers – compared to written text – varies 
The different ways of communicating information in the text clearly influence what the 
test persons notice. Especially the numbers in the table are less accessible to some of the 
test persons. Anja skips the table and explains: "Then there is such a typical engineer 
table, and then I think, "That is a bit boring and skip it. With MWh and efficiency, which I 
do not think of as of special importance for me to understand the whole [..,] I actually also 
skipped the table the second time and I did actually not notice that I did so". The 
unawareness indicates the importance of the structures Anja imposed on the text in the 
first reading. Also Sanne skips the numbers and by reflecting on this, she comments, 
"Maybe I am not such a number-oriented person". Lotte, on the contrary, uses the 
information in the table to compare the technologies leading to a prioritisation of them. 
 Local knowledge play a role 
Identity based upon local knowledge seems to play a role in what the persons relate to. 
Asked about unique aspects in her noticing, Sanne points at her relation to Aalborg, close 
to the Limfjord: "I am after all a local. It is not sure that a person from Zealand [other part 
of Denmark] would think like that". 
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Further, the experiment reveals some underlining and significance determination which 
cannot be rationally explained by the test persons. Instead, the test persons implicitly refer to 
‘feelings’ or 'intuitions'. Martin explains that he did not find the technologies important to 
him in the beginning; "For me to understand what this is about, it was actually not that 
important". He later describes his choice of what is important as a feeling of what is useful; 
confronted with the meaning of numbers, he argues: "it is not something that I feel in the 
moment that I have any use for. Not right now. It may be that I return to it later". Noticing 
thus becomes a guess - a "feeling" - rather than a rational exercise. Lotte does similar non-
rational underlining: "Now I underline that wind mills must constitute half of it. I do not 
know why I did it, but I did". Later, when underlining a sentence, Lotte comments: "I just felt 
like underlining it". Confronted with that comment, she elaborates, "I guess it is something 
about… In order to remember the text, you often underline numbers, for instance". 
 
HOW AND WHEN WE FRAME THE TEXT 
The experiment provides an empirical demonstration of the variety of how and when we 
frame the case. The variety is presented in table 18 as identified dominating frames supported 
by quotes from the transcription. The set-up of the experiment makes it possible to indicate 
the influence of the framings on the test persons' significance determination and how fast the 
case is framed by the test persons. 
 
Person Framing Quotes Influence on 
significance 
determination 
Time for  
expression 
Per Complex 
systems cause 
conflicts and 
are not 
needed - and 
nature is not 
the problem. 
"[T] his about when the wind is blowing and 
the water is running, etc. - that is a problem in 
this context. And that we somehow are 
assigned to the vagary of nature again, which 
we have been free from in a couple of 
hundred years due to all that coal we have 
been able to dig up" and "the big systems, 
which are created by the society, will always 
be based on exploitation of the nature" 
No doubt about 
the need for 
applying SEA. 
Focus on nature 
and land-use in 
terms of 
impacts. Focus 
on low-tech 
alternatives. 
1 min. 
Stine How to get a 
smooth 
authority 
approval 
process 
"I would at least consider [storage] in terms of 
geography and the legislation, which we need 
to make sure to comply with in this regard" 
and "It has big importance for me as a 
consultant: Who [authorities] do we need to 
contact and at what point in time?" 
SEA not 
automatically 
necessary, but 
depending on 
authorities 
1 min. 
Christian Societal 
relevance of 
the 
technologies 
"The bigger environmental impact [the 
infrastructure] has, the bigger opposition it 
will get" and "What is more important than 
the costs is the political for the different 
technologies, because in the end, it will be 
expensive". 
SEA should 
have been done 
before 
delimiting to 
three 
technologies 
1 min. 
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NN Inadequate 
solutions to 
energy 
system 
planning 
"It is some gigantic solutions and therefore it 
is also some unpleasant solutions, when other 
much more simple solutions exist" and "I am 
completely stuck in the understanding that 
this is not good solutions. And there is no 
reason to use these." 
Critical stance 
on the choice.  
Arguing for a 
range of 
alternatives 
3 min. 
Sanne Initiatives are 
unpopular 
among locals 
"I think 'actors' - locally - who have to live on 
top of a storage. […] I think [public 
participation] is one of the interesting [aspects 
of planning], so of course I notice that" 
Focus on 
impacts on local 
citizens 
5 min. 
Lotte Synergies’ 
potential 
"There are many discussions about biogas 
from the agriculture and if it was possible to 
creative incentives, so that the agriculture 
actually produced some biogas and the 
natural gas network was utilised, then that 
would be intelligent" and "It could be smart if 
it was possible to exploit the air and hydrogen 
[from underground storage] near 
contaminated sites. Then it was possible to 
purify the site immediately" 
Positive 
potential 
among 
significant 
effects 
7 min. 
Martin 
 
Valid deter-
mination of 
technologies 
"Some of the things I did not underline were 
the specific technologies, which I in the first 
round was a bit unconcerned about, among 
others because I had trust in the validity of the 
Government experts' assessment. 
Initial 
refraining from 
suggesting 
alternatives 
14 min. 
Kristian 
 
A planning 
task 
"It may be that there is a planning approach 
over it [my suggestions]: How do these energy 
initiatives relate to the rest of society?" and 
"You will have to investigate if there are 
different conditions different places in 
Denmark" 
A spatial focus 
in terms of 
significant 
impacts 
14 min. 
Anja The big 
picture 
"I think more holistically than in the detail… 
That is what I found interesting… I think 
'Well, have they remembered to include 
everything? Are there other solutions? What is 
the thread in this? What is most important and 
what is not important for me to create a 
coherence in this'" 
(Not noticeable) 22 min. 
Table 18: Dominant framings of the case generated by the test persons with specification of the time of 
the first expression. 
 
How we frame the case is related to who we are and what we do: Stine and Kristian explicitly 
refer to their profession; Lotte refers to the projects she is working on at the time of the 
experiment; Per and NN relate to their experience and professional opinions. The framings in 
table 18 thus reflect how the test persons mirror themselves in the case.  
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The influence of the framings on the significance determination concerns the 'content' aspects 
such as the type of alternatives and impacts, but also 'process' aspects such as refraining from 
suggesting alternatives due to limited knowledge and disputes on the timing of the SEA. The 
experiment shows that the framing of the case is not a straightforward and linear process and 
the influence varies over time: Noticing 'storage', Anja initially suggests that the case is about 
carbon capture and storage. In line with Starbuck and Milliken's "if an initial framework fails, 
one can try its equally plausible converse", she quickly realises its incorrectness and instead 
suggests an energy storage framing of the case. 
Some of the test persons are aware of the framing and its influence. Per for instance explains, 
"I am used to looking at nature as a good on its own, which very often is in difficulties due to 
the conflicts that follow these types of systems, which are built up". He shows awareness of 
his frame of understanding: "That would probably be what I am primarily looking for". He 
argues that the conflict frame may be the reason why he did not notice the sentence with 
'Government's experts'; "If you were more political scientist than I am, then you may have 
seen it as the first thing, where it for me is a bit lower in the food chain". Per comments that 
his frame of big infrastructures with negative consequences is a "fundamental model of 
thought”, which he has used since the ‘70s: "But I do think that it to a wide extent is 
reasonable, since it reveals some internal conflicts…. If I could not find things in the text, 
which the system expects, then I probably would be left high and dry and say that this text 
was more or less meaningless and not interesting". 
When we frame the case varies considerably: Some test persons develop a specific framing on 
what the text is about within few minutes, whereas other test persons never seem to create an 
overall framing. The two test persons with an age over 50 and a professorship were quick 
(NN and Per within three minutes) to assign a specific frame to the text. Also the EA 
practitioners from the consultancy company and the Danish TSO quickly assigned a specific 
framing to the text. Relevant experience thus seems to lead to quick framings of the text. The 
energy researcher (NN) comments on the text that "I immediately see what this is all about. 
And then you may say that I have been trapped by my first impression. But I do not think 
that there were anything else other than I was a little more annoyed the second time, because 
I think some things are missing and that it is a wrong focus". Later, he explains the influence 
of his framing as: "I meet this text with the prejudice that these are bad storage technologies. 
And that it is top-down storage technologies. And that entails that I have to make a special 
effort to see the positive aspects in the text. What I have not really done." NN does, however, 
defend his framing "It is obdurate, however, it is reasoned obduracy… There is no reason to 
use more time on this; it is bad solutions".  
NN's quick framing can be seen as the automatic and involuntary processes that inhibit active 
attentional processing as Bargh pointed at: NN acknowledges that he is completely stuck in a 
certain framing of inadequate solutions and that he was not able to go beyond that framing to 
see positive aspects of the technologies. NN's framing thus delimits openness in his sense-
making of the technologies. Automatic and involuntary processes seem to work the other 
way around for Kristian in noticing certain elements as funny, since they facilitate active 
attention to these elements: By what seems as automatic processes, he finds the implication of 
a new wind adventure funny and the extra attention to this element creates reflections on the 
previous information. 
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At the same time, NN and Per's quick framings reduces irrelevant stimuli, whereby more 
attention can be given to the impacts and alternatives that their framings consider as relevant. 
Fast and firm framings based on familiarity with the case can thus be an instrument to gain a 
discussion and openness towards alternatives on a higher level of sophistication than among 
persons that are not familiar with the case.  
Based on the experiment, the test persons' familiarity with the energy sector and the 
familiarity with preparing an assessment seem to be two important dimensions of when and 
how significance is framed. Table 19 suggests four personal profiles of significance 
determination within these two dimensions. 
 
 No or low familiarity with SEA Very familiar with SEA 
High level of familiarity with 
the energy case 
Relating (Lotte, NN) Settling (Per, Stine) 
Low level of familiarity with 
the energy case 
Seeking (Kristian) Arranging (Martin, Sanne, Anja) 
Table 19: Profiles within the dimensions of familiarity with preparing SEA and familiarity with the 
energy case indicated by the experiment. 
 
The 'relating' profile found several associations and potentials in the energy case without a 
certain quick frame on what should be assessed: Lotte relates cues in the text with a number 
of experiences she has gained in her profession. The 'seeking' profile recognised few elements 
in the text and did not identify a specific frame for understanding the case: Kristian explicitly 
stated that he emphasised the implementation examples, because they appeared 'funny' to 
him. The test persons familiar with similar cases and with preparing SEA were quick to settle 
the case in terms of what it was about and how to proceed. These persons are grouped in a 
'settling' profile. The 'arranging' profile found aspects to assess, but did not have the technical 
insight to develop a specific frame for the energy case.  
The experiment findings indicate that a high level of familiarity with the energy case may be 
both a pitfall and a benefit in terms of significance determination: People that are very 
familiar with the energy case make a fast framing that precludes information and at the same 
time focus their attention on what is (assumed to be) the most important elements. Similarly, 
a low level of familiarity may mean a more unstructured and slow process, but at the same 
time a critical stance on the basics of the provided information and openness towards other 
perspectives on the problem. 
The suggested profiles seem to relate to how much is noticed during the first reading versus 
the second one. Kristian in the seeking profile and Sanne and Anja in the arranging profile do 
not realise during the first reading that the initiatives mentioned in the text can be seen as 
alternatives, which may be due to less familiarity with the energy case. Kristian also realised 
during the second reading that he did not notice the need for long-term storage during the 
first reading. These two aspects were both noticed by the more experienced test persons 
(although not underlined). In a discussion following the experiment, Kristian coins the 
difference: "I imagine that when NN or Per reads it, they more heavily relate it to their 
working field […] whereas I had to read it through to understand what it is about". 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this article we have explained the main ideas of sense-making theory and proposed that 
sense-making is a central activity in significance determination in both screening and scoping 
stages of SEA. Sense-making theory provided us with a theoretical and methodological 
approach to conceptualising and investigating sense-making involved in test persons’ 
determination of significance. 
The experimental research has, due to the low number of test persons, no ambition of making 
comprehensive and general statements about sense-making in SEA processes. The research is 
meant as an input to the reflection on the social processes that take place initially and 
continually during the SEA process. Its strength lies in the empirical demonstration of how 
we make sense in these processes. 
In the following, we will firstly highlight four main findings of the experiment, and secondly 
discuss implications of these findings for how we perceive and practice significance 
determination in SEA.  
The first main finding is that the test persons' sense-making processes supplement ideas and 
concepts within decision-making. Kørnøv and Thissen (2000) disputed the idea that ‘more 
information leads to better significance determination’, and the experiment shows instances 
where the test person developed a firm frame in the very beginning of the reading of the case 
regardless of the remaining information. Simon (1947) proposed the idea of 'satisficing' and 
the experiment shows instances in which test persons are satisficing their need for 
information in order to get on with the process.  
The second is that individual SEA practitioners and researchers differ significantly from each 
other in not only what is determined significant, but also in what is noticed and labelled prior 
to the choice of significant impacts. They differ in what elements they notice, how they label 
the elements, what they consider as significant information and what implications it should 
have for the further assessment process.  
The third is that professional background and education are far from the only factors decisive 
for what we determine as significant. The experiment e.g. shows that age and experience play 
a role: The older and/or more experienced, the faster and more firm framing takes place. The 
experiment thus demonstrates that determination of significance relies upon a much more 
complex pattern involving factors like professional background, interest and age/experience. 
The fourth is that the experiment reveals a notable difference in what the test persons notice 
during the first reading compared to the second reading – with the second reading 
supporting a more critical position and questioning approach. The experiment furthermore 
shows widespread awareness among the test persons of how they approach a text. Still, some 
of them are surprised that they missed important information during the first reading, which 
indicates that we should be more critical about what we notice.  
The article underlines that the individual engaging with the SEA text is not objective and 
passive, but is a sense-maker. The text is not ‘transmitted’ and received fully by the 
individual. Instead we experience the test persons as constructing stories of meaning, which 
involves ‘negotiations’ between the SEA text and the individual in the reading process and 
even ‘re-creation’ of elements in the text. 
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As a consequence of the outlined findings, sense-making is a mandate of significance 
determination. The question is then how we can approach our sense-making in a way that is 
beneficial for significance determination processes? How can we use this insight to develop a 
better appreciation of the link between information and significance determination? Three 
suggestions are provided in the following: Recognition of and reflection upon own sense-
making, frame awareness in team-setting, and reconsideration of guidance and good 
governance.  
 
RECOGNITION OF AND REFLECTION ON SENSE-MAKING 
As presented, the experiment shows a tendency of test persons being more critical during the 
second by questioning premises and the intention of the text. Wood and Becker (2005) 
propose a frame-reflective approach to counteract similar problems: "To limit the problems 
associated with screening errors, further guidance should seek to raise awareness of the 
existence of frames amongst practitioners and encourage a frame-reflective approach to 
screening decision making" (p. 367). They picture "frame-reflective practitioners" who 
actively question the basis of their assumptions and the subsequent implications, but they do 
further advise how it can be done in practice.  
Insight into how we make sense like the insight the test persons gained through the 
experiment may be a means to be aware of assumptions. Similar to the experiment, an open 
dialogue with colleagues based on a comparison of what is noticed and what is found 
significant in a given case may provide a basis for increasing our awareness of our blind 
spots and rigid framings. 
 
TEAM-SETTING FOR SCREENING AND SCOPING 
The findings emphasise the importance of setting a team with different profiles and 
familiarity with the case. Furthermore, the findings indicate that differences in background, 
age and experience are needed if we want a more heterogeneous and holistic perception of 
the case. Awareness of the frames we employ in team-setting may thus make it possible to 
reduce 'blind spots' and enhance a broader perspective on impacts and alternatives. Insight 
into frames in an organisation may therefore be important knowledge when organising SEA 
processes and aiming at better quality of the SEA process. Even on an individual level, it may 
be relevant to consider who would supplement my frame and notice what I expect he/she not 
to notice in this case.  
The different levels of sophistication of the framings identified in the experiment calls for 
consideration of familiarity to the case when setting the team. The higher level of 
sophistication plays an important role in distinguishing between significant and non-
significant impacts and alternatives, and sophisticated framings may thus be a necessity to 
avoid that too many impacts and alternatives are scoped in rather than excluded. At the same 
time, less familiarity with the case may be needed to question what more firm framings take 
for granted. The significance determination may thus in practice benefit from openness at 
different levels of sophistication, so that both basic assumptions and advanced issues are 
critically questioned.  
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It may similarly be relevant to consider sense-making processes in the public consultation. 
DTEA (2002) argues that making the process of significance determination “more explicit, 
open to comment and public input” would be an improvement of the practice. Public 
consultation is an opportunity to bring a large number of mental frames into the screening 
and scoping process and careful consideration to the sense-making process may provide an 
opportunity to articulate elements that are not noticed or not labelled. 
 
GUIDANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Guidance on SEA involves a range of checklists on screening and scoping based on targets 
and thresholds. To enhance accuracy, it has even been proposed to treat significance through 
a scientific approach (Stamps III 1997) with 'precise' thresholds for when impacts are 
significant. The limited reference of thresholds in the test persons' sense-making indicates 
that thresholds do not play a role at this early stage. Experience seems to play a far larger 
role. Thresholds and targets may rather be used as retrospective legitimacy for the choices 
made during meaning creation. In this way, the findings support the American practice of 
avoiding significance thresholds (Slotterback 2011). 
The experiment also paves the way for a discussion of good governance. As an example, the 
IAIA best practice principles state, "the [EA] process should result in full consideration of all 
relevant information on the affected environment, of proposed alternatives and their impacts" 
(IAIA 1999). The experiment findings urge a re-consideration of such formulations, as the 
meaning of 'full consideration', 'all relevant information', and 'affected environment' differs 
from person to person and from profile to profile. To acknowledge the constructionism and 
complexity inherent in sense-making, the best practice principle could instead focus on the 
openness and ways of interaction during the process. 
 
Overall, the recommendations underline the need to notice and recognise significance 
determination, have conversations in interactions about its nature and role, and make 
significance determination an object of both social and institutional learning.  
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ADDENDUM: EMPHASISED ELEMENTS 
Overview of underlining made by test persons. 1 symbolises first reading, 2 the second reading. 
 
Element noticed 
P
er 
M
artin
 
N
N
 
K
ristian
 
A
n
ja 
S
an
n
e 
S
tin
e 
L
o
tte 
C
h
ristian
 
Strategic choice of storage possibilities  2  2      
High share of renewable energy 1 1+2      2 1 
Sun, wind, and wave energy 1     2    
Store large amounts of energy 1       2 1 
100 % renewable energy       2  1 
Of which windmills must constitute at least half 2 1  1 1 1 2 1 1 
Sudden changes in weather 1 1       1 
Stability of the electricity system    1     1 
Need for storage  1   1     
Long-term storage    2    2 1 
Storage technologies 1 1      1  
Short reaction time 2 1  1    1 1 
The need for storage 1 1      1  
Estimated … period with surplus of wind energy     1   2 1 
Amount to 100,000 MWh   1     1 1 
Other initiatives  1+2  1 2    1 
Intelligent control of the electricity network 1   2 2 2  1 1 
Consumer behaviour 1 1  2 2 2   2 
Other storage technologies  1   2   2 2 
Strategic choice of storage possibilities 1 1      1  
Government's experts have determined 2 2       1 
"Compressed Air Energy Storage" 1 1    1  1 1 
Compressed air below soil layers    1   1 1  
Of different depth        2  
"Energy islands" 1     1  1 1 
Pumping water into large reservoirs    1   1 1  
Difference in potential energy        1  
Between two water reservoirs        2  
Different height … use of turbines      2  1  
"Hydrogen storage" 1     1  1 1 
Splitting water to hydrogen (and oxygen)       1 1  
Fuel cells    1    1  
Table: The entire table   1    1   
Table: Energy Islands 2       1  
Table: Storage period column      1    
Table: Efficiency column 1   2      
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Table: App. 500 ($/kWh)    2    1  
Geographically, the technologies are different 1   1+2 1   1+2 1 
The area and the height of the plants 1       1+2  
Closing the Limfjord in one end 2 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Height differences  1      1 1 
Wind power plants on a ring of embankment 1 1    2  1 1 
Short difference between production and storage  1      1+2 1 
In underground soil layers    1  1 1+2 2 1 
Artificial air cushions just below surface 1 1  1   1 1 1 
Underground storage 1 1        
Only minor facilities on the surface 1 1  1    2 1 
More places in DK with suitable underground   1  2    1 2 
Storage for hydrogen cars 1 1      2 1 
The existing natural gas network … as a transport 2 1  2   1 1 1 
Denmark is a frontrunner 1 1        
Fuel cells        1 1 
Mentioned as a possible new wind energy adventure 1   1  2 1 2 2 
Oxygen … can be used by the industry  2     2   
Energy islands can be combined with dams and roads 1   1    1 1 
Dam across Horsens Fiord would create a large reservoir    1   1 1 1 
 
 
_______________
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POSTLUDE: ELABORATION OF CENTRAL ASPECTS 
The article only presents a part of the data, which the experiment provided about the test 
persons' sense-making. Among the aspects that are not included in the article are the details 
of the test persons' use of criteria (which and with what outcome) and the details of critical 
stances to the information about the case (what is questioned, by whom and when). The 
intension is that these aspects will be published in another journal article. 
This postlude elaborates on the journal article in terms of the importance of how teams are set 
and on the use of checklist. Furthermore, the article is used as a point of departure for 
discussion SEAs as plausible stories and SEA application as a nursing practice in line with 
Weick's writings. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SETTING A TEAM 
The article points at the question of whether it is possible to set a team in a way that the risk 
of not noticing important elements is reduced and so that non-significant elements are scoped 
out. The importance of setting a team is pointed at e.g. by Drucker in a management context. 
He emphasises the unique characteristics of every team and the relevance of viewing teams 
as tools: 
 
"Teams, in other words, are tools. As such, each team design has its own uses, its own 
characteristics, its own requirements, its own limitations. […] Which team to use for 
what purpose is crucial, difficult, and risky decision that is even harder to unmake. 
Managements have yet to learn how to make it." (Drucker 2009, p. 75) 
 
Drucker argues that the ability to set a team will become more important in the future: "The 
ability to diagnose what kind of team a certain kind of knowledge work requires for full 
effectiveness, and the ability, then, to organize such a team and integrate oneself into it, will 
increasingly become a requirement of effectiveness as a knowledge worker." (Drucker 2009, 
p. 202). In a sense-making perspective, setting a team thus becomes a meta-diagnosis: A 
diagnose of who is diagnosing what and in what ways. This requires a good knowledge 
about the team candidates' way of making sense.  
With the insight from the experiment it would be possible to set up teams with test persons 
that would A) notice similar information and create similar stories, B) notice different 
information and create similar stories, C) notice similar information and create divergent 
stories, and D) notice divergent information and create divergent stories. Whereas option A 
and D seem generally known, little awareness seems to be on option B and C. 
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USE OF CHECKLISTS 
The experiment reveals a limited explicit orientation to objectives and plans in the test 
persons' sense-making of significance. The experiment thus points at two aspects: A) 
Checklists are important if these connections are wanted; B) Without checklists, persons are 
open to the provided information and checklists would have directed this openness to 
specific aspects.  
Sense-making literature includes a range of warnings against routines and checklists in 
ambiguous and complex environments with vague questions and muddy answers. Weick 
(1989) quotes a poem by Robert Graves to emphasise the risk of thinking in clearly structured 
ways without a continuously criticism to these: 
 
He is quick, thinking in clear images; 
I am slow, thinking in broken images. 
He becomes dull, trusting to his clear images; 
I become sharp, mistrusting my broken images. 
Trusting his images, he assumes their relevance; 
Mistrusting my images, I question their relevance. 
Assuming their relevance, he assumes the fact; 
Questioning their relevance, I question their fact. 
When the fact fails him, he questions his senses 
when the fact fails me, I approve my senses. 
He continues quick and dull in his clear images; 
I continue slow and sharp in my broken images. 
He in a new confusion of his understanding; 
I in a new understanding of my confusion. 
 
The findings of the article are thus an interesting input in the debate on checklist as it shows 
what happens when persons are not using such standardised formulas. The study thus opens 
up a new experiment-based approach to significance determination that e.g. could involve an 
experiment of two representative groups of test persons determining significance on the same 
choice, one with a checklist and one without. 
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PLAUSIBLE SEAS? 
Weick (2009, p. 9) uses the notion of 'cartography' as an explanation of the existence of an 
infinite number of plausible maps of the reality. Conducting an SEA can be seen as making a 
map of the reality that is as good as our resources permit, however, it will never be perfect 
and it may not be judged as correct or accurate by others. 
Weick tells a story of how a military unit uses a map to find their way as an elaboration of the 
map metaphor. During a military manoeuvre in Switzerland, a Hungarian reconnaissance 
unit was sent into the Alps. Heavy snow made the unit loose their orientation. When they got 
back, the lieutenant of the detachment asked them how they found their way, which leads to 
Weick's point: 
 
"We considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. And then one of us found a map in 
his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the snowstorm, and then 
with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we are. The lieutenant borrowed this 
remarkable map and had a good look at it. He discovered to his astonishment that it was 
not a map of the Alps, but a map of the Pyrenees" (Weick 1995, p. 54) 
 
In an SEA perspective, the point of the story is that although SEA reports are constructed and 
likely flawed representations of the world, an SEA report can guide the environmental 
considerations in the action following a strategic decision; the descriptions do not have to be 
precise to fuel considerations on environmental aspects in decision-making on plans or 
programmes. A similar point is made by Starbuck and Milliken (1988, p. 40): "one thing an 
intelligent executive does not need is totally accurate perception". This is where Simon and 
Weick use the concepts of satisficing and plausibility, respectively. Furthermore, the belief in 
the correctness of an assessment may in itself animate SEA practitioners to bring 
environmental aspects onto the agenda and reach a more environmentally friendly planning 
regardless of whether retrospect may show that the SEA 'map' was flawed. 
Weick's praise of being active and use actions to make sense of what is going on can be 
argued to be in line with and in contrast to the ideas behind SEA: An imperfect map may be 
good enough for act of a public consultation process and the acting in consultation process 
may help SEA practitioners getting a better understanding. On the other hand, relying on an 
imperfect map when consenting developments may contrast the precautionary principle, e.g. 
if an authority abandons possibilities for adapting to a better understanding. In the 
consenting of Energinet.dk's releaching of the natural gas storage plant in Ll. Torup, see 
subchapter 7.1, the Environment Centre Århus acknowledged uncertainty about the content 
of heavy metals in the underground salt and rather than relying on limited knowledge and 
expectations in their consenting, they therefore made the consent requirement dependent on 
the actual concentrations in the future discharge: "Continuous analysis of the brine must be 
made during discharge in order to document that the composition of the brine after dilution 
is not significantly different than the composition of the salt water in Lovns Bredning" 
(Environment Centre Århus 2010, p. 291, translated). This imperfect map made it possible to 
act and to adapt to a future better understanding of the impacts. 
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SEA APPLICATION AS A NURSING PRACTICE 
The ongoing task for SEA practitioners of having an eye for developments that may be SEA 
mandatory seems analogue to the practice of a nurse as told by Weick. The nurse is, during 
her routine activities, noticing and bracketing cues in the streams of events and inputs that 
surround her in an ongoing making sense of the patients' well-being. Weick narrates: 
 
"During her routine activities, the nurse becomes aware of vital signs that are at variance 
with the “normal” demeanor of a recovering baby. In response to the interruption, the 
nurse orients to the child and notices and brackets possible signs of trouble for closer 
attention" (Weick et al. 2005, p. 411). 
 
The nurse is trying to create meaning of some signs that is not what she expects. This process 
is guided by the nurse's mental models that lead her to notice and understand specific cues 
and (temporary) ignore others. The bracketing of cues eventually leads her to label the baby's 
signs, and thereby replacing ambiguity with simplicity so that the hospital system can start 
treating the baby. Analogous to the nurse, SEA practitioners notice and bracket signs about 
developments or impacts that we are not sure whether to include in our impact assessment. 
Replacing the baby with an environmental impact, Weick's story would be: 
During our impact assessment, we become aware of signs of environmental 
impacts that are not easily labelled by our experiences. In response to this 
interruption, we orient to this impact and notices and brackets possible signs of 
significance for closer attention. 
Sense-making thus takes place when we have no experience or no labels for a certain event or 
'thing' and thus have to create meaning of what it is and how it fits into our mental frames for 
conducting assessments. The 'baby' could also be a new or ambiguous kind of development 
that we feel may have significant impacts or values that we have not experienced before. The 
experiment above is an example of how the 'baby' is labelled and signs are bracketed in order 
to make sense of significance. 
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8.2. CHOICES AND SENSE-MAKING IN AN EA OF A GAS STORAGE 
The aim of the following investigations of the environmental assessment process on the 
development in the natural gas storage project in Ll. Torup is to show empirically how actors 
diagnose information and create stories based on these in a real life context. The focus is thus 
on the details of human choice, cf. the conceptual framework. The choices made in the 
environmental assessment process are to different extent non-programmed as the persons 
interviewed in some instances expressed that the decision situations were new to them.  
The following investigations involve a short-term and a long-term period of time. The long-
term study seems typical within sense-making literature, as many articles are made on 
historic data or longitudinal participation (see subchapter 5.2). The short time frame is 
expected to make it possible to show nuances and to direct changes in persons' sense-making 
to the social processes taking place at the public consultation meeting. Information about 
these processes is relevant for the arrangement of public consultation meetings and in terms 
of how we communicate at these meetings. It is, however, a snap-shot of an ongoing sense-
making process and organizing activities among all involved actors, and it may be difficult to 
explain the changes taking place, as these are part of a complex web of interacting processes. 
The short term investigation was presented and discussed at the AESOP conference in 2010 
and published in the selected proceedings (Lyhne 2010). In terms of the choice circles model, 
the short-term investigation aimed at exploring: 
- Sense-making in real life context, especially making sense of whether information is 
known or new. 
- The nuances of sense-making in a specific and time-limited public meeting. 
The long-term investigation is made a year after the public consultation meeting in the short-
term investigation. It has point of departure in the short-term investigation and sheds light 
on what happens afterwards to the senses made during the public meeting. It furthermore 
puts light on how actors interpret and act on a major change in the consenting process. In 
terms of the choice circles model, the long-term investigation aims at exploring:  
- How a significant change influence sense-making and choices among actors 
- The relation between diagnosis and choices in practice  
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LL. TORUP GAS STORAGE 
The Ll. Torup gas storage facility is situated in central Jutland and it has been in operation 
since 1987. Energinet.dk owns and operates the natural gas storage facility, which consists of 
seven cavities at a depth of 1,270-1,690 metres leached in a salt dome. The caverns are 200-300 
metres high with a diameter of 50-65 metres. In 2008, Energinet.dk started planning for a re-
leaching the existing caverns and an increase in storage capacity by new caverns. The plan for 
re-leaching and leaching of new caverns has an expected time frame of 25 years for 
completion (Energinet.dk 2009j).  
Despite significant strategic implications such as the national security of supply and the 
relation between storage and the need for new gas connections, the gas storage expansion is 
staged as an infrastructure project at EIA level. The planning process involves a wide range 
of documents and authorities: EIA and environmental approval by Aarhus regional 
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environment centre, municipal plans by Viborg Municipality, permit from the Energy 
Agency, and approval by the Minister of Climate and Energy. Besides the authorities, a range 
of actors in the area are engaged in the processes. The local actors are primarily fishermen, 
residents, owners of summer cottages, and nature NGOs. They are organised through a few 
resource-strong persons that have used considerable efforts in trying to stop or significantly 
change the process.  
Following the public consultation meetings in 2010, including the one investigated, the gas 
storage re-leaching project changed character: In September 2010, the plan for storage re-
leaching and expansion was changed to only include a re-leaching of the existing caverns. 
According to Energinet.dk (2010i), the cancelling of the expansion was due to changes in the 
premises for the gas storage expansion with reference to the major changes in infrastructure 
developments described in subchapter 7.1.  
According to Buus (2009), struggles about the Fjord are not new to the inhabitants around 
Hjarbæk Fjord. In the 1950s, the need for a transport connection crossing the Fjord increased 
a conflict between fishermen, who wanted a bridge to keep the flow of water into the Fjord, 
and the farmers, who wanted land reclamation. In 1960, after years of struggle, the 
government decided on a dam solution that could control water height in the Fjord. In the 
following decades, oxygen depletion and a worsening of the environmental quality were 
evident, and the fishermen and nature organisations struggled to open the dam in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The problems in this period were according to the locals also caused by the 
original leaching of the natural gas storage in Ll. Torup. In 1991, the dam was opened and the 
salt water re-entered the Hjarbæk Fjord. 20 years after, the local inhabitants are part of new 
struggles; the farmers fight against the water river basin management and the fishermen and 
nature organisations fight against Energinet.dk's interests on re-leaching and expanding the 
natural gas storage with discharge of the salt into the Fjord. The investigation thus concerns 
and area and population with a history of disputes on interests. 
 
APPROACH AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The short and long term investigations have a range of similarities in terms of persons and 
data collection methods, but they also differ, e.g. in terms of approach and point in time. The 
short-term investigation was conducted during spring and summer 2010 and it is primarily 
based on interview and observation. The long-term investigation is made in the spring and 
summer of 2011 and it is primarily based on interviews. The approach and data collection 
methods of the two investigations are presented and discussed below following a description 
and considerations on the interviewees, who are common for the two investigations. 
 
The interviewees 
The interviewees were found by searching the media for persons that publicly expressed 
their sceptics about the project and the EIA. A variety of opinions were sought and partly 
achieved by representatives from local fishermen, from a regional organisation of a national 
nature NGO, and from a regional organisation of a national bird NGO. These representatives 
provided a good basis for using a snowballing technique to identify other relevant 
interviewees for coming studies. The interviewees were all knowledgeable of the case and 
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engaged in being critical of the development. Their opinions and interpretations are likely to 
have influenced this investigation to reflect a critical view of the planning process as 
compared to more 'neutral' actors. The long term investigation balances the opposition to the 
project with an interview with a manager from the gas storage branch of Energinet.dk. 
The interviewees were linked in the sense that they had read each others' statements on the 
project. They were furthermore all included in the list of experts, which the Fjordvenner 
organisation relied upon in their opposition to the project development. One of the 
interviewees was a key profile in this organisation and the two other interviewees were quite 
anonymous; one of the anonymous interviewees described his role as "I have a minor role [in 
the network], since I have no strong attitude to the project". These linkages partly constitute a 
bias towards a certain angle on the process, but they also constitute a possibility for 
validation of statements on the organisation and its opinions. The mix of heavily involved 
and distanced persons is furthermore thought to give a more nuanced picture of the process 
and the interaction between involved actors.  
The efforts of making my intensions with the interview clear for the interviewees were 
complicated by the setup of the Ph.D. project as it is partly funded by Energinet.dk that owns 
the gas storage company that has initiated the re-leaching of the caverns. My affiliation may, 
on the other hand, also have given an increased interest in my project as the persons then had 
an opportunity for a dialogue with an "insider" in Energinet.dk. 
 
Investigating sense-making in a short period of time 
The investigation is based on a sense-making framework in accordance with the conceptual 
framework. It frames the investigation of how participants at the meeting change their 
understanding of aspects in relation to the environmental assessment, see table 20. The 
analytical framework is expected to show how and to what extend the participants' sense 
changes at the public consultation meeting. This information is intended to make it possible 
to discuss what influences participants' sense-making process, and constitute a point of 
departure for investigations of under what circumstances, sense-making is taking place. 
Given the complexity of the sense-making processes taking place in such a public 
consultation meeting, the information may, however, be a blurred picture of a high number 
of evolving senses on equivocal stimuli. 
The investigated meeting is the specific public consultation meeting of the Ll. Torup planning 
process held at Viborg Musiksal, May 3rd 2010 at 7pm. About 200 people were present, 
including representatives from 3 regional environment centres, the natural gas storage 
company and the Danish Energy Agency. Among the audience were representatives from the 
Danish Society for Nature Conservation, Danish Ornithological Association, fishermen and 
city council members. Two peaceful happenings against the planning were taking place at the 
entrance and a protest banner were decorating the room of the meeting, see figure 26. 
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Figure 26. The investigated public consultation meeting on the Ll. Torup gas storage project 
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The investigation covers a minor part of the participants' sense-making concerning the 
project. Their sense-making about the project is assumed to start when the participants 
realised that their enacted information about the project seemed not in accordance with their 
expectations and experiences, e.g. when impacts are bigger than what is acceptable. Their 
sense-making process was initiated when the participants' noticed the planning ideas for the 
first time and continues throughout the re-leaching to following activities. The focus of this 
investigation is delimited to the development in the persons' sense-making processes from 
before the meeting to after the meeting. The analytical framework include aspects that the 
participants are expected to have made sense of and encompass both technical or physical 
aspects as well as persons' understanding, see table 20. 
 
Sense about Before the meeting After the meeting 
The project   
Societal need for the project   
The basis for the project   
The consenting process   
Environmental impacts   
Agency choice of alternatives   
Other peoples' understanding and values   
Table 20: Analytical framework for the investigation of development in senses during the public 
consultation meeting. 
 
The investigation is based on a triangulation of the methods of interview, document analysis 
and observation. The document analysis covered statements about the project in news media 
and web pages, since such statements were assumed to have an influence on the sense-
making among the actors. National and local newspapers, ministerial news letters, and 
private homepages about the project were analysed for information about the case. Search 
words were names of the impacted areas, words related to the planning, and names of the 
authorities and key persons involved in the process. The output was an overview of opinions 
and an insight in who cited whom. The document analysis constituted a part of the basis for 
developing interview questions and for interpreting observations and interviewees' 
statements. 
Three full interviews were made on the day of the public consultation meeting. Two 
interviews were made in the homes of the interviewees to encourage a relaxed and 
confidential atmosphere, and the third at the venue of the meeting. The interviews 
during/after the meeting had character of being conversations and continuations of the 
interviews before the meeting. I emphasised that they would be given the possibility to 
comment on or reject my use of their statements prior to publishing. Furthermore, I 
conducted the interviews like conversations taking notes in stead of recording the 
conversation in order to encourage a relaxed tone. Thus, the quotation may not be 100% 
accurate, however, the formulations are approved by the persons afterwards and thus an 
acceptable representation of what they were likely to say in this situation and still stand up 
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for. To make the topic of sense-making easier to understand, I used the words 'perception' 
[opfattelse] and 'understanding' [forståelse] in the communication with the interviewees. 
Furthermore, I focused on their concepts and what they found interesting rather than using 
the analytical framework slavish. The interview questions in "everyday" language were of the 
character: What do you make of the EIA report? What do you expect to hear about at the 
meeting? Did you hear something new at this meeting? Did it change your understanding of 
the project or its impacts?" 
The investigation relied on the participants for realising developments in their sense-making 
during the meeting. The short talks during and after the meeting were likely too short for the 
participants to reflect on their sense-making, since a huge amount of information was given 
at the meeting and the project involves a complex of consequences and characteristics. The 
nuances of sense-making may therefore have been more apparent if the interviewees had 
more time to reflect on their sense-making. Time and reflection may, on the other hand, 
attribute sense-making developments to the meeting that took place after the meeting. It 
might be that sense-making on the dialogue at a meeting late in the public participation 
process primarily may take place after the meeting.  
The findings from the document analysis and the interviews were supported by an 
observation of the public consultation meeting on the Ll. Torup case. The observation 
included noticing who was speaking, how the audience reacted, what arguments were used, 
and how opinions of specific issues were developed (if possible). The observations were 
noted and some were discussed with participants at the meeting. 
 
Investigating sense-making in a long period of time 
The long term investigation is a follow up of the investigation of the public consultation 
meeting. The same actors are approached to investigate their sense-making and choices 
during almost a year in the period of June 2010 to May 2011. At the time of revisiting the 
interviewees, the authorities were about to approve the re-leaching part of the original plan. 
Like in 2010, the actors were visited in their homes to encourage an open-minded 
conversation. Unfortunately, it was only possible to interview two of the three actors visited 
in 2010, since one of the interviewees were overloaded with work. Another of the 
interviewees had been less into the process than expected which required adaptation of 
questions during with the interview. Contrary to the investigation in 2010, a sufficient level of 
trust was built to record the interviews.  
The interviews were made with a structure of initially asking into passed events and the 
details around these to create an account of the events and only thereafter asking into the 
interviewees' opinions and interpretation of "why so?" This sequence made it to some extent 
possible to understand and ask into the basis for the opinions and interpretations and thereby 
to approach the interviewees' sense-making process. The interview approach is in this respect 
inspired by Ward and Wright's (2009) investigation of sense-making in the Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link development. Their interviews focused on the "most pivotal events that shaped the 
project" and the constructed stories around these events. The Ll. Torup interviewees were 
presented to the reporting on the conversations in 2010 and the reporting was used as a 
checklist in the conversation on their subsequent changes in understanding and actions. The 
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analytical framework in the short-term investigation is used to structure the analysis in this 
investigation as well. 
The interviews were presented as follow-up meetings to gain insight into how actors were 
creating meaning of the process since the public consultation meeting. Like the first meetings, 
the interviews were staged with a clear interest in improving practice based on the 
knowledge gained.  
Four primary issues guide the questions raised in the interviews: 
- How the actors describe the development since the public consultation meeting (What are the 
most important events? What is the opinion on these and what actions are taken?). This 
issue is intended to provide for insight in what cues the interviewees have selected as 
part of the diagnosis and the creation of stories about the process. 
- How the actors describe the development in their own understanding in relation to table 20. This 
issue is intended to reveal changes in their understanding, which the actors are able to 
identify. Potential changes are used as a platform for asking into the actors' perception of 
what caused these changes and what the consequences are. 
- How they look at other actors' sense-making of the project and its impacts - and potential 
developments in these. This comparison issue is intended to reveal concerns about identity 
and nuances in the interviewees' own sense-making. It may furthermore give rise to 
questions into potential changes. 
- How they see the interaction with the authority in the development process. This issue has point 
of departure in the trench war understanding of the meetings in 2010. How did the 
interaction change after the public meetings ended? What has really influenced the 
involved actors' attitudes? 
As an addition to the investigation in 2010, a manager at the developer, Energinet.dk, was 
interviewed about his sense-making of the process and choices in the process. These 
interviews are guided by three primary issues: 
- Causes of the decision of changing the project. The intension of this issue is to reveal the 
developments in understanding that led to the changes and a possibility for asking into 
these changes in the development. This issue is furthermore a balancing point of view of 
the meaning created by the non-governmental actors on the change. 
- Information and knowledge put forward by the public actors that add to the understanding of the 
project and its impact? This issue is intended to reveal what kind of changes the developer 
reflects upon and articulates.  
- Changes in the understanding among the public. This issue is intended to be a possibility for 
having another view on the responses given by the non-governmental actors. 
The interviews were made in a passive manner, letting the interviewees speak freely about 
the process. The purpose of this strategy was to let the interview persons speak about things 
that they found interesting and relevant when explaining the process for a research purpose. 
The interview strategy was thus based on the assumption that the interviewees mention the 
things they find important in the interview context and not something else. My impression of 
the interviews is that the interviewees did not deliberately hide, exaggerate or distort 
information, but described the developments in a frank manner reflecting how they saw it. In 
Strategic decision-making as human choice 
 213 
a single instance, the interview strategy gave rise to an expression of minor bewilderment 
about my passivity and the lack of a more structured interview. A main weakness of the 
interview strategy is that it is difficult to determine, when a topic is drained for relevant 
stories: When the interviewee is talking, he or she may get sudden associations to other 
topics, and it is difficult to determine whether the interviewee had finished the first topic or 
was just reminded of another important thing to tell. 
The interviews have been transcribed and edited, which has involved removal of swearwords 
and translation from dialect to standard Danish. The editing has aimed at keeping the 
original understanding, although some nuances in the meaning of the words most likely have 
been lost. Similarly, some nuances may be lost in the translation to English. The interviewees 
have been given the chance to comment on the draft versions of my interpretations and 
conclusions, however, the feedback was minor and only supporting my understanding of 
their sense-making of the developments and concerns.  
 
FINDINGS ON SENSE-MAKING DURING AND AFTER A PUBLIC MEETING 
The findings of the investigation are summarised in figure 27 as the developments from 
sense1 during the public meeting to sense2 and in the year after to sense3. The developments 
visualised in the figure is in the following elaborated with reference to the interviews. The 
interview persons are in the following termed SCHOLAR (DN representative), ORGANISER 
(a key person in the Fjordvenner network), and MANAGER (a manager in Energinet.dk). 
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Figure 27: Development in sense-making among the local actors SCHOLAR, ORGANISER and MANAGER during a public meeting and in the following year. 
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During the public meeting 
During the meeting, the interviews and observation revealed that most senses were stable as 
it was possible to identify only a few developments in the interviewee's sense-making. These 
developments were primarily related to other actors' values and knowledge about the basis 
for the project. 
In terms of the sense-making on the project, the societal need for it, and the environmental 
impacts, the interviewees seemed settled on a specific sense, which did not change during the 
meeting. A reason for this may be a perception among the interviewees of a continuous 
avoidance of answering questions among the authorities: One of the interviewee's 
complained: "I am upset that they [the environment agency] do not answer the questions". 
An example of an avoided question was a question about the Environment Centre Aarhus' 
reason for selecting the laboratory test of the salt content for the EIA report which showed the 
smallest concentration of heavy metals compared to other tests. After the meeting, 
ORGANISER specifically stated: "No new [relevant] information about the consequences 
were put forward at the meeting" and the EIA report was still labelled "political". Looking 
beyond the interviewees, some participants at the meetings did, however, utter changes in 
their understanding of the planning. A participant, for instance, started a comment on the 
planning with: "I think I have become wiser about the operation phase tonight". 
In terms of the societal need, ORGANISER doubted the societal benefit of the extra capacity 
of the natural gas storage facility: "The extra capacity of the caverns has the purpose of 
earning money and not a necessity for the society". An explanation of the need for natural gas 
storage by a representative from the Danish Energy Agency seemed not to influence this 
interpretation. 
In terms of other actors' values and understanding, the answers from the Environment Centre 
Aarhus seemed to develop the interviewees' sense-making. Prior to the meeting, the 
interviewees had created a story of the environmental centre declining the alternatives 
without considering these fully. The decline of a pipeline for wastewater discharge in 
Kattegat was mentioned by an interviewee as a "not substantiated choice". During the 
meeting, the interviewees seemed to realise that the environmental centre had a professional 
judgement as basis for their decisions and based on this professional judgement, it had 
considered it outside the possible demands to Energinet.dk. Another development in sense-
making was bracketed by one interviewee in emphasising that the environmental centre at 
the meeting clearly admitted that they - despite the clear formulations in the EIA report - did 
not know the amount of heavy metals in the caverns. The sense made on the environmental 
centre's understanding was made in a context of appraisal of local experience; Organiser 
argued: "We know more about the local characteristics since we live here, and we 
experienced the impacts from the leaching of the caverns decades ago".  
The sense-making among meeting participants seemed widely based on news media. This 
was evident since several actors pointed at the same "mistakes" in the EIA report and used 
very similar arguments. A later examination of the consultation comments showed a 
template for commenting and similar formulations in a number of the comments opposing 
the EIA report. 
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In the period after the public meeting 
The interviews a year after the public meeting show a development in the persons' senses 
that is strongly influenced by Energinet.dk's change in the consent application. Whereas the 
investigations of the public consultation meeting in 2010 did not reveal noticeable changes in 
senses in a range of categories, most senses are modified a year after, see figure 27. 
The interviewees' sense-making of the project has developed due to the reduction of the size 
of the project in Energinet.dk's application. They have bracketed changes in the size and 
discharge amounts of the reduced project application. The project is, however, still described 
by SCHOLAR as "a big industrial project" and by ORGANISER as "unacceptable". The 
numbers involved in the change are of a size, which according to SCHOLAR means that 
people are not able to grasp the size of it: "It would not have made a difference whether it 
was eight million tonnes of salt during ten years or 17 tonnes during 25 years. You can't relate 
to it anyway". During the interview, SCHOLAR described that his way of looking at the 
project has changed from focusing on the untreated wastewater to focusing on the use of the 
Fjord: "What is my objection against it - or has eventually become my objection - is probably 
more the use of the Fjord area as a dumpsite". This development in sense-making may follow 
from a more distanced view on the case with comparison to other development projects. 
SCHOLAR and ORGANISER seem to acknowledge the societal need for the project. 
ORGANISER states: "We have nothing against the expansion of the gas storage facility. But 
we don't want the waste in the Fjord. It must be extracted as a raw material, which can be 
used in the Danish industry or for de-icing salt". This acknowledgement differs from the 
interpretation in 2010, in which ORGANISER described the project as a company activity 
made for profit. This development in sense-making may be related to an increased focus 
among the Fjordvenner on the alternative use of the salt; they started framing the extraction 
of the salt for industrial use as a positive thing since, they argued, involves local employment. 
It seems that Fjordvenner has realised that they may not be able to stop the maintenance of 
the storage facility and ORGANISER therefore actively staged other solutions. SCHOLAR 
compares the re-leaching project to the windmill test centre in Østerild and the ministerial 
plans on storage of nuclear waste. He argues that these projects are all more or less needed 
for the society, however, the "three projects which are so huge, that they will cause stir no 
matter where they are placed". 
In terms of the interviewees' understanding of the basis for the project, ORGANISER 
repeatedly comments on "so many flaws" in the EIA. He refers for instance to what he sees as 
flaws in the information about the original leaching of the caverns, the content of the salt in 
the cavern, and the status of the Fjord. ORGANISER's sense-making of the basis for the EIA 
seems to have developed from uncertain knowledge about impacts in 2010 to manipulated 
information: "They [Environment Centre Aarhus] do not write that it [the discharge in the 
Fjord] is harmful despite they know it. The Environment Centre Ringkøbing has written that 
Hjarbæk Fjord and Lovns Bredning cannot tolerate more xenobiotic substances". This 
development in sense-making seems to be due to greater insight into the evidence behind the 
EIA report and growing mistrust to the authorities, see the discussion below. MANAGER 
interprets the discharge as the same per mille as the existing water and as original sea salt 
with original content of metals. He therefore emphasises that "if you don't pollute, you 
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cannot be imposed extra expenses" and that alternative uses of the salt also would annoy 
many people. 
In terms of the consenting process, released information about the expenses made by 
Energinet.dk on the maintenance prior to formal approval leads to a development in the 
interviewees' sense-making. SCHOLAR expressed his (new) understanding: "It almost 
sounds as if Energinet.dk has had a prior approval, because you don't invest 90 million 
kroner in preparing work, and then afterwards expect a rejection". His opinion on relevant 
solutions is therefore limited to a treatment of the discharge: "What I think would be 
progressive [from the opposition's point of view] … would be to require BAT [Best Available 
Technology] on the discharge. As long as they will not extract the salt for industrial use, it has 
to go somewhere." He uses an analogy to indicate his opinion of what he interprets as special 
treatment of the re-leaching project: "You could use the picture that if Nobel [salt extraction 
company] in Mariager had two tonnes of a faulty salt product, which they wanted to get rid 
of, could they then get permission to drive it to the Vildsund dike and tip it in the Fjord?". He 
supplements this argument by questioning whether the gas storage facility in Ll. Torup 
would have been granted permission to be created by discharge in the Habitat area if it was 
established in 2011. SCHOLAR furthermore indicates that it may be a deliberate tactic to 
decrease the project to reduce the opposition: "The big public opposition will be difficult to 
re-engage", and he comments: "It would have been embarrassing for Energinet.dk if they get 
the permission to both projects and then afterwards have to say that they will not need it". 
SCHOLAR is thus concerned whether the consenting environmental centre is able to stop the 
process if the discharge exceeds the limits: "Is there willingness to intervene against the 
project if problems appear? Because then they have probably spent a quarter of a billion". He 
underpins his doubt by stating that the environmental centre may not have a choice: "It will 
then become a political matter […] because the next stage is that it will become a law like in 
Østerild".  
ORGANISER has similarly focus on the political part of it. He is of the opinion that 
Fjordvenner has disclosed a "collusion" between Energinet.dk and the former Minister of 
Environment, Troels Lund Poulsen: "There are some correspondence which is not in 
accordance […]. We have explored that by using our right to access to documents. It is clear 
to us that somebody is lying. We have asked Troels Lund, but he did not want to answer us. 
But he will, when they [other persons in Fjordvenner] take the case further. Then we present 
it to the Ombudsman". 
MANAGER comments: "It is feelings among the citizens that steer this process" referring to 
the extra meetings and involvement of a range of actors. He seems to feel that the process is a 
waste of time, since "the Minister [of Climate and Energy] has acknowledged that we must be 
allowed to maintain the storage". The opposition to the project was not expected by 
Energinet.dk, since there were no stir among about the storage prior to the application. The 
manager explains: "We have a good relationship to our neighbours that lives on top of the 
caverns". In terms of the EIA, he disapproves the questioning of the basis of the decision: 
"Everything is examined. It has been consulted with the expertise" referring to the authorities, 
the consultancies, and the monitoring before, during, and after any discharge activity. He 
comments the hesitation among municipalities for the final approval: "This process has been 
a little too much about feelings" and "it has been a matter of politics". He seems to disapprove 
 
 218 
the compliant attitude in the environmental centre of prolonging the public consultation: "It 
seems like the opposition's motivation increases when extra meetings are made and the 
process is prolonged". In what seems an effort of balancing the negative view on the process, 
he comments: "It is a victory for the democracy that there are people that engage in this 
without personal benefit". 
In terms of the types of environmental impacts, SCHOLAR's sense has not changed: "It is the 
same things, which are discharged". The perception of the volume of the substances to be 
discharged is, however, changed: "Those numbers that is written in it [the EIA report] - it 
took a long time for me before I realised the real size of these. You know, when it is all 
summarised and then added some worst case scenarios with some elements, which have 
naughty names, but are quite harmless in the conditions they are found." Due to the public 
debate on the river basin management plans, SCHOLAR and ORGANISER put the impacts in 
this new context. SCHOLAR points at the difference in scale: "People discuss water plans and 
concurrently they discuss discharge from such a big industrial project like this. That is in the 
same area, where people discuss whether to remove a minor damming of a small stream 
somewhere!" The river basin management plans will likely not have direct impact on the re-
leaching project, SCHOLAR argues, but the re-leaching may impact the decision of when the 
targets for the basin must be fulfilled. ORGANISER furthermore uses an analogy to the 
impacts on the Fjord of a societal cost of a highly polluted area on shore remaining after an 
industrial plant name Collstrup was closed: "Consider the costs in terms of the Fjord: Take a 
look at the Collstrup-case! Out on the Fjord it is harder to measure." 
In terms of the authorities' understanding and values, ORGANISER is convinced that the 
authorities know more than they show. He supports this conviction with the above 
mentioned inconsistency between what Environment Centre Ringkøbing write and what 
Environment Centre Århus assess on the tolerance level. His interpretation of the agencies 
has thus evolved from a critical lack of knowledge to a deliberate and critical withholding of 
knowledge. Asked about the environmental centre's unwillingness to respond to answers, 
SCHOLAR state: "I think it is because they are afraid that if they start to say "Listen, it may be 
like that", then they will unravel their argumentation", implicitly referring to a risk of 
reduced respect around the environmental centre's work. ORGANISER furthermore criticises 
Skive Municipality for being passive in the process despite impacts on the municipal's areas. 
He suggests that it is due to a 30 million kroner subsidy to photovoltaic panels on the 
municipal buildings: "It is so rotten. That is why they keep a low profile". 
ORGANISER's sense-making of the role of the authorities seems to have evolved towards 
increase mistrust with a continuous dissatisfaction with the responses he get: "You are 
ignored if you have any specific questions that 'hit'. They try to ignore us all the time". He 
describes the authorities' situation as a deadlock: "They don't want to answer, because it will 
damage their case no matter what they answer. If they answer yes to one question and no to 
another, they will contradict themselves". This seems to have led him to the radical 
interpretation that "[t]he only way in which you get something out of a public servant is to 
threaten him with newspaper publicity". He reflects on the reasons for this passive attitude 
by stating that "they are highly educated, but they don't have background knowledge about 
the case". 
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DISCUSSION  
The basis for the discussion is limited by the setup and method applied in the investigation of 
the persons' senses. A more strict focus on the topics during the interviews and more persons 
may have facilitated a better picture of developments in senses in the process. The findings 
do, despite the limitations, give insight in real-life processes of environmental assessment 
consultations, which is interesting in terms of the project aim and conceptual framework. 
The findings above a in the following discussed in terms of how sense-making seems to differ 
during a consultation process, the relation between enactment and diagnosis circles of the 
choice circles model, and implications for practice. 
 
Indication of more developments in sense-making of impacts when less is known 
The few developments in sense-making among the participants seem to be due to the 
investigation being "late" in the process. The investigated meeting was held three months 
after the EIA report was first published and after two other public meetings were held. The 
stories created on the report therefore have had plenty of time to gain strength before the 
investigation. The interviewees referred to several changes prior to the meeting. As an 
example, two interviewees mentioned their change of sense in regards to the data about the 
content of the salt: The environmental authority revealed that the EIA report was partly 
based on data from a 20 years old sample of the salt in the caverns rather than a new sample. 
As the age of the sample was not mentioned in the EIA report, the interviewees had assumed 
that new samples had been made. The new information changed attention from the 
uncertainty about the content to the inadequacy of old samples. The interviews indicate that 
the biggest changes in the interpretations of the project takes place when little information is 
known about the project. Or described otherwise; the more the interviewees know about the 
project, the smaller changes is likely to take place in their senses of the project. This relation is 
symbolised in figure 28 in which the investigated public meeting would be placed where the 
curve is nearly horizontal.  
 
Figure 28: Relation between knowledge about the project and the development in the interpretation 
about the project. 
 
Development in 
interpretation 
The investigated 
meeting 
Increased information about 
the project (and time) 
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The figure is supported by a reflection by SCHOLAR on how he had created meaning of the 
environmental assessment: 
 
"In the beginning I focus on details and re-calculate their numbers to look for e.g. a factor 
ten mistake. Thereby I focus on things "that are too flawed". It is an effort of demolish the 
logic and arguments in the report. Later, I get a better overview of the report and get the 
impression that the most significant point of criticism are covered, for instance in the 
description of operation phases in the environmental approval."  
 
The investigations indicate that for knowledgeable persons, senses related to factual 
information is settled prior to senses about other actors' values, which may be due to how 
accessible the different information is to the persons.  
In terms of the dialogue at the public consultation meeting, the figure could be used to argue 
that a typical short question-answer sequence is relevant in the early sense-making among 
participants when the participants are trying to get a grasp about the project. Later in the 
sense-making, a public meeting with no more than a few questions per person may, however, 
not be a relevant forum for reaching a level of detail in the dialogue between the 
knowledgeable participants and the environmental centre that would develop the actors' 
sense-making. An interviewee at the Ll. Torup public meeting directly commented the 
insufficient time for "decent explanations". 
The major change of project application influences sense-making among interviewees in a 
few respects. Many characteristics remain the same, why the appertaining senses among 
interviewees do not change: The change regards the size of the project and amount of 
discharge to the Fjord, but the project and amounts are still more comprehensive than the 
interviewees accept. Instead, the change leads to sense-making on the reason for changing the 
project. As an elaboration of figure 28, the minor development in sense-making following the 
change of the project could be symbolised as a similar curve in continuation of the first curve; 
a major change would initiate developments in sense-making, which over time again would 
develop into smaller changes.  
 
The EIA process as sense-giving rather than sense-making 
The dialogue at the meeting was often characterised by different framings by participants. 
Differences in framings e.g. concerned the environmental impacts: The regional environment 
centre framed the question of mercury as "it is only 2 kg compared to the average intake from 
the sea to the fjord on 100-800 kg", giving the impression that the impact is minimal 
compared to the natural conditions. One of the participants counter-framed the impact as "1 
kg is one too much", referring to the protected status of the Fjord. Furthermore, the 
environmental centre spoke about the impacts with point of departure in their proposed 
limits for heavy metal concentrations on the wastewater content in the environmental 
approval whereas the opposing actors spoke about the impacts with point of departure in the 
uncertainties in the knowledge about concentrations of heavy metal in the salt to be re-
leached. The amount of salt in the discharge was similarly framed by the environmental 
centre as grams per litre whereas other participants used a metaphor of an incredible number 
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of lorries loaded with salt every day. Such carefully formulated framings of impacts are in the 
sense-making literature discussed by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) as "sense-giving", see 
chapter 4.2. They define sense-giving as "the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality." (p. 442). The concept of sense-giving inspired Maitlis and Lawrence 
(2007) to introduce "sense-giving contests", which in cases like the Ll. Torup hearing meeting 
seems like a relevant concept. The sense-giving contests at Ll. Torup just only seem to cause 
modest developments in sense-making among participants. The sense-making literature does 
not seem to provide solutions to how to handle sense-giving contest, which also have to be 
context dependent. 
 
Intertwinement between diagnosis and enactments 
In line with the conceptual framework, the investigation shows interaction between diagnosis 
and enactments - or interpretation and action - in the sense that diagnosis of situations 
influences actions and actions influence the diagnosis: If SCHOLAR had chosen to engage 
more in the process, he might have diagnosed the situation more like ORGANISER with 
frustration about the lack of answers on questions - and opposite; if ORGANISER had not 
diagnosed his efforts as successful, he might have put less effort in influencing the 
authorities; ORGANISER's diagnosis of the EIA report as worthless evolves with continuous 
questioning into the information basis. 
The investigation thus gives a basis for supporting the choice circles model by arguing that 
how actors diagnose stimuli thus depends on their enactments (e.g. what they bracket from 
stimuli in the media influences their diagnosis of the problem) and that diagnosis influences 
what they regard as relevant actions (e.g. diagnosis of a public discussion leads ORGANISER 
to require meeting on municipal approval). 
The events, which the interviewees point at in their description of the process following the 
public meeting, are Energinet.dk's change in the application for development consent, an 
audience for the Planning and Environment Committee of the Parliament, and the municipal 
endorsement process of the project. These events as well as the interviewees' diagnosis and 
actions are visualised in figure 29. In general, both interviewees described the development 
since the public consultation meeting as stagnant, since they most of the time were awaiting 
actions by the authorities; ORGANISER complained that: "What has happened is that we 
have waited for a long, long time […] to get responses on our 97 requests and comments", 
and SCHOLAR does not hesitate to state that: "Nothing has happened" in a disappointed 
tone, when asked about developments since the meeting, although he shortly after refers to 
Energinet.dk's change in the consent application. 
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Figure 29: Relations between diagnosis [D] and actions [A] on specific events in the gas storage 
development process. 
 
In the period following the public meeting, SCHOLAR seemed to diagnose the development 
as democratic balanced between the public opinion at Fjordvenner and the authorities; "I 
think the public opinion on this project is well represented by Fjordvenner". Therefore, he 
saw little need for him to engage in the process, and he prioritises other matters. In contrast, 
ORGANISER - as one of the central persons in Fjordvenner - diagnosed authority employees 
as "untrustworthy" and the EIA report as worthless; "It is not worth the paper it is printed on. 
There are SO many flaws in it". The diagnosis of the EIA report as worthless seemed to 
evolve during a continuous process of asking into details about the information behind. 
ORGANISER confronted the Ministry of Environment with contradictory statements by an 
agency manager in an attempt to get him sacked. The following dismissal of the manager is 
interpreted by ORGANISER as a consequence of his confrontation.  
Energinet.dk's change of application is diagnosed by SCHOLAR as a negative development; 
"That may be the worst thing that could happen […] because then Energinet.dk will get 
consent for the re-leaching, since the public debate will run out". This despondent diagnosis 
was accompanied with no actions by SCHOLAR; "I have not even looked at the new 
municipal planning amendment and environmental approval". ORGANISER diagnosed the 
change in application as partly due to the public pressure; "We celebrate it […] It was the 
pressure that arose concurrent with the government initiative of significantly changing the 
Danish heat system". This diagnosis seemed to support ORGANISER's faith in the 
possibilities for changing the process and give rise to continued actions. 
Following the 
public meeting 
Change of 
application 
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ORGANIZER: D: Public pressure works <> A: Continuing pressure 
ORGANIZER: D: We know more 
<> A: Lecturing committee 
SCHOLAR: D: Will get consent <> A: None 
SCHOLAR: D: Public represented by Fjordvenner <> A: Less attention 
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<> A: Requiring meeting 
Time 
ORGANIZER: D: Manager unreliable <> A: Effort on removing him.  
D: EIA report worthless <> A: Asking a wealth of clarifying questions  
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Fjordvenner's audience for the Planning and Environment Committee of the Parliament was 
interpreted by ORGANISER as an opportunity to inform the politicians about the 
consequences of the project; "We knew much more than they did; they did not know 
anything about it to be honest".  
The municipal planning approval process is diagnosed by SCHOLAR as an opportunity for 
putting the re-leaching process on the agenda. Through the municipal's Green Council he 
assisted a colleague in requiring the project on the agenda of the municipal's Green Council 
in which the municipality is represented with employees involved in the approval process. 
The agenda-raising action was, however, accompanied by modest expectation by SCHOLAR; 
"It will not have a major influence, but it is also to make the municipality or the municipal 
council aware that there is someone noticing that a project like this is in an approval process 
in the municipality". ORGANISER diagnosed the municipal approval process as an 
opportunity for influencing the local politicians; "Then we immediately requested a meeting 
with the mayors in Vesthimmerland and Viborg, because we wanted to influence them. And 
they agreed on meeting us." 
 
Implications and further questions 
To the extent the investigation confirms the assumed potential of sense-making it opens up 
for a range of questions to be studied: Would it be beneficial to differentiate the dialogue with 
the public depending on their insight, since the insight seemed to influence the level of detail 
on which changes in sense-making takes place? Weick argue that sense-making and identity 
are intimately linked, and it is therefore interesting to ask: Are people adopting an identity of 
being part of the opposition developing a common sense of the project? Are the membership 
of the opposition decreasing people's critical stance towards information and meaning shared 
in the opposition? When is sense-giving a legitimate activity? 
One of the interviews led to considerations about how to improve the dialogue in the 
consultation process. SCHOLAR argues that making the scoping consultation public would 
fulfil a need for letting feelings and opinions come forward at an early stage; "Village idiots 
and organisations would be allowed to bring forward their opinions… You wouldn't have to 
be objective. You would be allowed to bring forward assumptions". Besides a more open 
dialogue that would constitute better opportunities for developments in sense-making 
among actors, the early dialogue could be an advantage for the Environment Centre: "Then 
the Environment Centre […] would have been prepared on the potential major points of 
criticism […] and would be able to say "Listen, we have been presented to these things before, 
and we have taken them into account in the widest possible way". The early dialogue may 
furthermore give an obviously wanted possibility for the locals and NGOs to discuss and 
develop alternatives and measures before these are determined by the finished EIA report. 
 
 224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPIN-OFFS 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION 
 
CHAPTER 10 
DISCOURSES ON THE ROLE OF SEA  
 
 
 
As spin-offs to the investigations of strategic decision-making processes, this part of the thesis 
articulates the scope of the SEA legislation and discourses on the role of SEA in the energy 
sector. These two topics have been key issues in the process of applying SEA in Energinet.dk 
and in the Danish Energy Agency. The spin-offs are interlinked with the empirical 
investigations and the change agent approach as ambiguities about scope and role of SEA 
have been main troubles in the considerations on how to apply SEA in a meaningful way. 
The spin-offs are furthermore strengthening the answers to the research question of how to 
apply SEA in the Danish energy sector. 
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CHAPTER 9: SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATION 
 ON PLANS AND PROGRAMMES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
 
"The SEA definition of plans and programmes … is more reliant on the interpretation of 
other terms e.g. "authority", "required by legislation, regulatory or administrative 
provisions", which at least in the short terms is likely to lead to uncertainty. This perhaps 
reflects the greater complexity of the types and nature of plans and programmes across the 
EU, compared with projects" (Sheate et al. 2005, p. 5). 
"Since the SEA Directive was entered into force, a most frequently asked question has 
been "whether the plan and programme at stake should be subject to SEA process or not". 
This question is supposed to be resolved by the SEA Directive itself and its Guidance. Yet, 
due to the unclear interpretation provided by the SEA Guidance, the diversity of decision 
making types among different Member States and the different industrial sectors, the 
application of it to plenty of cases remains unclear" (Gao 2006, p. 129). 
"The meaning of 'set the framework for future development consent' is not defined in the 
Directive, but also an important provision needing interpretation. … Land use plans are a 
particularly clear example that contain criteria for determining what kind of specific 
development can take place. Others may be far less clear, and in such instances there will 
be a need to consider carefully (on a case by case basis) whether the framework for 
development consent is set" (Marsden 2008, p. 218). 
 
As depicted in the quotes above, the formulations in the SEA Directive are ambiguous. 
Ambiguous formulations may, as Sheate et al. indicate, be necessary to reflect the variety of 
contexts across Europe, however, the ambiguous formulations also constitute a hurdle for 
SEA adoption in specific contexts as pointed at by Gao. Marsden argues that the meaning of 
the Directive is less clear in other sectors than the spatial planning and this chapter will 
outline ambiguities in terms of the Danish energy sector. 
This chapter presents an exploration of the meaning of the formulations in the EU Directive 
on SEA that are decisive for whether a plan or programme falls within the scope of the 
Directive. Contemporary plans and programmes in the Danish energy sector are then 
analysed based on this exploration. The aim is to present a preliminary overview of which 
plans and programs within the energy sector falls within the requirements of the SEA 
legislation. The chapter is part of the basis for answering the sub-question of "How should 
SEA be applied in order to approach the characteristics of strategic decision-making in the 
energy sector?". 
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9.1 INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE SEA DIRECTIVE 
This subchapter relates the plan and programme documents in the Danish energy sector to 
the scope of the EU Directive on SEA. First, the section presents the interpretation of the three 
aspects that are central for the determination of whether plans and programmes are within 
the scope of the EU Directive on SEA, namely the meanings of 'plans and programmes', 
'framework for development consent', and 'authority'. Then, the width of the European 
Commission's interpretation is related to the range of plan and programme documents in the 
Danish energy sector, which may be environmentally decisive, cf. the definition of 
environmentally decisive in subchapter 4.2. 
The investigation of the scope of the Directive is primarily based on the European 
Commission's guidance on the implementation of the Directive (European Commission 2003) 
supplemented by rulings by the European Court of Justice. Gao's (2006) framework is used as 
inspiration for the investigation of plan and programme documents in the Danish energy 
sector. The analysis is discussed with Kim Behnke from Energinet.dk and fragments of the 
analysis are discussed with representatives from DEA and the Danish Nature Agency as a 
preliminary validation of the arguments made.  
 
MEANING OF 'PLANS AND PROGRAMMES' 
The interpretation of 'plans and programmes' is based on characteristics rather than titles of 
documents as "documents having all the characteristics of a plan or programme as defined in 
the Directive may be found under a variety of names" (European Commission 2003, p. 5). 
'Strategies' or 'reports' may have the characteristics needed to be within the scope of the SEA 
Directive. According to Kremlis from the DG environment, the scope of the Directive in terms 
of the not legislatively required plans has been point of departure for 7 infringement cases 
(Kremlis 2011). 
A main characteristic is that the documents must be required by legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions, cf. article 2 in the Directive. These types of documents include 
voluntary plans that become the basis for an authority's execution of duties. In a Danish 
context, the coverage of voluntary plans was initially not covered, but it was included 
following a letter of formal notice of infringement from the European Commission in 2008. 
Voluntary plans are not further defined in the Danish legislation, the Commission's guidance 
argues that such "voluntary plans and programmes usually arise because legislation is 
expressed in permissive terms, or because an authority decides to prepare a plan on an 
activity which is unregulated" (European Commission 2003, p. 9). Whereas legislative and 
regulatory provisions seem quite clear, administrative provisions are to be interpreted 
depending on the "[e]xtent of formalities in its preparation and capacity to be enforced" (p. 9). 
The Commission's guidance comments that: "Administrative provisions are by definition not 
necessarily binding, but for the Directive to apply, plans and programmes prepared or 
adopted under them must be required by them, as is the case with legislative or regulatory 
provisions." (p. 9). This leaves a question of the threshold for the 'capacity to be enforced', e.g. 
in terms of agreements between actors. Administrative provisions are described as "formal 
requirements for ensuring that action is taken which are not normally made using the same 
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procedures as would be needed for new laws and which do not necessarily have the full force 
of law" (p. 9).  
Another main characteristic is that plans and programmes must set a framework for future 
development or impact a Natura 2000 site. Plans and programmes that only "summarise what 
has already been set out" (European Commission 2003, p. 47) are not within the scope of the 
SEA Directive. Further exclusion criteria are minor geographical coverage, minor 
modifications, and defence or financial purposes.  
The plans and programmes must frame one or more 'projects', cf. article 3 and the preambles 
of the Directive. The SEA guidance states that "The word ‘project’ should be interpreted in a 
way which is consistent with its use in the EIA Directive" (European Commission 2003, p. 12), 
and it thereby covers construction and installation works as well as "other interventions in 
the natural surroundings" (article 1 on the EIA Directive). A basic requirement of 'projects' in 
the EIA Directive is that at some point "a form of development consent" must be put in place 
(Sheate et al. 2005, p. 4) meaning a "decision of the competent authority or authorities which 
entitles the developer to proceed with the project" (article 1 of the EIA Directive). The SEA 
guidance refers to a judgement by the European Court of Justice that stated that the Directive 
has a wide scope and a wide purpose. The SEA guidance therefore suggests that the 
determination of whether an act is to be considered a plan or a programme falling within the 
scope of Directive 2001/42/EC should have a wide scope, and that a yardstick may be "the 
extent to which an act is likely to have significant environmental effects" (p. 6). The SEA 
guidance goes as far as to suggesting that: "It may be that the terms [plans and programmes] 
should be taken to cover any formal statement which goes beyond aspiration and sets out an 
intended course of future action" (p. 6). A revision of the Danish legislation in 2009 
broadened the scope from framework for projects to framework for "projects or land use" in 
line with the other interventions in the scope of the EIA Directive.  
Finally, plans and programmes must be subject to preparation and/or adoption by an 
authority, or preparation by an authority for adoption by Parliament or Government through 
a legislative procedure.  
 
MEANING OF 'SET FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT CONSENT'? 
Central in the determination of what plans and programmes are within the scope of the EU 
Directive on SEA is the formulation "which set the framework for future development 
consent of projects" used in article 3, paragraph 2a and 4. Plans and programmes are SEA 
mandatory when they set a framework within paragraph 2a, and must be SEA screened if 
they are within paragraph 4. This distinction is, however, not central for the interpretation of 
the phrase. Furthermore, the following review of the Directive and the related guidance does 
not further explore the definition of a 'development consent'. 
In annex II to the SEA Directive, 'framework' is mentioned in relation to criteria for 
determining the likely significance of effects: "the degree to which the plan or programme 
sets a framework for projects and other activities, either with regard to the location, nature, 
size and operating conditions or by allocating resources". The Commission's guidance 
comments that the illustrative list of frames on location, nature, size, etc. is "indicative and 
not exhaustive" (European Commission 2003, p. 11).  
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The meaning of "set the framework" is not further specified in the Directive, but the 
Commission's guidance elaborates on the formulation:  
 
The meaning of 'set the framework for future development consent' is crucial to the 
interpretation of the Directive, although there is no definition in the text. The words 
would normally mean that the plan or programme contains criteria or conditions which 
guide the way the consenting authority decides an application for development consent 
(European Commission 2003, p. 10). 
 
This elaboration of the phrase is thus based on loose terms ('normally') and other undefined 
phrases such as "guide the way". Whether particular criteria or conditions set the framework 
is therefore to be assessed in each case as "a matter of fact and degree" (European 
Commission 2003, p. 11): Some factors that is constraining development may have a 
significant influence on future consent and other, especially trivial or imprecise, factors may 
have no influence on the granting of consents. The Danish guidance from 2006 is emphasising 
this point: "The critical point is, whether a planning document has a character or a content 
that in general provides a framework for future development consent" (Danish Ministry of 
Environment 2006, p. 8, translated). The critical point thus both relates to the specificity of the 
frame and how binding the frame is. The interpretation of frameworks is to be settled by 
court decisions in The European Court of Justice and national courts. 
In addition to the types of frames mentioned in the annex II of the SEA Directive, the 
guidance on the SEA Directive furthermore specifies the meaning of criteria and guidance by 
examples (European Commission 2003, pp. 10-11): 
- Limits on the type of activity or development which is to be permitted in a given area.  
- Conditions which must be met by the applicant if permission is to be granted  
- Preservation of certain characteristics of the area concerned 
- Location of subsequent development 
- Allocation of "financial or natural (or possibly even human) resources" conditioning "in 
specific, identifiable way how consent was to be granted (e.g. by setting out a future 
course of action (as above) or by limiting the types of solution which might be available)." 
The guidance furthermore provides examples of plans and programmes in other directives 
that are likely to set frames for future development consent (pp. 48-49): 
- Waste management plans identify suitable disposal sites or installations and they "appear 
to set the framework for development consents of waste disposal installations". Plans that 
set criteria for suitable disposal sites and/or delegate this task to lower tier plans "also 
seem to set the overall framework for subsequent development consents and should 
therefore also be covered by the SEA Directive. Thereby delegation of task also becomes a 
framework. 
- River basin management plans may and may not be SEA mandatory and the "answer will 
depend on the contents in each case" in terms of whether they set framework for future 
development consent. 
Important for Energinet.dk's approach of not approach formal plans, but pivotal decisions 
when they are made (see subchapter 6.2) is the formulation in the EC guidance that plans and 
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programmes that only "summarise what has already been set out" (European Commission 
2003, p. 47) are not within the scope of the SEA Directive.  
 
MEANING OF 'AUTHORITY' 
The meaning of authority is especially relevant for energy sector decision-making, since TSOs 
may be within this definition. The discussion of Energinet.dk and its possible status as 
authority are part of the discourses in chapter 10. 
In the SEA guidance, the authority concept is part of the formal conditions which plans and 
programmes need to fulfil in order to be covered by the Directive. These formal conditions 
primarily relate to the process of being "formally adopted by an Authority" (European 
Commission 2003, p. 8). Rulings by the European Court of Justice have given the meaning of 
authority "a large scope":  
 
It can be defined as a body, whatever its legal form and regardless of the extent (national, 
regional or local) of its powers, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure 
adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State," 
(European Commission 2003, p. 8) 
 
The meaning of 'public service' is not further defined, and according to Gao (2006) the 
interpretation of whether a private company's activity is for the company's "own purpose" 
(European Commission 2003, p. 8) or a public service differs across countries. 
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9.2 OVERVIEW OF ENERGY DECISIONS IN TERMS OF THE DIRECTIVE'S SCOPE 
The range strategic decisions that are made in the Danish energy sector by adoption of 
documents similar to the plan and programme concept of the SEA Directive is in the 
following analysed in terms of the above interpretation of the scope of the Directive. The 
section is thus a preliminary screening of plans and programmes in the energy sector without 
a detailed, jurisdictional interpretation of whether the plans and programmes set a 
framework.  
Summarising the wide interpretations in the previous section, the SEA legislation covers all 
documents that: 
- Set out a framework (a wide understanding, e.g. including limiting the solutions available) 
for future developments that at some point requires permission to proceed. 
- Are adopted by an authority (including bodies made responsible for providing public 
service) or adopted by Parliament or Government through a legislative procedure. 
The judgement of 'setting framework' not only includes 'traditional' frames for physical 
projects, but the wider interpretation in line with the European Commission's guidance, 
which also includes conditions for allocating resources.  
Furthermore, the scope involves a criterion of significant environmental impacts of the 
developments. The significance is not included in the following analysis, since it requires a 
deeper insight in the role and legislative basis for the documents. Significant impacts are 
likely when dealing with decisions at strategic level. Similarly, the judgement following 
paragraph 3 in the Directive is omitted. 
The analysis of the energy sector documents is summarised in table 21, which relates the 
content of the documents to the interpretation of setting framework and scope of plans and 
programmes. If both criteria of are fulfilled, the documents should have been at least 
screened for SEA. The authorities' practice is included by an analysis of whether the 
documents have officially been screened for SEA. 
The analysis includes a bias in the fact that the decisions formulated in the documents may 
have been made prior to the adoption of the plan. The documents in the analysis are therefore 
to be seen as examples of documents that could be relevant in terms of SEA legislation.  
The categories of plans and programmes are inspired by Gao (2006, pp. 226-243) and the 
overview of Danish documents is based on an examination of the homepages of Energinet.dk, 
DEA, and the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy. 
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Types of 
decisions on 
energy 
Examples in a Danish 
context 
SEA legislation Practice: 
SEA 
screening? 
Adopted by 
authority? 
Setting 
framework? 
National policy-making  
Comprehensive 
energy and 
climate change 
packages 
"Energiforlig af 21 februar 
2008"  
A Parliament settlement 
which includes targets 
for consumption and RE, 
increased subsidy, tax 
changes, etc. 
Yes: Elements are 
adopted by the 
Parliament through a 
legislative procedure, 
e.g. act no. 1392, 2008. 
Yes: Conditions for 
replacement of 
windmills 
(neighbour 
ownership) and 
legalising district 
cooling projects. 
No. (EAs 
according to 
a separate 
circular 
from 1998, 
but both 
regulations 
should 
apply) "Bedre integration af vind"  
A Parliament settlement 
from 2009 which 
includes initiatives on 
use of heating element  
Yes: Elements are 
adopted by the 
Parliament through a 
legislative procedure, 
e.g. act no. 722, 2010. 
Yes: Criteria for 
ownership of the 
heating elements 
are changed.  
 
"Grøn Vækst 2.0"  
A Parliament settlement 
from 2010 which 
includes initiatives on 
biomass 
Yes: The elements 
within the settlement 
are adopted by the 
Parliament through a 
legislative procedure, 
e.g. act no. 1502, 2009. 
No: The closest is 
agreement on 
supporting the 
transmission of 
biogas through the 
natural gas 
transmission 
network. 
No. (EAs 
according to 
a separate 
circular 
from 1998) 
Strategies "Energistrategi 2050" 
Government strategy 
from 2011 on the future 
development on energy 
No: The strategy is 
adopted by parties, 
but not decided 
through a legislative 
procedure 
No: The strategy 
includes frames for 
new constructions 
and subsidy, but 
the frames are only 
proposals. 
No. 
The 
implementation 
of Kyoto-related 
mechanisms 
"National allokeringsplan 
for Danmark i perioden 
2008-2012" 
A plan for how 
Denmark will live up to 
Kyoto protocol and the 
EU burden-sharing 
agreement 
Yes: The national 
allocation plan is 
adopted by the 
Parliament in 2008 
after approval by the 
European 
Commission, cf. 
executive order no 
348, 2008 
Maybe: Depends 
on whether the 
plan delimits new 
activities in the 
way that new 
activities must be 
allocated quotas as 
part of the consent 
procedure. 
No. 
Energy 
reduction 
"Strategi for reduktion af 
energiforbruget i 
bygninger" 
Government strategy 
from 2009 which 
includes suggestions for 
reducing energy 
consumption 
Yes: It is adopted by 
ministries 
Maybe: Although 
it includes criteria 
for new buildings, 
the criteria seem 
only to be 
suggested. 
No. 
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Ministries  
Implementation 
of EU targets 
"National handlingsplan for 
vedvarende energi i 
Danmark" 
Plan from 2010 showing 
how the EU Directive on 
renewable energy is 
fulfilled 
Yes: It is adopted by 
the Ministry of 
Climate and Energy. 
No: This plan is 
not seen as 
including new 
decisions, but 
summarising 
initiatives 
No. 
Energy storage 
stockpile, and 
strategic reserves  
"Handlingsplan for en mere 
energieffektiv indvinding af 
olie og gas i Nordsøen 2009-
2011" 
Action plan made by DEA 
in 2009 to reduce energy 
consumption in gas and 
oil extraction 
Maybe: Depending 
on interpretation of 
the degree of which 
the plan guides the 
consenting. 
Maybe: 
Depending on 
the 
interpretation of 
the degree to 
which the plan 
set frames for 
development 
consents. 
No. 
"Conditions regarding pre-
investigations offshore" 
Made by DEA in 2008 to 
cover oil and gas activities 
Yes: It is adopted by 
DEA 
Yes: It put up 
conditions for 
investigations, 
e.g. on 
coordination 
with other 
activities. 
No. 
Energy 
exploration, 
mining, and 
production 
activities 
"Fremtidens 
havmølleplaceringer - 2025" 
Basis for action plan for 
locations of offshore wind 
power made in 2007 
Yes: It adopted by the 
DEA. 
Yes: The action 
plan shows 
where wind 
power can be 
placed and in 
which order. 
Yes. 
Nuclear waste 
storage 
"Forstudier til slutdepot for 
lav- og 
mellemaktivt affald" 
Basis for decision on 
narrowing potential 
locations for nuclear 
waste 
Yes: It is made by an 
Ministerial working 
group and decided 
upon by the 
Parliament 
Yes: It is basis 
for a decision on 
possible 
locations for 
nuclear waste 
No. 
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Energinet.dk  
Energy research, 
development and 
demonstration 
"Plan for udmøntning af 
PSO programmet ForskVE i 
2011"  
A plan for allocation of 
research funds made by 
Energinet.dk in 2010. 
Yes: approved by 
Energinet.dk and 
DEA 
No: (depending on 
interpretation of 
"resources" and the 
criteria). The plan 
includes criteria 
for allocation of 
research funds, but 
these are not a 
framework for 
consents 
No. 
Energy 
transportation 
and distribution 
activities 
"Strategy plan" and 
"System plan". 
Plans made by 
Energinet.dk biannually 
Yes: These are 
adopted by 
Energinet.dk/DEA 
No: Although the 
plans include 
descriptions of 
developments, the 
decisions on these 
developments are 
made separately, 
prior to the plans 
No. 
Energy supply 
plans 
"Gas i Danmark" 
Natural gas security of 
supply plan made by 
Energinet.dk in 2010 
Yes: It is adopted by 
Energinet.dk in 
accordance with 
Executive order no. 
884, 2006 and no 
1464, 2005. 
Yes: It is basis for 
decisions on 
infrastructure 
developments. 
Yes. 
Plans for 
electricity grid 
"Kabelhandlingsplan - 132-
150 kV" 
Plan for cabling the 
electricity grid 
Yes: It is adopted by 
Energinet.dk 
Yes: It e.g. set 
frames for 
dimensioning of 
new infrastructure 
No. 
Infrastructure 
development 
(Planning document not yet 
made) 
Energinet.dk 
development of 
infrastructure 
Yes: It is adopted by 
Energinet.dk after 
preceding approval 
by DEA 
Yes: It frames the 
possible routes. 
No. 
(Intended) 
Technical 
regulations 
"Technical regulation 3.2.5 
for wind power plants with a 
power output greater than 
11 kW"  
Regulation made by 
Energinet.dk in 2010  
Yes: It is adopted by 
Energinet.dk 
Indirectly: The 
regulation is basis 
for type approval 
in terms of 
standards on e.g. 
tolerance for 
voltage drops, but 
and this type 
approval is a 
condition for 
consent 
No. 
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Municipal planning  
Municipal energy 
plans and climate 
plans 
"Helhedsorienteret 
energipolitik for Thisted 
Kommune" 
Strategic energy plan in 
Thisted Municipality from 
2009 
Yes: It is adopted by 
the municipality as a 
basis for the 
management of 
duties 
Yes: It e.g. settles 
that at latest in 
2025, all new 
municipal 
building must 
comply with a 
certain energy 
standard.  
Yes. 
 "Status og plan for 
varmeforsyningen i Rebild 
Kommune" 
Heat plan made by Rebild 
Municipality in 2010. 
Yes: It is adopted by 
the municipality 
Yes: It settles that 
new local spatial 
plans outside 
district heating 
areas must 
include criteria on 
certain energy 
standard for the 
houses.  
Yes. 
(Determin
ed not to 
set 
'frames') 
 "Klimaplan for Solrød 
Kommune 2010-2025" 
Climate plan made by 
Solrød Municipality in 
2010 
Yes: It is adopted by 
the municipality 
No. No. 
Table 21: Analysis of documents made by authorities in the Danish energy sector in terms of the scope 
of SEA legislation.  
 
The table includes examples where no official planning documents exist, which impede SEA 
application in relation to these planning processes. Implementation of SEA in Energinet.dk 
may lead to public planning documents on specific infrastructure initiatives. In the case of the 
extraction of hydrocarbon, a change in the legislation (act proposal no. 141, 2011) would make 
it possible to prioritise uses of the subsoil and thereby give rise to a planning document. SEA 
legislation may thus give more attention to the strategic documents with which decisions are 
made. 
In a few instances, the examples of plans and programmes are act proposals subject to 
environmental assessments according to the Prime Minister's Office's Circular no 159 of 
16/09/1998. In such instances, two environmental assessments should be made as both set of 
rules should be complied with (Email correspondence with Gert Johansen from the Danish 
Nature Agency, March 25, 2010). The analysis of the plans and programmes in the energy 
sector thus calls for a review of the extent of overlap between the two regulations on 
environmental assessment to avoid unnecessary work. 
Whereas the examples of plans and programmes in the table cover four instances of SEA 
screening, they also cover a range of instances (six) in which the plan or program in question 
according to the author's judgement following the interpretation of the European 
Commission's guidance should have been screened or subject to a full SEA. An example of 
such an instance is the nuclear waste storage planning document that narrows the possible 
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locations of nuclear waste. Parliament settlements are another important instance as they 
undoubtedly are decisive for environmental impacts. The lack of screening in these instances 
may be due to deliberate ignorance, unawareness, or misinterpretation of the legislation 
among employees in authorities. Unawareness has often been referred to in my informal 
discussions with authorities. According to a lawyer within the energy sector, plans that 
despite demands are not assessed cannot be lawfully enforced and if employees were aware 
of this interpretation, SEA would most likely be applied to a wider extend, since no employee 
would risk being responsible for a legally invalid plan. 
The scope of plans and programmes in terms of what they set a framework for is discussed 
by Gao (2006). He outlines four types of energy plans and programmes in relation to the SEA 
Directive (pp. 256-257): 1) Habitat-type - energy policies or plans relating to habitat sites; 2) 
EIA-type - energy policies or plans framing EIA projects (e.g. wind); 3) Quasi-EIA-type - 
energy policies or plans framing EIA-similar projects (e.g. wave energy); 4) Non-EIA type - 
energy policies or plans on e.g. institutional reforms, energy efficiency regulation, energy 
R&D, financial subsidies or non-financial supports for energy activities, etc. In terms of the 
latter category, Gao (2006) argues that subsidies are unlikely to be granted without conditions 
on how, and he therefore conclude that subsidy schemes may be within the scope of the 
legislation. It is, however, whether such subsidy plans can be seen to set out a framework for 
future developments. In a Danish context, the degree to which this type of plans and 
programmes set a binding framework for future developments seems limited.  
As an example of the EIA-type, the Cable Action Plan made by Energinet.dk which includes 
frames for projects, e.g. on the location; "Five new 400/132 kV stations are established: KYV, 
RIN, HSK, AMV and TEG" (Energinet.dk 2009h, p. 49, translated). As described in subchapter 
6.1, part of the frames set in this plan dependent on the frames given by the political order to 
make this plan and the SEA application is therefore not straightforward. The main substance 
of the Cable Action Plan is a range of technical analyses on the dimensioning of the system 
and its components: Load analyses on intact grid and situations with different failures in the 
grid are made for a range of scenarios and each cable section is evaluated in terms of 
transmission capacity (Energinet.dk 2009h, p. 43). The load analyses show how much power 
is running through each wire in the different scenarios and short circuit analyses are used to 
control whether the existing material, like circuit breakers, are dimensioned in such way that 
they are to be able to be part of the new structure. How SEA is to be integrated into this type 
development of frameworks for development consent seems unexplored in SEA literature, 
however, a meaningful solution is needed. 
An example of the non-EIA type of energy PP is Energinet.dk's plan for the allocation of 
funds in the ForskVE research programme, which allocate resources according to a set of 
criteria. The programme is, however, likely not within the scope of the legislation as it does 
not exclude available solutions, and it does not directly provide a binding framework for 
consents. In the technology development programme ForskEL, Energinet.dk has in 2010 and 
2011 applied an environmental assessment procedure (Energinet.dk 2011b) to enhance 
environmental considerations. Energinet.dk is thereby proactive in terms of possible future 
environmental assessment requirements following possible new interpretations on the 
Directive's formulations. 
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In the quasi-EIA type category are e.g. photo-voltaic, solar thermal, and wave energy 
activities, which are not part of the annexes of the EIA Directive. Plans and programmes that 
set out a framework for such activities may, however, be within the scope of the article 3 (4) 
of the SEA Directive due to the wide interpretation of 'projects' following from the 
interpretation in the EIA Directive. The degree of 'bindingness' and the question of significant 
environmental impact determine whether such plans and programmes are within the scope. 
Besides Energinet.dk, the above list does not include plans and programmes made by non-
governmental actors which have been made responsible for a public service. This does not 
exclude private actors with public responsibilities from conducting SEAs and, as an example, 
the Swedish Vattenfall has voluntarily used SEA to raise a debate on CCS in Sweden 
(Eriksson et al. 2006). In a Danish context, the question of which actors are responsible for a 
public service within the energy sector still needs to be answered to clarify the scope of the 
EU Directive on SEA in a Danish context; Companies that e.g. achieve a status as a company 
with a public service obligation on energy supply in accordance with the Act on electricity 
supply (no 516 of 20/05/2010) may e.g. be within the scope of the SEA Directive. Such 
companies may e.g. be regional electricity supply companies that owns and develop the 
regional grid, currently without attention to SEA. 
 
OVERLAP BETWEEN PLAN AND PROJECT 
The energy infrastructure development may involve implications in terms of the distinction 
between 'project' and 'plan'. Some of the areas of potential overlaps between the EIA and SEA 
Directives pointed at by Sheate et al. (2005) are found in the above list of energy plans and 
programmes: 
- Potential overlap where large projects are made up of sub-projects, so that the large project 
can be treated as one large project in terms of the EIA Directive or as a programme of sub-
projects in terms of the SEA Directive. A similar overlap is found in the infrastructure 
development in Energinet.dk as depicted in the conceptualisation in subchapter 6.2.  
- Potential overlap where project proposals require amendment of land use plans before 
application of development consent. This is also the case in Energinet.dk's infrastructure 
development that for some parts requires amendment to the municipal land use plans.  
- Potential overlap where plans set binding criteria so that projects complying with these 
must be given consent. This is case in the pre-investigation of oil and gas offshore until a 
legislation that makes it possible to decline applications is entering into force (act proposal 
no. 141, 2011). In this case, SEA is not applied. 
The ambiguity in the distinction between 'project' and 'plan' is in Denmark shown in the fact 
that the planning and decision on the national test centre for windmills in Østerild was by the 
Ministry of Environment interpreted as a 'project', despite the formulations in the act on the 
test centre directly stated that "The purpose of the act is to set a framework for the 
establishing and operation of a national test centre for major windmills in an area at 
Østerild…" (paragraph 1 in Act no. 647 of 15/06/2010, translated). Following the test centre at 
Østerild, a more holistic planning for development of similar test centre was made, and this 
planning was by the authority judged to be subject to the SEA Directive requirements. 
Scope of the legislation 
 239 
The development of extraction of oil and gas in the Nord Sea is done according to plans made 
by the operators and approved by the DEA. An example is the plan for expanding the 
infrastructure in the Halfdan Nord East field made by Mærsk Oil and Gas which was 
approved by the DEA in 2009 (Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy 2009). Although the 
new infrastructure is made within the frames of the existing EIA consent, the development 
plan may be another overlap between EIA and SEA regulation, if the approval by the 
ministry of the plan is interpreted as an adoption. Indeed, the approval frames size, area, and 
resources. 
 
OVERLAP BETWEEN SECTORS 
As it appears from the list, the energy sector planning is related to other sectors like the 
agriculture and building sectors. This intertwinement with other sectors may constitute a 
challenge for the scope of plans and programmes and the scope of the specific assessments. 
Does the natural gas security of supply plan e.g. have to include the transport sector as 
transport policy may increase the need for biogas as a fuel in the future? If so, how does the 
natural gas plan relate to alternatives for transport needs? Another cross-sectoral plan is a 
possibly upcoming national action plan for charging spots for electricity vehicles: This plan 
would indeed be crossing the borders of the transport and energy sectors as well as the 
spatial planning. Similar questions may rise in terms of the energy sector's intertwinement 
with the financial sector (import/export, jobs), the agriculture sector (biomass), etc. By nature 
of the intertwinement, this is not only a problem for the energy sector, but the overlap 
necessitates a coordination of SEA application between sectors. 
The government platform for the Danish Government elected in September 2011 (Danish 
Government 2011) includes references to planned documents, which are relevant to consider 
in terms of SEA legislation. These documents also have cross-sector elements. 
- A "climate plan" (p. 28). 
- A "climate act" (p. 28). 
- An "energy agreement" (p. 29) including expansion of renewable energy, hereunder wind 
power. 
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CHAPTER 10: DISCOURSES ON THE ROLE OF SEA  
 TIMING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
"With an additional cost of up to 20 billion kroner is it thought-provoking that the 
decision to sink the high voltage network has not been subject to a broader political debate, 
which the public could participate in. […] When is the overall, cross-disciplinary, societal 
weighing made from which the Minister and Parliament Committees can make decisions 
with such big economic consequences?" (Professor Lotte Jensen, in Vestergaard 2009, 
translated) 
 
Besides fulfilment of legislative requirements, SEA plays different roles in different context. 
The role may among other things differ between being proactive or reactive to strategic 
decisions and between having a central role in decision-making or being a minor add-on to 
existing tools. Discourses on the role of SEA and public participation in the Danish energy 
sector are part of a broader societal debate, which is exemplified by the quote of Lotte Jensen 
above. SEA application in the Danish energy sector will most likely be affected by and affect 
some of these discourses. 
This chapter explores the discourses on the role of SEA and the role of public participation in 
SEA, which has been prominent in the collaboration with energy sector actors in this Ph.D. 
project. The analysis of discourses of the role of SEA encompasses the issue of responsibility, 
which has been investigated in a legislative perspective in the previous chapter. The analysis 
of discourses on roles is furthermore related to the choices made in the empirical 
investigations on timing of SEA and framing of alternatives. The investigation of discourses 
on SEA is an exemplification of the complexity and importance of discourses when applying 
SEA in new context. 
The first discourse analysis concerns discourses identified in Energinet.dk on the role of SEA 
in the strategic decision-making. The second discourse analysis concerns the role and timing 
of public participation in the strategic decision-making. The second analysis reveals 
discourses claiming difficulties in making the public interested in strategic questions. 
Therefore, this analysis is added an analysis of the character of consultation comments in 
some of the investigated contemporary strategic decision-making processes in the Danish 
energy sector. 
Discourses are related to decision-making in the sense that discourses reflect the interests of 
actors involved. Durning (1995) refers to conceptualisations of decision-making as a “system 
of competing discourse coalitions and their struggles to ‘control shared meanings’ and to gain 
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acceptance of their framing of a policy issue" (p. 103). The following analysis of discourses 
could therefore be seen as another 'unravelling' of strategic decision-making processes, but 
the following discourses are on another level: The previous empirical investigations concerns 
the strategic decisions on plans and infrastructure developments in the energy sector, 
whereas the investigations in this chapter concerns aspects of how SEA of such strategic 
decisions are to be applied. 
Discourse is here understood as the claims and views on something held by one or more 
actors, and in contrast to the ongoing element of sense-making presented in chapter 4.1, 
discourses are in this section treated as entities of a rather fixed and formal nature. It is, 
however, interesting that discourses are created by people to make sense and to influence, 
and discourses are influencing how people make sense of events and how people act: "In 
other words, discursive practices give rise to a multitude of experiences, some of which are 
translated into expectations or rules of action through the development of various discourses 
(Helms Mills and Mills 2010, p. 65). Weick (2009) states that discourses can function as a 
justification for actions, why they may be difficult to change. Discourses are closely related to 
the conceptual framework presented in chapter 4, and forms a link between formal elements 
and socio-psychological processes. 
The investigated discourses also relates to the change agent approach as insight in discourses 
may be a basis for improving SEA application, e.g. by proactively recognising and engaging 
with similar upcoming discourses. Such insight seems central to change agent approaches, 
see chapter 3. A general experience in the interaction with practice in the Ph.D. project is 
hesitation to apply SEA among actors in the energy sector. Discussions on SEA often become 
a debate on interpretation of whether an energy plan or programme required by legislation 
and set up frames for development consent. The discourse analysis approach applied in this 
chapter is emphasising that actions are related to interpretations. Runhaar (2009, p. 203) 
stresses that "The method is based on the premise that the way people talk is not a neutral 
reflection of our world, identities, and social relations, but rather plays an active role in 
creating and changing them. The discourses on the role of SEA are thus important for 
understanding past, current, and future actions on SEA application.  
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10.1  DISCOURSES ON THE ROLE OF SEA 
In terms of SEA application, discourses can be seen as a part of a "professional struggle 
between a spatial planning tradition and profession and the emerging environmental 
professions" (Emmelin and Lerman 2005, p. 179). Despite the importance for SEA 
implementation, discourses seem seldom investigated in SEA literature. In examining SEA 
and transport planning, Hildén et al. (2004) find that "Different views of planning lead to very 
different interpretations of what the assessment can and should be about, what they should 
deliver and whether SEA as a whole is a justified means" (p. 521). These different views may 
stem from differences in educational and professional background, organisational position, 
etc. Hilding-Rydevik (2001) points at the importance of discourses and storylines for 
integration of sustainable development in spatial planning. Another notable exemption is 
Runhaar (2009), who is investigating how SEA contributed to decision-making through 
influencing discourses on specific issues. Adopting a power perspective, he viewed decision-
making as "a system of competing discourse coalitions and their struggles to ‘control shared 
meanings’ and to gain acceptance of their framing of a policy issue" (p. 200).  
The following investigation of discourses has point of departure in my participation in 
Energinet.dk. Energinet.dk is an organisation with more than 400 employees with different 
background and interests. How employees in Energinet.dk think Energinet.dk should use 
SEA therefore forms several internal discourses. The discourses play an essential role for the 
Ph.D. project, since discourses that ascribe SEA a passive role in Energinet.dk may impede 
Energinet.dk's benefit of the Ph.D. process; an active approach would give more possibilities 
for input from the Ph.D. project to Energinet.dk's work than a passive approach.  
The discourses partly have point of departure in the relation between SEA and the legislation 
that frames Energinet.dk's activities. This relation is complex as it involves several sets of 
legislation, interpretation, and praxis through court judgements. The discourses in 
Energinet.dk have been driven by different interpretations of the legislation, and they are in 
the following termed the 'idealistic' discourse, the 'jurisdictional' discourse, the 'strategic 
management' discourse, and the 'external consultant' discourse. The presentation of the 
discourses is based on participation in meetings and notes on the internal communication in 
Energinet.dk. The presentation of the discourse is subjective as many other nuances of 
discourses could be presented, however, the validity of the proposed framing is strengthened 
by discussion and integration of comments to an draft version of the analysis by Kim Behnke, 
Energinet.dk. The different discourses are presented in terms of their stance and arguments 
on the role of SEA, Energinet.dk's SEA obligation, and when SEA should be applied. A 
summary of the discourses are shown in table 22. 
The analysis is based on insight from participation which has been challenged and supported 
by a survey among key persons in Energinet.dk as part of an internal review of how 
environmental considerations are integrated in the company. The 10 interviews conducted in 
this review was transcribed and synthesised into a report and the conclusions and quotes 
were validated by a commenting by the interviewees. The aim of this review was to 'mirror' 
the organisation and to facilitate an internal platform for a critical reflection on its practice. 
The names of the persons quoted in the discourses are anonymised to protect the persons 
from public criticism as the interviews were made in another context. 
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FOUR DISCOURSES ON THE ROLE OF SEA IN ENERGINET.DK 
The 'idealistic' discourse emphasises that the aim of the Directive and Danish legislation on 
SEA is inclusion of relevant environmental information into decision-making. This discourse 
is indirectly drawing on sustainability thinking in line with the Brundtland Commission's 
equal emphasis on economic, social and environmental issues. This emphasis is accompanied 
by a pragmatic stance on the scope of the legislation, which is seen as second to the aim: The 
most important thing is to include environment where it is relevant and the legislation is just 
a minimum requirement to facilitate or directly support this process. The nuances in the 
formulations in the legislation e.g. on the scope on plans and programmes are therefore not 
central in this discourse on SEA implementation. The reasoning in terms of Energinet.dk is 
that Energinet.dk is by law required to do a planning for future infrastructure development, 
and regardless of what authority approves the planning, it is SEA mandatory: "Expansion in 
pursuance of (1) [new transmission grids and material changes to the existing grids] shall, 
prior to commencement, be illustrated in a plan outlining the future transmission capacity 
requirement " (Act on Energinet.dk, §4, 2). With the idealistic nature, the discourse goes 
beyond the plan concept to approach the moments of decision-making to increase the 
potential influence of SEA. Thus, all strategic decisions with significant environmental 
consequences are to be preceded by an SEA. 
 
Discourse 'Idealistic' 'Jurisdictional' ’External 
consultant' 
'Strategic management' 
Main focus Apply SEA when it 
is environmentally 
relevant  
Legally correct 
implementation 
Transparency by 
SEA application 
Room of manoeuvre - 
apply SEA when it is 
appropriate in a 
tactical sense 
Energinet.dk's 
SEA obligation 
Energinet.dk is 
legally required to 
do planning prior to 
construction of 
infrastructure, and 
this planning is 
therefore SEA 
mandatory. 
All actions in 
Energinet.dk 
require 
permission from 
other authorities, 
therefore is 
Energinet.dk not 
authority. 
Energinet.dk is 
to be 
understood as 
an authority 
since it is a 
public owned 
company. 
Energinet.dk is 
developer and cannot 
both be developer 
and authority. 
Therefore not obliged 
to do SEA.  
Application of 
SEA in 
Energinet.dk 
SEA at every 
strategic decision 
with significant 
environmental 
consequence 
Only when 
required by other 
authorities 
All major plans 
and 
programmes 
Doing SEA when it is 
appropriate for doing 
business, i.e. to avoid 
problems 
Table 22: Discourses on the role of SEA in Energinet.dk 
 
The 'jurisdictional' discourse emphasises that Energinet.dk as a state-owned institution must 
implement the legislation on SEA correctly regardless of the potential effect of other ways of 
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implementing the legislation. An employee is emphasising the importance of adhering to the 
rules of the game:  
 
"[i]t is important that we know the rules of the game. That means what is the difference 
between EIA and SEA? What is our role [in terms of these]? […] That we know our role 
in terms of our obligations may be the most important element in how we integrate 
environmental concerns. […] Where the authorities are requiring it, we must apply SEA 
and where they do not require it, we shall - with good reasons - not apply SEA". 
 
Allocating man-power on tasks than potentially is not jurisdictionally required could be 
criticised by other actors. A main phrase in the jurisdictional discourse is that Energinet.dk 
needs permission from other authorities for all construction activities and therefore cannot be 
understood as an authority itself. The discourse includes an analogy of comparing 
Energinet.dk to the organisation Dansk Supermarked (a Danish supermarket association), 
who plans for locations for new supermarkets, but relying on others' permit to realise the 
planning. It is maintained in this discourse that SEA should be carried out by the authority. 
Therefore, Energinet.dk should not do SEA unless it is required by other actors.  
The 'external consultant' discourse emphasises that since Energinet.dk is a state-owned 
company and created to serve the society's needs, its actions ought to be transparent. This 
discourse is founded within the good practice for public organisations, which state that "The 
public sector builds on values like openness, democracy, legal rights, integrity, neutrality, 
legal capacity, and loyalty. […] Authorities and employees thus have a common 
responsibility for respecting the public sector's basic values in execution of tasks and delivery 
of services to citizens" (Personalestyrelsen, KL and Danske Regioner 2007, p. 5, translated). 
Administrative law is made to secure "that citizens are involved in the administration's 
decision-making process, so that they can influence the basis of the decisions that are made 
above them" (p. 5). The 'external consultant' discourse is thus criticising the tactical reasoning 
of interpretation of SEA legislation in the 'strategic management' discourse. SEA is in this 
discourse seen as part of the administrative obligations of a public organisation, and 
Energinet.dk is therefore to follow the formulations in the act of approaching plans and 
programmes. 
The 'strategic management' discourse is emphasising the need of the strategic management to 
have room for manoeuvre in negotiations with other actors at a strategic level without 
requirements on transparency and several months of assessment processes. The room for 
manoeuvre also concerns the conflict between competition and transparency. The discourse 
claims that publishing information at a strategic level could give other actors a tactical 
advantage. One employee described this problem as:  
 
"The challenge is that there are things that you don't want to share, because of the 
negotiating position; there are some strategic concerns in it" 
 
The strategic management discourse is connected to an identity perception of Energinet.dk 
being developer of infrastructure, and it is therefore argued that according to administrative 
law, Energinet.dk cannot be both a developer and an authority that approves the 
development. A manager argued that "Like a Supermarked we cannot both develop and 
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approve our new supermarkets". This discourse therefore disputes the 'idealistic' discourse of 
targeting the strategic decisions that are potentially decisive for environmental consequences. 
Instead, seemingly ambiguous formulations in legislation should be interpreted in favour of 
the room for manoeuvre in the tactical play between TSOs. SEA is therefore to be applied 
when it is appropriate for the business, e.g. in cases where SEA can be used for improving the 
public discussion and to decrease public opposition at EIA level, supporting the legitimacy of 
the decision or in cases where it benefit the cooperation with other actors. A similar 
motivation is found in Valve (1999) who argues that the Finnish Ministry of Transport in a 
given case applied EA "to convince the audience and other financiers that environmental 
matters are taken care of and that the decision-making is carried out in an appropriate 
manner" (p. 139). 
 
DISCUSSION: IMPORTANCE OF DISCOURSES 
The discourses on the role of SEA have similarities with the discourses related to EIA in 
Scandinavia decades ago as reported by Emmelin and Lerman (2005): Is SEA a constraining 
procedure or a necessary structure for integration of environmental considerations? Is SEA 
based on a too rational understanding of decision-making? Is SEA guided by too many 
explicit requirements? Emmelin and Lerman also found support for what is termed the 
strategic management discourse above: "There are indications that the formal participative 
elements in both spatial planning and EA are increasingly seen as a hindrance to strategic 
decision making" (p. 188). Furthermore, the discourses relates to the tension of strategic 
decision-making between "weighting and daring" (Larsson and Emmelin 2007, p. 3), between 
the rational deliberative and intuitive approaches to decision-making. Supporting the 
findings of previous studies, the discourses identified in Energinet.dk may thus be relevant as 
stereotypes for other strategic development context that may be useful in preliminary 
identification of discourses in other organisations. 
The importance of discourses on the role of SEA seems indirect in Jay (2010, p. 3495) who 
comments that "There is clearly a difference of emphasis in the weight given to these Belgian 
and UK documents in planning decisions, which results in one coming under the terms of the 
SEA Directive, and the other not." In Britain, the National Grid has settled on the discourse 
that their plans do not set frames for future developments, since the grid operator is obliged 
to provide connection to any customer regardless of their plans: "[T]he transmission 
companies have no ultimate control over the connections that are made to the system (of 
either generating plant on the one hand, or distribution and supply on the other). The 
transmission licence holders are under a statutory obligation to provide a connection to their 
networks for any customer who requests one, regardless of how well this may or may not 
coincide with optimum network development" (Jay 2007, p. 77). The loss of control is 
according to Jay a result of the privatisation in which the "'unbundling' of the industry into 
independent components has made has made electricity networks into largely reactive 
businesses in which customer behaviour" (p. 78). Although Energinet.dk is able to do more 
active business, a discourse of 'no full control' could be expected in Energinet.dk, since 
Energinet.dk and other grid companies are obliged to provide connection to producers and 
consumers of electricity (§20 in Act on electricity supply, no 516 of 20/05/2010). 
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Based on the interpretation of SEA Directive in the previous chapter, a central question seems 
to be whether Energinet.dk or the Ministry is 'responsible', when Energinet.dk's plans for 
expansion have to be approved by the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The answer to 
this question is decisive for, who is responsible for the application of SEA. The European 
Court of Justice argues in a judgement on the case of British Gas (ECJ 1990) that not only 
bodies which has been made subject to authority, but also bodies which has been made 
subject to "control by the state" or assigned "special powers beyond those which result from 
the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals" (European Commission 2003, p. 
8), so the ministerial approval of Energinet.dk's plans seems not to prevent status as a 
responsible body. The question of authority is thus a question of whether Energinet.dk has 
"special powers". Energinet.dk has access to loan from the Ministry of Finance (paragraph 14), 
it has legislative rights to charge consumers for sustain security of supply, collect 
information, require operation or shut-down of power plants (paragraph 8, 27a and 27b in 
executive order on electricity supply, no 516, 2010). Energinet.dk therefore has special 
powers, and therefore seems to be a body made responsible for a public service. In a similar 
tone, the Rigsrevisionen (the National Audit Office of Denmark) stated in 2004, that 
Energinet.dk's activities predominantly would be authority execution activities associated 
with the state's ownership of the transmission network and system responsibility 
(Rigsrevisionen 2004) 
The discourses seem to disregard the formulation of the EU guidance on implementation of 
SEA (European Commission 2003) on "subject to preparation and/or adoption by an 
authority" (p. 5). This formulation means that Energinet.dk even without authority status 
must do SEA on documents that set frames if the approval by the Ministry equals an 
adoption. If Energinet.dk thereby falls within the scope, the crux of the matter is whether 
Energinet.dk should apply SEA on its own initiative or await authorities to require it: The 
question is whether application of SEA is part of working "on behalf of the authority" 
(European Commission 2003, p. 8), or it needs a specific order from the authority. Similar 
question is related to the documents that set frames and are adopted through legislative 
procedures by the Parliament or Government.  
The change agent approach would a first glance make use of the above "clarifying" 
arguments in efforts of forcing through the "correct" understanding. Although, the arguments 
are highly relevant in the discussions, the discourse development in organisations like 
Energinet.dk is a more complex process with a range of interests and considerations. The 
clarifying arguments therefore are up against more powerful interests and the change agent 
approach may therefore use a wider perspective than the legislation itself. It is important to 
keep in mind, that the change agent is - despite own beliefs - not more right about how things 
should be or above other actors in terms of legitimacy; the interpretation of the relation 
between legislation and decision-making is open for discussion and different understandings.  
The discourse development in Energinet.dk is furthermore more dynamic than outlined in 
this chapter. Like the framing of alternatives in the natural gas security of supply planning, 
discourses are influenced by contextual dynamics; external changes may make dominant 
discourses irrelevant, why they quietly dissolve; other changes may make divergent views in 
a "discourse' periphery" (Asplund and Hilding-Rydevik 2001) gaining influence. As a means 
to generate change, Asplund and Hilding-Rydevik (2001) point at storylines: "A storyline that 
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gains common accept may have a redeeming role in situations where it is otherwise is 
difficult to reach a decision or action" (p. 19, translated). In Energinet.dk, storylines on SEA 
have been generated in the public appendix to the company's Strategy Plan. Although they 
have been important input in the discourses, they have not gained the redeeming role.  
The growing awareness of SEA in the Danish Energy Agency may be an important driver in 
the clarification of responsibility and roles in the Danish energy sector. A jurisdictional 
clarification in the agency would besides the Agency decision-making also make the rules of 
action easier to clarify in Energinet.dk. 
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10.2  DISCOURSES ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
"[…] Serious theoretical and methodological difficulties, including those related to the 
selection and framing of 'problems' and 'options', the treatment of deep uncertainties and 
the impossibility of aggregating in analysis the divergent social interests and value 
judgement which govern the prioritisation of the different dimensions of 'sustainability' 
[…] render futile any attempt to develop an 'analytical fix' for the problems of appraisal. 
In this light, systematic public participation is recognised not just as an issue of political 
efficacy and legitimacy, but also as a fundamental matter of analytical rigour" (Stirling 
1999, p. 111) 
"Increased opposition towards big, planned windmills onshore causes a range of 
municipalities to either limit their windmill plans, to postpone them, or skip new onshore 
mills. In less than eight months, the number of opposing citizen groups, which has joined 
the Organisation of Neighbours to Giant Windmills [Landsforeningen Naboer til 
Kæmpevindmøller], increased from 40 to more than 90. The objections cause more and 
more politicians to tremble in their boots. (From 2011, translated) 
 
The previous analysis indicated that transparency and public stir is a concern in the strategic 
decision-making in the Danish energy sector. In the following, focus is on discourses on 
public participation.  
Public participation in the strategic development of the Danish energy sector is interesting in 
many respects. Two are indicated in the quotes above, namely that public participation is 
relevant in non-programmed strategic decisions-making characterised by uncertainties and 
multiple of interests and that public opposition is blooming in the Danish energy sector 
despite political attention and use of resources to smooth the infrastructure development 
process.  
This section thus views public participation from two angles: The discourses found through 
interviews in Energinet.dk in connection with an internal clarification of how environmental 
concerns are integrated at strategic level in the company and the content of public 
consultation comments in two contemporary strategic developments of infrastructure. The 
persons are anonymised to protect the persons from public criticism as the interviews were 
made in another context. 
Due to the general opposition and the status as a public owned company, Energinet.dk is 
focused on the public participation process and careful about fulfilling legislation and 
involving 'relevant actors' on an early stage. The following discourses are therefore widely 
concerned with whether the public should be involved further than the legislation requires. 
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DISCOURSES IN ENERGINET.DK 
The discourses on public participation in Energinet.dk especially relates to when public 
participation is relevant in the strategic development of infrastructure, which is related to the 
questions of what makes sense for the society and what is the public interested in. Figure 30 
shows the opinions among persons in Energinet.dk that were put forward as part of the 
internal clarification of how environmental issues are considered at strategic level, see the 
methodology chapter. The two dominant discourses (three out of ten persons) are that the 
public participation has to be about an issue that concerns the public and that the public 
participation should be done prior to a final decision on a specific option. The discourses of 
public participation in the early internal economic and technical analysis and in the 
preparation of a plan that outlines options are in line with the SEA legislation (article 6, in the 
preparation of plans and with appropriate time frames) and therefore not further described. 
 
Appropriate time for public participation Number of employees 
On early internal economic and technical analyses 2 
On the preparation of a plan that outlines options 3 
After a decision has been made 1 
On concrete issues that concern the public 3 
Figure 30: Distribution of employees within discourses on when and on what planning stages (see 
figure 20, p. 144) public participation is relevant in the strategic development of energy infrastructure 
in Energinet.dk (n=10) 
 
The discourse of having public participation and hearings after a decision is made is partly 
reasoned by consideration to competition and partly to avoiding 'unnecessary disturbance' in 
the society. The former is described by a manager in Energinet.dk as: "The challenge is 
sometimes that there is information, which we do not want to share, because it is about 
negotiating position and there is some strategic in it; which way are we going. And there are 
some competitors out there, which have other interests". The latter is described by a manager 
as: "We should not go out and say: "What do you think of this?" if it is not likely that it is 
realised". The question of when projects are likely to be realised is then interpreted as in 
principle not before the Board of Energinet.dk has approved a project. 
The discourse of focusing public participation on concrete issues is described by a manager as 
"If you want to go into dialogue with neighbours and citizens, then it probably has to be quite 
concrete. [Early in the strategic development] you may get into dialogue with Greenpeace or 
WHO or organisations like that. But if you want to get in contact with neighbours, then it is 
[in the routing of infrastructure], where it is more concrete". Another employee argues that "It 
would be a very difficult communicative solution, since how is the individual committed to 
have a look on how, for instance, the capacity towards South is expanded. You need a special 
interest in that". 
These discourses on public participation widely differ and efforts on developing a 
meaningful SEA application have to approach these in order to develop a meaningful 
practice on SEA. The doubts on public participation on a strategic level of decision-making 
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are not unique for Energinet.dk: Information discussions with other authorise indicate similar 
discourses. Common for the discourses in Energinet.dk is interest in a demonstration of a 
societal benefit of public participation at the strategic level. The following brief investigation 
of public consultation comments is an input to such a demonstration. The analysis uncovers 
the range of energy related issues commented on and it is - despite interesting perspectives - 
widely delimited from an actor analysis of who says what. 
 
PUBLIC CONSULTATION COMMENTS 
Comments from the public in two environmental assessment processes on infrastructure 
developments are analyses in appendix D. These processes are the National Test Centre for 
Windmills in Østerild and the Offshore Wind Action Plan that also were part of the 
investigation in subchapter 6.1. The comments are summarised and discussed in the 
following in order to shed light on what the public comments concern. This is an input to 
discuss relevance of public participation in the strategic level in the Danish energy sector. 
The analysis shows that consultation comments in both processes concentrates on three main 
categories: 
- The decision-making process, hereunder how the planning is made, how the public 
participation is made, disputes on the legitimacy of the intervention, and critical 
comments on the documentation, hereunder defects and appropriateness of the data used 
for the assessment. 
- The energy needs and technology, questioning societal benefit, relevance of the initiative 
and suggestions on other alternatives, as well as critical comments on the scope of 
planning 
- Impacts of infrastructure on humans and nature, hereunder neglected or underestimated 
impacts. 
In the Offshore Wind Power Action Plan, the affected municipalities and the wind power 
companies criticises the documentation behind the assessments and the ambiguity around 
assumptions and criteria in the decision-making. Values are in some comments very explicit. 
In terms of energy needs and technology, the consultation comments are primarily related to 
the spatial characteristics of the windmills, e.g. Region North Jutland that is concerned about 
visual impacts. The comments primarily concern the design and the location of windmills, 
suggesting other alternatives. Furthermore, the comments point at the interrelatedness of 
windmills with the energy system in a national as well as international perspective. The 
impacts of the infrastructure is in the comments primarily related to maritime safety, tourism, 
fishery and fish stocks, habitat areas, and cumulative effects. The positive impact of 
development of wind power on the greenhouse gas emission is widely acknowledged, like 
the expansion offshore rather than onshore. The responses to the consultation comments by 
the committee in charge of the plan widely refer to the EIA process, but the comments also 
leads the committee to reconsider distance to harbour, knowledge from the offshore wind 
demonstration programme, and cost estimates (DEA 2008b). 
The analysis of the consultation comments on the EIA report of the National Test Centre in 
Østerild shows that the comments concern a range of energy-related topics. Concerning the 
decision-making process, the comments criticised the choice of the location, the public 
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participation, the legitimacy of the way the test centre was chosen, the documentation of the 
process and basis, and the disregarding of the previous planning. Concerning the energy 
sector's needs and testing of technology, the consultation comments concerned the relevance 
of the test centre, the ambiguity on the requirements of the centre, the location in Østerild 
versus other places for wind testing, and the societal benefit. The public consultation 
comments have been influenced by an increased organisation of the public opposition, why 
most of the individual comments therefore contained similar issues and arguments.  
 
Discussion of the comments 
The cases show that despite the tool (EIA of the Østerild test center and SEA of the offshore 
wind plan), strategic considerations are brought forward. This has also been the case in the 
Ll. Torup case, see subchapter 7.1. The investigation thus indicates that it is a general 
character of energy infrastructure development that the affected people are disputing 
strategic aspects such as the societal need, legitimacy and documentation of the need. 
Research is used politically to criticise the basis of the environmental assessments, but rather 
than being constructive the cases indicate that it is done in an effort of impeding the decision-
making process. 
Comparing the consultation comments from the two cases, it is evident that the number of 
comments and essence of the comments widely differs: The Østerild case is conflicting with 
the interests of a range of local people and nature NGOs, why their concerns dominate and 
the comments are critical to the decision-making as well as the ambiguity or lack of 
information. In the offshore wind location case the comments represent a broad range of 
actors including neighbouring countries, and concerns about visual aspects and 
documentation dominate among the comments. Whereas public comments to the offshore 
wind plan is more about the scope of the planning and system boundaries, the comments to 
the Østerild centre is about secrecy and ambiguity in the decision-making process. 
The debate and comments in the cases reflects a weighting between local and national/global 
interests, which seems typical for energy infrastructure development; the infrastructure is 
benefitting the society and harming the individual which is affected by the infrastructure. 
This is often termed NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard), however, the Østerild comments 
were wider framed than a simple individual protection of land and economic interests. 
The brief analysis suggests that the public are commenting a wide range of relevant issues 
that potentially can improve the process. Two aspects seem, however, to hinder a 
constructive process: The relevant comments widely stem from direct personal interests, 
which may not be as direct in more abstract strategic decision-making processes, and the 
public efforts of commenting is not made to advance the process and the assessment, but to 
stop the infrastructure development. These two aspects must be dealt with before public 
participation becomes truly contributing at strategic level in the energy sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SYNTHESIS 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 11 
ELEMENTS OF A MEANINGFUL WAY OF APPLYING SEA 
 
CHAPTER 12 
LOOKING OUTWARDS AND FORWARD 
 
 
 
This chapter synthesises the findings of the previous chapters, hereunder the empirical 
findings and the relevancy of the frameworks. The synthesis constitutes the answer to the 
overall research question presented in the introduction. 
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CHAPTER 11: ELEMENTS OF A MEANINGFUL WAY 
 OF APPLYING SEA 
 
"SEA should not be an empty paper-activity. SEA must enter the decision-making 
processes at a time and with a content that make SEA an active element. This ambition 
has been difficult to get materialised, since there are many stakeholders and processes 
connected to Energinet.dk's activities, which are not organised with an eye to 
accommodate SEA procedures" (Behnke 2010). 
 
The aim of the thesis was to explore strategic decision-making as an element of assisting the 
Danish energy sector in developing a meaningful way of applying SEA at strategic level. 
'Meaningful' in the sense that application of SEA should be an active element in strategic 
decision-making as Behnke describes above and be a way to improve consideration of 
environmental aspects. As the title of this chapter indicates, the collaboration with actors in 
the energy sector during the three years has not resulted in a final and definitive way of 
applying SEA. It has, however, identified important elements of a meaningful way and these 
elements will be outlined in this chapter.  
The first subchapter outlines how the mysterious non-programmed, strategic decision-
making processes during the Ph.D. project have been unravelled and how the findings of the 
thesis add to the understanding of these processes. The thesis has provided a platform for 
discussing when and how strategic decisions are made and what the possibilities are for 
approaching these decisions through SEA processes. The subchapter furthermore outlines 
and discusses the growing amount of experiences - both in Energinet.dk and the Danish 
Energy Agency - with SEA during the project period. 
The second subchapter synthesises the experiences with the frameworks developed in this 
thesis. This includes a critical discussion of the relevancy and potential of the research 
approach, the conceptual framework, and the methodology in terms of the empirical 
investigations. The second subchapter thus deals with the meaningfulness of the frameworks 
in investigating strategic decision-making and SEA application. 
Together the two subchapters presents the answer to the overall research question of "What 
do a combination of a change agent research approach and a conceptual combination of 
decision-making and sense-making provide of insight into how SEA can be meaningfully 
applied in the strategic decision-making processes in the Danish energy sector?" The chapters 
do not include recommendations, but they present a concentrate of the most important 
experiences and findings in the thesis. The listing of the most important experiences may be a 
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relevant inspiration for the future work in the sector and inspiration for actors within the 
fields of SEA or decision-making. Besides being a constructive input to the process of 
applying SEA in the strategic decision-making of the energy sector, the elements of a 
meaningful way also provide directions for further collaborative research and for 
continuation of the learning process on how to apply SEA in this and similar contexts. These 
directions are outlined in the following chapter. 
 
 
11.1 FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND SEA 
The point of departure for this thesis was limited knowledge about how non-programmed, 
strategic decisions were made in the Danish energy sector. Furthermore, the state of the art 
pointed a limited empirical understanding of 'decisive moments' in decision-making 
processes. To add to this limited knowledge, the research question of "When in the 
development of Danish energy infrastructure are strategic decisions made that are potentially 
decisive for environmental aspects and how are these choices made?" has in this thesis been 
explored through empirical studies of contemporary strategic decision-making processes. The 
findings from these studies are presented below. 
 
WHEN AND HOW STRATEGIC DECISIONS ARE MADE 
First of all, the empirical investigations support the preliminary experience-based 
postulations of strategic decisions being made outside formal systems and having a non-
programmed character. The investigations into decision-making on major energy 
infrastructure reveal a minor role of the formal plans, since pivotal decisions are made prior 
to these. This is e.g. the case in Energinet.dk's infrastructure planning and in the case of the 
National Test Centre for Windmills where technical reports and informal political choices in 
practice are delimiting the range of options in play prior to formal documents. In terms of the 
non-programmed character, the investigations shows how developments internal or external 
to organisations create novel and unexpected situations for which no previous experience 
provided a perfect match for the decision situation. The natural gas planning is an example of 
this where the SEA team had to develop a new set of alternatives in novel situations created 
by contextual dynamics. The empirical investigations furthermore support the iterative and 
cyclic understanding of strategic decision-making, which the conceptual framework outlined 
with reference to Mintzberg, March and Weick. Such iterations are e.g. found in the natural 
gas security of supply planning with iterations on the framing of alternatives or in the 
reconsiderations on the need for storage in the Ll. Torup natural gas storage case. 
Secondly, the empirical investigations make it clear that a range of strategic decisions have 
been and are made without systematic environmental consideration, public participation, and 
transparency on alternatives. At the point of finalising this thesis (November 2011) only three 
strategic decision-making processes have been subject to SEA during the first seven years of 
SEA legislation in Denmark, whereas three other SEA processes are being conducted. 
Thirdly, the investigations reveal insights of different level of details in when and how non-
programmed strategic decisions are made: 
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- The investigation of strategic decision-making as series of choices reveals that decisions on 
major energy infrastructure a made in an interaction between policy-making and 
planning. Whereas much literature assumes a hierarchy of decision-making in which 
policy decisions frame planning decisions which frame project decisions, the investigation 
suggest that this simplified hierarchical model is misleading at a strategic level of decision-
making. 
- The investigation of strategic decision-making as contextual interaction reveals that the 
strategic context can be very dynamic and influence strategic decision-making in a number 
of ways. The investigation of the Natural Gas Security of Supply Plan thus shows how the 
natural gas planning was influenced by the financial crisis, EU recovery aid subsidy, new 
Danish political settlements, technological and regulatory development, Russian politics, 
etc. The dynamics of the strategic context emphasises the need for adaptability of the 
decision-making process. 
- The investigation of strategic decision-making as human choices reveals patterns in how 
we create meaning of information and how meaning and actions are interlinked. The 
experiment on significance determination shows the importance of how we notice 
information and frames a text whereas the investigation of the EA of the Ll. Torup gas 
storage shows developments in senses in practice and how these influences actions. These 
investigations call attention to sense-making processes as an important element of strategic 
decision-making, since the way we make sense of stimuli determines our perception of for 
instance strategic options and what decisions are to be made. 
Fourthly, the thesis shows empirically how strategic decision-making in the Danish energy 
sector is constituted by interaction among a variety of ways of making decisions. These ways 
differ among other things in terms of what is the basis for decision-making, how political the 
decision-making is, and how predictable the process is. The most influential ways of strategic 
decision-making in the development of major energy infrastructure identified in this thesis 
are: 
- International politics in EU, e.g. in major financial support to the Kriegers Flak 
interconnection. This EU support was decisive for environmental aspects, since it 
changed the Danish priority on the locations for offshore wind and put up a pressure by 
deadlines that reduced the possibilities for applying SEA prior to important decisions on 
the project. 
- National political negotiations in the Parliament, e.g. on the location of the national test 
centre in Østerild. This choice was decisive for environmental aspects, since it located the 
centre in a major forest. 
- A competitive environment with among TSOs, e.g. strategic probings on transnational 
connections. Such initial agreements may be decisive for environmental aspects, since 
they determine what option is focused on. 
- Technical planning of infrastructure in Energinet.dk, e.g. analyses of the load analyses in 
the Cable Action Plan. The assumptions and delimitations of such technical analyses may 
delimit the options in play and thus be decisive for environmental aspects. 
The list is by no means exclusive, but it builds on a considerable share of the recent strategic 
decision-making processes on major Danish energy infrastructure developments in the last 
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three years. The list should be added interdependency, since for instance the Offshore Wind 
Action Plan was dependent on the Cable Action Plan, which again was dependent on the 
political negotiations. With these characteristics, the energy sector strategic decision-making 
is in line with Weiss' (1988) description of policy-making as interactive, multi-participative, 
and diffuse processes. The nature of the strategic decision-making processes on Danish 
energy infrastructure may thus be better characterised as policy-making than planning. 
Strategic decision-making in the Danish energy sector thus seems to be a distinctive mix of 
competition between Energinet.dk and other TSOs on new energy connections, a prominent 
actor like Energinet.dk that is an independent, state owned company, a wide range of 
political instructions and settlements, major private energy companies, and international 
influences from especially EU and international organisations like ENTSO-E. 
These findings on when and how non-programmed strategic decisions are made lead to the 
answer to the fourth sub-question of how SEA should be applied in order to approach the 
characteristics of strategic decision-making in the energy sector, which is presented in the 
following. 
 
HOW SHOULD SEA THEN BE APPLIED TO BE MEANINGFUL? 
The point of departure for this thesis was limited knowledge in SEA literature about how 
SEA can be applied in the strategic decision-making in energy sectors. As argued in the 
introduction and in the quote by Behnke above, the application of SEA in the energy sector is 
not straightforward. Some elements of a meaningful way of applying SEA in the sector are, 
however, identified in the thesis and discussed in the following. The main elements are: 
- Orienting SEA towards formal plans is not adequate. 
- The approach of targeting pivotal decisions on specific infrastructures may be relevant, 
although this approach is not without drawbacks 
- SEA must to be applied in a way that can adapt to strategic contextual dynamics, which 
with short notice can change the premises of the decision-making radically.  
- Compromises with early public involvement may be a meaningful preliminary solution to 
enhance application of SEA in competitive environments 
- Setting the team for an SEA must consider sense-making profiles to reduce the risk of not 
noticing relevant strategic options and to enhance quality of significance determination 
First of all, the empirical investigations put up a strong argument for the inadequacy of 
orienting SEA towards formal plans and programmes in the energy sector. A range of formal 
planning documents in the sector has character of summarising decisions rather than 
constituting a decision. 
Energinet.dk's approach of targeting SEA to pivotal decisions on specific infrastructure 
developments may be a relevant substitute for the orientation to plans and programmes. The 
approach is based on the acknowledgement that the company's strategic decision-making is 
project-oriented rather than plan-oriented. Energinet.dk's approach has been passively 
approved by the Agency of Spatial and Environmental Planning, and it is therefore a feasible 
option for other actors in the sector. Energinet.dk has not yet demonstrated in practice 
whether it is possible to bring an SEA of an individual infrastructure into a fully strategic 
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discussion that includes comparison with other options. Special attention to this issue is 
needed to avoid salami-slicing of strategic developments. 
The empirically identified strategic dynamics challenge the ability of SEA to respond to 
comprehensive contextual developments. Using the jargon of Christensen and Kreiner (1991), 
the premises on which the SEA process is initially designed may need multiple revisions 
during the SEA process due to contextual developments. Nooteboom and Teisman (2003) 
similarly point at the risk that impact assessments may be too early, since "the problem 
definition used in the assessment is always redefined during the decision-making process". 
The SEA literature suggests to handle contextual developments by predicting decision-
making processes and the related contextual developments (Dalkmann et al. 2004) or to apply 
SEA in a flexible way that makes 'rapid responses' possible (Therivel 2004). The unpredictable 
character of some of the developments identified in this thesis suggests that the prediction of 
developments only to some extent is possible. Rapid responses seem highly needed in 
instances like in the Parliament policy-making or in strategic probings among TSOs. In these 
instances, decision-makers will most likely not await a longer assessment if they perceive the 
situation to be highly beneficial in terms of their interest. In the extent it is possible, 
prediction of developments may thus be needed in order to prepare a decent basis for 
decision-making and for involving relevant actors prior to this kind of decision-making. 
Therefore, a mixture of adaptability and prediction seems adequate for SEA application in the 
Danish energy sector. The strategic dynamics even leads to concerns about the adequacy of 
legislation on SEA: The investigation of the natural gas security of supply planning questions 
whether the legislatively required eight weeks of public consultation is feasible in a dynamic 
strategic context. In instances, unpredictable contextual developments changes the relevant 
alternatives significantly in shorter periods than the eight weeks, and the public consultation 
could therefore be repeated over an over again in trying to keep up with new decision 
situations. 
The competitive environment and the strategic dynamics in practice seem to reduce the 
interest in SEA application at strategic level: The discourses identified in the thesis point at 
inappropriateness of transparency in strategic negotiations and hesitation towards public 
debates on infrastructure plans when there is a risk that these may not be implemented. A 
compromise with the SEA aim of early public involvement may be a pragmatic way to 
increase application of SEA and meaningful in terms of improving environmental 
considerations in strategic decision-making. Without transparency and public consultations, 
SEA elements like systematic environmental considerations seem easier for the actors to 
integrate at a strategic level, and the public may instead be involved when transparency is no 
longer a problem. Such compromises are, however, not without drawbacks, and lack of 
public involvement may result in public dissatisfaction and opposition towards the strategic 
decisions and the following infrastructure developments. Furthermore, lack of public debates 
on a strategic level may hinder the development of more radical alternatives (Lund 2009). 
A meaningful application of SEA does not only involve adjustments of the SEA tool, but also 
adjustments in the strategic decision-making. Energinet.dk's targeting of SEA to pivotal 
decisions necessitates that a planning document is made for these decisions in order to 
provide a point of departure for SEA application. SEA may thus have a role of creating new 
official documents, new routines, and a new transparency. In SEA literature, this role is 
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described as the ability of SEA to 'structure' decision-making processes (Fischer 2003). How 
this role is reflected in practice in the Danish energy sector is not yet clear, as the number of 
SEA applications is modest. The investigation of the natural gas security of supply planning 
indicates that SEA application leads to a new document that outlines the potential decisions 
in the entire natural gas security of supply report. Present SEA processes furthermore 
indicate that commission reports become a more decisive status by being the document on 
which SEA is applied.  
The discussions of how SEA is meaningfully applied in the Danish energy sector are related 
to the discussions of what are the aims of SEA and how SEA is done effectively (Cashmore et 
al. 2009, Stoeglehner et al. 2009). The trade-off between early public participation and 
application of SEA in competitive environments emphasises that in practice it is most likely 
not possible to achieve all aims of SEA. Although both are important in the Danish energy 
sector, the development of SEA has to start somewhere, and application of some SEA 
elements in the strategic decision-making process may give rise to application of other 
elements. This successive implementation is also related to the discussion of ownership of 
SEA application, which is argued to be a prerequisite for effective SEA application 
(Stoeglehner et al. 2009). The frames for the empirical investigations in this thesis role support 
the development of ownership through a critical friend role. The meaningfulness of these 
frameworks is discussed in the following subchapter. 
 
 
11.2 MEANINGFULNESS OF THE FRAMEWORKS 
This subchapter presents the answers to the research questions on the relevance of the change 
agent within the field of SEA and of the conceptual combination of decision-making and 
sense-making. The main conclusions are: 
- The change agent research approach is rewarding in terms of relevancy of the research and 
demanding in the combination of change and research 
- The change agent may be a medium for a critical interdependence between research and 
practice 
- Sense-making theory is a relevant supplement to the insight in SEA literature about how 
decisions are made 
- The combination of disciplines and models into a continuum of perspectives is a relevant 
approach to consider synergies and complementarities of insights into how decisions are 
made. 
 
MEANINGFULNESS OF THE CHANGE AGENT APPROACH 
The investigation of the three collaborative and co-funded Ph.D. projects reveals that acting 
as a change agent is a demanding task as it requires the researcher not only to be a researcher 
that plans and conducts research, but also to be a social agent that interacts with relevant 
actors as well as negotiates interests in the research with partners on issues like objectives and 
content of the research. If the researcher manages this double role and the social setup of the 
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research both involves strategic interdependence as well as room for manoeuvre for the 
researcher in a kind of organisational autonomy, the change agent approach can be a 
rewarding process for the involved actors. In this way, the change agent approach can 
enhance relevance of research concurrently with a critical stance to the practice studied. 
This Ph.D. project shows the relevance of staging a change agent in a context like the Danish 
energy sector in order to facilitate change: As an independent resource person, I was to an 
increasing extent approached with questions from practice on SEA application by among 
others the DEA. In this way, I became a sparring partner that to some extent facilitated 
development of SEA practice. 
The experiences of doing change agent research in this Ph.D. project reveals a range of 
difficult choices during the process. Among these are issues of how to influence actors in the 
energy sector and whom to approach, which required considerable attention. These choices 
will likely become less demanding as the researcher is gaining more experiences of being a 
change agent, and expectations to the output of this type of research should therefore reflect 
how experienced the researcher and the partners are in making use of this kind of research 
collaboration. 
The considerations of how to influence the actors in the energy sector is related to 
considerations of how to create research that bridges theory and practice. Based on the 
researcher's and partner's experience, this bridge is staged as a critical interdependence in 
which theory provides critical input to practice and practice provides critical input to theory. 
A change agent research approach with access to insight in the strategic interdependence and 
autonomy in the research seems a highly adequate medium for this critical interdependence. 
The critical friend role in this Ph.D. project has widely been an informal and internal 
approach rather than a confronting approach using public media to enhance practice. The 
latter would most likely have given a formal progress in the energy sector, but my judgment 
was that an external pressure would have increased the risk that actors would perceive SEA 
as yet another administrative burden rather than a meaningful tool that is able to strengthen 
strategic decision-making. It would furthermore most likely not have opened the amount of 
doors for further cooperation and the frankness and insight accessed in this project. The 
public debate is, however, important and one of the tasks following this thesis writing is to 
use Danish public media disseminate experiences and start public debates on SEA practice in 
the energy sector - in a critical friend way and if possible by co-writing with involved actors. 
 
MEANINGFULNESS OF THE CONTINUUM AND COMBINATION 
The state of the art showed a fragmented understanding in SEA literature of how strategic 
decisions are made. The fragmentation of insight in different disciplines and theoretical 
models is argued to make it difficult to see synergies between these. Therefore, theories of 
decision-making and sense-making were combined into one model and this combination was 
included in a conceptual framework that portrayed strategic decision-making as a continuum 
of perspectives with varying levels of detail.  
The thesis shows how theories of and research on decision-making are enhanced by insight 
from sense-making theory. The relevance of the combination of decision-making and sense-
making as well as of the continuum has been tested through the empirical investigations. The 
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main question discussed in the following is whether the conceptual framework has been 
successful in creating synergies or the results are no more than complementary 
understandings of strategic decision-making processes: Did I only merge two theoretical 
fields or did I create a new insight based on the insights of the combination? 
The potential synergies of the continuum relate to how the different levels of perspectives 
support and add to each other: 
- The overall level is the patterns that show what the details of decision-making results in 
at an overall perspective. In a company, this level would equal the boardroom that has 
the overview of progress and the overall decisions on new efforts. This level would be the 
typical entry point for application of SEA. At this level, social processes are simplified 
and aggregated to be able to gain an overview of these. 
- The detailed level is the processes that cause the overall patterns. In a company this 
would be the clerk offices or the factory floor. This level is the micro-practices that 
convert the overall ideas into actions. This level determines what SEA application 
includes and leads to. At this level, social processes are nuanced and complex. 
More concretely, the continuum has in this thesis lead to instances where the insight from one 
model is enhanced by insight from the other models and thereby creating synergies in the 
understanding of how decisions are made: 
- What in the series of choice investigation seems a 'defect' SEA practice in the natural gas 
security of supply planning is explained by the more detailed perspectives in the 
contextual dynamics model and in the insight in sense-making revealed through the 
choice circles model. 
- The choice circles model may seem without direction and a never-ending iteration. The 
investigations by use of the contextual model and the series of choice model show the 
patterns of how choices progress into a development of energy infrastructures. 
- The investigations based on the choice circles give insight into how practitioners 
determines significance of a choice as well as how participants in a specific 
environmental assessment process made sense and acted upon events and information. 
These insights add to the understanding of the framing of alternatives in the natural gas 
security of supply planning process. 
There is no doubt that the continuum and the combination of theories of decision-making and 
sense-making can be improved, however, the indications of synergies and complementarities 
support the meaningfulness of combining models and disciplines. 
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CHAPTER 12: LOOKING OUTWARDS AND FORWARD 
 WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
 
"Time [for discussing SEA] is right precisely because the current economic crisis presents 
an opportunity for SEA practitioners to reflect on whether we are doing things well, 
making a difference to decision-making and enhancing sustainability of proposed 
development plans, programmes or policies" (Dusik and Sadler 2011) 
 
The research presented in this thesis is part of a comprehensive amount of research and 
reflection on SEA and its role in strategic decision-making processes. The ideas and findings 
of this thesis have been part of these reflections at conferences like the IAIA special 
conference "SEA implementation and practice: Making an impact?" quoted above. It is 
therefore relevant to relate the findings of this thesis to the reflections and research on SEA 
made by other actors.  
Looking outwards and forward, this chapter relates the thesis to contemporary 
considerations on the way forward for SEA by outlining what these findings suggest for 
future practice and research on SEA. The chapter is divided into two main aspects, namely 
visioning SEA as a strategic tool and suggestions on the way forward for research on SEA. 
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12.1 VISIONING SEA AS A STRATEGIC TOOL 
 
"I have a dream… A model of SEA which takes in lessons learned from existing practice, 
but is still open to innovative and novel practice" (Tetlow 2011) 
 
In line with Tetlow's vision, the development of SEA should be balanced between existing 
practice and innovation. The use of sense-making in this thesis is an example of an 
innovation, which is combined with lessens learned from decision-making literature. The use 
of sense-making aims at increasing understanding of strategic decision-making in order to 
strengthen SEA's role as a strategic tool. The vision of SEA as a strategic tool seems especially 
relevant in the Danish energy sector, in which the content of the existing SEA reports 
resembles an EIA. The experience on assessments at an EIA level in the sector seems thus to 
have inspired the practice on SEA. In the following, both the timing and content of SEA is 
discussed in terms of a vision of SEA as a strategic tool. 
The demonstrated strategic dynamics and interaction in the strategic decision-making 
processes support the increased focus on SEA as an adaptive, flexible, strategic, and 
continuous process. As evident from the IAIA special meeting on SEA, there is a general 
agreement of developing SEA as a tool that forms developments rather than provides reactive 
assessments. This visioning is not new as elements of it were proposed a decade ago (e.g. 
Kørnøv and Thissen 2000), however, the growing amount of experience of low influence of 
SEA on strategic decision-making is interpreted to support the need for developing SEA as a 
strategic tool. Energinet.dk's approach on targeting pivotal decisions when these are made 
rather than the summary of these in formal plans is a suggestion for enhancing the flexibility 
of SEA in strategic decision-making. 
Whereas this project has brought forward insight in the relation between SEA and strategic 
decision-making, the challenge of how to form SEA procedures to make the adaptive and 
continuous process possible still is an unsolved issue. Some inspiration may be found in the 
Portuguese guidance that is proposing a strategic process with focus on critical factors for 
decision-making (Partidário 2007). This guidance has even been applied on electricity grid 
planning, however, it may need adaptation to the Danish context. The choice circles model 
developed and applied in this thesis gives rise to concerns of how the present procedures and 
practice of SEA is able to approach complex interactions and iterations in the strategic 
decision-making of the Danish energy sector. 
One of the unresolved issues of all approaches oriented towards strategic decision-making is 
to identify the appropriate time for giving input to decision-making. Some literature, e.g. the 
ANSEA approach, suggests that it is possible to predict moments of decision-making, 
whereas other literature, e.g. the Garbage Can Model, suggests that this is hardly possible. 
Acknowledgement of the demonstrated interaction between policy-making and planning and 
the strategic dynamics is a step towards understanding strategic decision-making and 
thereby increase the possibilities for developing SEA as a strategic tool. 
According to George Kremlis, the Head of Unit for cohesion policy and environmental 
impact assessments in the EU's DG environment, the strategic character of SEA is also at the 
agenda in DG environment (Kremlis 2011). As a keynote on the IAIA special conference, he 
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revealed that the EU - due to member states opinions - has rejected the idea of merging the 
EIA and SEA Directive. The idea has been fuelled by the confusion around the two tools and 
their overlap in procedures and scope, but the differences between strategic and project level 
decision-making are, however, recognised to be too considerable to merge the two tools (see 
e.g. Nilsson and Dalkmann 2001). Instead, Kremlis revealed thoughts about covering policies 
and legislative proposals in the SEA Directive, although he argued, SEA is still in its infancy 
and it is too thus early for amendments. The interaction between policy-making and planning 
identified in this thesis is a strong advocate for expanding the Directive to include policy-
level in order to have better possibilities for approaching the interaction. With a more 
comprehensive empirical basis, research on this interaction therefore seems a relevant input 
to the considerations in the DG environment. 
This thesis has been devoted to process issues, and considerations on the content and 
environmental implications have been sparse. Process and content are, however, related and 
forming SEA as a strategic tool gives possibilities to give environmental boundaries a more 
prominent role: Research shows that the current developments on Earth are exceeding the 
'boundaries of change' and the 'carrying capacity' of the Earth and especially the Earth's 
capacities on nitrate, biodiversity and GHG is often mentioned as widely exceeded (United 
Nations 2010). As a consequence of this, frustrations on content issues are visible in the 
discussion of SEA effectiveness. At the IAIA special conference, Riki Therivel expressed her 
frustration in statements like: "SEA does not have teeth!", meaning that decision-makers are 
not obliged to follow the recommendations of the SEA report. Other EU legislation like the 
Habitat Directive has a more direct influence on decision-making as this Directive does not 
allow developments unless integrity of the protected area is sustained. The only "teeth" SEA 
has are public pressure and societal responsibility, which more often than not are 
heterogeneous entities pointing in diverging directions, e.g. when local employment and 
growth are contradicting biodiversity targets. The role of SEA is, however, not to have teeth 
on its own, but in a timed and appropriate way to bring in the teeth of other environmental 
regulation and objectives relevant for the proposal.  
 
SEA AS A STRATEGIC TOOL IN THE DANISH ENERGY SECTOR 
The increasing focus and application on SEA in the Danish energy sector will over time 
spread to stakeholders and processes connected to the strategic development in the sector. In 
this way, the sector and the SEA procedures will eventually adapt to each other, so that 
legislation will be fulfilled. Time will show to what extent SEA becomes an active and 
meaningful tool in the strategic development of the sector. This thesis provides a platform for 
developing a meaningful practice on SEA at strategic level by input to the discussions on SEA 
in the sector: 
- For the timing of SEA in strategic decisions-making processes, the thesis accounts of how 
the recent strategic decisions were made and provides elements of a meaningful way of 
applying SEA in the Danish energy sector. 
- For the discussion of the range of decision documents that should be considered in terms 
of SEA legislation, the thesis provides an initial list of plans and programmes. 
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- For the discussion of the role of SEA, hereunder public participation and transparency at 
strategic level, the thesis outlines discourses identified in Energinet.dk and demonstrates 
strategic concerns in public consultation comments. 
- For practical issues of improving quality of environmental assessments, this thesis 
provides insight in the importance of mental frameworks, experiences, and how to set a 
team for SEA application. 
Whether SEA will become a meaningful strategic tool in the energy sector largely depends on 
ownership among key persons in the years to come. It furthermore depends on the 
stakeholders' ability to development solutions to how to apply SEA in competitions between 
TSO and how to approach the interaction between Parliament, Ministries, and Energinet.dk. 
Another main hurdle for SEA application in the sector is increasing use of political 
settlements in the Danish Parliament (Frandsen 2008), which do not seem to fall within the 
scope of SEA: "There are no rules for political settlements, but a political settlement is a text, 
which some political parties have agreed upon" (The Danish Parliament 2011). Political 
settlements are without doubt environmentally decisive and they mark a short-coming in the 
scope of SEA. If political settlements were within the scope, they would furthermore 
constitute a practical challenge as new solutions are introduced and decided upon overnight. 
SEA application in the energy sector also faces considerable challenges in terms of increased 
EU regulation. In order to ensure sufficient and timely development of infrastructure, the 
European Commission (2011) requires member states to specify elements of EA procedures 
such as "the conditions under which an alternative is considered as satisfactory" and it opens 
up for a possibility for overriding strong environmental protection instruments such as the 
Habitat Directive (92/43/EC) and the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) if certain 
conditions are satisfied. Also new technologies challenges SEA application: As an example 
the increased focus on shale gas and shale oil extraction bring in technologies which 
potentially have considerable impacts on the environment and for which limited previous 
European experiences exist. Furthermore, a recent EU report (autumn 2011) comments on 
severe flaws in the environmental regulation of these technologies (European Parliament 
2011b). 
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12.2  SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON SEA 
The studies and findings in the thesis open up for a range of interesting research areas. The 
most important research needs and areas suggested by this thesis are outlined below. These 
areas reflect interests and concerns about the stability of the conclusions in the thesis, e.g. in 
terms of delimitations.  
Insights in decision-making processes are both important for the more theoretical 
development and understanding of decision aid tools and for the application in practice. 
How and to what extent we articulate decision-making is important for the benefits of SEA in 
practice. The change agent approach and the critical friend role have been relevant in the 
articulation in the Danish context, but the means and ways in which decision-making is 
articulated is an important area of research that links up to discussions about aim and 
effectiveness of SEA. Like any other field, there is a slippage between our models and the 
phenomena to which they refer, and the better our models of strategic decision-making 
reflect the processes in practice, the better possibilities we have for improving tools like SEA. 
The relevance and potentials of the use of sense-making theory in the fields of planning and 
impact assessment has been acknowledged at conferences, but the potentials are still to be 
demonstrated in practice. The thesis has opened up some of the multiple ways in which 
sense-making theory can be useful for understanding SEA and strategic decision-making in 
theory and research, but in terms of practice, more experiences and research are needed in 
order to achieve a fundament on which to base advice for practice. Among the possible 
directions for sense-making research are studies that bridges empirical insight from 
organisation and management literature with application of tools like SEA. In this way it 
would be possible to draw on a vast amount of research already being done. One of the 
urgent suggestions which the thesis leads to is to broaden the study of sense-making from a 
widely individual level in the thesis to a social and interactive level. This broadening is 
important for understanding the social interaction and thereby strategic decision-making. 
Sense-making theory may furthermore pave the way for an increased meta-methodological 
awareness among SEA researchers: How we make sense of problems and information in out 
studies is important for our findings and the possible uses of the research. Sense-making is 
thus inherent in current debates on how we should do research and how to engage with 
practice. Sense-making seems to favour constructivist elements, but it may in any field of 
study be an eye-opener on the importance of enactments, labelling and the stories created 
during the research process. 
The field of SEA seems to evolve in a range of directions, and SEA literature includes articles 
that relate SEA to an almost infinite range of different theories. Some theories are overlapping 
and other theories are contradicting, however, these theories and their implications are 
seldom related. Although the use of new theories out is relevant in order to increase 
understanding of SEA, it should be balanced with efforts of combining theories to reduce the 
present fragmentation and theoretical confusion. A practice of better relating new theories 
with the existing knowledge in the field may be a more acceptable way of promoting a 
'combining agenda', which authors like Herbert Simon have been advocates for; LEGO bricks 
are only fascinating when their possibilities for combining and creating a bigger picture are 
explored. 
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Combination of theories is to some extent a trade-off between details and overview. If a 
combination is to make use of the insights from a range of theories, it most likely has to make 
compromise the details of each theory in order to be simple enough to communicate and 
operationalise. It would be interesting to combine the proposed choice circles model with 
theories of power, politics, learning, and institutional change, but including these into one 
model seems an extremely difficult task and may lead to more confusion than simplicity and 
overview. The combining agenda may therefore play a role as a discipline-focused exercise 
that is supplemented with a cross-disciplinary relating. This cross-disciplinary relating is 
relevant, since the process perspective on strategic decision-making in this thesis is only one 
among a wide range of relevant perspectives that is needed to increase the understanding of 
strategic decision-making.  
Inherent in the combining agenda is the possibility for criticising and supporting concepts 
that are widely taken for granted in the literature. A concrete example is the 'window of 
opportunity' concept that often seems to be used as a tangible and fixed unit that is possible 
to identify in reality. A sense-making perspective would contradict the tangible and fixed use 
of the concept by emphasising that such 'window' is potentially destructive way of 
simplifying the complexity and dynamics of ongoing social processes. Sense-making theory 
would emphasise that such 'windows' - if relevant to use this concept - must be enacted and 
perceived by actors both in research and practice. Sense-making theory may even argue that 
all social interaction is decision-windows and some are selected by decision-making 
researcher in order to retrospectly explain their understanding of the progress. Such a 
critique could be the point of departure for bringing the concept beyond the current problems 
of application.  
 
INSPIRING AND LEARNING FROM STUDIES ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
A way forward for the research on SEA in the Danish energy sector could be to relate the 
findings to other research on strategic decision-making processes in a Danish context. This 
comparison would reveal whether the Danish energy sector is a unique context for SEA 
application or whether insight can be gained from and transferred to other sectors. If the 
coming experiences in Energinet.dk with targeting SEA to pivotal decisions reveal better 
possibilities for applying SEA in strategic decision-making, it will be interesting to consider 
the relevance of this approach in other sectors and at other levels of decision-making. An 
outline of the relevance of relating insights to other Danish contexts is indicated in the 
following. 
Among the relevant research on strategic decision-making in Denmark is research on policy-
making. Some of the interesting studies are the studies made by Albrekt Larsen and Gould 
Andersen (2004), Lund (2000), and Flyvbjerg (1991). Albrekt Larsen and Goul Andersen aim 
at revealing power relations in the Danish policy-making by analysing decision-making 
processes in bigger political reforms. They argue that the decision-making processes are fast, 
centralised, and opaque and that policy-making is a matter of counting to 90 to get a majority 
in the Parliament and a trial & error process due to limited time for preparation of policies. 
Some of the investigated energy infrastructure decision-making processes support the 
description of fast, centralised, and opaque decision-making, e.g. the Østerild Test Centre. On 
the other hand, the investigations picture a wide range of actors involved in shaping the 
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future of the energy sector. Albrekt Larsen and Goul Andersen (2004) furthermore argue that 
government officers due to the fast decision-making must prepare for possible developments 
to have analyses ready when politicians ask for information. This is in line with the rapid 
responses described by Therivel (2004).  
In his investigation of energy policy in Denmark, Lund (2000, p. 249) points at an interaction 
similar to the findings of this thesis: "Official energy objectives and plans have been 
developed as a result of constant interaction between parliament and public participation, in 
which description of new technologies and alternative energy plans have played an 
important role". Comparison to Lund's investigations may provide new angles on perception 
of choices in decision-making: "For a period of 25 years, Danish energy policy has been 
formed as a result of a process of conflicts… [in which] public participation, and hence, the 
awareness of choices has been an important factor in the ultimate decision-making process" 
(p. 249) 
In a study of a municipal planning process, Flyvbjerg (1991) portrays decisive activities as 
taking place outside the formal system similar to the findings of this thesis: "The decisive 
activities are thus often not to be found in the development of objectives, policies, legislation 
and plans or in public participation and formal political processing in relevant political 
assemblies. On the contrary, they are found prior to any formulation of targets, policies, 
legislation and plans, in what could be termed the genesis of planning and policy-making, 
and after the formal political decision-making, in the implementation of the plan and the 
policy" (p. 19, translated). Despite a focus on municipal planning, Flyvbjerg's study may be 
an inspiration for how to understand and approach strategic decision-making. 
Thus, the suggested ways forward for research within SEA and strategic decision-making are 
to play closer attention to how we articulate decision-making and how we make sense of our 
research, to increase empirical studies of sense-making and increase critical combinations of 
insights from different disciplines and to exchange insight from other contexts. These ways 
forward may reduce the amount of mysterious and dark stretches of decision-making and 
thus support the development of SEA as a strategic tool. 
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APPENDIX A: DANSK RESUMÉ 
Denne afhandling udforsker strategiske beslutningsprocesser i den danske energisektor for at 
diskutere, hvordan strategisk miljøvurdering (SMV) anvendes meningsfuldt. Aktuelle 
beslutningsprocesser om større energiinfrastrukturer er gransket for at identificere, hvornår 
og hvordan miljømæssigt afgørende beslutninger tages i interaktionen mellem adskillige 
aktører. Disse beslutningsprocesser indebærer ofte situationer, som de involverede aktører 
ikke har oplevet før, hvilket er en særlig udfordring for anvendelse af SMV, som ikke er 
beskrevet i den eksisterende SMV-litteratur. 
I disse år gennemgår den danske energisektor omfattende forandringer i politikker, 
infrastruktur, teknologier, aktørsammensætning og lovgivning. For at undgå utilsigtede 
miljømæssige effekter eller tabte muligheder for miljømæssige forbedringer i disse 
omfattende forandringer er det nødvendigt, at miljømæssige aspekter overvejes i den 
strategiske beslutningsproces.  
Formålet med SMV er at integrere miljømæssige overvejelser i udarbejdelsen og vedtagelsen 
af planer og programmer med henblik på at fremme en bæredygtig udvikling. Litteraturen 
om SMV trækker på teorier om beslutningstagning, men indtil videre indebærer SMV-
litteraturen en begrænset viden om strategiske, ikke-programmerede beslutninger og 
hvordan denne type af beslutningstagen udfordrer anvendelsen af SMV. 
Viden om, hvordan strategiske beslutninger tages er fragmenteret i discipliner og modeller. 
Afhandlinger tager fat i denne fragmentering ved at udforske synergier i at kombinere 
modeller med forskellige detaljeringsniveauer i et kontinuum af perspektiver på strategisk 
beslutningstagning. For at styrke en begrænset indsigt i detaljerede socio-psykologiske 
processer indenfor SMV introduceres teori om meningsdannelse, og indsigt fra teorier om 
meningsdannelse og beslutningstagning er kombineret for at øge forståelsen af, hvordan vi 
skaber mening af beslutninger, og hvordan disse meninger interagerer med vores valg. 
Afhandlingen henter i denne henseende inspiration fra værker af James G. March, Herbert A. 
Simon og Karl E. Weick. 
Kontinuummet af perspektiver danner en ramme for udredningen af strategisk 
beslutningstagning i den danske energisektor. Aktuelle tilfælde af energiplanlægning og -
projekter er analyseret, og afhandlingen afdækker, hvordan politikdannelse og planlægning 
interagerer og tilslører spørgsmål om ansvar og timing af SMV; hvordan dynamik på 
strategisk niveau komplicerer formulering af alternativer i en SMV-proces for 
gasinfrastrukturplanlægning; hvordan praktikeres afgørelse af signifikans af 
miljøpåvirkninger i et strategisk valg er karakteriseret af uklarhed og variation Disse 
empiriske konstateringer højner den teoretiske forståelse af den strategiske, ikke-
programmerede beslutningstagen. 
Som sideeffekter til undersøgelserne af strategiske beslutningsprocesser italesætter denne 
afhandling spændvidden af SMV-lovgivningen i forhold til, hvilke planer og programmer i 
energisektoren der er - og kan være - omfattet af krav of SMV. Diskussionerne af 
spændvidden og SMV-værktøjets rolle har været centrale emner i processen med at udvikle 
et standpunkt i forhold til SMV i to af de vigtigste statslige organisationer i den strategiske 
udvikling i den danske energisektor, Energinet.dk og Energistyrelsen. 
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Afhandlingen er baseret på en forandringsagent-forskningstilgang og denne måde at gøre 
forskning på er undersøgt og diskuteret i forhold til relevansen og potentialerne af den i en 
SMV-kontekst. Baseret på tre empiriske cases er forandringsagenttilgangen fundet givende, 
men også en krævende tilgang. På linje med forandringsagent-tilgangen reflekterer 
afhandlingen en tredobbelt ambition i ph.d.-projektet: 
- At facilitere at der udvikles en SMV-praksis gennem interaktion og involvering af aktører i 
undersøgelserne 
- At kommunikere erfaringer til andre danske og internationale aktører 
- At bestride antagelser i SMV-litteraturen og foreslå videreudvikling af hvordan 
beslutningsprocesser forstås. 
Afslutningsvist præsenterer afhandlingen en skitsering af relevansen af kombinationen af 
forandringsagent-forskningstilgangen og det konceptuelle kontinuum af perspektiver i 
forhold til at opnå indsigt i strategiske beslutningsprocesser. Derudover skitserer 
konklusionen elementer af, hvordan SMV kan foretages på en meningsfyldt måde i de 
strategiske beslutningsprocesser i den danske energisektor. De vigtigste konklusioner er: 
- En kombination af discipliner og modeller i et kontinuum af perspektiver på strategisk 
beslutningsprocesser udgør et stærkt udgangspunkt for at øge forståelsen af, hvordan 
beslutninger tages. 
- Teori om meningsdannelse er et relevant ramme for at øge indsigten i, hvordan vi skaber 
mening af informationer, hvilket er afgørende i forhold til, hvordan vi opfatter strategiske 
valg og afgør hvilke alternativer, der er relevante. 
- Den forandringsagenttilgang, der anvendes i projektet, er et relevant medium for en 
kritisk indbyrdes afhængighed mellem teori og praksis som samtidig fremmer mere 
bæredygtige beslutningsprocesser. 
- Empiriske cases viser, hvordan strategiske beslutningsprocesser i sektoren er 
karakteriseret ved en udpræget interaktion mellem politikdannelse og planlægning i en 
yderst dynamisk kontekst. 
- The nævnte karakteristikker udfordrer anvendelsen af SMV i særdeleshed i forhold til 
timing og fleksibilitet. Det er ikke formålstjenligt at orientere SMV mod formelle planer. I 
stedet kan en tilgang med at målrette SMV afgørende beslutninger om specifikke 
infrastrukturer være relevant, selvom denne tilgang ikke er uden ulemper. 
- Kompromiser med tidlig involvering af offentligheden kan være meningsfyldt i 
konkurrenceprægede miljøer blandt organisationer, der udvikler energiinfrastruktur. 
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APPENDIX B:  STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
This appendix introduces and defines SEA as used in this thesis. The introduction includes 
the basics of SEA as well as the claimed benefit and the criticism of the tool. Furthermore, the 
appendix shortly addresses the questions of the importance of context and what is needed for 
SEA to work. A main argument is that SEA is only a structure, which actors may be able to 
use in their interests. 
 
THE BASICS OF SEA - IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The SEA literature includes a variety of definitions of SEA, hereunder aims of SEA (see e.g. 
Partidário 2003, Therivel 2004, and Petts 1999). Common elements of the aim of SEA are 
protection of the environment, promotion of sustainable development, transparency and 
public participation. These aspects are in part reflected in the Directive on the assessment of 
the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, which aims are "to provide 
for a high level of protection of the environment and to contribute to the integration of 
environmental considerations into the preparation and adoption of plans and programmes 
with a view to promoting sustainable development" (article 1). The variety of definitions of 
SEA often includes the elements of systematic process, evaluation, integration, early stage of 
decision-making, public participation, documentation and alternatives. A preferred definition 
of SEA in this thesis is: 
 
"a systematic, decision aiding procedure for evaluating the likely significant 
environmental effects of options throughout the policy plan or programme development 
process, beginning at the earliest opportunity, including a written report and the 
involvement of the public throughout the process" (Sheate et al. 2001, p. 7) 
 
SEA enters the development of strategic interventions at the policy, plan, or programme 
level. The policy-level is not included in the EU regulation, but in UNECE's Kiev protocol on 
SEA. In Denmark, the policy-level is subject to environmental assessment through a separate 
circular. The relation between decision-making and SEA also is described in many varieties. 
Figure 31 is a reproduction of Marshall and Fischer (2006, p. 282), which emphasise the 
relation between issues to be addressed, a tiered SEA system and basic stages of strategic 
planning. Despite their focus on "corporate planning", the model is similar to many other 
representations of strategic planning. The figure is added consideration of sustainability 
issues inspired by (Therivel 2004, p. 15). 
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Figure 31. Basic strategic planning model and SEA (Marshall and Fischer 2006, p. 282) 
 
CLAIMED BENEFITS AND CRITIQUES OF SEA 
Inspired by Stinchcombe and Gibson (2001), some benefits and critique on SEA claimed in the 
literature is outlined in table 23. The claimed benefits are implicitly compared to a situation 
without SEA elements, e.g. without consideration of a broad spectre of environmental 
consequences. These benefits may therefore not apply in situations, in which this element is 
already there or not relevant. The benefits relates to the process and content of decision-
making on interventions as well as institutional aspects.  
The presented critiques of SEA would also be true for a range of other tools. Despite the 
wealth of normative assumptions and implicit opinion in the SEA literature, SEA is basically 
no more than a structure, which people may use for different purposes. Included in these 
purposes are actions that in a sustainability framework would be termed "misuse" or "green-
washing". This is a general character of tools, and it is e.g. also pointed at by O'Brien (2000) in 
terms of risk assessment. According to O'Brien, risk assessment is a means in which actors 
"can add on their wants at the expenses of wholes (e.g. whole communities and countries, or 
seventh generation from now) without appearing to doing so. Risk assessment lets them 
appear simply "scientific" or "rational"" (p. xviii). SEA reports are not 'objective' accounts and 
even the rational assessment process is "malleable" (Stinchcombe and Gibson 2001, p. 367) in 
the sense that actors can manipulate it for in their own interests. 
 
Tiered SEA 
system 
Develop strategic 
vision/mission (based on 
SWOT analysis) Policy-SEA 
Issues to be 
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Basic stages of corporate planning 
Plan-SEA 
Project EIA 
Program-SEA 
Follow-up 
Identify/plan specific 
approaches/action to reach each 
goal 
Design implementation 
programme 
Implement projects 
Monitoring 
Set clear goals and objectives for 
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Course of 
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Action 
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exactly) 
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Benefits of SEA Critiques of SEA 
Improvement of the basis for decision in terms of 
environmental impacts 
Boundaries to human's rational behaviour, as 
described in subchapter 4.1 
Proactive approach to environmental issues Comprehensive and rational legislative 
requirements in complex and dynamic context 
Considerations on a broad range of environmental 
issues and interaction between these issues 
Institutional and political resistance 
Increased public participation at strategic level Assessment is not as 'objective' accounts as the 
rational process indicate 
Increased transparency  
Setting a framework for project-level activities and 
assessments (tiering) 
 
Increased awareness on environmental issues and a 
structure for inclusion of environmental concerns 
 
Table 23: Extract of claimed benefits and critiques of SEA in the literature (Stinchcombe and Gibson 
2001, Therivel 2004, pp. 14-19) 
 
Within SEA literature, the increased focus on decision-making theory has revealed a range of 
limitations and critiques to the rational model on SEA process. Many decades ago, Witte and 
Mintzberg, among others, have shown the inappropriateness of understanding decision-
making as a linear progression of stages, however, the SEA process is still conceptualised so. 
Kørnøv and Thissen (2000) point at aspects that contradicts the rational decision-making 
model, e.g. norms, cultures, and habits. Approaching formal information system more 
generally, Starbuck and Milliken (1988, p. 42) comment that "Formalized information systems 
often try to make up for inflexibility by providing extensive detail, so they bog down in detail 
and operate slowly: Irrelevant detail becomes noise, and slow processing makes the data 
outdated." 
Politics and power are other aspects that are problematising SEA. SEA processes may be a 
means in a political game. If SEA results are against a political initiative, the SEA may be 
given less attention and less weight in decision-making.  
A range of the criticism on SEA is related to the importance of context when discussing SEA; 
despite wide use of SEA and the claimed benefits, SEA may not be a relevant tool in all 
contexts. Authors like Hilding-Rydevik (e.g. Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir 2007) are 
prominent advocates for context awareness. 
AN SEA context is in an abstract and simplified version composed of tasks, tools, actors, 
interaction and structures. Concepts like "tiering", "quality", "effectiveness" seem often to be 
abstractly described without proper regards to contextual circumstances and that the 
meaning of the concepts depends on the people involved. Some of these concepts have 
proven beneficial in some context and of no use in others.  
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WHAT IS NEEDED FOR SEA TO WORK?  
Bartlett and Kurian (1999) argue that "Writing about EIA has been guided by assumptions 
and models that have been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly and systematically 
explored, formulated, or articulated" (p. 415). Examining literature on EIA they point at 6 
implicit models for how EIA is understood to work, the influence it has, the meaning 
attributed to it:  
- The rational and apolitical information processing model with a 'decisionist' view of 
policy-making; 
- The symbolic politics model, in which EIA may be "merely symbolic …an iterative 
mechanism for creating meaning… [or] a technique for the duplicitous legitimation of the 
exercise of power by the powerful" (p. 418). 
- The political economy model, in which the demand for EIA arises as a function of 
markets, and EIA primarily influences "through the way it alters financial opportunities, 
risks, and constraints" (p. 419). 
- The organisational politics model, in which EIA may change the internal politics of an 
organisation by harnessing "the natural pluralism and adversariness of specialised 
agencies and conflicting interest" (p. 421). Power and politics are part of this model, 
which do not include external forces. 
- The pluralist politics model, in which the influence of EIA "lies in the way it works to 
open up a closed agency patter of decision making" (p. 422) to other actors, e.g. by 
increased participation. The EIA process is conceptualised as "a process of negotiation, 
bargaining and compromise among organised groups" (p. 423). 
- The institutionalist model, in which the influence of EIA lies in the change of rules, 
procedures and culture of an organisation. 
In this thesis, SEA is understood to work through all Bartlett and Kurian's models, although 
the political economy model seems to have minor relevance. The models are highly 
interlinked, why it e.g. does not make sense to focus on the politics models without including 
the institutionalist or symbolic models. EIA thus work by processing information, by creating 
meaning, by internal as well as external reforms in organisations, and by changing rules and 
cultures.  
Hilding-Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir (2007) argue that "it seems that certain contexts are 
receptive to tools when … the political will, the organisational commitment, the professional 
skill and learning motivation, already exist" (p. 673-674). It should be noted that these 
elements are not pre-requisites to the introduction of SEA, but determining how receptive 
contexts are. 
Based on the models, and the claimed benefits and criticism described above, the following 
aspects are in this thesis seen as central for SEA to have an influence on the practice (cf. the 
normativity in the change agent approach): 
- Willingness among organisational agents to change existing practices and viewpoints and 
to use resources to introduce a new structure which potentially weakens or benefits their 
personal and organisational interests (practitioners as well as decision-makers). 
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- Interest among external actors in strategic issues and willingness to use resources to 
participate. 
- The ability for integrating SEA procedures in the legislative context in which an 
organisation operate.  
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APPENDIX C:  EXISTING AND PRELIMINARY MODELS IN THE COMBINATION OF 
DECISION-MAKING AND SENSE-MAKING 
This appendix presents a review of literature on efforts of combining decision-making and 
sense-making into one model. This review is used in chapter 4.1. Related to the efforts of 
combining the two disciplines, the appendix furthermore presents preliminary models that 
were part of the development of the conceptual framework in subchapter 4.2. 
 
EXISTING EFFORTS OF COMBINING DECISION-MAKING AND SENSE-MAKING INTO ONE 
MODEL 
Boland (2008) argues (with reference to Herbert Simon's "Sciences of the Artificial" (1969)) 
that "the higher-order or metalevel constructs of design science and design thinking" (p. 61) 
brings together the objective, analytic decision-making discipline and the subjective and 
constructive aspects of sense-making. In a design process, Boland argues, people initially 
make sense of the situation which is followed by decision-making on materials, functionality, 
etc. "[D]esigning plays the closure of decision making off against the openness of 
sensemaking" (p. 62) in a balance between the enactment and creation of stories in sense-
making with a formal system of deadlines and decision-requirements. Design is "a continuing 
source of challenge to our sensemaking and decision-making capabilities […] because of its 
central underlying belief [...] that things can be other than they are". (p. 62). Boland does not 
elaborate on what he means by "higher-order or metalevel constructs".  
Choo (1998) proposes a bridge between decision-making and sense-making in his book of 
The Knowing Organisation in which he conceptualises sense-making as a process that 
precede decision-making. Choo's point is that by "holistically managing its sensemaking, 
knowledge building and decision-making processes, the Knowing Organization will have the 
necessary understanding and knowledge to act wisely and decisively" (p. 1998, p. 319). 
Combining the three processes, he argues, gives a richer explanation of information use in 
organization. 
Ericson (2010) presents "an attempt to furthering out understanding of strategic decision 
making by moving beyond decision making, adding the dimension of sense…" (p. 132), 
focusing on emotion-related interpretative processes. The "add-on" of sense-making to 
decision-making is visible in arguments like "decision-makers become sense-makers when 
involving in framing an interpretation and understanding that provide guidance to action…" 
(p. 137). The add-on understanding of sense-making clearly contradicts Weick's 
understanding of sense-making as an ongoing and never-ending process. Decision-makers 
therefore do not become sense-makers; they are sense-makers.  
Seligman (2006) studies sense-making within an innovation-decision process to develop a 
"behavioral process understanding of adoption" (p. 118). In discussion technology adoption, 
he argues "adoption itself does not take place as a single decision, but rather as a series of 
sensemaking cycles causing perceptions of the technology to change until apparent adoption 
or rejection actions are performed." (p. 110). He argues that "Sensemaking helps us to 
examine the adopter's mental processes, providing a lower-level view of adoption. Whereas 
other approaches focus on the adoption decision and its antecedents and consequences, 
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sensemaking focuses on the adopter herself, i.e. her mental frameworks, and the antecedents 
and products of those frameworks. The sensemaking perspective provides a look under the 
hood, if you will, of the adopter's mental engine." (p. 110). Seligman argues that stages of 
decision-making can be viewed as a series of sensemaking cycles, which may explain 
curiosities in decision-making. Seligman 'translate' stages of an innovation-decision process 
(Rogers 1995) as sense-making processes. 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) suggest, in a Naturalistic Decision-making framework, that 
decision-making begins with sense-making of a situation. They propose a heuristic for coping 
with uncertainty that is based on a proposition that "Uncertainty in the context of action is a 
sense of doubt that blocks or delays action" (p. 150). They argue that people can 'fail' in 
making sense of a situation, so that decision-makers respond to an inadequate understanding 
of the situation (p. 159). They find that decision-makers "cope with uncertainty adaptively, 
matching different types of uncertainty with different coping strategies..." (p. 160). Therefore, 
they argue, decision support system should be expanded beyond the standard (rational) 
procedure for coping with uncertainty to support elements of their proposal for a heuristic 
that includes sense making.  
Greitzer and Podmore (2008) propose an integrated naturalistic decision-making model that 
is widely similar to the above depicted sense-making process. Their model emphasises the 
role of mental models in understanding what is going on and in selecting response. Training 
by this model will include "experiences and instruction on cues, patterns, mental models, and 
actions" (p. 5) that will enable people to perform well in novel situations.  
Wright (2005) combines decision-making and sense-making in practice by focusing on 
scenarios as a sense-making tool rather than decision-making tool. Wright regards the 
relation between decision-making and sense-making as an "almost simultaneous 
relationship" (p. 90), and he proposes scenarios to overcome the retrospective nature of sense-
making. Scenarios can stimulate "prospective sensemaking" (p. 87). Wright argues that 
adopting a scenario outlook and sense-making capacities "are said to enhance the abilities of 
the inductive strategist. Through this, managers are more open to the unexpected and are 
able to construct meaning from uncertainty and ambiguity, laying the foundations for 
transformational strategizing." (p. 86). 
These existing efforts are summarised in table 24. 
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Author(s) Relation between decision-
making and sense-making 
Conclusion 
Boland (2008) Cannot easily be combined Design reconcile the diverging qualities of 
decision-making and sense-making 
Choo (1998) Sense-making precedes 
decision-making 
Richer explanation of information use. 
Holistic managing of information use 
processes will make it possible to act wisely 
and decisively. 
Ericson (2010) Sense-making is an add-on to 
decision-making 
Increased understanding by a broadened 
conceptualisation of strategic decision-
making 
Seligman (2006) Stages of decision-making are 
series of sense-making cycles 
Explaining curiosities of decision-making. "A 
look under the hood" in understanding 
mental processes of the adopter 
Lipshitz and 
Strauss (1997) 
Decision-making begins with 
sense-making of a situation - 
failing sense-making cause 
failing decision-making 
Decision support systems should be added an 
initial sense-making element 
Greitzer and 
Podmore (2008) 
Naturalistic decision-making 
is depicted as a sense-making 
process.  
Sense-making may help people perform well 
in novel situations 
Wright (2005) Almost simultaneous 
relationship. 
Enhance strategising through better sense-
making capacities among individuals. 
Table 24: Overview of existing studies that combine decision-making and sense-making and their aims. 
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PRELIMINARY MODELS IN THE COMBINATION IN THIS THESIS 
The combination of decision-making and sense-making in a process perspective on strategic 
choices is not straightforward. The process of reaching an adequate model is explained in this 
appendix to be transparent on the basis and development of the choice circles model. The 
development of the model has been structured by an exercise of including sense-making in a 
standard model of decision-making and vice versa. This exercise leads to the in-depth 
understanding of differences and synergies that is needed to fully combine the two 
disciplines as concurrent processes in one model. 
 
 
Figure 32: Sense-making (italic) included in a strategic decision-making model 
 
The inclusion of sense-making into decision-making, see figure 32, depicts each phase of 
decision-making as cycles of sense-making, similar to Seligman (2006). This model may 
explain some of the processes involved in searching for alternative action, how infeasible 
options are eliminated and how people choose between alternatives. A hypothetical choice 
process on SEA and non-programmed decisions following this model: 
Organizational members face novel ideas for development. They first relate it to 
their experience to see if any routines would do (reasons to resume). Then they 
diagnose the stimuli of information (noticing cues, labelling and creating a story) 
to determine what is at stake. The diagnosis leads to search for and design 
(noticing cues, labelling and creating a story of plausible solutions) of options for 
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whether and how an assessment should be initiated for the novel ideas for 
development. The developed options are iteratively evaluated in terms of its 
appropriateness (interpretation of stories in terms of situation and identity) as a 
basis for choosing a satisficing option. 
The model is, however, not true to sense-making theory, since enactment cannot be equalled 
the understanding of 'action' in theories of decision-making, and since the processes of 
noticing, labelling and creating stories get artificially fragmentised rather than a continuous 
process. Furthermore, the model makes sense-making a highly deliberate and sequential 
process of deliberate choosing, which is not in line with Weick's writings of sense-making as 
an ongoing, vague, and conscious/unconscious process. The model seems, however, to be an 
adequate combination in its depiction of recognition and diagnosis of stimuli, and theories on 
decision-making may be a help to understand sense-making in an overview perspective, e.g. 
the importance of coincidence and temporal aspects. 
 
 
Figure 33: Decision-making (italic) included in a sense-making model 
 
The inclusion of decision-making into a sense-making model, see figure 33, is inspired by 
Greitzer and Podmore (2008) and Weick (1995). The benefit of the model is the continuity in 
the process of sense-making. Furthermore, the model emphasises the importance of diagnosis 
by stretching it to cover enactment, noticing, labelling and interpretation. A hypothetical 
choice process on SEA and non-programmed decisions following this model: 
Noticing 
and 
labelling 
cues 
 
Recognition and 
starting diagnosis 
Choice/  
Action  
Evaluation and 
authorisation 
Interpreting cues into plausible stories  
(What was the meaning of the choice?) 
 
Diagnosis including 
search/design and screening 
Retaining a 
story to guide 
future action 
 
Enacting (choice) 
Consequences 
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Organizational members face novel ideas for development. They talk to the 
people that develop the ideas (enactment) and as they hear about the ideas, they 
first look for reasons to resume to their activities. If this is not an option, they 
reformulate what they think is most important of what is said in using their own 
words (bracket, labelling, categorising). During and after the talking, they 
consider whether and how an assessment should be initiated for the novel ideas 
for development. In this process they compare (interpret) their experience and 
knowledge (mental frameworks) to characteristics of the ideas (cues 
retrospectively noticed). They consider options (stories), and settle on the most 
relevant in terms of their situation (plausible in terms of identity). 
The main critique seen from the decision-making point of view is that choice is separated 
from the search/design and evaluation routines and placed as a point of departure of the 
process. Furthermore, the diagnosis, search/design and screening routines are conflated into a 
single process. The conflation could, however, emphasise the cyclic nature of these aspects 
(see the original illustration in Mintzberg et al. 1976). Furthermore, choice is becoming an 
output rather than a deliberate action.  
A main problem of these preliminary models is that they do not properly deal with Boland's 
ontological questioning of whether choice and action are input or output. The problem is 
approached by proposing choice as the centre of recurring circles of enacting, diagnosing, 
search/design, and settling on an option, see figure 14 in the conceptual framework.  
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APPENDIX D:  ANALYSIS OF CONSULTATION COMMENTS ON ENERGY DECISIONS 
This appendix presents the analysis of public consultation comments, which is used in 
chapter 10. 
Few SEAs have been made at the national strategic level in the energy sector and the analysis 
is therefore added a strategic case that has been subject to EIA, namely the national test center 
for windmills, cf. subchapter 6.1. The investigation is not limited to comments on specific 
environmental impacts, since the comments also reveal concerns about decision-making and 
technical aspects of energy development.  
The review process applied in the following is similar to a grounded theory approach 
(Charmaz 2000) or an emerging coding in content analysis (Stemler 2001) in inductively 
coding data in the cases to label categories of comments and comparing between the cases. 
Notes from reading the comments have been iteratively categorised to reflect the essence of 
the comments. The creation of categories has taken synonyms of concepts and similar 
meaning of groups of words into account. Furthermore, it has been an aim to make the 
categories mutually exclusive. Reliability is enhanced by a control of the coding after a two 
month period. The control included a new grounded categorisation process with minor 
deviations in the categories. The validity of the review is enhanced by participation in the 
public consultation meetings on energy infrastructure development in Ll. Torup and 
Østerild, as well as insight from participating in meetings in Energinet.dk. Detailed notes 
from the meetings have been matched with the review of the comments, and the matching 
has led to better understanding of the intension of the formal comments as well as an 
increased understanding of what are primary and secondary concerns. 
The data for the review is written, formal comments received by the authorities in three cases. 
In the chosen cases, these comments have been accessible at the authorities' homepages in full 
transcription and with a summary note made by the authority. The investigation of the 
debates on energy issues thus does not include the informal and verbal debates, but only the 
written and formal comments. The investigation of energy debates may therefore not reflect 
the spontaneous and unreflective questions and overemphasise the selected and carefully 
formulated issues. 
 
Debates on energy issues in SEA processes on energy plans 
At the national level, the two finished SEA process (in March 2011) are Energinet.dk's SEA of 
the Natural gas security of supply plan 2010 and DEA's SEA of the locations of offshore wind 
power plants.  
The consultation of the SEA of Energinet.dk's report Gas in Denmark resulted in 8 responses 
from public authorities (Cowi 2010). Focusing on the energy related comments, one comment 
questioned Sweden's interest in a long term Danish supply of natural gas and another 
comment questioned whether Denmark has enough bio-products to cover both power plants' 
use of biomass and the production of biogas. Both comments were directed to the natural gas 
planning: "This does not concern the environmental assessment, but the natural gas security 
of supply plan" (p. 4). In the scoping consultation, the comments primarily related to the 
determination of significant environmental aspects, except from the argument by the Swedish 
Boverket for inclusion of an alternative of liquefied natural gas transported by ship. The 
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comments show insight in the problems of the planning and a concern for an adequate 
development of the gas infrastructure. The limited debate seems to support concerns among 
employees in Energinet.dk about lack of interest and involvement at strategic level, which 
also is found in Boothroyd (1995). 
The consultation of the SEA of DEA's location of offshore wind power (DEA 2007a, b and c) 
resulted in a range of hearing comments which are shown in table 25. The planning of 
locations for offshore wind power was a long process in which the SEA was rather late, cf. 
subchapter 6.1. This may be part of the explanation for the well-formulated and seemingly 
qualified consultation comments. The comments are widely in accordance with expectations 
in the sense that the nature NGOs advocate for nature interest, the industry advocates for low 
costs, the foreign authorities point at cumulative impacts, and the Danish authorities defend 
their interest. 
In terms of decision-making, the affected municipalities and the wind power company 
criticise the documentation behind the assessments and the ambiguity around assumptions 
and criteria in the decision-making. Values are in some instances very explicit. In terms of 
energy needs and technology, the consultation comments are primarily related to the spatial 
characteristics of the windmills, e.g. Region North Jutland that is concerned about visual 
impacts. The comments primarily concern the design and the location of windmills, 
suggesting other alternatives. Furthermore, the comments point at the interrelatedness of 
windmills with the energy system in a national as well as international perspective. The 
impacts of the infrastructure is in the comments primarily related to maritime safety, tourism, 
fishery and fish stocks, habitat areas, and cumulative effects. The Danish nature protection 
NGO points at the need to consider impacts of climate change on the offshore wind 
development. The positive impact of development of wind power on the greenhouse gas 
emission is widely acknowledged, like the expansion offshore rather than onshore. The 
consultation comments by the committee widely refer to the EIA process, but the committee 
decides to reconsider distance to harbour, knowledge from the offshore wind demonstration 
programme, and cost estimates (DEA 2008b). 
 
Categories Topics Debate point and example of reference 
Decision-
making 
Choice of 
location 
Should not prohibit future areas of environmental priority (A20) 
Assumptions are not adequate - cost are underestimated (B1) 
Criteria should be reconsidered due to new knowledge from offshore 
wind demonstration programme (B6) and to include distance to 
harbours (A42) 
Less priority on specific areas until more knowledge about 
consequences (B20-21) 
Challenge legitimacy of more wind power and infrastructure (B44-46) 
Praising that previous locations are deselected due to bird interests 
(B29) 
Participation Encouraging broad participation and local views (A30) 
Deadline and information for consultation is not sufficient (C2) 
Interest in more detailed dialogue by Dong (B11) and fishing 
association (B26) 
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Values Inappropriate that the area offshore wind is only 1/12 of bird 
protection area (A41) 
Climate changes are a much bigger threat for species than offshore 
wind (A42) 
Visual impacts does not outweigh increased costs (B12) 
More emphasis needed on "soft values" as e.g. local image and 
qualities (A31) 
Positive on development of offshore wind in order to reduce CO2 
emission (A22) 
Documentation  Material is not sufficient for a qualified assessment (A12) and 
decision-making (A30) 
Contrasting evidence on visual impacts (A42) and impact on certain 
species (A48) 
No documentation for nature values in areas (B3) and estimation of 
costs (B2) 
Visualisations inadequate due to low reference height (A19) 
Need for coordination of knowledge on impacts from concerned 
countries (C26) 
Other 
Planning 
In line with regional R&D venture on energy (A38) 
Must be coordinated with developments in other countries (A40) 
Energy needs 
and 
technology 
Design Pattern, type, size, number, and marking should be adapted to 
landscape (A33) 
Locations close to coast should be abandoned (A22) or better 
designed (A31) in terms of visual impact and tourism 
Grid connection should be made as underground cables (C33) 
Pointing at connection synergies by combining parks (B13) 
More flexibility on criteria on distance to shore and capacity (A42, 
A45) 
Alternatives Proposing conflation of four locations in one farther from the coast 
(A38) 
Proposing reconsideration of deselected areas (A42), specifically the 
Læsø alternative due to possibility for connection to Sweden (A48) 
Proposing location at Lysegrund (B8) and a location to replace Anholt 
location (B28) 
Proposing other priority among areas due to distance to appropriate 
harbours (A43) 
Open door possibility for wind farm development should be retained 
(A46) 
Opposing specific locations due to importance for fish stock and 
fishery (B28) 
Argument for specific testing area (A36) and for more locations (A41) 
Scope of 
planning 
A need for a North-European perspective on the expansion (B14) 
Need to consider consumption and market to estimate cost of 
offshore wind (B15) 
Urge for consideration of consequences of electricity grid 
development (B35) 
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Impacts of 
infrastructure 
Human 
activities 
Inconvenient to locate windmill plants in areas of intense sailing and 
ferry routes due to risk of collision and related environmental 
pollution (A12) 
Concern about the consequences of fishery (A26). SEA should include 
impact of erosion of sea bead and changes in material flows on 
fishery (A31) 
Need for considering cumulative effects on transboundary effects in 
general (C3) 
Visual impacts in terms of locals and tourism (A31) 
Impact on 
development 
Need for considering the impacts of climate change on the 
development, e.g. change in wind resources (B24) 
Impacts on 
nature 
Should consider potential for positive impact on biotopes and fish 
stock in the design of fundaments (A20) 
Should consider impact of electromagnetic fields around cables 
offshore (A20) 
Need for considering connections between habitat area (B21) and for 
documenting possible impacts on bird migration routes (A31) 
Need for considering cumulative effects on transboundary effects in 
general (C3) and of specific areas (C26) 
Table 25. Energy related consultation comments on the report on locations of future offshore wind 
(DEA 2007a, b and c). "A31" refers to page 31 in DEA (2007a), "B2" to page 2 in DEA (2007b), etc. 
 
Debates on energy issues in EIA processes on project development 
The consultation comments to the test centre in Østerild are investigated in the following. It is 
an extreme case in terms of environmental impacts, secrecy in decision-making, time pressure 
on the EIA, and uncertainty about the infrastructure and its impacts.  
The Test Centre in Østerild has received a lot of attention in the media due to the 
controversial location in a larger forest also categorised as a major silent area in the departed 
county planning. Furthermore, the local residents and the NGOs concerned about the nature 
in the area have been successful in involving experts on controversial topics. The attention is 
at the formal level expressed through 140 consultation comments on the EIA and 155 
consultation comments on the law proposal. The public scrutiny of the act and EIA revealed 
mistakes in the noise calculation, which meant that a act for amendment of the act with 
renewal of parts of the EIA had to be adopted in the Parliament. The amendment of the act 
with related EIA is not examined, since it is assumed that the energy related issues are 
similar. 
Much of the written comments from the consultation relates to the short period in which the 
EIA was made in. DASEP was under political pressure to finish the EIA in a short time, and 
they did in practice not have adequate possibilities for examining the area (few months in 
winter). In the investigation of the debate on energy issues, these defects in the EIA are only 
interesting as a reflection of the character of the decision-making process on energy 
infrastructure. The investigation therefore does not include these defects, but focuses on the 
debates related to 1) decision-making on energy, 2) energy technology and needs, and 3) 
impacts of energy infrastructure. 
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Table 26 show that the consultation comments on EIA of the National Test Centre in Østerild 
concern energy issues within a range of topics. Concerning the decision-making process, the 
comments criticised the choice of the location, the public participation, the legitimacy of the 
way the test centre was chosen, the documentation of the process and basis, and the 
disregarding of the previous planning.  
Concerning the energy sector's needs and testing of technology, the consultation comments 
concerned the relevance of the test centre, the ambiguity on the requirements of the centre, 
the location in Østerild versus other places for wind testing, and the societal benefit. As an 
example a comment criticise the ambiguity on information about constructions at test centre, 
e.g. measuring equipment. 
Finally, the comments concerning the impacts of this new infrastructure, the comments 
concerned the restrictions on human activities in the area and the impacts on humans and 
nature. These comments especially related to the unknown character of the infrastructure, 
since these infrastructures are the first of its kind: How is it possible to calculate noise when 
the specification of the source is not known and not limited in detail? The uncertainty on the 
impacts fostered especially frustration of the people living in the area. These concerns seem to 
reflect a tension between opening for flexibility for development of environmentally friendly 
technology and prediction of impacts and abatement measures to protect the environment. 
Neither of the extremes may be optimal. The concerns about the windmills may be a 
reflection of concerns about uncertainty and ambiguity in the knowledge about impacts on 
human and nature of energy infrastructure. 
Some of the concerns in the public debate were changed during the project development. The 
relation between concerns and changes has not been systematically investigated, but it seems 
that the debate has played a role in raising awareness and political pressure. Concerns about 
the large amount of tree-cutting were followed by a significant reduction in tree cutting; a 
professional dispute on the noise calculations was followed by a renewed EIA; a professional 
criticism of the decision-making was followed by an expert consultation. Other concerns e.g. 
about the silent area and the bat occurrence, were not followed by changes. 
 
Categories Topics Debate point and example of reference 
Decision-
making 
Choice of 
location 
Incomplete screening of potential areas without debate on criteria (p. 
2) 
Area not pointed at by Wind industry (p. 2) 
Choice of criteria for screening - why not distance to wind industry 
and existing infrastructure (p. 16) 
Public  
participation 
No or incomplete answers to petition of access to documents (p. 2) 
Public participation phase has been shorter and less comprehensive 
than normally in the municipality (p. 9) 
Secrecy prior to decision on location (p. 15) 
Material made public shortly before meeting (p. 15) 
Legitimacy Decision by construction act, not planning system, to disregard 
legislation? (Hovsøre and national park was decided with planning 
system (p. 18) 
Adequacy of expropriation for industrial constructions (p. 18) 
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Inadequacy of existing legislation/circulars/schemes for a new 
kind/size of construction - test windmills (p. 361) 
Documentation  Lack of documentation for deselection of alternatives (including at 
sea/border) (p. 2) 
No documentation for expenses by placing the centre at sea (and no 
comparison to expenses on-shore (p. 23) 
Need for independent review of technological and research 
potentials (p. 227) 
Previous  
planning 
Contradicting Government's committee report on windmill planning 
on-shore (not disturbing areas like Østerild) (p. 505) 
Contradicting Ministry's committee report on serie-0 mills on land 
(p. 507) 
Energy needs 
and 
technology 
Relevance of 
test centre 
Facilities for wind testing and development important for climate 
efforts (p. 10) and employment (p. 321) 
Criticising that it is crucial that the test centre is located in Denmark 
(p. 443) 
Ambiguity on 
requirements 
Ambiguity on information about constructions at test centre, e.g. 
measuring equipment (p. 361) 
Criticising ambiguity in the statements of the wind industry on their 
spatial needs (distance, turbulence, roughness) (p. 398)  
Østerild 
location 
No documentation on soil/underground and possibilities for 
constructing 250 m high mills (p. 274) 
Economical burden of grid connection (p. 322) 
Alternative 
places for 
testing 
More relevant contextual conditions at sea for offshore windmills (p. 
23) 
Criticising perception of possibility for testing off-shore on-shore (p. 
746) 
Why one big area - indications that each wind company wants their 
own (p. 274) 
Should fulfil interest in less distance to other infrastructure and 
companies (p. 28) 
Societal benefit Should add local visitor/information centre (p. 10) 
No safeguarding of continued Danish benefit of energy test centre 
(p. 739) 
Risk on loosing public support (p. 746) 
Is it fair that society a forced to suffer due to industry needs (p. 32) 
Lack of documentation on local employment (p. 15) and criticism of 
assumption of a benefit for local area (p. 453) 
Impacts of 
infrastructure 
Human 
activities 
Limitation of developments in wind field (p. 2) 
Lack of information of safety zones when mills are not safety 
approved (p. 4) 
Impact on 
humans 
How to calculate noise when source is not known (p. 276) 
Background noise reduced by forest cutting (p. 4) 
Lack of assessment of low frequency noise (p. 31) 
Lack of knowledge about health impact of light (p. 277) 
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Why allowing visual impact of commercial logos (p. 276) 
Impacts on 
nature 
Lack of documentation on assessment of low bird collision risk (p. 5) 
Criticising knowledge about bird behaviour at windmills of this size 
(p. 749) 
Criticising knowledge about wild animals behaviour in noise and 
light (p. 6) 
No visualisation of appearance of test centre at night (p. 2) 
Operation should be limited in nature sensitive periods (p. 510) 
Criticising that amount of forest cutting depends on not finished 
measuring (p. 635) 
Criticising assessment on bats in wing span (p. 750) 
Table 26. Energy related consultation comments on the national test centre in Østerild (DASEP 2010) 
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APPENDIX E:  SCREENSHOTS OF MY WEBPAGE ON IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND 
SENSE-MAKING 
This appendix presents screenshots of my sense-making webpage, referred to in chapter 3.2. 
 
Screenshot from www.bricksite.com/sense-making. Notice that the page has 152 unique hits 
(October 2011). Updates on the website have been announced through an email list primarily 
made at the IAIA'10 conference in Geneva, where I presented the topic at a poster. 
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Second screenshot from the webpage. The reproduction of the comments to the poster at the 
IAIA'10 is aiming at encouraging debate and relation to practice. 
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APPENDIX F:  OVERVIEW OF MENTIONED RULES AND REGULATION  
The following regulations of the energy sector are mentioned in the thesis: 
- Executive order no 1464 of 19/12/2005. Bekendtgørelse om anvendelse af 
naturgasforsyningsnettet og planer for det fremtidige behov for 
gastransmissionskapacitet. [Executive order on the use of the natural gas supply grid and 
plans for the future gas transmission capacity requirement] 
- Executive order no. 884 of 21/08/2006. Bekendtgørelse om varetagelse af 
naturgasforsyningssikkerheden. [Executive order on safeguarding natural gas security of 
supply] 
- Executive order no 348 of 9/05/2008. Bekendtgørelse af lov om CO2-kvoter [Executive 
order on act on CO2 quotas] 
- Executive order no 224 of 16/03/2009. Bekendtgørelse af lov om Energinet.dk [Executive 
order on act on Energinet.dk] 
- Executive order no 516 of 20/05/2010. Bekendtgørelse af lov om elforsyning [Executive 
order on act on electricity supply] 
 
The following regulations on the environment and environmental assessments that also 
apply to the energy sector are mentioned: 
- Circular no. 159 of 16/09/1998. Cirkulære om bemærkninger til lovforslag og andre 
regeringsforslag og om fremgangsmåden ved udarbejdelse af lovforslag, redegørelser, 
administrative forskrifter m.v. [Circular on remarks to proposals for bills and other 
government proposals and on the procedure on preparation of bills, accounts, 
administrative regulations, etc.] 
- Executive order no 936 of 24/09/2009. Bekendtgørelse af lov om miljøvurdering af planer 
og programmer [Executive order on act on environmental assessment of plans and 
programmes] 
- Executive order no 1510 of 15/12/2010. Bekendtgørelse om vurdering af visse offentlige og 
private anlægs virkning på miljøet (VVM) i medfør af lov om planlægning [Executive 
order on assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment (EIA) pursuant to the act on planning]  
- Habitat Directive (92/43/EC): Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora 
- Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC): Directive 2000/60/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for 
Community action in the field of water policy 
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APPENDIX G:  DECLARATIONS OF JOURNAL CO-AUTHORSHIP 
Co-author statements are required by Ministerial Order in connection with submission of 
Ph.D. thesis: " With reference to Ministerial Order no. 18 of 14 January 2008 regarding the 
Ph.D. Degree § 12, article 4, statements from each author about the Ph.D. fellow’s part in the 
shared work must be included in case the thesis is based on already published articles." 
 
Two journal articles included in this thesis have been co-authored: 
- 'Change agents in the field of strategic environmental assessment: What does it involve 
and what potentials does it have for research and practice? 
- How do we make sense of significance? Findings from a laboratory experiment on an SEA 
case. 
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Article title: 'Change agents in the field of strategic environmental assessment: What does 
it involve and what potentials does it have for research and practice? 
 
Place of publication: Journal of environmental assessment policy and management 
List of authors: Lone Kørnøv, Ivar Lyhne, Sanne V Larsen, & Anne M Hansen 
Ph.D. fellow: Ivar Lyhne 
 
Contribution: Overall, Ivar contributed with 25 % of the text in the article. More detailed, the 
extent of the Ph.D. fellow’s contribution is assessed on the following scale: 
A. Has contributed to the work (0-33%) 
B. Has made a substantial contribution (34-66%) 
C. Did the majority of the work independently (67-100%). 
Declaration on the individual elements    Extent (A, B, C) 
1. Formulation in the concept phase of the basic scientific problem on 
the basis of theoretical questions which require clarification. 
         A 
2. Planning of analyses and formulation of investigative methodology, 
including choice of method and independent methodological 
development. 
         B 
3. Involvement in the analysis or the specific investigation.                                      B 
4. Presentation, interpretation and discussion of the results obtained in 
article form. 
         A 
 
Signature, Ph.D. fellow 
 
Signature, co-authors 
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Article title: How do we make sense of significance? Findings from a laboratory 
experiment on an SEA case 
 
Place of publication: Journal of Environmental Management (not published) 
List of authors: Ivar Lyhne and Lone Kørnøv 
Ph.D. fellow: Ivar Lyhne 
 
Contribution: Overall, Ivar contributed with 75 % of the text in the article. More detailed, the 
extent of the Ph.D. fellow’s contribution to the article is assessed on the following scale: 
A. Has contributed to the work (0-33%) 
B. Has made a substantial contribution (34-66%) 
C. Did the majority of the work independently (67-100%). 
Declaration on the individual elements                                           Extent (A, B, C) 
1. Formulation in the concept phase of the basic scientific problem on 
the basis of theoretical questions which require clarification. 
         B 
2. Planning of analyses and formulation of investigative methodology, 
including choice of method and independent methodological 
development. 
         C 
3. Involvement in the analysis or the specific investigation.                                      B 
4. Presentation, interpretation and discussion of the results obtained in 
article form. 
         B 
 
Signature, Ph.D. fellow 
 
 
Signature, co-author 
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